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T 488/16 - Not plausible at the filing date

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Is it plausible that the compound had the effect?

In this opposition appeal the effect (inhibiting PTK activity) of the claimed compound (dasatinib) was supported with post-published documents: documents (9) and (10) filed during the Examination procedure and documents (36) and (37) filed with the statement of the grounds. 

The application as filed contains a large number of compounds of which one is selected in the claim under appeal. The decision does not contest that the post-published documents show that this compound works, indeed works very well. The question is, whether this was plausible at the filing date. The board maintains the revocation of the patent. 


Reasons for the Decision
1. The appeal is admissible.
2. As communicated in advance to the board (see point IX above), respondent 2, who did not submit any comments or observations with regard to the substantive issues, did not attend the oral proceedings before the board, to which it had been duly summoned. The board decided to continue the proceedings pursuant to Rule 115(2) EPC and Article 15(3) RPBA.
3. Admission of documents (36), (37) and (38)
3.1 Documents (36) and (37) were filed with the statement of grounds of appeal in direct response to the opposition division's decision revoking the patent. In the decision under appeal, the opposition division was of the opinion that the technical effect relied on by the appellant had not been plausibly demonstrated at the filing date. Furthermore, it criticised the lack of an identifiable pharmacophore. As a consequence, contrary to the opposition division's initial indication in its preliminary opinion, the post-published evidence was not taken into account and inventive step was not acknowledged.
The appellant challenged the opposition division's findings and addressed these key issues in its statement of grounds of appeal, in particular the concern as to the lack of an identifiable pharmacophore. Documents (36) and (37), dealing with the question of what the application conveyed to the skilled reader, were filed in support of the appellant's position that the opposition division erred in its assessment of what was plausibly disclosed in the application, and consequently in its assessment of inventive step. In these circumstances, the board is of the opinion that the submission of these documents with the statement of grounds of appeal is an appropriate and legitimate attempt by the appellant to address the objections raised in the decision under appeal and to further support its position with respect to plausibility and inventive step.
The argument of respondent 1 that these declarations might have been considered much earlier and could therefore have been filed at a much earlier state is not convincing. The title page of both documents makes reference to such data as the patent, application and appeal number. It identifies the patentee and the opponents and, in this context, also mentions third party observations. In the board's opinion this reference is not an indication that the present declarations were a late reaction to these third party observations, which for some unknown reasons were not filed before.
3.2 Hence, the board decided to admit documents (36) and (37) into the proceedings.
3.3 Document (38) was filed about one month before the oral proceedings took place. None of the respondents raised an objection to its introduction into the proceedings. Nor did the board see any reason to reject this document. Consequently, document (38) was admitted into the proceedings.
4. Post-published documents
4.1 Documents (9) and (10), in particular document (9), on which the appellant relied as evidence that the presently claimed compound dasatinib showed protein tyrosine kinase (PTK) inhibitory activity and was therefore suitable in the treatment of disorders associated therewith, particularly cancer, were filed more than three years after the filing date of the patent in suit (document (9) in December 2004 (on the Internet in July 2004); document (10) in November 2003). In the decision under appeal, the opposition division decided not to take these documents into account on the grounds that the alleged activity had not been made plausible at the effective date of the patent in suit and that the post-published documents were the first disclosure going beyond speculation. This decision was challenged by the appellant, who continued to rely on these documents as confirmation for a plausible disclosure of dasatinib as PTK inhibitor.
4.2 It is established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal that the assessment of inventive step is to be made at the effective date of the patent on the basis of the information in the patent together with the common general knowledge then available to the skilled person. Post-published evidence in support that the claimed subject-matter solves the technical problem the patent in suit purports to solve may be taken into consideration, if it is already plausible from the disclosure of the patent that the problem is indeed solved (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, I.D.4.6; T 1329/04, point 12 of the Reasons; T 1043/10, point 12 or the Reasons).
Thus, for post-published evidence to be taken into account, it is necessary to establish whether or not the asserted activity has been made sufficiently plausible for dasatinib at the effective date of the patent in suit. Basis for this assessment is the application as filed and the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art at the filing date.
4.3 The application is directed to an extremely broadly defined group of compounds of the following generic formula I:
FORMULA/TABLE/GRAPHIC
Q is an aryl ring or a 5- or 6-membered heteroaryl ring (see page 3, lines 5 to 14); the variables are defined on page 3, line 10 to page 8, line 7. Furthermore, a subgroup is defined having the following general formula II:
FORMULA/TABLE/GRAPHIC
were A is carbon or nitrogen, B is nitrogen, oxygen and sulfur, X is oxygen and sulfur and the other variables are defined as for formula I (see page 8, lines 8 to 18).
Preferred compounds of formula I are defined on page 13, line 16 to page 14, line 2, where Q is thiazole, Z is a single bond and R2 and R4 are hydrogen. Taking into account, the more preferred definitions of the variables R1, X1, X2, R3 and R5, the information on pages 13 and 14 translates into the following formula
FORMULA/TABLE/GRAPHIC
The application also discloses 580 compounds falling within the scope of general formula I, including dasatinib (see example 455).
4.4 On page 39, line 10 to page 43, line 25, the application describes a number of PTKs, which are potential targets of the claimed compounds, and the diseases or disorders associated therewith. Particular types of kinases, which are listed in this context are the non-receptor kinases Lck, Fyn, Lyn, Src, Yes, Hck, Fgr and Blk, which belong to the Src-family (page 39, lines 10 to 15) or the receptor kinases HER1 and HER2, which belong to the epidermal growth family (see page 42, line 30 to page 43, line 3 and page 1, lines 20 to 21). Other types of receptor and non-receptor tyrosine kinase families are mentioned on page 1, lines 18 to 24. As is apparent from pages 39 to 43, inhibition of specific protein tyrosine kinases are associated with specific disorders, for example Lck inhibitors are of value in the treatment of T-cell mediated diseases, such as arthritis, multiple sclerosis, lupus, transplant rejection delayed-type of hypersensitivity, certain types of cancer, etc; Hck and Fgr are important in the Fc gamma receptor response and are considered valuable in the treatment of inflammatory bowel disease or autoimmune glomerulonephritis; Lyn and Src are important in the Fc epsilon response and are of value in the treatment of asthma or allergic disorders; HER1 and HER2 can be used in the treatment of proliferative treatments, such as psoriasis and certain types of cancer.
4.5 On page 50, line 4 to page 53, line 18, the application refers to assays "which can be employed in ascertaining the degree of activity of a compound ("test compound") as PTK inhibitor" (see page 49, lines 29 to 30). The assays are generically described and refer to the "protein kinase of interest" and the "test compound" or "compounds of interest" to be assayed. No further details are provided in this respect. Nor are any results, for example IC or Ki values, provided. Indeed, there is no evidence at all in the application as filed that shows that any of the compounds falling within the scope of formula I, let alone dasatinib, is active as an inhibitor for any of the specific protein tyrosine kinases, except a mere assertion on page 50, lines 1 to 2 with reads that "Compounds described in the following Examples have been tested in one or more of these assays and have shown activity."No further information is provided. No individual values or range of values are given. No information as to whether the observed "activity" is suitable for the intended use, i. e. the treatment of a number of diseases and disorders, is provided. In the board's judgement, a mere verbal statement that "compounds have been found active" in the absence of any verifiable technical evidence is not sufficient to render it credible that the technical problem the application purports to solve, namely providing PTK inhibitors to treat disorders or diseases associated therewith, is indeed solved, in particular in the present case, where the invention is directed to a very broadly defined class of compounds encompassing millions of structurally rather different candidates with unknown properties, where even the examples show a broad structural variation and where it is inherently unlikely for any skilled person that all of the compounds of the invention or at least a substantial amount of them will exhibit the alleged PTK inhibitory activity.
In the present case, there is also no evidence on file showing that, at the date of filing, the skilled person was in the possession of common general knowledge which, even in the absence of data, made it plausible that the compounds of the invention, in particular dasatinib, could be expected to show PTK inhibitory activity. The appellant's argument that a number of structurally different compounds are known as PTK inhibitors and are in clinical trials or near clinical development (see document (34), point 3 on pages 559 to page 565) is not pertinent in this context, as no conclusion with regard to PTK inhibitory activity of dasatinib can be drawn from this knowledge in the absence of any correlation between structural features and function.
Even if the board were to accept the assertion on page 50 of the application as filed as an indication that some tests had been carried out, no information is provided as to which of the structurally rather different compounds had been tested and in which assay, in particular whether any of the tests included dasatinib. In this context, the board would like to emphasise that it does not accept the appellant's contention that the passage on page 50 is to be read in the sense that all compounds of the examples had been tested. As pointed out by the respondents, such a reading also appears to be in conflict with the appellant's post-published evidence according to which certain compounds of the examples were inactive at a specific concentration. In this context, the board notes that in document (38), Mr Barrish, one of the inventors, refers to a review of the results of the assays performed before the patent was filed, which showed that these specific compounds were tested and found active in "one or more PTK assays" (see points 20 and 21). Irrespective of fact that document (38) can not be relied on for the purpose of what has been made plausible by the application (see point 4.7 below), no evidence was provided in support of this assertion. Nor are any results concerning the performance of dasatinib provided in document (38).
4.6 In support of its position that the claimed effect had been made plausible for the skilled reader, the appellant relied on the declarations of Professor Alessi and Professor Parang (documents (36) and (37)).
4.6.1 As a preliminary remark, the board would like to point out that the opinion of highly skilled experts on how a disclosure of a document is to be understood does not reflect the view of the notional skilled addressee, who is a person of ordinary skills aware of what is common general knowledge in the art at the relevant date. Experts give evidence based on their professional experience and expertise which is not common general and will have an influence on their way of reading the disclosure of a document. Since the assessment of the disclosure from the point of view of the skilled person does not normally call for special technical knowledge or experience, expert evidence on this matter will not be pertinent. Such evidence is only necessary when the board does not consider itself in a position to decide upon a matter without technical assistance. As the board includes two technically qualified members such cases will be rare and will only occur in special circumstances. Finally, opinions by party experts are subject to the free evaluation by the board. It is therefore the adequate substantiation and persuasiveness of the experts' propositions that matter rather than the mere fact that they are presented as an expert opinion which is a means of evidence within the meaning of Article 117(1) EPC.
4.6.2 In his declaration, Professor Alessi mainly comments on the suitability and reliability of the assays referred to in the application for measuring the effectiveness of kinase inhibition (see paragraphs 13 to 27 of document (36)). This is not contested by the board. However, the board fails to see the significance of Professor Alessi's observations, in particular since they do not provide an explanation as to why the skilled reader would simply accept the assertion on page 50 of the application without question. In the board's opinion, the skilled reader can be expected to react in a way common to all persons skilled in the art, which means that any acceptance as to whether or not a particular assertion is correct must be based on verifiable facts, be it information provided in the patent application or available to the skilled person as common general knowledge. In the present case, no such verifiable facts exist. The situation is further aggravated taking into account that, contrary to the appellant's view, the skilled person is not in a position to readily verify the assertion on page 50 in the absence of any detailed information as to the conditions under which the assays are to be carried out. As is apparent from point 4.5 above (see last paragraph), whether or not a compound is "active" apparently also depends on its concentration.
4.6.3 In his declaration, Professor Parang mainly reviewed the examples in the application, which in his opinion indicated to the skilled person a progression through a research program. Starting from early hit compounds, such as example 1, successive variants were synthesised to improve those compounds. Professor Parang identified in the first 129 examples three groups of thiazole compounds (see document (37), page 5, Figures 1, 2 and 3). From example 376 onwards, he identified a further common core structure with a 2-chloro 6-methyl-phenyl group at the carboxamide in position 5 of the thiazole ring (see Figure 4 on page 6 of document (37)). According to Professor Parang, the continued re-use of this common structure meant that a useful pharmacophore had been identified and the additional work embodied in the subsequent examples was to fine tune and optimise the physicochemical properties, particularly the solubility of the compounds. Dasatinib was one of the compounds that re-use the aforementioned common structure. It also fell into the preferred group of compounds as described on page 13 to 14 of the application which lent additional support to it being a PTK inhibitor.
4.6.4 The board agrees with Professor Parang insofar as it is possible to group compounds from the examples together which share a common structural moiety, such as a methyl substituted thiazole ring as illustrated in Figure 2 of the declaration, a 2,4,6 trimethylphenyl groups at the carboxamide in position 5 of the thiazole ring as illustrated in Figure 3, or a 2-chloro 6-methyl phenyl at the carboxamide in position 5 of the thiazole ring as illustrated in Figure 4. Other groups are also apparent, for example, compounds without a thiazole ring (see examples 368 to 375), compounds with a 2-chloro 6-methyl phenyl at the carboxamide in position 5 of the thiazole ring but no aryl or heteroaryl group at the nitrogen in position 2 as in Figure 4 (see examples 322 to 362), compounds without a 2,4,6-trimethylphenyl group or a 2-chloro 6-methyl phenyl group as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 (see examples 410 to 427 or 521 to 526, 539 to 551). Indeed, no moiety is apparent which is common to all examples.
However, in the complete absence of any data, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not the examples reflect a progression in the direction of improved PTK inhibitory activity. Nor is any conclusion possible as to whether or not a suitable pharmacophore reflected by the formula in Figure 4 of Professor Parang's declaration, which includes dasatinib, had indeed been found at the filing date of the application.
4.6.5 In summary, neither Professor Alessi's nor Professor Parang's declaration can support the appellant's view that the alleged activity had been made plausible for dasatinib at the time of filing.
4.7 Document (38), on which the appellant also relied, is not relevant in answering the question whether the application made it plausible for the skilled person that dasatinib showed PTK inhibitory activity, since it refers to knowledge which was not available to the skilled person at the filing date. Furthermore, although this document refers to results, which had been obtained before the filing date of the patent in suit, none of these results were included in this document or were ever provided in the proceedings before the EPO, in particular not for dasatinib.
4.8 The appellant also argued that the EPC does not require experimental proof. A summary statement as provided on page 50, lines 1 to 2 was sufficient to meet the low plausibility threshold, which was satisfied in the absence of any substantiated doubts. No absolute proof was required and there was no legal basis to provide any raw data. As the threshold test had been met, the post-published evidence which merely confirmed the PTK inhibitory activity of dasatinib should be taken into account.
4.9 The board agrees with the appellant insofar as it is not always required to include experimental data or results in an application (see T 578/06, point 13 of the Reasons). It is however a conditio sine qua non that it is shown that the technical problem underlying the invention was at least plausibly solved at the filing date. If, as in the present case, the nature of the invention is such that it relies on a technical effect, which is neither self-evident nor predictable or based on a conclusive theoretical concept, at least some technical evidence is required to show that a technical problem has indeed been solved. In the board's judgement, it is not acceptable to draw up a generic formula, which covers millions of compounds, vaguely indicate an "activity" against PTKs and leave it to the imagination of the skilled reader or to future investigations to establish which compound inhibits which kinase and is therefore suitable to treat the respective diseases associated therewith. In this context, the board notes that it has been acknowledged by the appellant that the skilled person would not expect that each compound would be active against all kinases. The board would also like to emphasise that in the present case the issue is not the absence of any in vivo data or clinical data, but rather the absence of any verifiable data with regard to the asserted technical effect.
Furthermore, contrary to the appellant's assertion, the post-published document (9) - the only document which refers to dasatinib - does not merely confirm the technical effect, but rather discloses a specific PTK profile, which identifies dasatinib as an inhibitor with potent anti-tumour activity (see table 2 on page 6660). No such disclosure is present in the application as filed.
4.10 With regard to the appellant's argument that the burden of proof was on the respondents to show that the application did not solve the technical problem it purports to solve, the board notes the following:
In the present case, no decision is required as to whether there exists, as argued by the appellant, a presumption that a granted patent solves the technical problem it purports to solve. The respondents (opponents), starting from the disclosure in the application as filed, have provided technically sound and persuasive arguments as to why the alleged effect had not been made plausible, which raises doubts as to whether the technical problem had been solved at the filing date, in particular by dasatinib. Thus, even if the burden was on the opponents to raise substantiated doubts, they discharged of it. It then rests on the appellant who continues to rely on the alleged effect to counter-argue and to rebut these doubts.
4.11 In support of its case, the appellant also made extensive reference to the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal. In particular, it relied to a number of decisions in which the boards have taken post-published evidence into account, for example T 428/12, 1677/11, T 715/03 (erroneously referred to as T 517/03), T 1642/07 or T 210/11.
4.12 In the board's judgement these decisions cannot support the appellant's case.
(...)

For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The request for referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal is rejected.

This decision T 0488/16 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier:ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T048816.20170201. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by AKuptsova obtained via Pixabay under the Pixabay License (no changes made).

T 2369/12 - Everything you submit can and will be used against you?

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The Examining Division held a particular auxiliary request not to be disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (Article 83 EPC).

In the appeal, the applicant now appellant submits a post-published document (Exhibit A) with the title "Efficacy of Enterisol® Ileitis administered to Lawsonia-positive pigs 1 to 6 days of age" and argues that there was no evidence on file that there were serious doubts substantiated by verifiable facts that the application lacked sufficient disclosure, and indeed, that the post-published data contained in "Exhibit A" made it plausible that vaccination with the L. intracellularis vaccine in the face of maternal immunity in young pigs would be effective.

The present case shows the Board scrutinizing Exhibit A and - probably to the dismay of the appellant - concluding that it is in fact Exhibit A which as a whole raises serious doubts on the suitability of the claimed bacteria for vaccination. "Everything you submit can and will be used against you"?

Reasons for the Decision
(...)

Auxiliary request I - Claim 1

Disclosure of the invention - Article 83 EPC

3. Article 83 EPC requires that the European patent application discloses the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. In the case of a therapeutic use, the application must disclose the suitability of the product to be manufactured for the claimed therapeutic application (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition, II.C.6.2).

4. For the therapeutic use of claim 1, the application must disclose the suitability of the attenuated L. intracellularis bacteria for the vaccination (i.e. for inducing immunity) of 1 to 9 day old pigs against L. intracellularis infections, when administered by oral drench.

5. The appellant argued that the application disclosed the suitability of attenuated L. intracellularis bacteria for the vaccination of 1 to 9 day old pigs against L. intracellularis infections. In particular, Examples 2 and 3, taken alone, demonstrated the suitability of attenuated L. intracellularis bacteria for the vaccination of 1 to 9 day old pigs against L. intracellularis infections.

6. The board does not consider these arguments as persuasive in the face of the evidence of Exhibit A, submitted by the appellant with the statement of grounds of appeal (see points 7 to 8.5, below). The results contained in the application were either from in vitro or tissue culture assays (Examples 1 and 2) or, if they were generated through animal studies, relate to maternal antibody-negative piglets or piglets of 3 weeks of age (Examples 3 and 4, respectively). On the other hand, the evidence in Exhibit A derives from a clinical study representing an embodiment of the claimed subject-matter, i.e. it provides direct evidence of the suitability of attenuated L. intra-cellularis for the purpose claimed and is therefore given more weight than the results contained in the application.

7. The Exhibit provides the results of a study "conducted to evaluate Enterisol® Ileitis vaccine efficacy in suckling piglets derived from Lawsonia intracellularis exposed (group A) and negative sows (group B) and to determine if there was any maternal interference with vaccine efficacy against a virulent, pure culture L. intracellularis challenge" (see Exhibit A, page 1).

8. Piglets in groups A and B were further divided into subgroups 1 to 6 (see Tables 1 and 2 of the Exhibit). Piglets in subgroups 1 and 4 were vaccinated with a single dose of attenuated modified live

L. intracellularis (Enterisol® Ileitis) at 1 week of age. Piglets in groups 2, 3, 5 and 6 received a placebo. At 6 to 7 weeks of age, piglet groups 1, 2, 4 and 5 received a virulent, pure culture of L. intracellularis challenge, while groups 3 and 6 did not.

8.1 All piglet groups were humanely euthanised and evaluated for macroscopic (gross) and Lawsonia-specific microscopic lesion development at 3 weeks post challenge administration (9 to 10 weeks of age; supra).

8.2 Table 2 provides a summary of average gross lesion scores for the small and large intestines, with group 1 being the trial group (piglets from L. intracellularis exposed sows, vaccinated) and group 2 being the control group (piglets from L. intracellularis exposed sows, unvaccinated). It can be seen from the table that the trial group has significantly larger intestinal lesions than the control group.

8.3 Table 3 provides a summary of average microscopic lesion scores for the small, large and whole intestines, with group 1 being the trial (vaccinated) group and group 2 being the control (unvaccinated) group. Here too, the trial group has significantly larger intestinal lesions than the control group.

8.4 The appellant argued that, although Tables 2 and 3 of the study report showed that group 1 piglets (from Lawsonia positive sows, vaccinated and challenged) had greater gross average lesion scores than the unvaccinated challenge control (group 2), the data in Table 4 confirmed that the same group, had better daily clinical scores than the unvaccinated control group.

8.5 Table 4 does indeed show that group 1 piglets had fewer clinical symptoms of infection than those in the challenge control (group 2). However, given the significance of intestinal lesions as a symptom of infection and of the fact that two out of three measures of infection were significantly worsened in piglets from sows exposed to L. intracellularis bacteria in comparison to the non-vaccinated piglets from the same sows, the board must conclude that Exhibit A as a whole raises serious doubts as to the suitability of attenuated L. intracellularis bacteria for the vaccination of 1 to 9 day old pigs against L. intracellularis infections when administered by oral drench, which cannot be overcome by the results in the application, given their indirect nature (see point 6 above).

9. In view of the above, the board holds that the application does not disclose the invention of claim 1 in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.

(...)

11. In view of the above considerations, none of the pending claim requests relates to an invention for which the application meets the requirements Article 83 EPC.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 2369/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier:  ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T236912.20170317. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Miranda Warning" by Mike Licht obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 1921/12 Who should sign a 'decision'

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In this decision the Board of Appeal is annoyed about the fact that a Rule 140 Correction of a decision of the Examining Division (signed by the whole division) and a Rule 139 Correction of an obvious error (signed only by the primary examiner in the opposition period, i.e. after grant; G 1/10 stopping this process was not yet issued) are not in the public part of the file.
The Board sees the R.139 correction as not valid since no formally correct decision is taken; it would require the signature of the whole Examining Division.   
In the decision several aspects of the problem-solution approach are re-discussed. The Board is also not keen on hearing witnesses. 

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. Appellants 01, 02 and 03 (respectively opponents 01, 02 and 03) lodged an appeal against the decision rejecting their oppositions against European patent 1 646 477.

II. The Opposition Division held that none of the grounds of opposition raised and substantiated under Article 100(a) EPC (lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and under Article 100(b) EPC (lack of sufficient disclosure) held against the patent. It considered that the wording of the claims , as corrected by the Examining Division under Rules 139 and 140 EPC, was the valid version of the claims.

III. The present decision is based on the following documents mentioned, among others, during the opposition proceedings: [...]

IV. The statements setting out the grounds of appeal and the replies thereto of the respondents contain a large number of requests.

In the annex to the summons for oral proceedings the Board presented its preliminary opinion on these requests of the parties, stating inter alia that:

There was a deficiency in the first instance proceedings because of the correction requested by the respondents with letter of 15 November 2010, which had been incorrectly allowed by the Examining Division under Rule 139 EPC. The main issue in this correction was the addition of "or less" after "0,25 microns" in claim 1. In fact there was no decision of the Examining Division, since it had been taken by only one member of that division. In view of this evidence (which was sent to the parties) and the particular circumstances, however, the Board could deal with this issue itself without remittal to the Opposition Division, nor need the appeal fee be reimbursed.


The main request, as well as the auxiliary requests and the fall-back request of 18 May 2012 could not be allowed, because their respective claims 1 contravened the requirements of Article 123(2) and (3) EPC and Rule 139 EPC as they extended to input stage planetary gearboxes having teeth that had been superfinished to a final surface roughness (Ra) of 0,25 microns or less.

The request to maintain the patent as granted could also not be allowed, due to the subject-matter of its claim 1 lacking novelty over D4 and inventive step over the combination of the teachings of documents D1 and D2.

As the preliminary position of the Board on priority of claim 1 corresponded to the position taken by the Opposition Division, remittal of the case, as requested by the respondents, was also not envisaged.

The arguments of the appellants supporting their objections concerning lack of sufficient disclosure were considered not convincing.

V. With letter of 23 September 2016 the respondents maintained their main request of maintenance of the patent in the form upheld by the Opposition Division, or as granted. They replaced all the previously submitted auxiliary requests with 6 new auxiliary requests for claim 1, 3 new auxiliary requests for claim 6 and 5 new auxiliary requests for claim 9, together with an amended fall-back request. They objected to the Board showing with non-public evidence the non-existence of the correction decision by the Examining Division. It was requested to hear the remaining members of the latter and the chair of the Opposition Division. In this respect the respondents submitted two questions of law and requested that if neither the case was remitted to the Opposition Division, nor the requested corrections were allowed, they be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

The following document, related to inventive step over the combination of the teachings of documents D1 and D2, was also submitted:

R15: Saint Gobain v Fusion Provida Ltd, Case No: A3/2004/2441.

VI. Oral proceedings before the Board were held on 26 October 2016. Although having been duly summoned, appellant 02 did not attend, as announced with letter of 5 October 2016. According to Rule 115(2) EPC and Article 15(3) RPBA, proceedings were continued without that party.

At the start of and during oral proceedings the respondents requested, as a main request, that the patent be maintained as granted according to the "Druckexemplar", and filed a first auxiliary request for maintenance as corrected. In view of the main request, the issue of the correction decision of the Examining Division was deferred. In regard of the outcome of the discussion on the main request (no inventive step over D1 and D2) the first auxiliary request was withdrawn and replaced by a (new) first auxiliary request. The respondents also requested that Mr. Summers be heard by the Board.

For the further course of the oral proceedings, in particular the parties' initial requests and the issues discussed with the parties, reference is made to the minutes.

VII. At the end of the oral proceedings the parties' final requests were established to be as follows:

Appellants 01 and 03 (appellant 02 in his written submissions) requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be revoked.

The respondents requested that the case be remitted to the Opposition Division for prosecution in the event that documents A8 to A10 were admitted into the proceedings, that the appeals be dismissed, i.e. that the patent be maintained as granted on the basis of the "Druckexemplar" or, in the alternative, that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of the set of claims filed during the oral proceedings as (new) first auxiliary request with the claims thereof to be renumbered.

All other initial requests were not maintained by the parties.

The present decision was announced at the end of oral proceedings.

VIII. The text of independent claim 1 of the main request, corresponding to the patent as granted according to the Druckexemplar, is as follows:

"An input stage planetary gearbox for a large wind turbine generator comprising a hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and a sun gear, wherein one or more of the hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and sun gear comprise a plurality of teeth that have been superfinished to a final surface roughness of 0,25 microns."

The text of independent claim 9 of the main request is as follows:

"A method for reducing lubricant debris in an input stage planetary gearbox for a large wind turbine generator, wherein the planetary gearbox comprises a hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and a sun gear, the method comprising superfinishing the teeth of one or more of the hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and sun gear to a surface roughness of 0,25 mym or less before operating the planetary gearbox."

The text of independent claim 1 of the (new) first auxiliary request is as follows (amendments over claim 1 of the main request are, respectively, in bold or struck out, emphasis added by the Board):

"An input stage planetary gearbox for a large wind turbine generator comprising a hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and a sun gear[deleted: , wherein one or more of the hollow wheel gear , two or more planet gears, and sun gear], wherein all of the teeth of all of the gears [deleted: comprise a plurality of teeth that] have been superfinished to a final surface roughness (Ra) of 0,25 microns"

The text of independent claim 9 of the (new) first auxiliary request is as follows (amendments over claim 9 of the main request are, respectively, in bold or struck out, emphasis added by the Board):

"A method for reducing or eliminating damage to the bearings of [deleted: lubricant debris in] an input stage planetary gearbox for a large wind turbine generator, by reducing lubricant debris generated from the gear teeth, wherein the planetary gearbox comprises a hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and a sun gear, the method comprising superfinishing the teeth of one or more of the hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and sun gear to a surface roughness of (Ra) 0,25 [deleted: mym] microns or less before operating the planetary gearbox."

IX. The appellants argued, insofar as relevant to the present decision, substantially as follows.

The Opposition Division wrongly delegated to the Examining Division its responsibility to decide on the correction requested by the respondents under Rule 139 EPC. The Examining Division was not competent to deal with this request because examination proceedings were not pending. It also wrongly applied the requirements of Rule 139 EPC.


The decision under appeal is insufficiently reasoned on the issues of sufficiency of disclosure, priority, novelty and inventive step. The decision also does not contain any discussion on the expert statements submitted in relation to the knowledge of a person skilled in the art, said aspect having been extensively discussed during the oral proceedings before the Opposition Division.

As acknowledged in the decision under appeal, D1 discloses a gearbox from which the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request only differs in the claimed value of surface roughness of the teeth of the gears.

This gearbox is a suitable starting point to discuss inventive step, especially because D1 contains a statement according to which smooth gear surfaces improve the micro-pitting resistance and therefore also the gearbox performance.

This effect is also mentioned in the description of the patent in suit.

The problem to be solved can be formulated as how to avoid micro-pitting in large gears used in input stage planetary gearboxes for large wind turbine generators.

Based on this problem the relevant person skilled in the art can only be identified as a gear design specialist, and not necessarily a wind turbine generator designer.

D2 teaches that smoothing the surface of the teeth of gears to a surface quality of 0,127 to 0,254 microns ([10], [22], "5 to 10 micro-inch") overcomes the problem of micro-pitting.

The decision under appeal was based on the wrong assumption that the person skilled in the art, starting from D1, would disregard this teaching as it is not specifically related to the field of large input stage planetary gearboxes for large wind turbine generators.

The knowledge of the skilled person in this technical field should, however, be properly appreciated on the basis of documents A8-A10, which should be admitted.

The circumstances alleged in R12, to show that at the time the invention was made nobody considered that such large gears could indeed be superfinished, are not described in detail. Therefore the reasons leading to the refusal by Sparleck GmbH to smooth the surfaces of large gears are only partially known.

As a consequence, this declaration cannot prove that the skilled person would generally refrain from superfinishing large gears used in slow speed planetary gear boxes.

A8 explicitly mentions wind turbine generators, and shows (figure 4 at page 4) that superfinishing of large gears was possible (and advantageous) before the priority date of the patent in suit.

The respondents cannot be surprised by the contents of A8, because the author of A8 is also the inventor of the patent in suit.

A8 is prima facie relevant and proves that the skilled person had the necessary knowledge to superfinish large gears, as taught by D2.

Documents A9 and A10 are also prima facie relevant because they show that according to a well known design procedure (FVA 54) for preventing micro-pitting, the parameter Ra is to be kept at 0,25 microns or less.

A8, A9 and A10 have been submitted with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal to confirm the information that would have been provided by the experts during the opposition proceedings, had they been allowed to speak. Therefore they show that the Opposition Division based its decision on an incorrect assessment of the knowledge of a skilled person.

These documents should therefore be admitted into the appeal proceedings.

R6 to R9, submitted by the respondents as a reaction to A8-A10, are not prima facie relevant and should not be admitted. At the oral proceedings, that request for not admitting documents was specifically directed to R7-R9.

The request to hear Mr. Summers on what was actually the situation in A8 should not be allowed, as it is very late filed and causes a delay of the proceedings, since its preparation for it would only be possible with an adjournment of the oral proceedings.

The subject-matter of claims 1 and 9 of the (new) first auxiliary request clearly does not involve inventive step over the combination of the teachings of documents D1 and D2. This request should therefore not be admitted into the proceedings as it not clearly allowable.

The ratio decidendi of G 2/88 (OJ EPO 1990, 93) is not directly applicable to claim 9 of this first auxiliary request, as G 2/88 relates to a change into a second (non-medical) use claim of a substance, and claim 9 rather relates to a process for producing an improved gearbox characterised by superfinishing the teeth of the gears wherein the purpose of carrying out said process steps is indicated in the claim.

X. The respondents argued, insofar as relevant to the present decision, substantially as follows:

The minutes of the oral proceedings before the Opposition Division show that appellant 01 contested extensively the right of the Examining Division to decide upon the request of correction, and Dr. Krull, the expert brought by appellant 03, was allowed to speak. The right to be heard was therefore not denied.


The decision under appeal is sufficiently reasoned on the mentioned issues, as it enabled the appellants to follow all their lines of argument, and argue before the Board that some of them were based on misjudgements of the Opposition Division.

The request for correction under Rule 139 EPC has been correctly dealt with and allowed by the Examining Division following T 226/02, because at that time neither the Opposition Division nor the Examining Division were bound by G 1/10 (OJ EPO 2013, 194).

A8, A9 and A10 have been filed late without any explanation for their delay, and the criteria for admission are not satisfied, as they are not prima facie relevant.

A8 neither refers to gearboxes for wind power generators, nor to gearboxes for low speed applications, such as in an input stage planetary gearbox.

Figure 4 of A8 relates to a superfinishing experiment on large gears which did not produce satisfying results, and does not therefore represent an enabling disclosure which could be relied upon by the skilled person, who is a specialist in the field of large wind turbine generators.

Mr. Summers should be heard by the Board to allow the respondents to confirm that.

R7 to R9 have been submitted as a reply to the issues raised by A8-A10, and in particular to show why they are not relevant, and should be therefore introduced into the proceedings and discussed, if A8-A10 are admitted into appeal proceedings.

D1 discloses a gearbox from which the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request only differs in the claimed value of surface roughness of the gear teeth.

However, D1 being only a recommendation from AGMA and not a standard, would not be considered by the skilled person as a reliable starting point to discuss inventive step.

The effect of the only distinguishing feature is that the presence in the lubricant of debris coming from the teeth is reduced. This prolongs the life of the bearings, which are lubricated by the same lubricant as the gears in the planetary gearbox.

Based on this effect, the problem to be solved should be formulated as how to improve the service life of the bearings in the known planetary gearbox.

This is because, as R6 clearly shows, at the effective date of the patent in suit the skilled person was very concerned with the failure of bearings, as these components were particularly problematic, and did not consider failure of the gears and the gearbox because of micro-pitting on the gear tooth surfaces as an equivalently problematic issue.

Based on this problem the person skilled in the art cannot be the generic gear designer, as argued by the appellants, but can only be a specialist in the field of large wind turbine generators.

D2 would not be taken into consideration by that skilled person as it relates to gears of any type, even of plastic material, does not mention micro-pitting, and mentions an improved fatigue life of only 100 hours after polishing.

Gears to be used in the technical field of the patent in suit operate with high loads at very low speed, and are therefore not to be compared with gears designed for being used in other technical fields.

A teaching coming from a document which is not directly related to this technical field would not be considered as reliable enough to depart from accepted practice with a reasonable expectation of success.

The approach used by the appellants in the discussion on inventive step is over-simplified, as it does not take account of the principle of expectation of success, as outlined in R15.

It is known (lubricant retention or oil-pocket theory) that excessively smooth surfaces do not retain lubricant. This is because the customary surface roughness values used in this technical field were significantly higher than those which are now claimed.

R12 (declaration of Mr Bruins) shows that before the priority date of the patent in suit not even a specialized company like Sparleck GmbH was able to surface finish the surface of big gear components (above 100 kg) simply because the manufacture of machines suitable for surface finishing of these gears was not possible.

The (new) first auxiliary request should be admitted into the appeal proceedings because its claims are clearly allowable. Clear allowability of claim 9 is, in particular, evident in the light of the ratio decidendi of G 2/88 (supra).

Reasons for the Decision

1. Allegations of procedural violation - insufficient reasoning of the appealed decision

1.1 The appellants argue that the impugned decision is not sufficiently reasoned on the issues of sufficiency of disclosure, priority, novelty and inventive step.

1.2 The Board disagrees and notes that the decision contains under point 1.1 general reasoning on sufficiency of disclosure, related to what the skilled person would make of the wording of the claim and how the objections of the appellants should in fact be seen.

The Board establishes that the reasoning on "reach through" claims is insufficient as it amounts to "we do not agree that these are reach through claims". However, since the minutes do not refer to this argument of appellant 1, it cannot be established whether this argument was presented extensively or only as an allegation at the oral proceedings. In the latter case the simple answer mentioned above is regarded as sufficient.

Concerning the alleged lack of substantiation in the reasoning on priority, novelty and inventive step, the Board establishes that the decision under appeal contains (see points 13 and 14) reasoning on these issues, and notes that the appellants were able to criticize it in detail, and therefore were able to deal with it.

1.3 The appellants also consider the decision as being deficient because it does not contain any discussion on the expert statements submitted by the appellants and related to the knowledge of a person skilled in the art, said aspect having been extensively discussed during the oral proceedings.

1.4 The Board is not in a position to assess whether a procedural violation occurred in this respect, because it is not clearly apparent from the minutes to which extent these issues have actually been discussed.

1.5 Be that as it may, the Board considers that even if one of these procedural violations occurred, no purpose would be served by remitting the case to the Opposition Division, which would at most issue another, maybe better reasoned, decision but to the same effect.

This consideration, combined with the fact that the appellants were able to deal, in their respective statements setting out the grounds of appeal, with the impugned decision in detail constitutes, in the Board's view a special reason for not remitting the case, as allowed under Article 11 RPBA.

The Board therefore decides not to remit the case.

2. Allegation of procedural violation by the Opposition Division in respect of the competence of the Examining Division to decide on the correction of the patent under Rule 139 EPC

Since this question has become moot by the requests having been amended at the oral proceedings, there is no necessity to deal with this issue here. It will be shortly discussed under point 3.

3. Main request (reference to the "Druckexemplar")

3.1 The respondents formulate their main request in that the patent be maintained as granted i.e. in the form according to the "Druckexemplar".

3.2 The appellants note that this does not correspond to the version of the claims with which the patent was maintained when the oppositions were rejected, because that was the version incorrectly accepted by the Examining Division. Based on that they argue that the main request of the respondents amounts to a request to set aside the decision under appeal, which they cannot request as non-appellants.

3.3 The Board disagrees, because it is the order of the impugned decision, which is that the oppositions are rejected, which determines the actual version of the patent that results from the decision. In the present case that is the version as granted, which is indeed the subject-matter of the present main request ("Druckexemplar", see also point 3.5 below).

3.4 This is also not affected by the "Rule 139 EPC correction decision" dated 23 May 2012 which introduced the "or less" into claim 1. This decision was taken by only one member of the Examining Division, as could be established from EPO form 2051 which the Board could retrieve from the non-public part of the file. The parties were provided with a copy of that form.

Such a decision would be, in the opinion of the Board, non-existent. The result would be that the valid version of the patent is the version as granted, as was notified by the Board to the parties with its communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings.


Since the main request, by its content, made a decision of the Board on this point unnecessary, there was also no need to refer questions related thereto to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

3.5 There has been another decision dated "22.[deleted: 10]8.2011", also retrievable from the same EPO Form 2051, but this time having been signed by all the three members of the Examining Division, with which they saw the need for correcting printing errors that occurred when the "Druckexemplar" was prepared for printing the granted patent, via Rule 140 EPC, i.e. a correction of their decision to grant.

That was entirely unnecessary because the "Druckexemplar" is in any case the valid version of the granted patent since it is the version communicated to the applicants with the notification pursuant to Rule 71(3) EPC, to which agreement had been given (see also T 995/95, Facts and Submission, point VII; T 1635/10, Reasons, point 1.2; T 809/10, Facts and Submissions, point IX), and to which the decision to grant referred (Article 97(1) and Rule 71a(1) EPC).
Be that as it may, this decision does not affect the wording of the present main request, which is exactly the version of the "Druckexemplar". In any case, the appellants had no objections to this decision of the Examining Division.

3.6 In the issue of the corrections carried out, via the use of EPO Form 2051, on the European Patent after grant, the Board whishes to note that it is rather disturbing that such decisions, more in particular the details of the persons that took them, are not at all retrievable by the public via file inspection. They are not excluded from file inspection pursuant to Article 128(4) EPC and Rule 144(d) EPC, see the Decision of the President of the EPO of 12 July 2007 (OJ EPO 2007, Special Edition, Nr. 3, J.3).

3.7 The main request that the patent be maintained in the form as granted ("Druckexemplar") cannot therefore be considered as a request to set aside the decision under appeal, but is a request to dismiss the appeals.

3.8 For the sake of clarity the Board notes that the text of claim 1 according to the "Druckexemplar" does not contain the modifications requested with the second request for correction, pursuant to Rule 139 EPC ("or less").

4. Admissibility of the documents submitted during the appeal proceedings

4.1 A8-A10

The respondents request that A8-A10 not be admitted as being not prima facie relevant and late filed. The respondents also request, in the case that a positive decision on their admissibility is taken, to remit the case to the Opposition Division to deal with this fresh evidence.

The Board notes that the above question of admissibility raised by the respondents can only be discussed in the light of Article 12(4) RPBA as these documents have not been submitted during the opposition proceedings, but were filed by appellant 03 with its statement setting out the grounds of appeal.

The Board notes that Article 12(4) RPBA mentions "evidence which could have been presented in the first instance proceedings". To the benefit of the party concerned the Board interprets this to mean "should have been presented" (see also T 1689/12, Reasons, point 1.2, T 419/12, Reasons, point 2.1.2).

The question therefore arises whether appellant 03, in the course of opposition proceedings, should have realised that further material needed to be filed.

This is, for the following reasons and as argued by the appellants, not the case.

The appellants argued in the opposition proceedings that there was no prejudice against superfinishing of large gears, more in particular of gearboxes in wind turbine generators, at the priority date of the patent in suit.

Appellant 03 based this on documents A1 to A7 submitted before the Opposition Division, and offered an expert to testify on their content. Appellant 01 used documents D1 and D2 and argued that the skilled person would apply the general teaching of D2 to the gears of input gearboxes in large wind turbine generators.

In its communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings the Opposition Division rejected documents A1-A7 as not belonging to the prior art and expressed a positive opinion on inventive step over the combination of the teachings of documents D1 and D2. More in particular, the Opposition Division wrote that the skilled person would not do so.

To this appellant 01 replied that it would bring an expert to oral proceedings to support its arguments (appellant 03 had already offered an expert).

At the oral proceedings, these experts (Mr. Krull and Mr. O'Hara) were present.

The minutes do not show that they were allowed to speak. According to appellant 03 his expert (Mr. Krull) was cut short in his submission by the chair of the Opposition Division, who stated that A1 would in any case not be considered prior art. The latter was confirmed by the minutes.

Since the Opposition Division, only at the oral proceedings, did not accept the means of evidence submitted by appellants 01 and 03, the submission of A8-A10 with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal of appellant 03 is regarded by the Board as an acceptable attempt to further support with written evidence the existing line of arguments on the general knowledge of the skilled person and what he would consider as acceptable further teachings.

The Board therefore decides to admit A8-A10 into the appeal proceedings.

The Board also notes that the respondents cannot be surprised by the contents of A8, because the author of A8 is also the inventor of the patent in suit.

A9 and A10 are also not surprising in their respective content, as they relate to a well known gear design procedure.

4.2 R7-R9

The Board also decides to admit these documents, because they have been submitted by the respondents for the case that A8-A10 are admitted by the Board, in application of Article 13(2) RPBA.

The Board notes that the question, raised by the appellants, whether these documents are or are not prima facie relevant does not play a role in this respect.

5. Remittal of the case to the Opposition Division for further prosecution on the basis of documents A8-A10 and R7-R9

The respondents request that the case be remitted to the Opposition Division for further prosecution, as A8-A10 and R7-R9 were not the subject of the appealed decision.

The Board notes that none of A8-A10 has been directly referred to by the appellants in their objections as to patentability of the subject-matter of the claims of the main request and of the first auxiliary request.

The appellants only introduced A8-A10 to support an existing line of argument, namely that the skilled person would not consider that superfinishing of large gears was technically impossible at the priority date of the patent in suit.

As a consequence, the admission of A8-A10 does not raise issues substantially different from those on which the contested decision was based.

The Board also notes that the respondents only introduced R7-R9 to show that a wind turbine specialist aiming at improving the device disclosed in document D1 would not have taken the teaching of document D2 into consideration.

As this is the argument on which point 14.2 of the decision under appeal is in any case based, also the admission of R7-R9 does not raise a different issue either.

As a consequence, the relevant request to remit the case to the Opposition Division for further prosecution is not allowed.

6. Hearing of Mr. Summers

6.1 The respondents alleged, during the oral proceedings held before the Board, that the experiment to which figure 4 of A8 refers did not result in a positive outcome. They argued that the information contained in this document does not represent an enabling disclosure which could be relied upon by a specialist in the field of large wind turbine generators.

The respondents therefore requested that the author of A8, Mr. Summers, be heard to confirm these allegations.

6.2 The Board does not consider it necessary for the present decision to hear Mr. Summers.

This is because it is not at all apparent to a skilled reader that the content of A8 is either not correct or not complete. This document does not contain anything on the basis of which a skilled reader would, at the priority date of the patent in suit, have inferred that the superfinishing experiment on large gears shown in figure 4 at page 4 was not successful.

That this was allegedly the case came up only during the oral proceedings before the Board, and was therefore not public before the priority date of the patent in suit.

According to the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition 2016, I.D.4.6) the assessment of inventive step is to be made at the effective date of the patent on the basis of the information in the patent together with the common general knowledge available to the skilled person at that date.

A testimony by Mr. Summers could therefore at most disclose something which is post-published.

7. Claim 1 of the main request - Inventive step

7.1 Content of the disclosure of D1

D1 discloses an input stage planetary gearbox (see page 21, point A.5.4, "Gear arrangements", where planetary gear arrangements are disclosed in the fourth and fifth paragraph) for a large wind turbine generator (up to 750 kW, see page 1, point 1, last line) comprising a hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and a sun gear (as it is normally the case with epicyclic gear arrangements), wherein one or more of the hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and sun gear comprise a plurality of teeth that have been finished to a smooth final surface roughness (in fact all teeth, see page 9, point 4.4.5.4).

7.2 D1 as a starting point to discuss inventive step

The Board concurs with the appellants that the wind turbine planetary gearbox disclosed in D1 is a suitable starting point for discussing inventive step, as it discloses most of the features of claim 1 of the main request and is used in an input stage.

The respondents argue that D1, being only a recommendation from AGMA, and not a standard, would not be considered by the skilled person as a reliable starting point.

The Board disagrees: any document that is state of the art under Article 54(2) EPC may be taken into consideration for that purpose, as long as it is a feasible starting point (see e.g. T 21/08, Reasons, point 1.2).

A document which is confidential, or so speculative or obviously defective as to be readily recognised as such by those skilled in the art when trying to reproduce its disclosure cannot be taken as such an appropriate starting point.

The respondents did not, however, provide any reason (and none is apparent to the Board) on the basis of which a skilled person would immediately consider D1 as speculative, unreliable or even confidential, just because its title recites "Recommended Practices for Design and Specification of Gearboxes for Wind Turbine Generator Systems".

7.3 Difference

As agreed by all parties, D1 only fails to disclose one feature of the subject-matter of claim 1, namely that one or more of the gears comprises a plurality of teeth that have been superfinished to a final surface roughness of 0,25 microns.

7.4 Effect - Problem

7.4.1 According to the patent in suit this level of smoothness is sufficient to prevent micro-pitting of the gear surfaces (see paragraph [21]).

Based on this effect, the appellants formulate the problem to be solved as how to improve the functioning, reduce noise and increase the service life of the gears in the known planetary gearbox (see again paragraph [21], top of column 6 and at the end).

7.4.2 The respondents argue that inventive step should only be discussed on the basis of another, different effect mentioned at paragraph [24] of the patent in suit, namely that the presence in the lubricant of debris coming from the teeth surfaces is reduced.

Based on this effect, the problem to be solved should be formulated as how to improve the service life of the bearings in the known planetary gearbox (see again paragraph [24]).

This is because, as clearly acknowledged in the description of the patent in suit (see paragraph [19], lines 42-44, and paragraph [24]) at the effective date of the patent in suit the skilled person was more concerned with the failure of bearings, as these components were considered to be particularly problematic, and would not consider failure of the gears because of micro-pitting on their surfaces to be an issue to deal with.

This is further confirmed by document R6. This document shows that before the priority date of the patent in suit gearboxes were considered to fail mainly because of their bearings (see starting from the first page (53), left column, last line, and right column).

In a technical field in which wind turbine gearboxes were subjected to chronic failure (first page, left column, line 3 of R6) because of their bearings the skilled person would not be really interested in improving the functioning, reduce noise and increase the service life of the gears.

7.4.3 The Board does not concur with the respondents: the reduction of debris coming from the teeth in the lubricant is not the only effect on the basis of which inventive step of claim 1 of the main request may be discussed. Such discussion can take place on the basis of any effect of the established distinguishing features, provided that such an effect is directly derivable from the patent in suit for a skilled person (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, I.D.4.4.1).

As the effect of preventing micro-pitting of the gear surfaces is explicitly mentioned in paragraph [21] of the patent in suit, together with the issues of damage of the gear surfaces, vibration and noise, the problems of improving the functioning, reducing the noise and increasing the service life of the gears in the known planetary gearboxes immediately follow. The Board considers that the above approach in the problem formulation is in line with the problem-solution approach, as defined in the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, I.D.4.4.1 and I.D.4.4.2).

7.5 Person skilled in the art

The respondents argue that the person skilled in the art should be a designer of components of large wind turbine generators, including gearboxes therefor, and not a specialist in gear design, because the former field is the technical field of the patent in suit.

According to the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (supra, I.D.8.1.1), the starting point for defining the appropriate skilled person (or group of skilled persons) is not only the technical field of the patent in suit, but also the problem to be solved on the basis of what the prior art (D1 in the present case) already discloses.

The Board therefore agrees with the appellants' position that the person skilled in the art is to be considered as a person with knowledge in the general field of gears and gearboxes, and not only in the narrow field of gearboxes for large wind power generators.

In any case, the Board is convinced that a skilled person as defined by the respondents, once confronted with the problem as defined in point 7.4.3, will refer to the specialist in the field of gear design, because the service life of gears depends heavily on the gear design (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, I.D.8.1.2: "Competent skilled person - group of people as skilled person").

7.6 D2 - consideration by the skilled person

7.6.1 The respondents note that according to R6 (see the fourth page, second half of the left column: "Simply Huge") gears to be used in the technical field of the patent in suit operate with high loads at very low speed and cannot be compared with gears designed for use in other technical fields.

D2 covers gears of any type, even of plastic material. It does not mention micro-pitting and mentions an improved fatigue life of only 100 hours after polishing.

They therefore conclude that a skilled person would not take a teaching coming from D2 into consideration.

7.6.2 The Board disagrees.

D2 is a document relating to transmission gears, and deals with the issue of improving their wear resistance (see paragraph [1]).

This document teaches that gears having a final surface roughness of 0,25 microns (within 0,127 and 0,254 microns, or 5 to 10 micro-inches, see paragraph [10]) have improved service life, because the maximum contact stress, as well as the subsurface shear stress are reduced as the result of improved lubrication conditions (see paragraph [11]).

The skilled person, being a gear specialist, and in the light of the objective problem as defined above, has therefore good reason to consider D2 and apply its teaching to the apparatus of D1, especially because he can be expected to take account of solutions to this problem proposed in the same or neighbouring technical fields.

Contrary to what is argued by the respondents, the teaching on surface smoothness is presented in D2 as universally valid (see page 5, line 10: "any metal gear"). There may indeed be an example related to gears having a fatigue life (up to 100 hours, see page 3 lines 50-51), but, as argued by the appellants, the "fatigue life" of a gear, which is expressed in hours under testing conditions, is something quite different in the eyes of a skilled person from the actual "service life" of the apparatus comprising such a gear.

7.6.3 As a consequence of the above, the Board concurs with the appellants that D2 would be taken into consideration by the person skilled in the art.

7.7 D1+D2 - combination of teachings

7.7.1 The respondents argue that the teaching of D2 cannot be applied to superfinishing the surfaces of the teeth of very large gears, like those described in D1.

This is because according to the declaration of Mr. Bruins (R12), before the priority date of the patent in suit not even a specialized company like Sparleck GmbH was able to superfinish the surfaces of large gear components (above 100 kg) simply because the manufacture of machines suitable for these gears was not possible.

7.7.2 The Board disagrees. In the first place because such a declaration is just what it is: it expresses the opinion of one company, not necessarily of the entire group of specialists in the field. Secondly, as argued by the appellants, the reasons leading to this opinion would be, even if all the circumstances alleged by the respondents in relation to R12 would be confirmed, only partially known. It cannot for example be excluded that also commercial reasons played an important role.

This declaration cannot therefore prove that the skilled person would always refrain from superfinishing large gears used in low speed planetary gear boxes, especially because he would, in such a situation, have referred to another specialist, namely an expert in the design of machines suitable for surface finishing of big components (see the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, I.D.8.1.2: "Competent skilled person - group of people as skilled person").


7.7.3 In addition to that, A8 clearly shows (see figure 4 at page 4) that superfinishing of very large gears (up to 1,2 meter diameter, see page 4, left column, point 1) was presented as possible before the priority date of the patent in suit. This already contradicts the declaration R12.

As already discussed above under point 6, the content of A8 belongs to the state of the art, whereas the information that the disclosure of this document is at least partially not enabling does not.

As a consequence, the skilled person would have seen no particular reason not to consider D2. In view of A8 he would not see any difficulty in applying the teaching of D2 to the gearbox disclosed in D1.

7.7.4 The respondents also argue (by referring to R15) that a skilled person dealing with the design of large wind turbine generators, which are costly devices to be installed in rough conditions with difficult access and with an intended design life of 20 years would not depart from accepted practice unless there was an expectation of success based on a reliable teaching. To be reliable such a teaching should be clearly related to the technical field of the patent in suit.

One particular reason for his caution is the so-called lubricant retention or oil-pocket theory: oil retention was considered exceptionally problematic for low speed gear stages such as those presently under discussion.

Starting from D1 the skilled person would therefore not apply the teaching of D2, or of any other document disclosing superfinishing outside of the technical field of the patent in suit, because the roughness values which were customary in gearboxes for wind turbine generators were significantly higher than those disclosed in D2 and now claimed in claim 1 of the main request.

7.7.5 The Board disagrees.

The question whether a skilled person would consider the teaching of documents which are not strictly related to the specific field of the patent as a priori unreliable, and whether and to what extent neighbouring areas beyond the specific field of the patent in suit might be taken into consideration when assessing inventive step is addressed in detail in the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (supra, I.D.8.2). Reference is frequently made to T 176/84 (OJ EPO 1986, 50) and T 195/84 (OJ EPO 1986, 121).

Accordingly, when examining inventive step, a skilled person would, as well as considering the state of the art in the specific technical field of the patent in suit, look for suggestions in neighbouring fields or a broader general technical field if the same or similar problems arise, and if he could be expected to be aware of such fields.

This is because solutions of general technical problems in non-specific (general) fields have to be viewed as forming part of the general technical knowledge which a priori is to be attributed to those skilled persons versed in any specific technical field.


This situation clearly applies to the present case for the combination of the teachings of D1, which is in the same technical field of the patent in suit, with those of D2, which, as discussed above, relates to the broader field of gear design.

The Board also notes that the skilled person would also consider that the teaching of D2 could be used with a reasonable expectation of success on the basis of the oil pocket retention theory, as it is not in contrast therewith. Indeed, paragraph [12] of this document warns the skilled person that excessively smooth surfaces (less than 3 microinches, corresponding to less than 0,08 microns, which is a value well below the claimed 0,25 microns) would be disadvantageous as they would result in reduced oil retention for lubrication.


In view of the above, the particular circumstances of the present case make that the present decision does not need to go into the ratio decidendi of national decision R15.

7.7.6 As a consequence of the above, the Board concurs with the appellants that the skilled person is in a position to apply the teachings of D2 to the input planetary gearbox of D1.

7.8 D1+D2 - result of the combination of teachings

The Board concurs with the appellants that the combination of the teachings of D1 and D2 renders the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request obvious.

This is because a skilled person would indeed take a cautious approach. As the respondents argue, because the surface roughness values normally chosen for these gears are above 0,25 microns, he would follow the warning given at paragraph [12] of D2 and limit at first the superfinishing to the upper value (10 microinches) of the range mentioned in this document, which is 0,25 microns.

D2 discloses a system of two gear elements (gear and pinion, see claim 1), in which all gear surfaces of both are superfinished (see claims 5 and 6).

By following this additional teaching of D2 the skilled person would inevitably arrive at the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request.

8. Independent claim 9 of the main request

D1 discloses a method for reducing lubricant debris (by improving micro-pitting resistance, see page 9, point 4.4.5.4; see also page 54, table G-7, showing the presence of laminar wear debris particles coming from the gears in the lubricant) in an input stage planetary gearbox (see page 21, point A.5.4, "Gear arrangements" where planetary gear arrangements are disclosed in the fourth and fifth paragraphs) for a large wind turbine generator (up to 750 kW, see page 1, point 1, last line), wherein the planetary gearbox comprises a hollow wheel gear, two or more planet gears, and a sun gear (as it is always the case with planetary gearboxes), the method comprising smoothing the teeth of one or more of the hollow wheel gear, two or more of the planet gears and a sun gear to a low surface roughness before operating the gearbox (see page 9, point 4.4.5.4).

D1 only fails to disclose one feature of the subject-matter of claim 9, namely that the method comprises superfinishing (smoothing) the teeth of one or more of the hollow wheel gear, two or more of the planet gears and a sun gear to a surface roughness of 0,25 mym ("microns") or less.

This difference substantially corresponds (mutatis mutandis) to the difference already established and discussed in relation to claim 1.

Based on this difference, the appellants formulated an inventive step attack based on the combination of the teachings of D1 and D2 by adapting the arguments already submitted in relation to claim 1, to the discussion of the method claim.

Also the arguments provided by the respondents in support of inventive step for the subject-matter of this claim substantially correspond to those which have already been discussed above in relation to claim 1.

As a consequence, the Board concludes that also the subject-matter of claim 9 of the main request lacks an inventive step, for the same reasons as discussed above in relation to claim 1 of the main request.

9. Admissibility of the (new) first auxiliary request

9.1 The appellants contest the admissibility of the (new) first auxiliary request filed as late as the oral proceedings with the argument that the subject-matter of independent claims 1 and 9 (to be renumbered as 2) is not clearly allowable as the amendments made do not overcome the inventive step objections already discussed in relation to claims 1 and 9 of the main request.

9.2 The respondents argue that claim 1 and 9 of the (new) first auxiliary request are clearly allowable, and that this is particularly evident for claim 9 in the light of the ratio decidendi of G 2/88 (supra).

9.3 The Board disagrees.

The request is made up of a claim 1 which the Board can recognise as having been in an earlier auxiliary request (with "or less"), and, more importantly, a claim 9 which was only filed with letter of 23 September 2016. The admissibility of the request can therefore clearly be dealt with under Article 13(1) RPBA.

In accordance with the jurisprudence (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, IV.E.4.4.1 a)) one criterion for regarding late-filed auxiliary requests as inadmissible under Article 13(1) RPBA is that they are directed to subject-matter which prima facie is not allowable.

This may either mean that such subject-matter does not give rise to new objections or that it does not overcome an outstanding objection.

9.3.1 Claim 9 is not clearly allowable.

The respondents note that claim 9 of the (new) first auxiliary request has been reformulated as a method for reducing or eliminating damage to the bearings of an input stage planetary gearbox for a large wind turbine generator by reducing lubricant debris generated from the gear teeth.

Such a claim clearly overcomes the inventive step objections discussed above. This is because, based on G 2/88 (supra), it should be regarded as a use claim (use of a gearbox), whereby such a use achieves a beneficial effect which was not known before (eliminating damage to the bearings), and therefore as including this technical effect as a functional technical feature.

Clear allowability is given because of this "eliminating damage to the bearings".

9.3.2 The Board disagrees.

G 2/88 (supra) deals with the novelty of second non-medical use in a claim amended from a "compound X" to a "use of compound X for a particular purpose", or similar wording, where the only novel feature was the purpose of that use.

G 2/88 (supra) does not appear to the Board to be applicable in the present case, even if one would not see it as an amendment to the earlier existing method claim 9, but as an amendment to product claim 1.

The reason is that claim 9 is not directed towards the use of the input stage planetary gearbox, but to its production steps. It is a production method. For this reason it is not a prima facie allowable amendment of product claim 1.

9.3.3 Seeing claim 9 for what it is, namely an amendment to method claim 9, the inventive step arguments in point 8 above continue to apply. If the method steps are not inventive, the (realisation of) the inherent effects of executing that obvious method cannot make the subject-matter of claim 9 inventive.


9.3.4 Claim 1 of the (new) first auxiliary request has been amended to further specify that all of the teeth of all of the gears (instead of a plurality of teeth of one or more of the gears) have been superfinished to 0,25 microns.

As discussed above in relation to claim 1 of the main request, the skilled person starting from D1 would apply the teaching of D2 to reduce micro-pitting. This teaching relates to two interacting gear elements and consists in smoothing the gear surfaces of both those elements (see claim 6).

The respondents did not provide any reason why a skilled person would not superfinish all the surfaces of all the teeth of all of the gears of D1 in order to minimize micro-pitting in the gearbox. Such a reason is also not apparent to the Board.

As a consequence, the Board does not see how the amendments to claim 1 of the (new) first auxiliary request may be considered as leading to subject-matter which is now clearly allowable for inventive step.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The patent is revoked.

This decision T 1921/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2016:T192112.20161026. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Signature" by Christian Pierret obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 1090/12 - Common general knowledge referred to by a board

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Under what circumstances does common general knowledge require proof? And who has to provide proof: applicants/proprietors, opponents, examining divisions, opposition divisions, and boards of appeal, any differences or all alike? Is it required that doubt is substantiated -rather than just asserted- as to its existence before it has to be proven? The Case Law Book (8th edition, July 2016) provides in section I.C.2.8.5 "Proof of common general knowledge": "Where an assertion that something is common general knowledge is challenged, the person making the assertion must provide proof that the subject-matter in question is in fact common general knowledge (T 438/97, T 329/04, T 941/04, T 690/06). In the case of any dispute as to the extent of the relevant common general knowledge this, like any other fact in contention, has to be proved, for instance by documentary or oral evidence (T 939/92, OJ 1996, 309, see also T 766/91, T 1242/04, OJ 2007, 421; T 537/90, T 329/04 and T 811/06). The proof is regularly supplied in citing literature (T 475/88). According to T 766/91 and T 919/97, evidence of general technical knowledge need be submitted only if the latter’s existence is disputed.". In the current case, the board however seems to indicate that the situation is different if the board itself uses common general knowledge to invalidate a claim.

Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. The appeal is directed against the decision of the examining division, dated 6 December 2011, to refuse application No. 02737140.0 for lack of clarity. As "obiter dicta", objections concerning lack of inventive step over D3 in combination with D5 were raised.

[...]

II. A notice of appeal was received on 23 January 2012. The appeal fee was paid on the same day. A statement of grounds of appeal was received on 21 March 2012. The main and the auxiliary request specified in the decision were maintained. Oral proceedings were conditionally requested.

III. In its summons to oral proceedings, the board gave reasons for its preliminary opinion that claim 1 of both requests lacked an inventive step over D3.

IV. In a letter dated 26 May 2017, the appellant filed a second auxiliary request.

V. Oral proceedings were held on 29 June 2017. At the end of the oral proceedings, the board announced its decision.

VI. The appellant requests (see letter dated 26 May 2017, section 6) that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a European patent be granted on the basis of the main request, filed 17 June 2009, or on the basis of the first auxiliary request, filed 4 October 2011, or on the basis of the second auxiliary request, filed 26 May 2017.

The appellant further requested the referral of two questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

The further application documents are: description pages 3-68 as originally filed, pages 1, 2, 2a filed on 8 February 2006; drawing sheets 1-5, 7-13 as originally filed, and sheet 6 filed on 28 October 2011.

VII. Claim 1 of the main request reads as follows:

"1. A system for allowing a client application (212, 260) to access a service at a server (214, 215), wherein the server includes a server engine (201) that provides access to the service via an interface (216, 217), the system characterised by: [...]"

VIII. Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request reads as follows:

"1. A system for allowing a client application (212, 260) to access a service at a server (214,215), wherein the server includes a server engine (201) that provides access to the service via an interface (216,217), the system characterised by: [...]"

IX. Claim 1 of the second auxiliary request reads as follows:

"1. A system for allowing a client application (212, 260) to access a service at a server (214,215), wherein the server includes a server engine (201) that provides access to the service via an interface (216, 217), the system characterised by: [...]."

Reasons for the Decision

1. Summary of the invention

The application relates to a piece of software called a "plugin framework" (see original description para-graph [15], first sentence; abbreviated PIF, see [73], fourth sentence and [32], second sentence) on a single computer (e.g. an e-commerce server, [8]). In the PIF, a so-called "(application) server engine" program 201 allows dynamic customisation of software interfaces by extending the PIF through plugin software modules ([15], first sentence; figure 3: 201, 216, 217). In this context, "dynamic" means "at runtime" ([37], last sentence; original claims 3 and 12). The PIF contains two kinds of software components, the client components (called "client application (212,260)" in the claims, "caller 260" in figure 6, "Applications 206" in figure 2 or "client applications 206" in [32], sixth sentence) and the server components (called "server (214, 215)" in the claims, "Server (Provider) A/B 214/215" in figure 3). A client component invokes a service provided by a server component through an interface 216/217 ([36]; figure 3).

An interface is a data type such as, for example, a "struct" in the C programming language or an array where each element of the data structure is a function pointer (i.e. an address of a C function procedure) pointing to a plugin function implementing the service ([38], first sentence; [75], second sentence; [31], page 8, lines 15-17). The interface must be registered and "realized" in the PIF ([38], second sentence). After the registration of interface implementations (which are, for example, contained in a DLL file) in the framework registry ([69]), a client application component makes a request to the PIF to "realizing" the interface by calling the _e_pif_realize routine ([70], sentences 1-3; [73], fourth sentence; [74], fifth sentence and figure 6: call 266 of _e_pif_realize). This call results in the client receiving a pointer to the desired implementation, which it uses to "retrieve" the implementation (i.e. the DLL) into its local memory ([73], fifth sentence; figure 5: 256 "Load Implemen­tation Code into Client Memory"; see also claim 1 of the current main request, lines 18-19). This "retrieving the implementation into local memory" during the realization process is also designated as "loading it [meaning the implementation] into the caller's address space" ([38], fourth sentence; see also claim 1 of the main request, lines 11-12). After the realization, the client application can invoke the functions in the implementation DLL ([38], third sentence).

2. Overview of the present decision

2.1 The clarity objections in the first instance decision (18.1-18.2) are unjustified.

2.2 The board does not remit the case to the department of first instance (Article 111(1) EPC 1973).

2.3 Claim 1 of all requests lacks an inventive step (Article 56 EPC 1973).

2.4 The board does not refer either of the two questions submitted by the appellant to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (Article 112(1)(a) EPC 1973).

3. Clarity

3.1 Apparently, most of the clarity objections in the decision (18.1-18.2) stem from the fact that the decision assumes that the "client application" and the "server" of the claims interact over a network, i.e. that they run in a client-server (hardware) architecture.

[...]

3.6 Therefore, the clarity objections in the decision are unjustified (Article 84 EPC 1973). Consequently, the appeal is allowable in the sense that the reasons of the decision do not justify a refusal of the application. On the other hand, the examination of the application has to be continued, because in the first instance there was no decision on the patentability of the claimed subject-matter.

4. No remittal to the department of first instance

Article 111(1) EPC 1973 reads: "Following the examination as to the allowability of the appeal, the Board of Appeal shall decide on the appeal. The Board of Appeal may either exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed or remit the case to that department for further prosecution." The appeal is allowable, because the examining division erred in its decision that certain claims of the application lacked clarity (see section 3 supra). Making use of its discretion, the board decides to exercise the power within the competence of the examining division to examine the subject matter of the claims submitted for a decision on appeal. Accordingly, the board will assess whether the subject-matter of claim 1 of each request involves an inventive step. It is true that proceedings before the EPO are designed such that issues may normally be decided by two instances, i.e. an administrative first-instance department and, upon judicial review, by the boards of appeal. However Article 111(1) EPC allows for an exception to this rule. Since the board is conscious of the negative opinion of the examining division on the presence of an inventive step (see "obiter dicta", sections 21 and 22 of the decision under appeal), it would serve no purpose to remit the case. The board is aware that this opinion can only be derived from "obiter dicta" on inventive step and that a decision by the examining division on this subject would have carried greater weight. But, as the argument of the examining division is sufficiently elaborated and clear and the amendments before the board have not brought about substantial changes that would affect the assessment of the case, the board considers that the opinion of the examining division would not be substantially affected by arguments put forward in the appeal proceedings. Consequently, the board decides itself on inventive step.

5. Inventiveness of claim 1 of the second auxiliary request

5.1 In the following, only the second auxiliary request is analysed, since it is more concrete and narrower than the other requests. Therefore, the finding of lack of inventive step relating to the second auxiliary request also applies to the main request and the first auxiliary request.

5.2 Initially, the board noted in its communication sent in preparation for the oral proceedings that several features do not contribute to the presence of an inventive step, since they are merely present somewhere in the claim, but are not referred to elsewhere in the claim. Therefore the board concludes that they do not have any function in the claimed system and therefore do not contribute to inventive step. These features are:

- the "server (214, 215)" (line 2): in the following, only the "server engine" (included by the server) is used; nothing is needed from the remaining server (whatever this might be);

- the registration [of the first implementation] (line 6);

- a plugin module [comprised in the first implementation] (line 10): not used in the following;

- the dynamic linking and loading of the plugin module of the first implementation into the server engine: this first loading of the implementation (lines 9-10), which targets the server engine's address space, seems to be useless, since the client cannot call it from there by inter-process communication, and the same implementation is anyway loaded a second time, namely into the client application's address space (line 11) in which the client application can easily invoke it;

- providing plugin APIs that act as extensions to the interfaces provided by the server engine: not used in the following.

5.3 The essence of the claimed invention can be summarised as follows:

- a client application calls a "realization" function at a server engine in order to invoke the functions of a first implementation;

- in response to the realization request, the server engine locates the first implementation,

- copies a first array of pointers pointing to the implemented functions from the first implementation to a so-called "proxy" array,

- copies pointers from a second array of pointers to the proxy array for a subset of function inherited from a second implementation and

- returns a pointer to the proxy array to the client application;

- furthermore, the first implementation is loaded into the client application's address space and retrieved from the local memory of the client application process.

5.4 Document D3, which has already been selected as closest prior art, in the decision's obiter dictum (21.1) discloses that:

- a client application calls a "realization" function at a server engine in order to invoke the functions of an implementation: see page 56, lines 1-3: "A client instantiates a component instance by calling the COM CoCreateInstance() function and specifying the desired CLSID and IID, ..." - Thus, in D3 the "realization" function is called CoCreateInstance() function, the server engine is called COM runtime system;

- as a response to the realization request, the server engine locates the implementation: implicit, since the server engine/COM runtime system of D3 later on loads the implementation into the client component's address space;

- returns a pointer to the table of pointers pointing to the implementing functions: see page 56, lines 3-5: "... and the COM runtime system returns a pointer to the desired interface." - The interface of D3 is a table of function pointers/Vtable, see page 55, right column, lines 6-9: "It [= COM] implements component interfaces as a table of function pointers, which are called vtables ...";

- the implementation is loaded into the client application's address space/local memory of the client application process: see page 56, fourth paragraph: "For in-process instances, the component implementation is usually held in a dynamically linked library (DLL) and is loaded directly into the process's address space. The vtable then points directly to the component implementation." - The execution context used in the claim is called "in-process" in D3; see page 56, third paragraph: "Under COM, components can be instantiated in three different execution contexts: directly in the application's process (in-process), ..."

5.5 Thus, the claim differs from D3 in that it uses an array as the data structure for representing the table of function pointers and in that it copies the array from the implementation to a so-called "proxy array". Furthermore, function pointers from a second implementation are also copied to the proxy array in order to let the first implementation inherit functions from the second implementation.

5.6 The board cannot identify a technical effect emerging from these differences which goes beyond the usual effects of using arrays, function pointers, copying and inheritance, well-known before the priority date of this application.

5.7 The appellant argued that the invention avoided having to re-program the functions of the second implementation in the first implementation. This allowed the reuse of program code and reduced development time.

5.8 However, this merely eases and accelerates the programming, which is a non-technical activity. Therefore this cannot contribute to the technical character of the invention, and consequently also not to the presence of an inventive step (see also decision T 423/11 of the same board, sections 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12).

5.9 The appellant further argued that the reuse of code reduced the memory consumption.

5.10 This did not convince the board either, since a memory reduction would only occur compared to a hypothetical programming situation in which the programmer chose to first write the code of the functions for one implementation and then again for the other implementation. However, in the system of D3 the programmer would directly write the code of the functions he wanted to use, and this only once.

5.11 Furthermore, if a situation arose in which the programmer - for technical reasons - needed the same function in two different implementations, he would not hesitate to access an existing function implementation by a function pointer, since D3 already uses Vtables and function pointers.

5.12 Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the second auxiliary request is not inventive (Article 56 EPC 1973).

5.13 As stated above at section 5.1, the same arguments apply to claim 1 of the main request and the first auxiliary request.

6. No referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal

Referring to the board's statement made in section 5.6, the appellant drew attention to section G VII 3.1 of the Guidelines that reads: "an assertion that something is common general knowledge need only be backed by documentary evidence (for example, a textbook) if this is contested" and submits that this passage is binding on the boards of appeal when exercising the power of the examining division. In the case at hand, the board denied that it was obliged to provide written evidence and explained during the oral proceedings that its members knew from their work on previous cases that the features listed supra were known to the person skilled in the art. It would therefore have been for the appellant to show an error in the board's appreciation, e.g. that one of the features at issue was in fact introduced into the art after the priority date of the application under appeal. The appellant sees in this discrepancy a point of law of fundamental importance for which he seeks clarification and requests the referral of one or both of the following questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

6.1 The first question

"To what extent is a Board of Appeal, when exercising power within the competence of the first instance department which was responsible for the decision appealed under Article 111(1) EPC, subject to the same constraints on that power as the first instance department, such as the duty to follow the Guidelines?"

The board judges that an answer to this question is not required. In order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a point of law of fundamental importance arises, the board shall, during proceedings on a case and either of its own motion or following a request from a party to the appeal, refer any question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if it considers that a decision is required for the above purposes (Article 112(1)(a) EPC). The Guidelines for Examination at the European Patent Office (Version November 2016 - further referred to as the Guidelines) are not part of the European Patent Convention (see Article 164(1) EPC 1973) and therefore cannot be binding upon the members of the boards of appeal (see Article 23(3) EPC 1973). This is acknowledged in the Guidelines on page 5, paragraph 1, that reads:

"It should be noted also that the Guidelines do not constitute legal provisions. For the ultimate authority on practice in the EPO, it is necessary to refer firstly to the European Patent Convention itself including the Implementing Regulations, the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC, the Protocol on Centralisation, the Protocol on Recognition, the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities and the Rules relating to Fees, and secondly to the interpretation put upon the EPC by the Boards of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of Appeal."

6.2 The second question

"To what extent is a board of Appeal, when exercising power within the competence of the first instance department which was responsible for the decision appealed under Article 111(1) EPC, entitled to rely upon an assertion of common general knowledge, such as for interpreting a prior art citation or assessing a technical effect, without providing documentary evidence of such common knowledge, even though the assertion is contested and there is, in effect, no possibility of appeal against such assertion."

The board refuses this request, as the question can be answered by reference to the EPC without doubt (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, IV., F., 2.3.7).

Firstly, the board refers to its answer to the first question: there is no obligation on the part of a board of appeal to follow the Guidelines. Secondly, there is also no general obligation on a board to provide documentary evidence for the existence of a piece of common general knowledge. In proceedings before the EPO, a board of appeal has to respect the right to be heard and to give reasons for its decision. In cases where a board refers to common general knowledge as state of the art, it is not obliged to provide documents in every conceivable case. Doing so may be the most straightforward way to give convincing reasons why, for example, a certain feature was known in the art at the priority date of an application. But it is not the only way. It is also possible for a board to state what it deems to be known, and possibly where it is known from, in a way that puts the appellant in a position to try to convince the board that its findings are erroneous. Proceeding that way respects the party's right to be heard (see for example T 458/07, section 7 and R 20/11, sections 3.1 and 4, last sentence). In analogy to the situation in which documentary state of the art is presented, the appellant has the opportunity to comment on the board's view and provide arguments as to why the facts the board relies on are held to be wrong. A mere denial that such commonly known prior art existed is not sufficient.In its letter of 26 May 2017, the appellant complained that it was not in a position to prove a negative, i.e. what is not known to the skilled person. But that is not what the appellant is supposed to do. He could, for example, have provided evidence of when the contentious array data structure feature was introduced into the art, which the appellant however chose not to do.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The request for referral of questions to the Enlarged Board of

Appeal is refused.

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 1090/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T109012.20170629 . The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Encyclopedias" by Kevin Doncasterobtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 293/12 - First substantive response after summons

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Will the board admit a 'just in time' submission?

What is the position of a party in opposition appeal who did not respond to the statement of the grounds, but did file a submission in response to the summons to oral proceedings? 
In response to the notice of appeal, one of the opponents (respondent 2) filed a brief letter stating that it would await the statement of grounds of appeal and announced its intention to submit a reply later in due course. After the statement of the grounds was filed, the board set a time limit of 4 month to file such a response. However, no further submissions were filed until a month before oral proceedings. 
The proprietor considers that the opponent has lost it chance to file arguments, by not filing a timely response to the statement of the grounds--since the opponent had not filed a reply to the grounds of appeal, one cannot regard its later submission as an amendment to a party's case. On the other hand, the opponent considers the submission to be just further arguments, and sees no reason why they should not be admitted. The board find a middle ground, taking the submission into account but as a later amendment to a party's case.


Reasons for the Decision
(...)
3. Admission of submissions
3.1 Letter dated 13 April 2017
Appeal proceedings are based on the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal and any written reply of the other party or parties (to be filed within four months of notification of the grounds of appeal), any communication sent by the board and any answer thereto filed pursuant to directions of the board (Article 12(1) RPBA).
Article 12(2) RPBA provides that the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply must contain a party's complete case. Under Article 13(1) RPBA any amendment to a party's case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply may be admitted and considered at the board's discretion. A non-exhaustive list of criteria to be included in the board's exercise of discretion is given in Article 13(1) RPBA.
The appellant argued that, because respondent 2 had not made a case under Article 12 RPBA, respondent 2's letter dated 13 April 2017 had to be disregarded.
However, the board does not derive from the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 RPBA that a party that did not file any submissions within the four months of notification of the grounds of appeal would, as from the outset, be excluded from presenting submissions at a subsequent stage. No such exclusion is explicitly provided for in Articles 12 or 13 RPBA. Nor can any such exclusion be implicitly derived therefrom. Rather, Article 12 RPBA is concerned with defining the basis for the appeal proceedings and introducing a cut-off point at which a party's case is considered to be complete, such that the board is able to assess the appeal case and, subject to oral proceedings, take a decision. Hence, it is the risk of a non-appealing party that a decision is taken without that party having made its case if it does not file its submissions in due time, combined with the further risk that any submissions filed after the cut-off point are not admitted under Article 13 RPBA.
In view of the above considerations, the board does not agree with the approach suggested by the appellant that respondent 2's letter dated 13 April 2017 was to be excluded for the sole reason that no submissions under Article 12(1)(b) RPBA had been filed.
In the context of a non-appealing party that did not make any submissions within the four-month time limit under Article 12(1)(b) RPBA, the board notes that such a party cannot be in a better position than a party that did make its submissions in due time. Accordingly, the board considers that the requirements set out in Article 12(2) RPBA concerning the quality of the submissions apply, i.e. all the facts, arguments and evidence relied on have to be expressly specified. Likewise, aspects which according to the case law of the boards of appeal are considered by a board when exercising its discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA may additionally be taken into account in the context of the board's exercise of its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA.
Therefore, the board also does not agree with respondent 2's view that, because the letter of 13 April 2017 merely comprised arguments, it should be admitted, as opposed to the submission of new documents. From Article 12(2) RPBA it is clearly derivable that the concept of a party's "case" refers to the presentation of requests, facts, arguments and evidence. Article 13(1) RPBA takes up this concept by referring explicitly to "a party's case". Accordingly, the submission of lines of argument which had not been presented up until the cut-off point laid down in Article 12(1) RPBA constitutes an amendment to a party's case within the meaning of Article 13(1) RPBA, and its admission and consideration are subject to the board's discretion.
As can be seen from the minutes of the oral proceedings before the board, respondent 2's submissions dealing with sufficiency of disclosure were the only submissions on which the board had to take a decision as to their admission into the proceedings.
Of the various lines of argument concerning sufficiency of disclosure presented in the letter, the board did not admit the line concerning the determination of the molecular weight, i.e. the parameter "molecular weight", its clarity and the absence of a method for its measurement addressed on pages 5 to 7 and under point III.1.of said letter.
This line of argument was raised for the first time in appeal proceedings in the letter dated 13 April 2017, received about a month in advance of the oral proceedings before the board. In this context it is not relevant either that the ground for opposition under Article 100(b) EPC as such was already discussed in opposition or that this line of argument had been addressed in the impugned decision, because the appeal proceedings are not a continuation of the opposition proceedings. As neither the appellant nor respondent 1 had presented said matter in their submissions according to Article 12(1) and (2) RPBA, it was not within the scope of the present appeal. Nor had this issue been addressed in the board's communication and thereby brought into the appeal proceedings of the board's own motion. Accordingly, this was indeed a new line of argument and subject to admission by the board under Article 13(1) RPBA.
In addition to the fact that this line was presented at a very late stage of the appeal proceedings, the board considers the examination of sufficiency of disclosure in relation to a parameter to be a complex matter which can give rise to further issues. It involves the analysis of the parameter as such and its measurement, the evaluation of the knowledge of the skilled person with regard to the specific polymer under consideration and possibly also the assessment of whether Article 83 EPC or Article 84 EPC is to be applied. In these circumstances, the board considers that the aspect of whether or not the line of argument is of prima facie relevance, an aspect which may also be taken into account in the context of Article 13(1) EPC, is outweighed by the aspects of complexity and the procedural stage at which the argument had been brought forward.
Accordingly, the board, exercising its discretion, decided not to admit said line of argument (Article 13(1) RPBA).
(...)
This decision T 0293/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T029312.20170515. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by PublicDomainPictures obtained via Pixabay under a  Creative Commons CC0 license (no changes made).

T 1519/15 - Not so poisonous parent

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A 'family' of Amanita muscaria, which is best not eaten

This Examination Appeal shows the Board applying G 1/15 to what would otherwise have been a 'poisonous parent' situation. The outcome is as expected - the decision under appeal is set aside.

The Examination Division considered , pre-G 1/15, the situation as follows: claim 1 of the divisional application represents a generalization with respect to a species described in an earliest US priority document P1, and thus is, in accordance with the pre-G/15 legal situation, in its entirety entitled only to a later priority date from a US priority document P2. The EP parent application, which is cited as D3, also describes P1's species and is thus, at least in as far as pertaining to this species, entitled to the earliest priority date P1. D3 thus belongs, at least in as far as the described species, to the Art. 54(3) State of the Art of the divisional application and thus takes away the novelty of claim 1.

Reasons for the Decision
1. According to decision G 1/15, "entitlement to partial priority may not be refused for a claim encompassing alternative subject-matter by virtue of one or more generic expressions or otherwise (generic "OR"-claim) provided that said alternative subject-matter has been disclosed for the first time, directly, or at least implicitly, unambiguously and in an enabling manner in the priority document. No other substantive conditions or limitations apply in this respect."

2. Claim 1 of the present application includes the generic expressions

"a sensing circuit comprising at least first and second sensing capacitors", and

"at least one mimicking capacitor".

Claim 1 does not specify whether there are any transistors. It thus encompasses the specific embodiment of Figs. 4 to 6 of document D3, which embodiment is also disclosed in the present application, see the identical Figs. 4 to 6.

Since this embodiment is disclosed in P1 (see pages 19 to 21), claim 1 is entitled to the priority of P1 in respect of the specific embodiment. The remaining (general) subject-matter claimed, i.e. in particular a sensing circuit having a number other than four sensing capacitors, is not disclosed in P1 and only benefits from the priority date of P2. Figures 4 to 6 of D3 thus do not belong to the state of the art under Article 54(3) EPC for the specific embodiment with four sensing capacitors falling within the ambit of claim 1. As regards the remaining embodiments encompassed by claim 1, for example those with a number of capacitors other than four, figures 4 to 6 of D3 are not relevant to novelty under Article 54(3) EPC. The disclosure of D3 relating to a number of sensing capacitors other than four, see e.g. claim 1, moreover, is not entitled to the priority of P1.

3. It follows from the above that the decision under appeal is to be set aside.

4. As explained in the communication of 23 May 2017, and agreed upon by the appellant, the Board considers it appropriate to remit the case to the department of first instance for further prosecution (Article 111(1) EPC). The Board has noted the statement made in the communication of 31 May 2011 during examination proceedings, according to which claim 1 was not objected to under Article 56 EPC in view of the feature relating to the use of a mimicking capacitor. However, this is a statement made by the primary examiner and not by the Examining Division, and moreover formal requirements, such as the adaptation of the description, have not been yet subject of discussion.

This decision T 1519/15 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T151915.20170803. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Fly Agaric...poisonous." by Bernard Spragg obtained via Flickr under Public Domain Mark 1.0.

T 158/14 - Hidden in plain sight

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If your appeal to an opposition is entirely based on new documents, which moreover could have been found with a straightforward Espacenet search, should your appeal then be inadmissible? 
The opponent filed two new Japanese documents (D9 and D10) together with its appeal. The proprietor objects to these documents on the basis that they could easily have been found in a search during the opposition period. In particular, the proprietor observes that an Espacenet search in the same EPC class as the opposed patent for the year prior to the priority year gives document D10 as its very first hit.  Document D9 requires a bit more work, but is found in a similar manner. According to the opponent, basing an appeal on these late-filed documents is not only inadmissible but amounts to an abuse of procedure.
The opponent has it own complaints about the proprietor though. Three days before the oral proceedings, a further response is filed of about 90 pages, including new requests. 
The board doesn't go along with either objection. 

Reasons for the Decision
1. Admissibility of the appeal and of the documents D9 and D10
1.1 The patentee argued that the appeal was inadmissible for the reason that the opponent's grounds of appeal were exclusively based on the newly cited documents D9 and D10, documents which should not be admitted into the proceedings because they were late-filed and not prima facie relevant for the subject-matter of claim 1 as maintained according to the interlocutory decision of the opposition division.
The patentee explained that it would have been easy for the opponent to find D9 and D10 in public databases, in particular for the reason that D9, D10 and the present patent had at least one of the IPC classes G01N1/36 or G01N1/28 in common. The mere fact that D9 and D10 were not written in an official EPO language was not a sufficient reason for allowing the opponent to introduce these documents into the proceedings after the nine-month period defined in Article 99(1) EPC. The opponent was supposed to have searched during the nine-month period all existing databases, including those of Japanese utility models, either itself or by mandating a Japanese search company. Furthermore, none of the documents D9 and D10 was novelty destroying or rendered obvious the subject-matter of claim 1. The patentee concluded that D9 and D10 were late-filed, technically not relevant and, therefore, should not be admitted into the proceedings.
In response to a question from the board during oral proceedings, the patentee stated that the filing of D9 and D10 with the statement of grounds of appeal amounted to an abuse of procedure in the sense that these documents were late-filed and that no other objections than those based on D9 and D10 were raised by the appellant in its statement of grounds of appeal against the patent as maintained by the opposition division.
1.2 The opponent was of the view that its appeal fulfilled all the legal admissibility requirements foreseen by the EPC.
It further insisted that documents D9 and D10 were not withheld deliberately by the opponent but that they were retrieved by pure coincidence after the decision of the opposition division with the help of a Japanese client of the opponent, the client having given a hint of the existence of Japanese patent documents disclosing the same invention as the present patent. It was not realistic that the opponent was supposed to search all possible databases in all possible languages. The EPO had also not retrieved these patent documents. Finally, since D9 and D10 were highly relevant for the patentability issue of the claimed subject-matter, they had to be admitted.
1.3 The board notes that the sole reason provided by the patentee for rejecting the appeal as being inadmissible was based on the fact that the opponent's statement of grounds of appeal had exclusively been based on newly cited documents D9 and D10 which should not be admitted into the proceedings.
Following the established case law of the boards of appeal, the board considers that late-filed documents, as long as there is no abuse of procedure by the opponent, may be admitted into the proceedings if they are prima facie sufficiently relevant for questioning the maintenance of the patent (see e.g. decisions T 1019/92, point 2.2 of the reasons; T 671/03, point 2.2 of the reasons; T 1029/05, point 2 of the reasons).
1.3.1 Abuse of procedure
The board acknowledges that D9 and D10 could in principle have been retrieved within the nine-month opposition period. This, however, is not the issue at stake, but rather whether the late filing of the documents constitutes an abuse of procedure. Concerning this aspect, the board is satisfied that the opponent provided a reasonable justification why D9 and D10 were not filed during the nine-month opposition period: these documents are Japanese utility models having no English abstract and were found by the opponent only by chance after discussing the appealed decision with one of its Japanese clients. Documents D9 and D10 were filed at the earliest possible point in time of the appeal proceedings, i.e. with the statement of grounds of appeal. The board sees no indication that the opponent deliberately withheld D9 and D10 for tactical reasons.
1.3.2 Relevance of D9 and D10
Both D9 and D10 relate to the same technical field as the present invention, i.e preparation of histological samples, deal with the same technical problem, i.e. how to clean tissue cassettes from excess embedding medium and even disclose the same solution to the problem, i.e. sliding the cassette over a heated plate. Therefore, the board is convinced that D9 and D10 are highly relevant with regard to the patentability of the claimed subject-matter.
1.3.3 For the above reasons, the board decides to exercise its discretion pursuant to Article 12(4) RPBA to admit D9 and D10 into the proceedings.
Since the sole reason substantiating the patentee's request to hold the appeal to be inadmissible is not found convincing by the board, and since the board sees no other reason for holding the appeal inadmissible, the appeal is admissible.
2. Main request
2.1 Admissibility
2.1.1 The opponent stated that receiving from the patentee a letter of approximately 90 pages, including a new main request and new first and second auxiliary requests, just a few days before the oral proceedings represented an unfair behaviour of the patentee and justified a restrictive handling of the RPBA when deciding the admissibility of the claim requests. Moreover, the amended feature of claim 1 "... to melt the excess embedding medium ..." introduced a new problem since it contained added subject-matter. Therefore, the main request should not be admitted into the proceedings.
2.1.2 The patentee argued that present claim 1 was identical to claim 1 as filed with its letter of reply to the opponent's statement of grounds of appeal. The subject-matter of present claim 1 represented a limitation of the subject-matter of claim 1 underlying the appealed decision. The basis for the amended feature could be found on page 4, line 28 to page 5, line 5 of the application as filed. Finally, the term "excess" did not represent added subject-matter since it had a basis in original claim 1.
2.1.3 Acknowledging that filing a submission with a large amount of pages and new claim requests shortly before the oral proceedings should in principle be avoided by any party, the board nevertheless decides that the main request is admitted into the proceedings for the reasons given by the patentee.
(...)
3. Admissibility of the first auxiliary request
3.1 The first auxiliary request is not admitted into the proceedings pursuant to Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA.
Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request has been received by the EPO on 23 June 2017, i.e. shortly before the oral proceedings held on 29 June 2017, contrary to the requirement of Article 12(2) RPBA, according to which the patentee had to present its complete case with the reply to the opponent's statement of grounds of appeal. No valid reason, such as the filing of new evidence by the opponent, is apparent for the late filing of the first auxiliary request.
Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request comprises the additional feature, taken from the description, that the plate is heated in the range of 60°C to 90°C. D9 does not explicitly disclose this feature. However, the board is of the view that it lacks prima facie an inventive step (Article 56 EPC 1973). Indeed, D9 teaches to heat the plate at a temperature sufficient to melt the embedding medium. Therefore, depending on the actually used embedding medium, the skilled person would necessarily heat the plate at a temperature above the melting point of the actually used embedding medium. In particular, if the embedding medium had a melting temperature in the range of 60° to 90°C, the skilled person would adapt the heating elements of D9 so as to heat the plate in the range of 60°C to 90°C.
But even if the embedding medium had a melting point below 60°C, the board considers it obvious for the skilled person to increase the temperature of the grooved plate above 60°C in order to solve the problem of rendering the removal of the excess embedding medium formed on the exterior walls of the cassette more efficient. It appears obvious, indeed, that the higher the temperature of the grooved plate, the more efficiently and the faster the excess embedding medium is melted away from the exterior walls of the cassette.
3.2 The patentee argued that the new feature was already implicitly present in the feature of claim 1 of the main request "... temperature sufficient to melt the excess embedding medium". The patentee further noted that the present oral proceedings were the last chance to obtain a patent for its invention. Moreover, the new feature was already present in claim 2 of the main request filed with the patentee's reply to the grounds of appeal. Concerning inventive step, the patentee argued along the lines of its argumentation for the main request.
In view of the discretion not to admit late-filed amendments given to the board under Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA, the board does not find these arguments convincing. As noted by the opponent, the amendment originates from the description and it was not foreseeable that the feature of claim 2 of the main request filed with the reply to the grounds of appeal would effectively be introduced in claim 1. Concerning inventive step, the patentee did not present new arguments additional to those already discussed with respect to claim 1 of the main request.
3.3 Since the subject-matter of claim 1 is late-filed and prima facie not inventive over D9, the board, in view of the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy, exercises its discretion pursuant to Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA not to admit the first auxiliary request into the proceedings.
4. Admissibility of the second auxiliary request
(...)
5. Apportionment of costs
5.1 The patentee requested for the first time with letter of 21 June 2017 the full refund of its costs in accordance with Article 16(1) and (2) RPBA, submitting that the late introduction of documents D9 and D10 only in the appeal proceedings constituted an abuse of procedure. The patentee reiterated its request during the oral proceedings without providing additional arguments.
5.2 Under Article 16(1) RPBA, it is at the discretion of the board to order, after request of a party, an apportionment of costs according to Article 16(2) RPBA and different from the principle that each party shall bear the costs it has incurred (see Article 104(1) EPC for the costs of opposition proceedings). Article 16, paragraph (1)(a) to (e), RPBA lists typical circumstances in which a divergent apportionment of costs is to be taken into account.
5.3 Circumstances according to Article 16, paragraph (1)(a) to (d), RPBA were not invoked by the patentee and are also not apparent. As to the alleged abuse of procedure pursuant to Article 16(1)(e) RPBA, the late filing of documents D9 and D10 by the appellant does not amount to such an abuse (see point 1.3.11.3.1 above).
5.4 As a result, the board, by exercising its discretion and after having carefully considered the relevant circumstances of the case, for the above-mentioned reasons does not see any persuasive grounds which would justify a departure from the normal rule that each party bears its own costs, and accordingly refuses the request of the patentee for an apportionment of costs.
(...)
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The patent is revoked.
3. The request for apportionment of costs is refused.
This decision T 0158/14 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T015814.20170629. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by vieleineinerhuelle obtained via Pixabay under Creative Commons CC0 (no changes).

T 1329/04

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In the decision T 488/16, recently discussed in this blog, it became again clear that the EPO is strict in allowing post-published evidence to prove inventive step. The core decision where this follows from is this decision, T 1329/04. 
The cathwords of this decision: The definition of an invention as being a contribution to the art, i.e. as solving a technical problem and not merely putting forward one, requires that it is at least made plausible by the disclosure in the application that its teaching solves indeed the problem it purports to solve. Therefore, even if supplementary post-published evidence may in the proper circumstances also be taken into consideration, it may not serve as the sole basis to establish that the application solves indeed the problem it purports to solve.
Thus, post-published evidence of a technical effect/advantage is allowed as long as there was enough information in the application as filed to make this 'new' information already plausible. 


Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal lies from the decision of the examining division dated 5 August 2004 refusing the European patent application No. 94 907 259.9 published under the international application No. WO 94/15966 with the title "Growth Differentiation Factor-9" claiming priority from US 08/003303 of 12 January 1993. The decision was based on the main request and auxiliary requests 1 to 3 then on file.
Claim 1 of the main request read as follows:

"1. A polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide having GDF-9 activity selected from the group consisting of:

(a) a polynucleotide having the nucleic acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:3;

(b) a polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:4;

(c) a polynucleotide which is an RNA sequence corresponding to the polynucleotide of (a) or (b);

(d) a polynucleotide encoding a fragment of the polypeptide encoded by any one of (a) to (c); and

(e) a polynucleotide which hybridises under stringent conditions with the polynucleotide of any one of (a) to (d)."

The main request was found to contravene the requirements of Articles 56, 57, 83 and 84 EPC.

The examining division took document (3) as closest prior art and defined the problem to be solved as being the provision of a putative further member of the TGF-ß super family of protein and/or nucleic acid encoding sequences. The examining division held, in particular, that the mouse GDF-9 cDNA (SEQ ID NO: 3) as well as the protein sequence (SEQ ID NO: 4) did not involve an inventive step because the cloning of a sequence of a putative new member of a gene family based on conserved sequence motifs would be achieved as a matter of routine and also, because the minimal characterisation given, i.e. the tissue specificity of GDF-9 expression was not sufficient to elucidate its physiological function or putative involvement in pathologies or to provide any surprising effect in view of the prior art. The many speculations about the function of GDF-9 which had been made on the basis of tissue distribution were found to be obvious. Finally, the examining division, in this context, refused to take into account the teachings of post-published documents showing that GDF- 9 was a growth differentiation factor because the application per se did not provide any evidence in this respect. The same objections were considered to apply to auxiliary requests 1 to 3 which were found to contravene the requirements of Articles 56, 57, 84 EPC.
II. Following the filing of the appeal, the examining division did not rectify its decision and remitted the case to the board of appeal (Article 109 EPC). Pursuant to Article 11(1)of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal, the board sent a communication indicating its preliminary, non-binding opinion.

III. In reply thereto, the appellant filed on 26 May 2005 a further submission together with a new main request and two new auxiliary requests to replace the corresponding previous requests on file. The main request was then withdrawn during oral proceedings before the board which took place on 28 June 2005. The first and second auxiliary request filed on 26 May 2005 were then taken as main and auxiliary requests, respectively. Claim 1 of the new main request read as follows:

"1. A polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide [-] selected from the group consisting of:

(a) a polynucleotide having the nucleic acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:3;

(b) a polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:4;

(c) a polynucleotide which is an RNA sequence corresponding to the polynucleotide of (a) or (b);

(d) a polynucleotide encoding a fragment of the polypeptide encoded by any one of (a) to (c), which fragment causes growth and differentiation of oocytes; and

(e) a polynucleotide which hybridises under stringent conditions with the polynucleotide of any one of (a) to (d) and encodes a polypeptide which causes growth and differentiation of oocytes." (the differences with claim 1 refused by the examining division are shown in bold).

Claims 2 to 5 related to further features of the polynucleotide of claim 1. Claims 6 to 8, 9 to 11 were respectively directed to a vector/host cells including/transformed by, the polynucleotide of earlier claims. Claims 12 and 13, 14 to 16 respectively related to the polypeptide encoded by the polynucleotide of any one of claims 1 to 5 and to antibodies specific to that polypeptide.

Claim 1 of the auxiliary request corresponded to claim 1 (a) to (c) of the main request.

IV. The documents mentioned in the present decision are the following:

(1): McPherron, A.C. and Se-Jin Lee, J. Biol.Chem., Vol. 268, No. 5, pages 3444 to 3449, February 1993;

(2): Se-Jin Lee, Proc.Natl.Acad.Sci.USA, Vol. 88, pages 4250 to 4254, May 1991;

(3): Se-Jin Lee, Mol.Endocrinol., Vol. 4, No. 7, pages 1034 to 1040, 1990;

(4): Jinwen Dong et al., Nature, Vol. 383, pages 531 to 536, 10 October 1996;

Exh.E: Hayashi, M. et al., Endocrinology, Vol. 140, No. 3, pages 1236 to 1244, 1999.

V. The appellant's submissions in writing and during oral proceedings regarding inventive step may be summarized as follows:

Document (3) was the closest prior art. It disclosed the identification of a novel member (GDF-1) of the transforming growth factor-Beta family (TGF-Beta). The GDF-1 cDNA was isolated by screening a cDNA library constructed from mouse embryos with oligonucleotides selected on the basis of the amino acid sequences of conserved regions amongst members of the superfamily. The GDF-1 polypeptide was shown to have all of the structural characteristics of members of the family and, thus, was acknowledged as belonging to it.

The problem to be solved could be defined as providing a new growth differentiation factor of the TGF-Beta family.

The solution provided was the polynucleotide SEQ ID NO:3 encoding the polypeptide SEQ ID NO: 4 (GDF-9; claim 1).

Although being slightly different from the cloning method disclosed in document (3), the method used to isolate GDF-9 cDNA needed not be taken into account when assessing inventive step. Inventive step was to be acknowledged on the basis of the unexpected structural properties of GDF-9. Its sequence was only very weakly conserved (no more than 34% homology with known members of the TGF-Beta family) and, furthermore, it contained only six cysteine residues instead of the seven cysteine residues which were a key characterising feature shared by all members of the family. A further distinguishing property was that GDF-9 expression was restricted to ovarian tissue whereas GDF-1 expression had been shown to occur not only in brain but also in ovary and adrenal gland (document (2), passage bridging pages 4250 and 4251).

The present case was, in fact, analogous to that dealt with in decision T 182/03 of 23 June 2004 where inventive step was acknowledged to a nucleic acid encoding human cAMP-specific phosphodiesterase (PDEIVB) of SEQ ID NO: 2, on the basis of the unique structural features of the enzyme and of its restricted pattern of expression. The then competent board had accepted post- published evidence that a drug had been developed on the basis of the enzyme's structural properties as supportive of inventive step.

In the present case, the appellant had also filed numerous post-published documents as further evidence of the role of GDF-9 as a growth differentiation factor. Admittedly, this evidence served to support the description in the application as filed of presumed functions of GDF-9, rather than to support any kind of technical evidence that GDF-9 would be capable of performing any one of these. Yet, predictions should be permitted because of the "first to file" approach of the European patent system which forced the applicant to cover all subject-matter connected to the invention. Furthermore, in accordance with the case law (T 939/92 OJ EPO 1996, 309, point 2.6.2 of the decision), reasonable predictions of relations between chemical structure and biological activity could be taken into account while assessing inventive step. Thus, the combination of the predictions regarding the functions of GDF-9 - as the post-published documents corroborated - with the disclosure of the structural properties specific to GDF-9 was sufficient evidence for a surprising effect to be acknowledged, which warranted recognition of inventive step.

VI. The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the first or second auxiliary requests, to be taken as main and auxiliary requests, filed on 26 May 2005.

Reasons for the Decision

Main and auxiliary requests

Article 56 EPC; inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1(a), i.e. a polynucleotide having the nucleic acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:3 and claim 1(b), i.e. a polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:4.

1. The closest prior art is document (3), a study in the field of cell differentiation. In its introductory part, it provides a list of polypeptide factors which play critical roles in regulating differentiation processes during embryogenesis. These factors are regrouped in a superfamily, the TGF-Beta superfamily, on the basis of their functional and structural relationships to the transforming growth factor-Beta which itself has influence on a wide variety of differentiation processes such as adipogenesis, myogenesis etc.. The structural features common to the family members are discussed on page 1035, right-hand column, last paragraph to page 1037, left-hand column, first paragraph. They reside in the C-terminal domain which starts with a cluster of basic residues. Seven cysteine residues are conserved with their characteristic invariant spacing (16/16 members of the family; Fig.3A). Furthermore, there exists amino acid sequence homology between the TGF-Beta family members in the regions starting with the first conserved cysteine residue and extending to the C-terminal end (Fig. 3B).

2. The aim of the work described in document (3) is to isolate a further member of the TGF-Beta family. A cDNA library is constructed and screened with oligonucleotides selected on the basis of the amino acid sequences of conserved regions amongst known members of the family. A positive recombinant clone is obtained which carries a cDNA encoding a 357 amino acids long protein designated GDF-1. A comparison (cf. page 1035, right-hand column) of the GDF-1 122 amino acids long C-terminal domain with that of known members of the TGF-Beta family shows the presence of the cluster of basic residues at the beginning of the domain, of the seven cysteine residues with their characteristic spacing as well as of many of the other highly conserved amino acids. In addition, GDF-1 is 52% homologous to a previously identified member of the family: Vg-1 (page 1037, left-hand column). On page 1038 (right-hand column), it is mentioned that: "An elucidation of the specific role(s) played by GDF-1 during embryogenesis and/or adult animals awaits characterization of the temporal and spatial patterns of GDF-1 mRNA expression and the functional activities of GDF-1 protein both in vitro and in vivo." Yet, it is concluded on the basis of the structural analysis that "the predicted sequence of GDF-1 clearly identifies it as a new member of this superfamily." (cf. page 1038, left-hand column).

3. It follows from the overall information given in document (3) that, while the TGF-Beta superfamily was initially identified by comparing the sequences of factors having a common role (their involvement in differentiation), once an unambiguous consensus sequence had been defined, the skilled person was prepared to accept that a polypeptide belonged to the TGF-Beta family if it exhibited this consensus sequence, even in the absence of any evidence as to its role.

4. Starting from document (3), the problem to be solved can be defined as isolating a further member of the TGF-Beta superfamily.

5. The solution provided is the polynucleotide of SEQ ID NO:3 encoding the polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:4, denoted GDF-9 (claim 1(a) and (b)).

6. Whether or not the problem as defined in point 4 above has been plausibly solved, i.e. whether or not it is plausible that the molecule as defined in point 5 above constitutes a further member of the TGF-Beta superfamily needs to be investigated.


7. In the application as filed (pages 10 and 11), GDF-9 is described as a 441 amino acids long protein having a C- terminal domain preceded by a putative tetrabasic proteolytic processing site. Yet, it does not exhibit the most striking structural feature which serves to establish whether or not a polypeptide belongs to the TGF-Beta family: namely the presence of the seven cysteine residues with their characteristic spacing; in fact, only six cysteine residues are present (cf. page 11, lines 3 to 9). The common general knowledge regarding cysteine residues is that because of their ability to form S-S bridges, they play a fundamental role in the tertiary structure of proteins, which tertiary structure is to a very large extent responsible for functional activity. Accordingly, any change in the TGF-Beta characterising pattern of seven cysteine residues and their invariant spacing would be expected to have significant repercussions on the function of any TGF-Beta family member. In the same manner, a molecule which does not exhibit the "seven cysteine residues pattern" cannot clearly and unambiguously be considered a member of the TGF-Beta family, unless further evidence is available to that effect.

8. Furthermore, as already mentioned above, members of the TGF-Beta superfamily share sequence homology. In the part of the application as filed describing the prior art related to the invention (page 2), it is disclosed that subgroups in the family had been defined according to the percentage of homology between members, the members of a given subgroup being from 70% to 90% homologous. Here, GDF-9 is very far from fulfilling this criteria as its sequence is stated to be significantly divergent from those of other family members (cf. page 28), the maximal percentage of homology which was observed being 34% with the bone morphogenetic protein, BMP-4. This implies that GDF-9 cannot be attributed to any subgroup and, thus, must at best be considered as the first member of a yet unidentified subgroup. This finding and that in point 7 lead to the conclusion that, contrary to GDF-1 in document (3), GDF-9 cannot be clearly and unambiguously identified as a member of the TGF-Beta superfamily by only using a "structural approach".

9. Of course, the situation could most probably be looked at differently if it had been demonstrated in the application as filed that GDF-9 played a role similar to that of the transforming factor-Beta (as was the case for all of the factors which initially served to define the superfamily). Yet, there is no evidence at all in this respect. In fact, the application only discloses that expression of GDF-9 is localised in ovarian tissues, which per se is useful but insufficient information in relation to any function the molecule might have.

10. As already pointed out above (cf. point 8), in the application (page 28), it is admitted that "..., the sequence of GDF-9 is significantly diverged from those of other family members". Yet, functions of members of the TGF-Beta superfamily previously isolated from ovarian follicular fluid (inhibins) or shown to inhibit ovarian cancer (MIS) are recited, and tentatively and presumptively attributed to GDF-9. Further putative roles are also suggested for GDF-9 which cover some of the effects observed with TGF-Beta (paragraphs bridging pages 8 and 9). At oral proceedings, it was argued that speculations of this kind should be permitted because of the "first to file approach" of the European patent system which forced the applicant to cover any and all subject-matter connected with its invention. The board is unable to endorse this reasoning. On the contrary, in a first-to-file system the (earlier) filing date of the application, not the date at which the invention was made determines to whom of several persons having made an invention independently of each other, the right to a European patent belongs (cf. Article 60(2) EPC). Hence, it is particularly important in such a system that the application allows to conclude that the invention had been made, i.e. that a problem had indeed been solved, not merely put forward at the filing date of the application. Therefore, the issue here is rather how much weight can be given to speculations in the application in the framework of assessing inventive step, which assessment requires that facts be established before starting the relevant reasoning. In the board's judgment, enumerating any and all putative functions of a given compound is not the same as providing technical evidence as regard a specific one.

11. Accordingly, as a significant structural feature fails to be identical in TGF-9 and the members of the TGF- Beta superfamily, and no functional characterisation of TGF-9 is forthcoming in the application, it is concluded that the application does not sufficiently identify this factor as a member of this family i.e. that there is not enough evidence in the application to make at least plausible that a solution was found to the problem which was purportedly solved.
12. The appellant filed post-published evidence (e.g. document (4) and Exhibit E) establishing that GDF-9 was indeed a growth differentiation factor. This cannot be regarded as supportive of an evidence which would have been given in the application as filed since there was not any. The said post-published documents are indeed the first disclosures going beyond speculation. For this reason, the post-published evidence may not be considered at all. Indeed, to do otherwise would imply that the recognition of a claimed subject-matter as a solution to a particular problem could vary as time went by. Here, for example, had the issue been examined before the publication date of the earliest relevant post-published document, GDF-9 would not have been seen as a plausible solution to the problem of finding a new member of the TGF-Beta superfamily and inventive step would have had to be denied whereas, when examined thereafter, GDF-9 would have to be acknowledged as one such member. This approach would be in contradiction with the principle that inventive step, as all other criteria for patentability, must be ascertained as from the effective date of the patent. The definition of an invention as being a contribution to the art, i.e. as solving a technical problem and not merely putting forward one, requires that it is at least made plausible by the disclosure in the application that its teaching solves indeed the problem it purports to solve. Therefore, even if supplementary post-published evidence may in the proper circumstances also be taken into consideration, it may not serve as the sole basis to establish that the application solves indeed the problem it purports to solve.
13. The appellant cited two decisions in support of its case. In T 182/03 (supra), inventive step was acknowledged to human cAMP-phosphodiesterase on the basis of its unexpected properties, it being structurally divergent from other phosphodiesterases and its expression being restricted to specific tissues. In this earlier case, however, the question of whether or not the enzyme was a solution to the problem to be solved - which has to be positively answered before any other criteria are taken into consideration - did not arise. Thus, the rationale underlying said decision has no bearing on the present case.

14. Decision T 939/92 (supra) was cited insofar as it held that it was possible to take into account predictions of relations between chemical structure and biological activity when assessing inventive step. That is indeed what is stated in point 2.6.2 of the decision, the sentence however continues to "... but ... there is a limit beyond which no such prediction can be validly made." In the board's judgment, the present case goes beyond the acceptable limit in the sense of that decision because the chemical structure of GDF-9 is not that for which the predicted biological function would be expected (see points 7 and 8, supra).

15. For the above reasons, the main request is refused for lack of inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1 (a) and (b). As the same subject-matter is found in claim 1 of the auxiliary request, the said request is also refused for the same reasons.

ORDER

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.
This decision T 1329/04 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier:ECLI:EP:BA:2005:T132904.20050628. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by AKuptsova obtained via Pixabay under the Pixabay License (no changes made).


J 19/16 - does a loss of rights in the international phase after regional entry have any effect?

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An international application was filed in 2005 (with priority of 2004) with the wrong receiving office -the USPTO- who assigned an application number to it. The international application entered the EP regional phase in Nov 2006, and the EPO assigned a EP application number to it. About three years (!!!) later, the USPTO recognized that they were not a competent receiving office and transmitted the international application to the International Bureau, which assigned it a new international application number. The EPO assigned a new European application number to it. Somewhat later, the EPO issued a loss-of-rights communication due to non-performance of the acts for entry for the application with the new number. The IB/RO notified the (original) applicant's professional representative that the international application (with the new number) was declared to be considered withdrawn for failure to pay the prescribed fees to the IB/RO. Various renewal fees were paid in the European phase. But then, in 2014, the Receiving Section issued a communication that the Euro-PCT application that had two European application numbers assigned would be consolidated as a single application. Furthermore, the appellant was informed that the application could not be processed by the EPO as designated Office, as it was considered withdrawn in the international phase, and that the time limit for requesting review of the findings of the IB/RO under Articles 24(2) and 25(2)(a) PCT seemed to have expired. The Receiving Section on 17 August 2016 decided that the application was deemed to be withdrawn with effect from 22 January 2009. It came to the conclusion that, as the IB/RO with notification of 22 January 2009 considered the international application withdrawn by virtue of Article 14(3)(a) PCT for failure to pay the prescribed fees, its effect as a regular Euro-PCT application (Articles 11(3) PCT, 153(2) EPC) had ceased as from the date of mailing of the notification from the IB/RO, with the same consequences as the withdrawal of a European application (Article 24(1)(ii) PCT). The applicant appealed this decision. Despite a range of arguments, including good faith, the applicant was not successful.


Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appellant (applicant) contests the decision of the Receiving Section dated 17 August 2016 declaring that European patent application No. 05 858 797.3 is deemed to be withdrawn with effect from 22 January 2009.

II. The application was based on an international application that was filed by the original applicant Robert Bosch GmbH under the PCT on 2 May 2005 with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as receiving Office, claiming priority of 24 May 2004. It was assigned the international application No. PCT/US2005/015105.

III. The international application entered the European phase on 23 November 2006. The European Patent Office (EPO) assigned it the European application No. 05 742 104.2.

IV. On 12 February 2008 the USPTO, not being competent under Rule 19(1)(2) PCT to receive the international application, transmitted the latter pursuant to Rule 19.4 PCT to the International Bureau of WIPO as receiving Office (IB/RO), which assigned it a new international application number (PCT/IB2005/004218) and informed the original applicant by communication dated 13 June 2008. The EPO subsequently assigned it the new European application No. 05 858 797.3.

V. With communication of 11 December 2008 the Receiving Section issued a noting of loss of rights pursuant to Rule 112(1) EPC in respect of European application No. 05 858 797.3, informing the original applicant that the application was deemed to be withdrawn (Rule 160(1) EPC) for non-performance of the acts required by Rule 159(1) EPC for entry into the European phase.

VI. The IB/RO informed the original applicant's professional representative with notification dated 24 November 2008 that the prescribed fees for the international phase had not been paid and at the same time invited the original applicant to pay the unpaid fees and the late payment fee within one month from the date of mailing. The IB/RO subsequently notified the original applicant's professional representative with letter dated 22 January 2009 that the international application was declared to be considered withdrawn for failure to pay prescribed fees. The EPO as International Searching Authority has never drawn up an international search report.

VII. The application was transferred in 2012 to a first transferee and in 2013 to the current applicant (which is the appellant) as second transferee. At the request of the new representative of the first transferee received on 13 July 2012, the EPO amended the entry in the European Patent Register concerning the representative and subsequently informed the applicant in its official communication dated 19 July 2012.

VIII. Starting in 2007, the renewal fees for the third to eighth year were paid by the original applicant, the renewal fee for the ninth year by the first transferee and the renewal fees for the tenth to twelfth year by the appellant. The latter renewal fee was paid on 24 November 2016 after the EPO with a communication of 5 July 2016 under Rule 51(2) EPC had drawn attention to the missing payment of this renewal fee and to the consequence pursuant to Article 86(1) EPC whereby an application is deemed withdrawn if a renewal fee is not paid in due time.

IX. On 18 September 2014 the Receiving Section issued a communication informing the appellant that, in order to consolidate the proceedings concerning one single Euro-PCT application with two assigned European patent application numbers, proceedings would continue in respect of application No. 05 858 797.3 and that the communication of 11 December 2008 should be disregarded. Furthermore, the appellant was informed that the application could not be processed by the EPO as designated Office, as it was considered withdrawn in the international phase, and that the time limit for requesting review of the findings of the IB/RO under Articles 24(2) and 25(2)(a) PCT seemed to have expired. After the subsequent reply of the appellant dated 25 November 2014 with which it requested "to further prosecute the 'correctly assigned' European application number EP 05858797.3 (PCT/IB2005/004218)", the Receiving Section with a communication of 10 November 2015 reiterated the opinion that it had already expressed.

X. At the request of the appellant, the Receiving Section on 17 August 2016 decided that European patent application No. 05 858 797.3 was deemed to be withdrawn with effect from 22 January 2009 and that all fees paid after that date would be refunded once the decision had become final. It came to the conclusion that, as the IB/RO with notification of 22 January 2009 considered the international application withdrawn by virtue of Article 14(3)(a) PCT for failure to pay the prescribed fees, its effect as a regular Euro-PCT application (Articles 11(3) PCT, 153(2) EPC) had ceased as from the date of mailing of the notification from the IB/RO, with the same consequences as the withdrawal of a European application (Article 24(1)(ii) PCT).

XI. On 17 October 2016, the appellant filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee on the same date. The statement setting out the grounds of appeal was filed on 16 December 2016.

XII. As far as they are relevant for the board's decision, the appellant's submissions may be summarised as follows:

Once a pending international application has validly entered the European phase, its further fate is unaffected by possible deficiencies that occurred during the international phase and become apparent later on. Thus, the fact that the international application was deemed withdrawn did not influence the pendency of the European patent application, which by then had already validly entered the European phase.

Furthermore, the appellant could reasonably have assumed that the EPO had exercised its discretion under Article 24(2) PCT to maintain the effect of the international application despite its deemed withdrawal, as for more than seven years its conduct had suggested that the European patent application was still pending. In this respect, the appellant invoked the principle of good faith or protection of legitimate expectations and cited the allegedly pertinent decision J 14/94. Several circumstances of the present case gave rise to legitimate expectations in the appellant's favour: For example, after the deemed withdrawal of the international application and up to the issuing of the communication from the Receiving Section on 18 September 2014, the EPO did not issue a communication indicating that the European patent application was deemed to be withdrawn. Also, as a consequence the Register up to said communication did not contain any information on or indication of the deemed withdrawal of the application which the appellant or third parties could obtain by inspecting the Register. Furthermore, the EPO continued the grant process, as can be seen from the amendment of entries in the Register concerning the applicant's representative, and accepted all renewal fees paid by the applicants. The notice from the EPO dated 5 July 2016 led to the reasonable assumption that the application was pending before the EPO and that only failure to pay the renewal fees in due time would lead to deemed withdrawal.

XIII. In a communication under Article 15(1) RPBA, annexed to the summons to oral proceedings, the board informed the appellant of its provisional opinion that the loss of rights which had occurred in the international phase could no longer be remedied in the national phase.

XIV. The appellant did not reply to the board's communication. However, with letter of 1 August 2017 it informed the board that it would not attend the oral proceedings.

XV. The board held oral proceedings on 3 August 2017. As announced, the duly summoned appellant did not attend. During the oral proceedings, the board considered the appellant's request put forward in the statement of grounds of appeal that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the case be remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution. At the end of the oral proceedings, the chairwoman announced the board's decision.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal complies with the requirements of Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC and is therefore admissible.

2. The duly summoned appellant did not attend the oral proceedings. In accordance with Rule 115(2) EPC, however, the proceedings continued without it. In accordance with Article 15(3) RPBA, the board relied for its decision only on the appellant's written submissions. The board was in a position to decide at the conclusion of the oral proceedings since the case was ready for decision (Article 15(5) and (6) RPBA), and the voluntary absence of the appellant was not a reason for delaying the decision (Article 15(3) RPBA). The principle of the right to be heard pursuant to Article 113(1) EPC was observed since, by absenting itself from the oral proceedings, a party gives up this opportunity to be heard (see the explanatory notes to Article 15(3) RPBA cited in T 1704/06, not published in OJ EPO).

3. In its annex to the summons the board gave the following opinion on the merits of the case:

"2. According to Article 24(1)(ii) PCT, if for instance an inter­national application is considered withdrawn by virtue of Article 14(3)(a) PCT, the effect of the international appli­cation provided for in Article 11(3) PCT in principle ceases in any designated state, with the same consequences as the withdrawal of any national application in that state. Exceptions to this rule are provided in Rule 90bis.6(a) PCT, in Article 25(2) PCT and in Article 24(2) PCT.

3. The Board of Appeal has examined the file and considered the written arguments submitted by the Appellant, in particular in the statement of 16 December 2016 setting out the grounds of appeal. The Board's provisional view is that the loss of rights concerning the application at issue which occurred in the inter­national phase can no longer be remedied in the national phase and that the Receiving Section therefore - at least as regards the outcome - acted correctly when it refused the Appellant's request to further prosecute the application. In reaching that provisional view, which - if maintained - will lead to the dismissal of the appeal, the Board has taken into account the considerations set out in the following paragraphs.

4. No effects of valid entry into the European phase

a. The Appellant submitted that once a still pending in­ter­national application has validly entered the European phase, its further fate is unaffected by possible deficiencies that occurred during the international phase and become apparent later on. Thus, the fact that the inter­na­tio­nal application was deemed withdrawn did not influence the pendency of the European patent appli­cation which by then had already validly entered the European phase (see points 2.4, 2.5 of the grounds of appeal).

b. This view seems to ignore Article 24(1)(ii) PCT (see point 2 above), according to which possible deficiencies of the international application that occur during the inter­national phase are generally relevant for its effect as a direct European application and as a rule come to bear in respect of the latter.

c. Furthermore, the competence of the designated Office to process or examine the application (only) after effective entry into the national phase (Articles 23, 22 PCT) does not prevent the receiving Office from undertaking a procedural step regarding the non-payment of fees prescribed under Article 3(4)(iv), Rule 27.1 PCT in the inter­national phase. In fact, Article 14(3)(a) PCT does not impose any obligation on the receiving Office to issue a corresponding declaration under said regulation within a certain period of time after the expiry of the prescribed time limits. In addition, the PCT neither contains a provision which - complementary to the provision laid down in Article 23 PCT - generally denies the competence of the receiving Office to take procedural steps once the application has entered the national phase nor a provision which assigns the competence for issuing the aforementioned declaration to the designated Office after the expiry of a certain time limit. Hence, parallel competences of receiving Office and designated Office regarding the same application are not excluded.

d. As a result, neither the effective entry into the European phase nor the announced disregard of the noting of loss of rights dated 11 December 2008, communicated by the European Patent Office on 18 September 2014, are appropriate to prevent the already mentioned legal consequences that derive from failure to pay the prescribed fees during the international phase.

5. Request for review under Article 25(2) PCT

a. Where the conditions under Article 25(2) PCT are met, every designated Office must maintain the effect of the international application as a national patent application pursuant to Article 11(3) PCT. Article 25(2) PCT obliges the designated Office to review the decision of the receiving Office at the request of the applicant and to main­tain the effect of the application if the decision "was the result of an error or omission".

b. However, the original applicant never filed such a re­view request pursuant to Article 25(2) PCT within the prescribed time limit, and the Appellant too did not rely on this remedy. Having said that, as far as the non-payment of the fees is concerned, and possible procedural errors relating to the transmittal of the international application to the International Bureau as receiving Office notwithstanding, the International Bureau/re­ceiving Office's decision dated 22 January 2009 is clearly not the result of an error: it is an undisputed fact that the original applicant failed to pay the fees due.

6. Request for excuse under Article 24(2) PCT

a. As a further exception to the principle pursuant to Article 24(1)(ii) PCT, the European Patent Office as designated Office by virtue of Article 24(2) PCT may maintain the effect of the international application as a European patent application pursuant to Article 11(3) PCT for other reasons, if the loss of rights occurred due to a mistake made by the applicant.

b. The Appellant expressly referred to this remedy when stating that it could reasonably have assumed that the European Patent Office had exercised its discretion under said Article, as for more than seven years its conduct had suggested that the European patent application was still pending (see points 2.13, 2.14 of the grounds of appeal).

c. Contrary to the assessment of the Receiving Section expressed in its communications of 18 September 2014 and 10 November 2015, the Board does not hold that in the present case a request for excuse under Article 24(2) PCT is already ruled out because the alleged procedural prerequisites have not been fulfilled. In fact, the two-month time limit pursuant to Article 25 PCT is not to be applied for circum­stances that are to be considered under Article 24(2) PCT: that would not be in line with Article 48(2)(a) PCT which obliges a contracting party to the PCT to "excuse, for reasons admitted under its national law, any delay in meeting any time limit". Thus, the time limit, if any, for making a request to be excused under Article 24(2) PCT is subject to national law, and to national law only.

d. However, the Appellant has not presented any facts and arguments whatsoever as to why - by ignoring the notifi­cations of 24 No­vem­ber 2008 and 22 January 2009 - the fees due in the inter­national phase were not paid, and why the European Patent Office as designated Office under Article 24(2) PCT should already have excused this deficiency that lay in the area of the applicant's own res­pon­si­bility.

7. Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

a. The protection of legitimate expectations is a fundamental principle of European patent law that has been expli­cit­ly recognised by the Enlarged Board and which can be taken into consideration under Article 24(2) PCT. There is no time limit for invoking it.

b. The protection of the legitimate expectations of users of the European patent system requires that such users must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on erroneous information received from the European Patent Office or on a misleading communication. It also requires the European Patent Office to warn the applicant of any loss of rights if such a warning can be expected in all good faith. Furthermore, it is in­cum­bent on both the European Patent Office and users of the European patent system who are parties to proceedings be­fore it to act in good faith. Users of the Euro­pean patent system have a responsibility to take all ne­cessary steps to avoid a loss of rights.

c. The Board is of the preliminary opinion that neither the original applicant nor the present applicant (Appellant) as its successor in title can successfully invoke the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

d. As regards the original applicant, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is not applicable in its favour since it did not comply with the subjective prerequisite of acting in good faith.

aa. This is due to the fact that the original applicant's professional representative got both the notifi­cation dated 24 November 2008 from WIPO's Receiving Office, containing the - required, see point 7. b. above - war­ning that the prescribed fees had not been paid to­gether with the invitation to pay them within one month from the date of mailing and the note about the le­gal conse­quences of failing to do so, and the noti­fication dated 22 January 2009 from the Receiving Office with the declaration that the inter­national appli­­cation was considered to be withdrawn due to the failure to pay prescribed fees. Thus, once the applicant has got un­am­biguous knowledge of its loss of rights, a basis for the legitimate expectation that this right might still per­sist or resume cannot exist.

bb. Herein is to be found the decisive difference to the Board's ruling in J 14/94 which the Appellant has cited (see point 2.16 of the grounds of appeal): there the European Patent Office in the case of an unpaid renewal fee neither issued a notice drawing the applicant's attention to the possi­bility offered by Article 86(2) EPC 1973 nor issued there­upon a notice under Rule 69(1) EPC 1973 informing the applicant of its loss of rights due to the unpaid fee. In other words, in that case the European Patent Office had not informed the applicant of the outstanding payment, whereas here the former applicant has explicit­ly been notified of the loss of rights, and hence given the opportunity to file a petition for review of this decision under Articles 25(2), 24(2) PCT, an opportunity which it did not take. Therefore the former applicant could not continue the examination procedure in good faith.

cc. The former applicant additionally appears undeserving of protection because it showed a lack of good faith by ignoring the communication from the European Patent Office dated 11 December 2008 instead of clarifying that the payment of the prescribed fees under Rule 159(1)(c)-(f) EPC had in fact already taken place in respect of application number EP 05 742 104.2. The same applies to the fact that the former applicant apparently ignored the notification from the Inter­national Bureau of WIPO/Receiving Office of 13 June 2008, too, which expressly asked it to indicate, in any future correspondence in connection with the underlying international application, the international application number newly assigned by the Receiving Office (PCT/IB2005/004218). This conduct shown by the former applicant seems at odds with the require­ment that users of the European patent system must act in good faith, which is why they have a responsibility to take all necessary steps to avoid a loss of rights (see point 7. b. above) and therefore could for instance have an obligation to request a clarifi­cation from the European Patent Office (see T 905/90, OJ EPO 1994, 306, 316, 318, points 6 and 7 of the Reasons).

dd. Hence, at the time the international patent appli­cation at issue was transferred to the first transferee on 30 May 2012 and later to the Appellant on 5 August 2013, the effect of the international application as a European patent application had already ceased and could not be restored under the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

e. As a consequence, the Appellant - who, by the way, has not explicitly stated that it was not informed by its predecessor in title of the loss of rights that had already occurred - may not, in its role as transferee, successfully invoke the principle of the pro­tection of legitimate expectations: since the effect of the international appli­cation as a European patent application had already ceased at the time it was transferred to the Appellant (see point 7. d. dd. above), a resumption of the rights conferred by the app­lication cannot be effected by the mere transfer of the application to third parties acting in good faith.

f. In addition, none of the aspects listed by the Appellant in its statement setting out the grounds of appeal can give rise to legitimate expectations in favour of the Appellant in its own role as applicant.

aa. Firstly, this applies to the fact that the European Patent Office - up to the issuance of the communication from the Receiving Section on 18 September 2014 with which the Appellant was notified of the loss of rights for the first time and contrary to its obligation pursuant to Rule 112(1) EPC regarding application number EP 05 742 104.2 - did not issue a communication that the European patent application was deemed to be withdrawn (see point 2.7 of the grounds of appeal), as well as, over a period of eight years (2007-2014) and despite said loss, did not refund the 3**(rd) to the 10**(th) renewal fees (see point 2.9 of the grounds of appeal).

(1) Sources of legitimate expectations generally require positive actions, such as erroneous information provided by the European Patent Office in individual cases (e.g. in the form of communications to the party) or contained in official statements of general applicability and published by the European Patent Office. A mere omission by the European Patent Office may thus give rise to legitimate expectations only if further circumstances comparable to positive actions arise, such as a misleading communication.

(2) Consequently, also in the case underlying the already cited decision J 14/94 the Board held that - in the absence of a provision in the European Patent Convention imposing any obligation on the European Patent Office to issue a corresponding communication under Rule 69(1) EPC 1973 within a certain period of time after a loss of rights has occurred - the mere fact that a communication pursuant to Rule 69(1) EPC 1973 is issued late may not, in itself, reverse a loss of rights (see point 3 of the Reasons). In the concrete case, however, additional circumstances existed that led to the legitimate belief that the appli­cation was still pending, since the European Patent Office not only accepted all the fees paid by the appellant but also continued substantive examination by issuing several communications inviting the appellant to perform procedural steps re­quired with a view to a later grant of the patent. Consequently, the appellant, trusting that the application was still pending, invested time and effort in the exami­nation procedure (see points 4 and 5 of the Reasons).

(3) In the present case, on the contrary, the European Patent Office - apart from accepting payments of renewal fees - did not issue any communi­cations re­garding the substantive examination of the appli­ca­tion or otherwise conduct itself in a way that suggested that it would continue or rather, in the absence of an International Search Report, start the substantive examination procedure. The same applies to the fact submitted by the Appellant (see point 2.8 of the grounds of appeal) that the European Patent Office, upon request by a new representative received on 13 July 2012, amended the entries in the Register of European Patents concerning the representative and subsequently informed the applicant in its official communication dated 19 July 2012: the amendment and the communi­cation hereof referred solely to a circumstance pertaining to the sphere of the applicant and did not relate to the substantive examina­tion procedure. Hence, the Appellant was at no time prompted to invest any time or effort in this procedure.

(4) Accordingly, also in J 1/08 the Board held that the mere fact that for an admittedly extremely long time the European Patent Office has simply not dealt with the application is not sufficient to justi­fy a legitimate expectation on the applicant's part that the application is regarded by the European Patent Office as still pending (see point 12 of the Reasons).

(5) As a result, the fact that the European Patent Office for a long period did not communicate the loss of rights and accepted the fees paid by the applicants is not enough to give rise to le­gitimate expectations.

bb. Furthermore, contrary to the Appellant's view (see point 2.9 of the grounds of appeal) the notice from the European Patent Office dated 5 July 2016, infor­ming it that the renewal fee had not been paid by the due date, can also not be regarded as a source of legitimate expectations.

(1) This is already due to the fact that this notice was issued after the communication from the Receiving Section on 18 September 2014, with the effect that the Appellant at the time of said notice was already aware of the loss of rights and could therefore no longer act in good faith.

(2) In addition, the indication in the penultimate paragraph on page 1 of the notice ("If the renewal fee and the additional fee are not paid in due time, the European patent application shall be deemed to be withdrawn (Art. 86(1) EPC)") is not a legitimate basis for a reasonable expectation that the appli­cation at issue is pending before the European Patent Office and that only failure to pay the renewal fees in due time would lead to a deemed withdrawal, as asserted by the Appellant. Rather, the cited sentence draws attention only to the legal conse­quences concerning the sole subject of the notice, i.e. the payment of the renewal fee and the additional fee, and does not make any statement whatsoever about further possible deficiencies concerning the application that may lead to its deemed withdrawal.

cc. Lastly, these findings are not called into question by the fact relied on by the Appellant (see points 2.11 and 2.12 of the grounds of appeal) that the Register of Euro­­pean Patents, up to the issuance of the official communication from the Receiving Section of 18 September 2014 and contrary to the registration obligation pursuant to Article 127, first sentence, and Rule 143(1)(n) EPC, did not contain any information or indication of the deemed withdrawal of the application at issue which the Appellant or third parties could obtain by inspecting the Register: the European Patent Convention does not contain any provisions stipulating that entries (or omission of entries) in the Register­ can be invoked against the European Patent Office itself or third parties. In fact, entries in the European Patent Register have a declaratory effect only; the commencement, the existence and the cessation of a right depend only on their respective substantive requirements, which is why an entry (or lack of one) in the European Patent Register does not necessarily mean that its content is correct (see T 799/97, point 3.2 a) of the Reasons; see also T 854/12, point 1.2.5 of the Reasons). As a consequence, the Appellant could not legitimately conclude from the absence of an entry in the Register about the loss of rights that there were no obstacles to continuing the grant process."

4. The appellant did not submit further arguments as to substance against this opinion.

After having reconsidered the case, the board sees no reason to deviate from its preliminary opinion as given in point 3 above. The board therefore comes to the conclusion that the loss of rights which occurred in the international phase can no longer be remedied in the national phase. Thus, the finding of the Receiving Section that the patent application at hand is deemed to be withdrawn with effect from 22 January 2009 and that all fees paid after this date are to be refunded is justified. The appeal is therefore to be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.


This decision J 19/16 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:J001916.20170803 . The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Ghosts" by Sean MacEntee obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 914/13 - One 73(1) in the hand worth two in the bush?

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During oral proceedings before the Examining Division, an auxiliary request of the applicant was found to meet the requirements of the EPC.  However, in response to the Rule 71(3) EPC communication, the applicant reverted to earlier higher-ranking requests. The application was refused by the ED. 

The applicant appeals, but in its preliminary opinion, the BoA essentially concurs with the ED in respect of the higher-ranking requests, and additionally finds claim 2 of the auxiliary request for which the intention to grant was issued earlier to contravene Art. 84 EPC.

Ultimately, the applicant files a sole main request based on the subject matter of the 'previously allowed' auxiliary request but with claim 2 deleted, and argues that, except for claim 2 having been deleted, the claims of the main request correspond to those on the basis of which the ED had issued its intention to grant during the examination proceedings.

However, rather than ordering a grant, the BoA remits the case back to the ED for further prosecution, while noting that it is not bound to the previous intention to grant, and suggesting that the arguments provided by the applicant in support of inventive step of the main request were to be heard.

Reasons for the Decision
Main request

1. Remittal according to Article 111(1) EPC

The Board avails itself of its power under Article 111(1) EPC to remit the case back to the examining division for further prosecution.

1.1 With respect to the main request, the appellant argued that a Rule 71(3) EPC communication had been previously issued by the examining division on 16 May 2012. Nevertheless the Board is not bound to find the claims allowable merely by the existence of this communication, nor is the examining division. The request has anyway changed from that considered previously.

Further, the appellant has supplied written arguments concerning inventive step.

1.2 At least the following matters appear to require consideration by the examining division:

(a) The dependency of claim 2 reads 'according to any preceding claim'. Whilst this might normally be understandable in the context of the claims alone as meaning the same as 'according to claim 1', page 3, lines 14 and 15 of the description refer to a plurality of both independent and dependent claims which are not present. The resulting inconsistency between the claims and the description appears prima facie to result in a lack of clarity and lack of support by the description (Article 84 EPC).

(b) The two paragraphs of the description from page 3a, line 12 to page 3b, line 6 are indicated as being 'described herein by way of information only'. These paragraphs, at least prima facie, appear to be 'obviously irrelevant' for the invention (Rule 48(1)(c) EPC).

2. For the avoidance of doubt, it should be noted that the Board has not concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request involves an inventive step. Since the decision to reject the application only deals with other matters, it appears fitting that the appellant should have a possibility to have its arguments considered at two instances should this be required.

This decision T 914/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T091413.20170720. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" by Kate Ter Haar obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

R 2/15 - Suspected partiality of a deputy of the vice president

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It's all about the right to be heard.


In review case R 19/12 it was decided that an objection of suspected partiality against the chairman of a board of appeal may be based on his capacity as vice president. Can such an objection of partiality also be raised if during the course of the appeal proceedings, the chairman is or was deputy of the vice president? Can you ask the members of a board it they have been a deputy of the vice president?  This case also confirms that a petition for review can concern an interlocutory decision

The petitioner claims his right to be heard has been violated numerous times. These include:

-During the oral proceedings before the board of appeal, the objected to chairman handed out a statement which said that the chairman did not wish to make comments. 

- The petitioner had asked for an interruption of the Oral Proceedings of an hour, but got only half an hour. The petitioner also requested return to written proceedings, which was denied. .

- The board rejected the objection of partiality on the basis that the scope of a deputy's responsibilities are more limited than that of a vice president. Petitioner alleges this was not communicated to the parties prior to the decision.

An earlier decision in this case also featured on this blog.  


Reasons for the Decision
Admissibility
1. Article 112a(1) EPC
The petitioner is adversely affected by the decision to be reviewed, since its objection of suspected partiality against the chairman of the Board in its original composition was refused. The requirement of Article 112a(1) EPC is therefore fulfilled.
2. Petition against an interlocutory decision
2.1 The petition concerns an interlocutory decision dealing with objections of suspected partiality raised against the Board’s chairman. Although this decision was not concerned with the substantive issues that were the subject of the appeal, but with a preliminary issue regarding the lawfulness of the composition of the Board, it was final in the sense of constituting res judicata for this issue, decided upon by the Board in its alternate composition.
2.2 Petitions for review of interlocutory decisions are not generally inadmissible, as already implicitly recognised in R 5/08 of 5 February 2009, which dealt with a petition for review concerning two such decisions. The Enlarged Board sees no reason to assume, in the absence of an express provision, that Article 106(2) EPC, which stipulates that a decision which does not terminate proceedings as regards one of the parties can only be appealed together with the final decision, unless the decision allows a separate appeal, is also to be applied to the petition for review procedure. Neither Article 112a EPC itself nor its implementing regulations (Rules 104 to 110 EPC) contain a provision corresponding to Article 106(2) EPC.
2.3 Moreover, Article 106(2) EPC, which concerns the ordinary legal remedy of appeal, cannot be applied analogously to the extraordinary remedy of petition for review, for the following reasons. Because the admissibility of a legal remedy is such a fundamental issue, any restrictions to it must be clearly laid down in the law. This holds all the more true for the petition for review procedure, due to the fact that it is an extraordinary means of redress and has its own specific admissibility requirements. The wording of Rule 109(1) EPC, which refers in general terms to the provisions relating to proceedings before the boards of appeal, is therefore not to be understood as encompassing a reference to the provisions governing admissibility.
2.4 It follows from the above that the Enlarged Board is unable to identify any reason to apply, to petitions for review of interlocutory decisions, the same restrictive approach to admissibility that is applied to appeals.
2.5 Accordingly, the fact that the present petition is concerned with an interlocutory decision does not render it inadmissible.
3. Article 112a(2) EPC
3.1 A petition may only be filed on the grounds stated in Article 112a(2) EPC in conjunction with Rule 104 EPC. The present petition alleges fundamental violations of the right to be heard according to Article 113(1) EPC (see section IX(1)(a) to (e) above) in connection with the ground specified in Article 112a(2)(c), and a failure on the part of the Board to deal with a request submitted by the petitioner (see section IX(1)(c) and (2) above) in connection with one of the fundamental procedural defects defined in Article 112a(2)(d) in conjunction with Rule 104 EPC.
3.2 Although it did not expand on this point at the oral proceedings, the petitioner had maintained in its written submissions that the present review proceedings were also an opportunity to look at the substance of the decision, because the Board's lawful composition was a prerequisite for any correct procedure and for compliance with the right to be heard. The Enlarged Board acknowledges that, since the interlocutory decision deals with objections of suspected partiality against a chairman, it unquestionably has consequences of the utmost importance for the proceedings as a whole. Nevertheless, as has been made abundantly clear in the established case law, review proceedings cannot serve as a means to review the merits of a decision (see e.g. R 1/08 of 15 July 2008, point 2.1 of the reasons, and R 13/12 of 14 November 2012, point 2.5 of the reasons). This principle also applies where, as in the present case, the decision to be reviewed concerns the refusal of an objection of suspected partiality. The petition for review is therefore clearly inadmissible in this respect.
4. Article 112a(4) EPC
The petition meets the formal requirements of Article 112a(4) EPC regarding the time limit, payment of the fee, and the filing of a reasoned statement.

5. Rule 106 EPC
5.1 According to Rule 106 EPC, a petition under Article 112a(2)(a) to (d) EPC is only admissible where an objection in respect of the procedural defect was raised during the appeal proceedings and dismissed by the board of appeal, except where such objection could not be raised during the appeal proceedings.
5.2 In so far as the petition is based on the alleged violations set out in section IX(1)(a), (b) and (e) above, the petitioner duly raised objections under Rule 106 EPC (see its objections 1, 2 and 3 reproduced in sections IV and V above).
5.3 As to the alleged violation set out in section IX(1)(d) above, i.e. that the petitioner was unable to comment on the facts underlying the board’s core reasoning relating to the deputy’s limited scope of responsibility, the petitioner maintained that it only became aware of this issue from the written reasons of the decision, and that its petition was also admissible because the alleged violation fell within the exception provided for in Rule 106 EPC.
5.4 Regarding the alleged violations summarised in section IX(1)(c) and (2) above, namely the absence of discussion about the admissibility of the petitioner’s correspondence with VP3 and the failure to decide on a respective procedural request, no relevant objections were raised at the oral proceedings before the board. Accordingly, to the extent that the petition relies on this ground, it is clearly inadmissible. To the extent that this specific objection forms part of the petitioner’s general objection of lack of transparency it will be dealt with in the context of the issues regarding the alleged lack of information (see point 9.5 below).
6. The board therefore concludes that the petition for review is clearly inadmissible in part.
Allowability
7. Overview
As pleaded by the petitioner during the oral proceedings (see section X above), the grounds put forward in support of the present petition for review essentially fall into two groups. The first group concerns the argument that the decision was based on facts and reasons never previously discussed and therefore objectively surprising for the petitioner (see section IX(1)(d) above). The second group encompasses those grounds which revolve around the alleged general lack of transparency and factual information in the appeal proceedings leading to the contested decision, a deficiency purportedly compounded by the conduct of the chairman objected to (see section IX(1)(a) above).According to the petitioner, this conduct not only led to the second objection of suspected partiality under Article 24(3) EPC, which was raised during the oral proceedings, but also prevented it from presenting its case properly. In this difficult situation, the further procedural violations specified in section IX(1)(a), (b), (c) and (e) as well as (2) above allegedly occurred. The Enlarged Board will deal with these grounds in turn.
8. First group of grounds - the surprising nature of the decision deprived the petitioner of its right to be heard
8.1 The petitioner’s argument that it was surprised by and had no opportunity to argue against the crucial reasons of the Board’s decision took the following lines (see also section IX(1)(d) above):
- At no time before or during the oral proceedings had it ever been suggested, let alone argued, by any party or the Board that the deputy for VP3 could be regarded as not being a full deputy, but rather as someone acting within "some specifically limited scope of deputising". The petitioner had therefore assumed that the chairman objected to had deputised for VP3 in the relevant period of time and with unlimited scope. Insofar as the decision held otherwise, it was based on facts the petitioner was not aware of.
- The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “deputy” was a person performing the same duties and under the same obligations as the person he was deputising for. No other meaning could be deduced from the relevant legal provisions. A limited interpretation of the term “deputy” was not only unknown but also completely inconceivable. The petitioner made it clear at the oral proceedings before the Enlarged Board that this had resulted in a new factual background on which it had been unable to comment.
- The petitioner had exhausted all available means of obtaining further evidence establishing the facts of the case. It had thus complied with its obligations in presenting its case.
8.2 As already summarised in section III above, the petitioner had based its first partiality objection against the chairman of the Board (in its original composition) solely on the argument that the reasons of the interlocutory decision in case R 19/12 relating to the suspicion of partiality of VP3 also applied to the chairman objected to if he had acted as VP3’s deputy.
8.3 In deciding on the petitioner’s contention that there was a parallel between VP3’s situation and that of his deputy, the Board took the view that decision R 19/12 focused on the particular duties and obligations of VP3. It therefore assessed whether the chairman objected to, if he had deputised for VP3, was subject to the same obligations as VP3 by virtue of Article 10(3) EPC.
More specifically, in the passages referred to by the petitioner, in particular points 4.3.1 to 5 of the reasons (see also section VI above), the Board based its reasoning on a specific interpretation of Article 10(2) and (3) EPC. It proceeded by deduction and referred to Article 21(1) EPC, stating that the chairman of the Board, like any member of the boards of appeal, was bound only by Article 23(3) EPC, and that the mere fact that he deputised for VP3 in administrative bodies did not mean that he was under the same duty to assist the President of the EPO. This obligation to assist, laid down in Article 10(3) EPC, was incumbent upon VP3 in his capacity as permanent Vice-President. The Board concluded that, even if a chairman could deputise for VP3 in administrative bodies, it was clear from the EPC that the deputy was not a member of the administrative hierarchy of the EPO or subject to the President's authority under Article 10(2)(f) EPC; he was not under the general obligation to assist prescribed by Article 10(3) EPC.
8.4 The core of the Board’s analysis summarised above is of a legal nature, i.e. it relies on legal provisions of the EPC that are accessible to all parties to EPO proceedings, not on any particular factual knowledge about the functioning of the boards of appeal. This also holds true for the Board’s further observation that with respect to review cases the chairman objected to was not in the same position of influence as that enjoyed by VP3 as regular chairman of the Enlarged Board. Indeed, Article 22(2), third sentence, EPC specifically excludes a technically qualified chairman from chairing the Enlarged Board. The petitioner's argument that the Board’s reasoning - paraphrased in the petition by the phrase “some specifically limited scope of deputising” (see the letter dated 11 May 2015, page 10) - was based on facts unknown to the parties therefore cannot be followed.
8.5 Nor is it apparent that the petitioner had no opportunity to put forward its point of view on the functions and duties of VP3 as compared with those of his deputy, including the question of which statutory provisions applied to one and which to the other. According to the minutes of the oral proceedings, this comparison was central to the discussion during the hearing. On page 3 of the minutes it is stated (underlining by the Enlarged Board):
“Taking into account the questions to which extent the functions of the Vice-President of DG3 and a chairman of a technical board of appeal, and the proceedings before the Enlarged Board of Appeal and a technical board of appeal, were comparable, the question whether the objection under Article 24(3) EPC was justified in the light of the findings of the interlocutory decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of 25 April 2014 in the case R 19/12 was discussed with the parties. The appellant requested that Question 1 on page 13 of its letter of 19 September 2014 be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (‘Referral question 1’).”
Question 1 on page 13 of the letter referred to in the minutes (see also section III above) reads as follows:
“Question 1: Is an objection under Art. 24(3) EPC against a member of a Board of Appeal justified for the sole reason that, during the course of the appeal proceedings, the objected-to member in addition to the judicial function holds or has held an administrative position in the European Patent Office, provided that such dual function is not required by law, in particular when the objected-to member holds or has held the position of deputy of Vice President in charge of the Boards of Appeal?”
This question had already been formulated in advance of the oral proceedings before the Board and was considered during the oral proceedings - as the minutes make clear - to be the petitioner’s reaction to the comparison of the functions of VP3 and his deputy. It shows that the petitioner was aware, or at least should have been aware, of the possibility that the Board might come to the conclusion that the functions and duties of VP3, on the one hand, and those of his deputy, on the other hand, were legally distinct and that this distinction was of relevance in the context of suspicions of partiality.
8.6 According to the petitioner, the Board never suggested that “a deputy could be regarded as not being a full deputy” and that Article 10(3) EPC applied only to Vice-Presidents, not to their deputies. In support of this argument, the petitioner contested the factual correctness of that part of the decision where the respondents’ arguments were summarised; it also questioned the reliability of the minutes in general on the grounds that they were not sent out until five months after the oral proceedings.
8.7 However, the mere fact that the minutes were issued late does not suffice to call into question the credibility of the above statement made in them. Further, there is no need to look any further into precisely what was stated in the oral proceedings by the Board and the parties and in particular whether or not the petitioner was directly confronted with the argument that - as it put it - a deputy was not a full deputy and had some specifically limited scope of deputising, and that therefore Article 10(3) EPC was not applicable to the deputy of VP3. The reason that there is no such need is that the petitioner - given that it was arguing that the findings in R 19/12 were transferable to the present case - was aware, or at least should have been, that the legal comparison of the duties and obligations of VP3 with those of his deputy was crucial for deciding on the merits of the objection raised under Article 24(3) EPC. It therefore had sufficient opportunity to argue its case.
8.8 The Enlarged Board concludes that no fundamental violation of the right to be heard can be established in respect of the first group of grounds on which the petition is based.
9. Second group of grounds - violations of the right to be heard and fundamental procedural violations which resulted in a lack of transparency and factual information in the appeal proceedings
9.1 Failure to investigate and to provide the information sought by the petitioner
9.1.1 According to the petitioner, by admitting the first objection under Article 24(3) EPC the Board in its original composition acknowledged that it was not devoid of merit. As put forward in “Referral question 2” annexed to the minutes of the oral proceedings and on page 15 of the letter dated 11 May 2015, the Board therefore had to investigate the factual background of the objection, because Article 3(1) RPBA and Article 6 ECHR obliged it to carry out an examination in order to provide evidence known by the Board.
9.1.2 This argument is not convincing. At the stage when the chairman objected to was still a member of it, the Board had to take care not to impinge on the competence of the body deciding on the merits of the objection. The Board in its alternate composition, on the other hand, was fully entitled to assess its merits.
9.1.3 Since the chairman objected to did not participate in the decision under review, his failure to comment in substance on the objection cannot as such constitute a procedural violation committed by the Board in its alternate composition. A procedural violation may reasonably be argued only with respect to the manner in which the Board reacted to this behaviour. The petitioner’s point is that the Board’s dismissal of all its attempts to get information or time to react to the objected-to chairman's failure to comment left it in the dark and thereby improperly limited its right to be heard.
9.1.4 However, as already set out above, the Board was of the opinion that it could reach a decision without any further investigations into the factual circumstances of the objected-to chairman’s deputisation for VP3. It was therefore not obliged to try to clarify an issue which, according to its own legal assessment (the correctness of which is not a matter to be evaluated in review proceedings, see point 3.2 above), was not relevant for the outcome of the proceedings. Furthermore, according to the established case law of the Enlarged Board, a violation of the right to be heard can only be considered as fundamental for the purposes of Article 112a(2)(c) EPC if a causal link exists between the procedural defect and the final decision (see R 1/08, point 3 of the reasons; R 11/09 of 22 November 2010, point 8 of the reasons; R 19/09 of 24 March 2010, point 9.2 of the reasons). There is no such causal link in the present case, since the decision expressly states that the circumstances which, according to the petitioner, should have been investigated had no bearing on the outcome of the appeal proceedings.
9.2 Time allocated to petitioner during oral proceedings
9.2.1 The petitioner alleges that it was not allocated enough time during the oral proceedings to react to the objected-to chairman's refusal to comment. It had requested that the oral proceedings be interrupted for at least one hour, but the Board only interrupted them for 30 minutes. The petitioner raised an objection (“Objection 1”, see section IV above), which was dismissed.
9.2.2 The Enlarged Board notes that the proceedings before the Board (in its alternate composition) took place on two days, i.e. between 10:40 hrs and 18:00 hrs on the first day and between 9:20 hrs and 14:00 hrs on the second day. On both days, the petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its case, including arguments, objections and questions for referral. In particular, it raised a second objection of suspicion of partiality based on the refusal to comment. It has not been argued - and is not apparent from the minutes - that the Board dismissed any of these arguments or objections as belated for not having been submitted immediately after the above-mentioned interruption. Therefore, the Enlarged Board fails to see how the difference in the length of the interruption (30 minutes instead of 1 hour) at this early stage of the proceedings could have affected in any way the decision which was finally taken.
9.2.3 Accordingly, the alleged deficiency cannot amount to a fundamental violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard.
9.3 Refusal to return to written proceedings
9.3.1 The petitioner furthermore maintained that the Board committed a fundamental violation of its right to be heard by refusing to return to written proceedings, since at the oral proceedings the petitioner could not adequately deal with the objected-to chairman’s failure to comment. The petitioner’s position is that a return to written proceedings would have enabled it to submit further relevant case law, in particular decisions of the ECtHR and of national courts supporting its contention that the chairman objected to had a duty to comment in substance and its further argument that its second objection of suspected partiality, based on the refusal to comment, was well-founded.
The petitioner argued during the oral proceedings before the Enlarged Board that the Board had made the wrong decision because - had it been aware of the relevant European and national case law - it would have recognised that it and the objected-to chairman were under an obligation to dispel any doubts. Its decision, according to the petitioner, ignored the ECtHR’s case law on Article 6 ECHR as well as the relevant national case law. There was thus a causal link between the refusal to return to written proceedings and the outcome of the appeal proceedings.
9.3.2 The issue which the Enlarged Board must decide on is not whether the Board made a wrong decision. That would imply an assessment of the merits of the decision and would therefore fall outside the scope of the petition for review procedure (see point 3.2 above). Rather, the crucial issue is whether, prior to the Board’s decision, the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to put forward all its relevant arguments.
9.3.3 The time allocated to the petitioner by the Board to react to the objected-to chairman’s refusal to comment is to be assessed in the context of the case as a whole.
The oral proceedings before the Board in its alternate composition, devoted to a preliminary procedural point, namely the objection under Article 24(3) EPC, and not to the substance of the appeal case, took place on two consecutive days and lasted, with interruptions, more than a full day. As already noted above (point 9.2.2), on both days the petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its case, including arguments, objections and questions for referral.
9.3.4 According to Article 15(6) RPBA, a board of appeal shall ensure that a case is ready for decision at the conclusion of the oral proceedings, unless there are special reasons to the contrary. Thus, whilst it is not out of the question for a board to return to written proceedings, this power has to be exercised with caution and in exceptional circumstances. So the issue is whether the circumstances of the present case were so exceptional that the Board was obliged to return to written proceedings and, by not doing so, fundamentally violated the petitioner’s right to be heard.
As is apparent from the written reasons of the decision (see section VI above), the Board took the view that Article 3(2) RPBA safeguarded the objected-to member’s right to be heard on the objection, by giving him an opportunity to present his comments, but did not impose any general obligation to provide a full response to the objection made. The Board accepted that there might be cases where a board would not be in a position to decide on the objection without obtaining the necessary information from the member objected to, but took the view that this was not such a case. Therefore, no partiality could be inferred from the objected-to chairman’s failure to comment in substance on the objection.
9.3.5 As already stated on a number of occasions above (see points 3.2 and 9.3.2), it is not within the Enlarged Board’s competence in the framework of the present review to decide whether the Board’s view was correct. The only question is whether the Board, to respect the petitioner's right to be heard, should have used its exceptional power to return to written proceedings to give it an opportunity to research the case law, in particular decisions of the ECtHR and national courts, for rulings that might have contradicted the Board’s view and persuaded it to change its mind.
One of the Board’s considerations in deciding not to accede to the petitioner’s request for a return to written proceedings was the content of a letter to VP3, a copy of which had been submitted by the petitioner with its letter of 19 September 2014. In that letter the petitioner noted that, so far, no statement had been made by the member objected to and it cited an English Court of Appeal decision according to which a judge faced with an objection that he should recuse himself on the ground of apparent bias had a duty to disclose relevant information (see annex Pet 11 to the present petition). The Board concluded from the letter that the petitioner, prior to the oral proceedings, had in fact given consideration to the possibility that no detailed answer would be given by the member objected to. The petitioner complained that a letter addressed to VP3 was being used against it, whereas further items of correspondence with VP3 had not been admitted (see point 10 below).
However, there are no grounds for objection if a board, when assessing a request for a return to written proceedings, takes into account the party’s previous behaviour as documented in a submission made prior to the oral proceedings. Nor is it inconsistent with this approach not to admit further correspondence submitted only at the oral proceedings.
9.3.6 For these reasons, it cannot be concluded that, in the procedural circumstances of the case at issue, the Board was obliged to accede to the petitioner’s request for a return to written proceedings to give it an opportunity to research further case law. In this respect, no fundamental violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard has occurred.
9.4 In view of the above, the Enlarged Board concludes that when the Board decided that the lack of detailed information from the chairman objected to did not give rise to the appearance of suspected partiality as alleged, it made a decision on an established fact: the chairman's silence, which it evaluated in the context of the case as a whole, including R 19/12 - which also refers to Article 6 ECHR and ECtHR case law. Having heard the petitioner’s arguments, it did not find it necessary, in order to evaluate the facts it had to decide on, to delay the proceedings and wait for possible guidance from national and European case law that might be submitted by the petitioner. Further, the Enlarged Board concludes that (i) the petitioner had time to express its doubts about whether the chairman objected to had the right to remain silent and about the consequences of this silence, (ii) there was no exceptional circumstance requiring a return to the written proceedings, and (iii) the contention that the silence of the chairman objected to might have been interpreted differently if the Board had been in possession of the national and European case law referred to by the petitioner remains speculative, given all the circumstances taken into consideration by the board in this particular case.
9.5 Non-admission of further correspondence with VP3
9.5.1 In addition to the copy of the enquiry letter already filed with the letter of 19 September 2014, the petitioner submitted two further items of correspondence with VP3 in the course of the oral proceedings, namely a copy of VP3's response to this letter and a copy of a further enquiry letter sent to VP3 on the first day of the oral proceedings (see sections IV and V above and the petition of 3 March 2015, page 8). The Board handed both documents back to the petitioner. The petitioner alleges that this amounted to a failure to decide on its requests that these documents be admitted (Article 112a(2)(d) EPC in conjunction with Rule 104(b) EPC), and that the absence of any discussion of these requests constituted a fundamental violation of its right to be heard (see section IX(1)(c) and (2) above).
9.5.2 Nothing in the minutes contradicts the petitioner’s allegation that the admissibility of the documents was not discussed. The Enlarged Board therefore assumes, at least for the sake of argument, that the parties were not heard on this issue.
9.5.3 However, even leaving aside the fact that the petitioner did not raise any specific objection under Rule 106 EPC in respect of the admission of the correspondence, the Enlarged Board notes that this correspondence was filed in order to (i) demonstrate the lack of information, (ii) justify the petitioner's expectation that the chairman objected to would make a statement disclosing the missing information, and (iii) demonstrate its surprise at the chairman's refusal to comment. Therefore, the reasons set out above regarding the lack of information and the decision coming as a surprise apply here as well, and the Enlarged Board fails to see that any possible causal link has been established between the fact that the Board refused to admit the correspondence, without making any formal decision, and the outcome of the proceedings.
9.6 The Enlarged Board concludes that no fundamental violation of the right to be heard can be established in respect of the second group of grounds on which the petition is based.
10. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the petition is clearly unallowable. It also follows that the fee for the petition cannot be reimbursed.
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
The petition for review is unanimously rejected as clearly unallowable.
This decision R 0002/15 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2016:R000215.20161121. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by GDJ via PixaBay under a CC0 license (no changes made).



T 2016/16 - All due care: assistant well-trained but not properly instructed/ not properly supervised by the patent attorney

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The applicant timely filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. However, the applicant missed the 4-month period to file the grounds of appeal, because the 4-month period had never been recorded in the internal electronic docketing system.  With the late-filed statement of grounds, the applicant filed a request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal was filed and the prescribed fee was paid. A well-trained, competent and experienced assistant, who has the CIPA Patent Administrator Qualification had overlooked to record the 4-month period and the responsible patent attorney did not think to check whether the period for filing the grounds of appeal had been logged in the docketing system. The Board concluded that, even with a system of double checking in place, the representative is not discharged from his or her duty to properly instruct and supervise the assistant (cf. T 1465/07, reasons 18, last paragraph). In the case at hand, the appellants have not shown that the assistant was properly instructed or that she was properly supervised. Thus, the appellants have not discharged their burden to prove the existence of a normally satisfactory monitoring system. The omission from the docketing system of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds can therefore not be said to equate to an isolated mistake in a normally satisfactory monitoring system. The request for re-establishment of rights is to be refused.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appellants (applicants) lodged an appeal against the decision of the examining division to refuse application No. 10 817 590.2. The impugned decision was posted on 16 March 2016.

II. The appellants filed a notice of appeal on 20 April 2016 and paid the prescribed fee on the same day.

III. The statement of grounds of appeal was filed on 22 August 2016. On the same day, a request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal was filed and the prescribed fee was paid. With the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellants filed a main request and an auxiliary request.

IV. The appellants were summoned for oral proceedings.

V. The board issued a communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA. In its preliminary opinion, it stated that the request for re-establishment of rights appeared to be admissible but it also appeared to be unfounded in particular because no evidence had been filed.

VI. The appellants filed a copy of a CIPA Patent Administrator Qualification certificate issued in the name of Ms S.

VII. In their letter dated 7 September 2017, the appellants informed the board that their representative would not be attending the oral proceedings.

VIII. In a telephone conversation on the same day, the rapporteur of the board informed the appellants' representative that, according to the board's preliminary opinion, the request for re-establishment should be refused. The representative confirmed that the appellants' letter of that day was not to be construed as a withdrawal of the appeal.

IX. Oral proceedings before the board took place in the appellants' absence.

X. The appellants' arguments, as far as relevant for the present decision, may be summarised as follows:

The time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal was not entered in the docketing system used by the representative's firm. The failure to observe the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal came to light after the representative's client raised a query regarding an invoice on 15 August 2016.

Normally, incoming post is checked every day and time limits are recorded in the internal electronic docketing system. The time limits set by any incoming communications are generally identified and recorded by a well-trained, competent and experienced assistant, who has the CIPA Patent Administrator Qualification and who normally performs her duties satisfactorily. The incoming communications are then brought to the attention of the attorneys working on the case and the relevant time limits are double checked. In the present case, the assistant, Ms S., only entered the first, two-month deadline for filing the notice of appeal in the docketing system on receipt of the decision. The appellants' representative, Ms F., was independently monitoring the case for the issuance of the decision and reviewed the docketing system once the decision had been received. However,the representative, when reviewing the case and the newly received decision, also overlooked the omission of the second, four-month deadline for filing the grounds of appeal. When filing the notice of appeal she did not think to check whether the period for filing the grounds of appeal had been logged in the docketing system as deadlines were recorded on receipt of the communication that sets them, i.e. the impugned decision, and not on the completion of other deadlines to do with the same case. The failure to record the relevant deadline in the system was an isolated mistake in an otherwise satisfactory system. The request for re-establishment should therefore be granted.

XI. The appellants requested the re-establishment of rights in respect of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal. The appellants also requested that the contested decision be set aside and that a patent be granted based on the claims of the main request as filed with the grounds of appeal. In the alternative, they requested the grant of a patent based on the auxiliary request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The decision under appeal was posted on 16 March 2016 and was deemed to have been delivered on 26 March 2016 (Rule 126(2) EPC). The time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal, therefore, expired on 26 July 2016 (Article 108, third sentence and Rule 131(4) EPC). Thus, the statement of grounds of appeal filed on 22 August 2016 was not filed within the prescribed time limit. The non-compliance with the time limit has the effect that the appeal is to be considered as inadmissible. Re-establishment of rights is available in this situation (Article 122(1) EPC).

2. According to the appellants' submissions, the failure to observe the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal came to light after the representative's client raised a query regarding an invoice on 15 August 2016. The cause of non-compliance with the time limit under Article 108, third sentence, EPC can therefore be considered to have been removed on that day. The two-month time limit for filing the request for re-establishment of rights in writing (Article 122(2) and Rule 136(1) EPC) was therefore observed by filing the request for re-establishment of rights on 22 August 2016. On the same day, the omitted act, i.e. the filing of the statement of grounds of appeal, was completed and the fee for re-establishment was paid. Furthermore, the request for re-establishment of rights states the grounds and facts on which it is based (Rule 136(2) EPC).

Hence, the request for re-establishment of rights is admissible.

3. The appellants have however not shown that all due care required by the circumstances was taken to comply with the time limit (Article 122(1) EPC).

3.1 In the case at hand, the appellants submit that the failure to comply with the missed time limit resulted from the erroneous omission of the time limit from the docketing system by an assistant and the failure of the representative to identify this omission.

3.2 In the case of non-observance of a time limit due to an error, the boards of appeal have established the criterion that due care is considered to have been taken if non-compliance with the time limit resulted either from exceptional circumstances or from an isolated mistake within a normally satisfactory monitoring system (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (hereinafter "CLBA"), 8th ed., III.E.5.2., penultimate paragraph). It is the appellants' contention that the present case amounts to such an isolated mistake.

3.3 The party requesting re-establishment of rights bears the burden of making the case and proving that the requirements are met (CLBA supra, III.E.5.2., last paragraph). Thus, in the present case the appellants bear the burden of proof to show the existence of a normally satisfactory monitoring system.

3.4 The representative may entrust to an assistant the performance of routine tasks provided that the necessary due care on the part of the representative has been exercised in dealing with the assistant. In this respect, it is incumbent upon the representative to choose a suitable person for the work, to properly instruct that person in the tasks to be performed and to exercise reasonable supervision over the work (CLBA supra, III.E.5.5.4b)).

3.4.1 According to the appellants' submissions, the assistant was a "well-trained, experienced assistant, who has the CIPA Patent Administrator Qualification". The only evidence provided by the appellants in this respect is a copy of the CIPA Patent Administrator Qualification certificate awarded to Ms S., the assistant to the appellants' representative, in 2009. While this document certainly can serve as proof of Ms S.'s suitability to perform the routine tasks in question, the appellants have not provided any evidence regarding the alleged "normally satisfactory monitoring system" of the representative's firm, i.e. any proof that would suggest that Ms S. had been properly instructed to perform tasks relating to appeals before the Boards of Appeal of the EPO and in particular relating to their handling in the firm's docketing system. In particular, there is no evidence on file that would suggest that the assistant had been instructed to enter not only the two-month time limit for filing the notice of appeal in the docketing system but also the four-month time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal. In this respect, the board also notes that the appellants' contention that the assistant normally performed her duties satisfactorily is not supported by corroborating evidence.

3.4.2 The appellants also submit that the time limits entered by the assistant in the docketing system are normally double checked by a patent attorney. In the case at hand however, the representative, Ms F., who was in charge of this double check, also overlooked the omission in the docketing system of the time limit in question.

The board observes that, while an independent cross-check of time limits is normally required in the case of large patent attorney firms (CLBA supra, 5.4.4) and in the present case the representative's firm can be considered not to be such a large firm, even with such a system of double checking in place, the representative is not discharged from his or her duty to properly instruct and supervise the assistant (cf. T 1465/07, reasons 18, last paragraph). In the case at hand, the appellants have not shown that the assistant was properly instructed or that she was properly supervised (cf. 3.4.1 supra).

3.4.3 Thus, the appellants have not discharged their burden to prove the existence of a normally satisfactory monitoring system. The omission from the docketing system of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds can therefore not be said to equate to an isolated mistake in a normally satisfactory monitoring system.

The question as to whether the representative herself should have noticed, when preparing the notice of appeal, that the time limit for filing the grounds of appeal was not registered in the docketing system need not therefore be addressed.

3.5 For these reasons, the request for re-establishment of rights is to be refused.

3.6 As the statement of grounds was filed after the time limit under Article 108, third sentence, EPC had elapsed, the appeal is to be rejected as inadmissible (Rule 101(1) EPC).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The request for re-establishment of rights is refused.

2. The appeal is rejected as inadmissible.


This decision T 2016/16 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T201616.20170913. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "A little luck - Close-up of a small paper four-leaf clover that my daughter and I made." by JD Hancock obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 1204/12 - Stern but fair?

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The city 'Brusque' in Brazil

In this examination appeal, the invention relates to the entering and setting of an 'availability status' in a 'Push-to-talk' application in a mobile communication device, with the independent method claims defining the associated data processing. Unfortunately for the applicant-now-appellant, the Board of Appeal quickly 'strips away' the semantic meaning of the data (e.g. 'alert status') and the data processing entities ('server', 'communication device'), to conclude that the invention merely pertains to 'storing/transmitting the data on/to different computers'. Any remaining feature+effect combinations are swept off the table as 'obvious'.

The claim of the main request:

1. A method of establishing a user communications availability in an application (206) operative on a mobile communications device (200), the method comprising:

determining an alert status associated with the mobile communications device (200);

responsive to the determination of the alert status being in a first state, presenting to a user a first plurality of options, each of the first plurality of options corresponding to establishing the user communication availability in the application with a status applicable to said application (206);

responsive to the determination of the alert being in a second state, presenting to the user a second plurality of options having at least one option different from the first plurality of options, each of the second plurality of options corresponding to a user communication availability with a different status applicable to said application (206);

receiving a selection from the user of an option from said first or second plurality of options;

responsive to said selection of the option from said first or second plurality of options, auto­matically establishing and setting, at the mobile communications device, the status of the user communication availability in said application (206) in accordance with the status corresponding to the selected option; and

sending the status of the user communication availability in said application to a server (114), wherein the sending causes the server (114) to transmit an availability status representative of the status of the user communication availability in said application to at least one other mobile communications device associated with said application.

Reasons for the Decision
1. Summary of the invention

The application relates to entering and setting a user communication availability status for a push-to-talk application (PTT app 206, see figure 5) in a mobile communication device 200 (e.g. a PDA, a smart phone or a PC; see original description, [20]). Push-to-talk is a server-based voice communication system for a group of users over a packet-switched network such as GPRS (see for example https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push-to-Talk_ over_Cellular).

The PTT app 206 in the mobile communication device 200 is the client-side software for this service. Its login availability module 232 ([48], last sentence) prompts the user for his/her communication availability status ([62]-[64]). The possible status values are "available", "do not disturb" and "silent/non-audible" (see original claims 7-9, [63] and figure 6, S45 and S26; in the original claims, the user communication availability status is called the "application state").

The claims relate to the second embodiment ([60]-[69]; figures 5 and 6). The user initially sets a ringer or alert status either to "audible/ring" or "non-audible/silent" ([19] and [61]). Depending on this ringer/alert status, only two of the three options are presented for selecting the user communication availability status. If the ringer/alert status is "ring", then "silent" is not presented as a selectable option for the user communication availability status ([63]; figure 6: S24). If the ringer/alert status is "silent", then "available" (corresponding to "ring") is not presented ([63]; figure 6: S26).

If the status has changed, it is set in the availability manager 230 ([48], last sentence) of the PTT app 206 in the mobile communication device 200, transmitted to a PTT exchange server 114 and set therein ([66]; figure 5: 232, 234; figure 6: S32, S34, S36).

According to the state, PTT server 114 routes an incoming call for the user of the mobile communication device 200 directly to it (if the status is "available"; [45]), it asks whether the client user would like to accept the call ("silent"; [45]) or automatically rejects the call ("do not disturb"; [46]). However, neither the PTT server nor its routing behaviour are claimed.

2. Inventiveness of claim 1 of the main request

2.1 The appealed decision (section 4) selected as the closest prior art an example of a PTT application residing in a cellular telephone, as acknowledged in the description ([10] and [11]).

2.2 However in the board's opinion, the invention as claimed does not relate to PTT communication as such but merely to an input-/output-process. It is unnecessary to take into account the semantics of the data entered by the user (i.e. of the user communi­cation availability status or alert status), since there is no step of a PTT communication being triggered by the data in any of the claimed method steps following the entry of the data.The claim mainly relates to inputting this data, in particular by presenting to the user a selection of possible options depending on a previously entered setting (the alert or ringer status of the mobile communication device; see [19] and [61]).

2.3 However, inputting this data does not produce any other technical effect than storing/transmitting the data on/to different computers.

2.4 In the grounds of appeal (page 3, paragraphs 8 and 9), it is argued that presenting only valid options for selecting the user communication availability status depending on the previously entered alert status reduces the number of gestures required to alter the user communication availability status.

2.5 However, such a reduction of input gestures only occurs when the user tries to input an invalid value. He or she would then have to repeat the selection (possibly after a warning message).

2.6 The board considers it to be obvious for a skilled person to design the method so that only valid options are presented, in order to avoid an invalid selection by the user. Presenting only valid options is a usual practice for the skilled person in programming.

2.7 Therefore, claim 1 of the main request is not inventive (Article 56 EPC).

3. Inventiveness of claim 1 of the auxiliary request

3.1 Claim 1 of the auxiliary request differs from that of the main request in that the mobile communication device tests whether the newly entered status is the same as the old status, which has previously been received from the server storing the status. The new status is only stored and transmitted if it is different from the old status.

3.2 In the letter dated 18 August 2017 (last page), the appellant argues that this reduces network traffic and processing at the other mobile communication device.

3.3 However, the board considers it obvious to the skilled person not to update (i.e. transmit and store) data which has not changed.

3.4 Therefore, claim 1 of the auxiliary request is also not inventive (Article 56 EPC).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 1204/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T120412.20170920. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Brusque1.jpg" released by the author into the Public Domain and obtained from Wikimedia

T 0231/13 - no inventor needed, a professional representative is enough

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At the opening of the oral proceedings their postponement was requested, because one of the inventors, who wished to accompany the professional representative, could not be present due to serious illness that required medical intervention. This was proven by a medical certificate dated 28 July 2017 and filed during the oral proceedings. The applicant submitted that the request for postponement could not have been made before because the need for medical intervention had been sudden and the representative had been informed of it only the evening before the oral proceedings. The Board denied the request, as it was not made as soon as possible, and because the party was duly represented. 

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The applicants have appealed the Examining Division's decision, dispatched on 7 August 2012, to refuse European patent application No. 05 764 574.9.

II. The Examining Division held that claim 1 of the main request did not comply with Articles 84 and 83 EPC, because its subject-matter was neither clear nor sufficiently disclosed. More particularly, the defined "sample size" and its determination according to the claim were objected to. Claim 1 of the auxiliary request contained subject-matter extending beyond the content of the application as originally filed, in contravention of Article 123(2) EPC.

III. Notice of appeal was received on 1 October 2012. The appeal fee was paid on the same day. The statement setting out the grounds of appeal was received on 7 December 2012.

IV. The Board summoned the appellant to oral proceedings. In the communication accompanying the summons the Board set out its preliminary opinion. It raised objections of lack of clarity of the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request and auxiliary request 2, in particular in relation to steps concerning the determination of a "sample size and calculated relative error", and lack of inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 as then pending.

V. Oral proceedings took place on 1 August 2017.

[...]

At the opening of the oral proceedings the appellant requested their postponement, due to serious illness of one of the inventors who wished to attend.

VI. Claim 1 as originally filed, which corresponds to claim 1 of the main request on which the impugned decision is based, reads as follows:

[...]

VII. The appellant's arguments may be summarised as follows:

Request for postponement of the oral proceedings

At the opening of the oral proceedings their postponement was requested, because one of the inventors, who wished to accompany the professional representative, could not be present due to serious illness that required medical intervention. This was proven by a medical certificate dated 28 July 2017 and filed during the oral proceedings. The request for postponement could not have been made before because the need for medical intervention had been sudden and the representative had been informed of it only the evening before the oral proceedings.

[...]

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. The invention

[...]

3. Request for postponement of the oral proceedings

At the opening of the oral proceedings the appellant requested their postponement, due to serious illness of one of the inventors who wished to attend.

Under Article 15(2) RPBA, "A change of date for oral proceedings may exceptionally be allowed in the Board's discretion following receipt of a written and reasoned request made as far in advance of the appointed date as possible." The notice of the Vice-President of Directorate-General 3 of the European Patent Office dated 16 July 2007 concerning oral proceedings before the boards of appeal of the EPO (Official Journal EPO 2007, Special edition No. 3, 115) explains in more detail how it can be expected that this discretion is exercised. In particular, for a request of a change of date to be allowed the party should advance serious reasons. The request should be filed "as soon as possible after the grounds preventing the party concerned from attending the oral proceedings have arisen". Examples of serious reasons are given under point 2.1 of that notice.

The aim of the above provisions is to fulfil the need for procedural economy while ensuring that the party can be duly represented during the oral proceedings.

The Board notes that the appellant was duly represented by the professional representative of its choice. Article 133(2) EPC specifically requires such a representation for persons not having their residence or principal place of business in a contracting state to the EPC, who must act through the representative. The attendance of one of the inventors is not relevant for discussion of formal and substantive points in oral proceedings, unless special issues arise, for example in connection with a particular technical point. In the present case, the representative did not put forward any such special issues and the Board cannot see any either. In this context, it is stressed that the above-mentioned notice expressly refers to grounds preventing the party concerned, i.e. its appointed representative - not other accompanying persons - from attending.

The Board further notes that although the medical certificate attesting the illness is dated 28 July 2017, the request was only filed four days later, at the last possible point in time, i.e. during the oral proceedings themselves. No reasons were provided why the representative was only informed in the evening of the day before the oral proceedings that the inventor was unable to attend. Hence, it has to be concluded that the request for postponement was not made "as far in advance of the appointed date as possible" within the meaning of Article 15(2) RPBA.

In view of these circumstances, the Board concludes that the need for procedural economy and legal certainty for the public outweighs the present personal wish of one of the inventors to attend, and exercises its discretion not to allow the postponement.

4. Admissibility of the main request

The main request was only filed during the oral proceedings. This constitutes an amendment to the appellant's case, the admission of which is at the Board's discretion under Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA.

According to Article 13(1) RPBA, "the discretion shall be exercised in view, inter alia, of the complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy". Moreover, under Article 13(3) RPBA, "Amendments sought to be made after oral proceedings have been arranged shall not be admitted if they raise issues which the Board [...] cannot reasonably be expected to deal with without adjournment of the oral proceedings." Another important criterion for assessing the admissibility of amendments to a party's case, according to the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal, is their prima-facie relevance.

The Board notes that the main request was filed at the last possible point in time, without any objective reason for doing so. The outstanding objections to the requests already on file were known by the appellant from the impugned decision and the Board's communication accompanying the summons to oral proceedings. The appellant's argument that an important aspect of the invention had only come to light in a recent discussion with one of the inventors cannot be accepted, as it depends on merely subjective circumstances under the appellant's control.

It is further noted that, compared with the requests already on file, the main request comprises several substantial amendments, including a change in claim category from a process to a device. Hence, the examination of its subject-matter, especially in view of the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC concerning added subject-matter, would entail a relatively high degree of complexity, possibly requiring an adjournment of the oral proceedings.

Lastly, the amendments are not prima facie relevant, since the steps concerning the determination of a "sample size and calculated relative error", still present in claim 1 of the main request and objected to in the communication accompanying the summons to oral proceedings, remain unclear. The appellant's argument that it was clear that those steps were performed by the claimed microscope is not convincing, since the claim, in one alternative designated "personalized sample", specifically contemplates that "an ideal sampling of said eye corresponding to said corneal endothelial cell analyzed samples is defined by the user".

For these reasons the Board does not admit the main request into the proceedings under Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA.

5. Clarity and sufficiency of disclosure of auxiliary request 2

[..]

As regards the appellant's argument that it was surprising that the application had been refused by the EPO but not in China, Japan and the US, the Board notes that it has to decide on the basis of the provisions of the EPC, which may differ from those of other texts. Decisions of other patent offices, possibly taken on the basis of different claim versions, are in any case not binding on the Board.

In summary, auxiliary request 2 is not allowable.

6. Inventive step of auxiliary request 1

[...]

Since, as explained above, the other features of the claim do not contribute to inventiveness, the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 cannot be allowed for lack of inventive step (Article 56 EPC).

The appellant argued that displaying the defined graphics, possibly on a single screen, was a technical feature, because it enhanced the conveying of information to the user. It suffices to note that the expression "convey of information" can only be considered a synonym for "presentation of information", which, as explained, provides no technical character.

Lastly, as explained in point 5 above, whether auxiliary request 1 was allowed in the US has no bearing on the present decision.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 231/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T023113.20170801. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Wandering around post-postponement." by Nick Quaranto obtained via Flickr under CC BY-SA 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 1972/13 - Examination at an end?

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With his response "R3" to summons for oral proceedings, the applicant filed amended claims of respectively a main and an auxiliary request, together with arguments. In addition, the applicant requested "cancellation of the oral proceedings and the continuation of the examination in writing, possibly supplemented by a telephone interview with the primary examiner, if the Examination Division deems it expedient". Subsidiarily it was requested "that the oral proceedings are conducted by video-conference, using IP technology; and that the date of the oral proceedings is changed". Shortly after, the applicant's representative contacted the primary examiner by telephone asking "whether the proceedings could be cancelled, and if not whether they could be postponed ... or held by visio [sic] conference". The examiner replied "that he would have a look at the case and at the internal instructions before giving an answer" (idem). With a communication a few weeks later, the applicant was informed that the oral proceedings were cancelled and that the procedure would be continued in writing. Subsequently, the decision to refuse the application was issued. In its reasons, it said "The examining division consented to the request of the applicant to cancel the oral proceedings and to continue the examination in writing, thereby issuing this decision." The applicant appealed.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. This appeal is against the decision of the examining division dated 9 April 2013 refusing European patent application No. 08290801.3, with publication number EP 2159926 A.

The refusal was based on the ground inter alia that the subject-matter of claim 1 of a main request and claim 1 of an auxiliary request did not involve an inventive step.

II. On 5 June 2013 the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the above decision.

III. In a separate decision dated 10 June 2013 (henceforth, "second decision"), the examining division refused a request pursuant to Rule 64(2) EPC for reimbursement of an additional search fee in respect of claims 8 and 9.

IV. The appellant subsequently filed a statement of grounds of appeal. In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the claims of the main request or the claims of one of two auxiliary requests as filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant also requested reimbursement of the appeal fee due to an alleged violation of the right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC.

The appellant conditionally requested oral proceedings "in case the Board of Appeal envisages to refuse the appeal".

V. The essential steps (i.e. those most relevant to the board's present decision) leading to the refusal of the application may be summarised as follows:

(i) In a letter of reply, referred to in the impugned decision as "R1", to an earlier communication of the examining division ("C1"), the applicant inter alia requested a refund of an additional search fee for claims 8 and 9 pursuant to Rule 64(2) EPC.

(ii) In a communication, referred to in the impugned decision as "C2", the examining division raised inter alia an inventive step objection based on the disclosure of document D1, and indicated that the additional search fee would not be refunded.

(iii) With a response referred to as "R2", the applicant filed amended claims of respectively a main and an auxiliary request, together with arguments, and maintained the request for refund of the additional search fee.

(iv) In a communication (referred to as "C3") accompanying a summons to attend oral proceedings (which had not been requested by the applicant), the examining division inter alia raised a new inventive step objection in respect of both main and auxiliary requests, starting out from document D2 and taking into account the teaching of document D1.

(v) With a response dated 9 July 2012, referred to as "R3", the applicant filed amended claims of respectively a main and an auxiliary request, together with arguments. In addition, the applicant requested "cancellation of the oral proceedings and the continuation of the examination in writing, possibly supplemented by a telephone interview with the primary examiner, if the Examination Division deems it expedient". Subsidiarily it was requested "that the oral proceedings are conducted by video-conference, using IP technology; and that the date of the oral proceedings is changed".

(vi) On 11 October 2012, the applicant's representative contacted the primary examiner by telephone asking "whether the proceedings could be cancelled, and if not whether they could be postponed ... or held by visio [sic] conference" (cf. the minutes dated 30 October 2012 of the telephone conversation of 11 October 2012). The examiner replied "that he would have a look at the case and at the internal instructions before giving an answer" (idem).

(vii) With a communication dated 23 October 2012, the applicant was informed that the oral proceedings scheduled for 14 November 2012 were cancelled and that the procedure would be continued in writing.

(viii) The decision to refuse the application was issued on 9 April 2013. In the reasons for the decision, in points 18 and 21 concerning the oral proceedings, it is stated that "The applicant never requested oral proceedings to be hold" [sic] and "The examining division consented to the request of the applicant to cancel the oral proceedings and to continue the examination in writing, thereby issuing this decision [board's underlining].". Further, in point 27.1 of the reasons, the examining division gives a response to an argument said to have been submitted in the applicant's response "R3".

(ix) The second decision (see point III above) concerning refusal of the request for refunding the additional search fee was issued on 10 June 2013.

VI. In view of the board's decision, it is not necessary to reproduce the wording of any claim.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC)

1.1 In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant submits two main arguments as to why its right to be heard has been infringed:

(i) The response "R3" contained a "detailed" reasoning and "actually new arguments" to which "no answer has been provided by the Examining Division until the refusal notification in item 27.1. Thus the applicant had no opportunity to present his comments on this new ground stated in item 27.1 in the notification under appeal".

(ii) "Moreover, in reply R1 [sic] to the first communication C2 of the Examining Division, the Applicant has filed at least one admissible request and provided a reasoned statement in support to the patentability of its subject-matter, that following the Applicant's reply, the Examining Division has adopted a different approach to assess the patentability of the invention: while in the first communication of April 5, 2011 document D1 was considered as the primary reference and the subject-matter of claim 1 was held to lack an inventive step over document D1 alone, in the Preliminary Opinion accompanying the Summon [sic] to attend oral proceedings C3, D2 is considered as the closest prior art, and D1 is used as a secondary reference. Thus the applicant demonstrated his good will concerning the progress of the written proceedings.

Thus, the continuation of the examination in writing would have consisted in the present case in giving the possibility for the applicant to respond to a notification pursuant 94(3) EPC or to oral proceedings [board's underlining]".

1.2 It is not necessary to consider argument (i), because the board agrees with the appellant that the examining division should either have issued a communication or have held oral proceedings (argument (ii)), for the reasons set out below.

1.3 In the applicant's response R3, it substantiated its request for cancellation of the oral proceedings and continuation in writing as follows:

"I. Oral proceedings would be untimely and unnecessary

It is not contended that the Examining Division can arrange for oral proceedings ex officio whenever it consider [sic] it expedient, even against the will of the Applicant.

However, the Examining Division should also bear in mind the need for economy, since oral proceedings (even in the form of video-conference) give rise to very significant costs for both the EPO and the Applicant.

Oral proceedings are expedient when the written proceedings are in a dead end, and no progress is made toward grant or rejection [board's underlining].

This is not the case here [board's underlining]. In reply to the first communication of the Examining Division, the Applicant has filed at least one admissible request and provided a reasoned statement in support to the patentability of its subject-matter.

It is worth noting that, following the Applicant's reply, the Examining Division has adopted a different approach to assess the patentability of the invention: while in the first communication of April 5, 2011 document D1 was considered as the primary reference and the subject-matter of claim 1 was held to lack an inventive step over document D1 alone, in the Preliminary Opinion accompanying the Summon [sic] to attend oral proceedings D2 is considered as the closest prior art, and D1 is used as a secondary reference.

This provides evidence that the examination is not stuck and can continue in writing, at a lesser cost for both the EPO and the Applicant [board's underlining].

Subsidiarily, the Applicant requires [sic] that the oral proceedings are conducted by video-conference, using IP technology, in order to save time and costs [board's underlining].

Moreover, a change to the date of the oral proceedings is required [sic] [board's underlining]."

1.4 It follows from the above submission, especially those passages underlined by the board, that the applicant's main request for continuing in writing with a subsidiary request concerning oral proceedings, although imprecisely worded, did not embrace the issuing of an immediate decision without holding oral proceedings. This is clear from the reasons given as to why continuing in writing was regarded as preferable to the holding of oral proceedings. In particular, oral proceedings would be "untimely", i.e. premature, inter alia because the examination procedure was not "stuck", i.e. still in a state of flux. Further, it lacks any semblance of logic to request as a first preference the issuing of a direct written decision, as the examining division apparently interpreted the appellant's main request, and, as a second preference, the holding of oral proceedings (in this case, by video conference on a different date). In the board's view, the only logical interpretation of the applicant's submission R3 is that it did not consider the examination procedure as being at an end but wished it to continue, preferably in writing by issuing a communication or, if not, by holding oral proceedings (in this case by video conference on a different date). The board further considers that having read the applicant's letter, the examining division at the very least should have been in doubt as to the status of the applicant's requests regarding the continuation in writing and the oral proceedings and should have requested clarification from the applicant in order to avoid committing a substantial procedural violation (cf. T 2373/11, points 2.5 to 2.8 of the reasons). The board notes finally that, in view of the new situation brought about by the letter R3, it is not relevant that oral proceedings were initially arranged ex officio and not in response to a request by the applicant.

1.5 The board concludes that the examining division infringed the applicant's right to oral proceedings, thereby infringing the applicant's right to be heard enshrined in Article 113(1) EPC. The violation of the right to be heard constitutes a substantial procedural violation justifying the reimbursement of the appeal fee (Rule 103(1)(a) EPC).

2. The second decision issued by the examining division refusing a request for refunding an additional search fee - decision null and void

2.1 The applicant's request for refunding an additional search fee was refused in a second decision issued by the examining division (see point III above). Before the second decision was issued, an appeal had been filed against the first decision.

2.2 The board considers that the first decision refusing the application pursuant to Article 97(2) EPC terminated the proceedings before the examining division. After notification of the decision, the examining division had no power to go beyond a correction of errors in the decision pursuant to

Rule 140 EPC (cf. T 830/03, point 1.2 of the reasons), or, considering that an appeal had been filed, granting interlocutory revision pursuant to Article 109 EPC. It follows that the second decision taken by the examining division after the notification of the first decision, and a fortiori after the filing of the appeal, was ultra vires and thus without any legal effect. The second decision is therefore null and void. The board notes that the correct procedure would have been either to have dealt with the request for refund of the additional search fee in the decision refusing the application, or to have decided on the matter earlier by issuing an interlocutory decision not terminating proceedings (cf. Article 106(2) EPC).

2.3 The board notes here that it is in principle not relevant whether or not a separate appeal against the second decision was filed, given that an appeal against a legally void decision could logically have no legal effect (cf. T 1257/08, point 1 of the reasons). Further, given that the case is to be remitted (see below), the board considers that if the second decision were not now expressly held to be null and void, it would leave an unclear legal situation before the first instance. In addition, with respect to the right to be heard on this issue at oral proceedings, the same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, as set out in points 1.1 to 1.5 above with respect to the first decision (cf. Article 113(1) EPC).

2.4 The second decision on refund of the additional search fee being null and void, the board considers it appropriate that the matter be reconsidered by the examining division.

3. Remittal (Article 111(1) EPC and Article 11 RPBA)

In accordance with Article 11 RPBA, the board shall remit a case if fundamental deficiencies are apparent in the first instance proceedings, unless special reasons present themselves for doing otherwise. The boards' consistent practice is to remit the case where the examining division failed to hold oral proceedings requested by the applicant, since it cannot be known if the examining division would have come to a different decision if oral proceedings had been held. The same situation applies where it is not clear whether a request for oral proceedings has been made. The board sees no special reason to diverge from the existing practice, especially in the light of the further procedural irregularities mentioned above with respect to the second decision (cf. point 2).

4. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the decision under appeal is to be set aside and the case is to be remitted to the examining division for further prosecution (Article 111(1) EPC). Further, the second decision refusing the request for refunding an additional search fee is to be held null and void.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The decision under appeal is set aside.

The second decision issued on 10 June 2013 is null and void.

The case is remitted to the examining division for further prosecution.

The appeal fee is reimbursed.

This decision T 1972/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T197213.20170905. The file wrapper can be found here. Figure taken from the decision to refuse from the examining division.

T 1889/13 - Right to non-overlapping boards?

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In this opposition appeal, the appellant requested that the members of the board who were involved in decision T 1676/11 relating to a divisional application of the opposed patent be excluded from taking part in the present appeal proceedings for suspected partiality under Article 24(3) EPC.

The arguments of the appellant can be summarised as follows:

  • The critical issues of the present appeal were in essence the same as the critical issues in the previous appeal proceedings T 1676/11 concerning the divisional application. 
  • The board members having decided the appeal for the divisional application would have difficulty in re-examining and deciding the present case without having a preconceived or anticipatory judgment or without giving rise to suspicion of such preconceived or anticipatory judgment.

Reasons for the Decision
1. Scope of the interlocutory decision

The present decision was taken by the alternate board composition established under Article 24(4) EPC in order to decide on an objection of suspected partiality raised under Article 24(3) EPC (see above points II, VI). In accordance with the procedure described in decision T 1028/96, the board in its original composition decided in its interlocutory decision of 20 May 2015 that the objection was admissible (see above point V). Said interlocutory decision is binding on the present (alternate) board. The scope of the present decision is therefore limited to the allowability of the objection of suspected partiality.

2. Allowability of the objection

2.1 Legal basis of the objection

2.1.1 The appellant has not argued that there was any reason for exclusion under Article 24(1) EPC, nor does the present board see any basis for the application of Article 24(1) EPC either. The appellant raised an objection for suspected partiality under Article 24(3) EPC only. Under Articles 24(3) and 24(4) EPC, the deciding board should apply a twofold test, namely:

- Firstly a "subjective" test "in concreto" requiring evidence of actual partiality of the member or members concerned;

- Secondly an "objective" test "in abstracto" to determine if the circumstances of a case would allow a reasonably objective and informed person to conclude that he or she might have good reason to suspect the partiality of the member concerned.

(see G 2/08, interlocutory decision of 15 June 2009, not published in OJ EPO, Reasons point 4)

2.1.2 As far as the "subjective" test is concerned, the appellant has not alleged that there was actual partiality and the present board has no doubts about the personal impartiality of all members of the board in its original composition.The appellant's objections concern the "objective" test, namely the possibility that board members could give raise to an objectively justified fear of partiality due to their decision on similar legal and factual matters in an earlier case.

2.1.3 The Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) and the business distribution scheme for the Technical Boards of Appeal do not foresee any obligation to arrange for non-overlapping boards where similar legal and factual issues have to be decided in different cases. To the contrary, Article 7 of the business distribution scheme foresees that where appeals pending before a board are closely linked, in particular by involving similar legal or factual questions, the Chairman may order that the board shall decide in the same composition (Business distribution scheme of the Technical Boards of Appeal for the year 2013, Supplement to OJ EPO 1/2013, 12).

2.2 Possible conflicts between the Business Distribution Scheme and the desideratum of a detached board

2.2.1 Both the composition of the board in T 1676/11 and the original composition in the present case were determined by the chairman of Board 3310 in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal and the applicable business distribution scheme. Due to the identical classification of the applications underlying both the present appeal and T 1676/11, Board 3310 is competent for both cases which means that the members of the board in both cases had to be chosen from the members attributed to Board 3310.

2.2.2 The appellant argued that a board should not be put in a position wherein its members are forced to either confirm or not their previous own judgment. However, the right to a lawful judge also includes the right to a judicial body having a foreseeable composition in accordance with a predetermined business distribution scheme. There may be unavoidable conflicts between the wish for a completely detached board and the requirements of the business distribution scheme from which deviations are allowed only in specific circumstances. In cases where three or more proceedings are related to each other (e.g. a parent and two divisional applications), it would normally be impossible to compose three non-overlapping boards within the business distribution scheme.

2.2.3 In view of the potential conflicts with the business distribution scheme, the mere desire for a board which has not encountered any of the relevant factual and legal issues in a related case cannot justify an obligation to appoint non-overlapping boards in cases concerning divisional and parent applications in the absence of specific facts which are sufficient to raise specific concrete doubts on the ability of the board members to hear the appeal with an objective judicial mind (see J 15/04, Reasons point 8).

2.2.4 It follows that practical considerations and the procedural framework not only gave rise to a provision in the business distribution scheme encouraging identical compositions in closely linked cases (see above point 2.1.3), but may even require that overlapping or identical board compositions are established in cases which may involve closely linked questions.

2.3 Specific circumstances in view of the suspicion of partiality

2.3.1 The right to object against a judge for reasons of suspicion of partiality is meant to prevent a judge being influenced in his or her decision making - be it deliberately or inadvertently - by extraneous considerations, prejudices and predilections, i.e. by considerations other than the arguments he or she considers as being factually and legally relevant for the case under consideration. A suspicion of partiality might arise where there are circumstances possibly justifying a suspicion of a tendency to favour one or more of the parties or to discriminate against one of them. However, any such suspicion must be based on the specific facts of the case. It cannot be justified merely by the submission that a legal question was already decided in a certain way in a prior decision (see G 1/05, OJ EPO 2007, 362, Reasons point 23 with references to national laws).

2.3.2 There are no indications or evidence on file which may be used to rebut the assumption that all members of the original composition would decide on the merits of the present case in an unbiased manner. The two technically qualified members may have decided in a related case on similar technical and legal issues but they did not do so in such outspoken, extreme or unbalanced terms that it would preclude them from dealing with the present case with an open mind and without preconceived attitudes(see R 2/12, interlocutory decision of 26 September 2012, not published in OJ EPO, Reasons point 2.2; G 1/05, Reasons point 24).

2.4 Case law referred to by the appellant

2.4.1 In support of its argument that members of a board should not be put in a position where they are compelled to confirm or not to confirm their own previous judgment, the appellant relied, in particular, on decision T 1028/96. In this case, the board members who had decided the appeal proceedings leading to the grant of the patent had to be replaced in the opposition appeal proceedings, since the legal issues to be discussed in the opposition appeal proceedings were essentially the same as those relevant in the earlier ex-parte appeal proceedings. The board in T 1028/96 referred to Article 19(2) EPC which sets clear limits to overlaps between examining divisions and opposition divisions in the same file and took the position that such limitations should apply all the more to the second instance (T 1028/96, Reasons point 6.6). For the examining divisions assigned for a divisional and its parent application, no provisions exist which limit overlaps between the examining divisions. Accordingly, the examining division in the present case consisted of the same examiners as the examining division for the divisional application underlying decision T 1676/11.

2.4.2 In the view of the present board, cases involving grant and opposition appeal proceedings for the same file have to be clearly distinguished from cases involving parent and divisional applications, and not only in view of Article 19(2) EPC. A board which has taken a specific decision in ex-parte appeal proceedings may be compelled to directly interfere with its own earlier decision if the same issues are relevant in opposition appeal proceedings (for example, if the same amendments were allowed under Article 123(2) EPC before grant and were attacked under Article 100(c) EPC in opposition). Certain decisions taken in the ex-parte appeal proceedings may formally restrict (i.e. under Article 123(3) EPC) the possible outcome of opposition appeal proceedings.

2.4.3 Such possible conflicts and limitations do not exist in the present case. The claims presently on file differ from the claims not allowed in T 1676/11, for example, in that the claims refused under T 1676/11 included product claims whereas the requests presently on file contain only process claims, the subject-matter of said process claims differing substantially from the process claims decided upon in T 1676/11. Furthermore, within the generally applicable procedural rules, the appellant may at any time file new requests and rely on new arguments or evidence, which may or may not be related to the issues decided in T 1676/11, but which may lead to issues being decided differently than in T 1676/11.

2.4.4 In view of the differences which already exist and/or may arise in the future proceedings between the facts of T 1676/11 and those of the present proceedings, in contrast to T 1020/06, the appellant's argument that the subject-matter and the points of law to be discussed in the two cases were identical, cannot hold.

2.5 For the above reasons, the board in its present (alternate) composition does not recognise any sufficient basis for a suspicion of partiality under the terms of Article 24(3) EPC. The request to exclude the members of the original composition who had taken part in T 1676/11 is therefore refused and the appeal proceedings will continue with the original composition of the board.

This decision T 1889/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T188913.20170314. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo obtained via Pixabay under CC0 1.0 license.

T 514/14 - Respondent could have reacted to the raised objections well in advance to the oral proceedings

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In this opposition appeal, the parties were summoned to oral proceedings. In a communication issued in preparation therefor, the Board drew the parties' attention to some issues likely to be addressed at the oral proceedings. The Board inter alia expressed concerns regarding the clarity of claim 1 held allowable by the Opposition Division and pointed out that compliance with Article 84 EPC might also become an issue with regard to the auxiliary requests. Concerning the issue of compliance with Article 123(3) EPC, the Board drew the parties' attention to a specific paragraph of the Case Law Book. The Respondent/proprietor commented on the points addressed in the Board's communication, and defended inter alia its position submitting that the amended claims of all the already pending requests were clear (Article 84 EPC) and complied with Article 123(3) EPC. It nevertheless filed three additional sets of amended claims as auxiliary requests 4 to 7. Oral proceedings before the Board were held. The debate focused on the compliance of the pending claims with Articles 84 EPC and 123(3) EPC. During the oral proceedings, the Respondent filed a further amended set of claims as auxiliary request 1bis, to be intercalated between auxiliary requests 1 and 2. The Appellant/opponent asked not to admit auxiliary request 1bis due to its late-filing. 

Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. The appeal by the Opponent lies from the interlocutory decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the European patent EP 1 629 075 in amended form on the basis of the then pending first auxiliary request.

II. Independent claim 1 according to said first auxiliary request held allowable by the Opposition Division reads as follows (amendments to claim 1 as granted made apparent by the Board, additions in bold):

"1. A bathroom cleaning composition which comprises by weight:
(a) 0.1 % t 10% of a chlorine bleach compound;
(b) 0.1 % to 3% of an alkali metal silicate;
(c) 0.25% to 5% of a phosphate builder salt which is sodium tripolyphosphate; and
(d) the balance being water,
wherein the bathroom cleaning composition further includes
(e) an amine oxide surfactant,
and has a pH of at least 9 to 14."

III. In the decision under appeal, the Opposition Division came to the conclusion that the patent as amended according to said first auxiliary request met the requirements of the EPC, in particular those of Article 123(3) EPC.

IV. In its statement of grounds, the Appellant (Opponent) invoked inter alia non-compliance of the claims allowed by the Opposition Division with Article 123(3) EPC.

V. In its reply, the Respondent (Patent Proprietor) rebutted the Appellant's objections but nevertheless filed three sets of amended claims as auxiliary requests 1 to 3.

VI. The parties were summoned to oral proceedings. In a communication issued in preparation therefor, the Board drew the parties' attention to some issues likely to be addressed at the oral proceedings. The Board inter alia expressed concerns regarding the clarity of claim 1 held allowable by the Opposition Division (point 3.2.3 of the communication) and pointed out that compliance with Article 84 EPC might also become an issue with regard to the auxiliary requests (point 5 of the communication). Concerning the issue of compliance with Article 123(3) EPC, the Board drew the parties' attention to the "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO", 8th edition, 2016, section II.E.2.4.13" (point 3.2.1 of the communication).

VII. Under cover of a further letter of 2 June 2017, the Appellant filed a further item of evidence (D4) supposed to illustrate common general knowledge. It submitted inter alia that claim 1 of the main request (claim 1 in the version held allowable by the Opposition Division) was either objectionable under Article 123(3) or lacked clarity (Article 84 EPC), and extended its Article 123(3) EPC objection to the respective claims 1 of auxiliary requests 1 to 3.

VIII. With letter of 21 June 2017, the Respondent also commented on the points addressed in the Board's communication, submitting inter alia that the amended claims of all the already pending requests were clear (Article 84 EPC) and complied with Article 123(3) EPC. It nevertheless filed three additional sets of amended claims as auxiliary requests 4 to 7

IX. Oral proceedings before the Board were held on 21 July 2017. The debate focused on the compliance of the pending claims with Articles 84 EPC and 123(3) EPC. During the oral proceedings, the Respondent filed a further amended set of claims as auxiliary request 1bis, to be intercalated between auxiliary requests 1 and 2. The Appellant asked not to admit auxiliary request 1bis due to its late-filing.

Amended claim 1 of auxiliary request 1bis differs from claim 1 as granted in that it reads as follows (amendments made apparent by the Board, additions in bold):

"1. A bathroom cleaning composition which comprises

(c) 0.25% to 5% of a phosphate builder salt; and

and has a pH of at least 9 to 14,

and in which the composition comprises 0.25% to 5% of a phosphate builder salt which is sodium tripolyphosphate".

X. Final requests

The Appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be revoked.

The Respondent requested as its main request that the appeal be dismissed or if that is not possible that the patent be maintained on the basis of the claims according to one of the following auxiliary requests, to be taken in their numerical order:

- auxiliary request 1, filed with letter of 4 September 2014,
- auxiliary requests 1bis, filed at the oral proceedings of 21 July 2017,
- auxiliary requests 2 to 3, filed with letter of 4 September 2014,
- auxiliary requests 4 to 7, filed with letter of 21 June 2017.

XI. The Appellant's objections and arguments of relevance for the present decision can be summarised as follows.

- The formulation of feature (c) in claim 1 of the main request either amounted to an extension of the scope of protection, compared to that of granted claim 1, thus contravening Article 123(3) EPC, or had to be regarded as unclear, thus contravening Article 84 EPC.

- The same applied to the formulation of feature (c) in the respective claims 1 of auxiliary requests 1 and 2 to 7.

- Auxiliary request 1bis was filed too late and should therefore not be admitted into the proceedings, taking into account that an objection under Article 123(3) EPC had already been raised in the notice of opposition and in the statement of grounds of appeal. Such an objection was also raised with respect to auxiliary requests 1 to 3, in the Appellant's response to the Board's communication. The latter also addressed a corresponding clarity issue with respect to claim 1 of the main request. The Patent Proprietor thus had ample opportunity to react by filing an auxiliary request overcoming these deficiencies at an earlier point in time, i.e. before the day of the oral proceedings.

XII. The Respondent essentially counter-argued as follows.

- Feature (c) of claim 1 according to the main request made it clear that the claimed composition was limited to compositions comprising a total amount of 0.25% to 5% of any or all phosphate builder salts, as was claim 1 as granted, but additionally required that all of the 0.25% to 5% phosphate builder salt present had to be in the form of sodium tripolyphosphate.

- The wording of feature (c) of claim 1 of the first auxiliary request expressed the same limitation even more explicitly.

- Auxiliary request 1bis should be admitted into the proceedings because it was filed in reaction to the Board's objection under Article 84 EPC against the first auxiliary request, raised for the first time during oral proceedings.

- Since claim 1 of auxiliary request 1bis was formulated according to the wording "en cascade" considered allowable in decision T 999/10, it was not objectionable under Article 84 or Article 123(3) EPC.

Reasons for the Decision

Main request - Lack of clarity

1. Compared to claim 1 as granted, claim 1 of the main request is amended by incorporating a feature taken from the description. Claim 1 is therefore, open to clarity objections arising from this amendment (decision G 3/14, OJ 2015, 102, Order).

2. Article 84 EPC stipulates that the claims shall be clear and define the matter for which protection is sought. Those requirements serve the purpose of ensuring that it is possible to assess whether or not a given subject-matter falls within the ambit of a particular claim.

Article 123(3) EPC stipulates that a European patent may not be amended in such a way as to extend the protection it confers.

Amendments made to a granted claim should thus not lead to an ambiguity (lack of clarity) in wording, let alone if they pave the way for a technically sensible interpretation of the so-amended claim, which, if adopted, makes the claim objectionable on the ground that it extends the scope of protection conferred by the claim as granted.

3. The Respondent submitted that feature (c) of claim 1 according to the main request (wording under II, supra) imposed two conditions on the claimed composition, namely:

- that the total relative amount of any or all phosphate builder salts present had to be within the range from 0.25% to 5% (as according to claim 1 as granted),

and, additionally,

- that all of the phosphate builder salt present was in the form of sodium tripolyphosphate.

Since amended claim 1 comprised an additional limitation, the scope of protection conferred by this claim was clearly restricted in comparison to claim 1 as granted.

4. The Board does not accept this argument for the following reasons.

4.1 Within the context of amended claim 1 at issue feature (c) does not expressly exclude the presence of phosphate builder salts other than sodium tripolyphosphate in the claimed composition. Considering the open definition ("comprising") of the claimed composition, another technically sensible interpretation is that according to feature (c), the claimed composition comprises 0.25% to 5% of sodium tripolyphosphate, but that other phosphate builder salts may also be present in the composition, in undefined amounts.

4.2 Claim 1 construed in this alternative manner also encompasses compositions not encompassed by claim 1 as granted, i.e. compositions comprising phosphate builder salts in a total relative amount of more than 5%, thereby extending the scope of protection conferred by the latter claim, contrary to the requirements of Article 123(3) EPC.

4.3 In the Board's judgement, claim 1 lacks clarity (Article 84 EPC) due to the ambiguity of its wording, generated by the amendment made and allowing for two substantially different interpretations of the claim and its scope of protection.

5. The Appellant's main request is, therefore, not allowable.

First auxiliary request - Lack of clarity

6. Feature (c) of claim 1 according to the first auxiliary request reads as follows (amendments to claim 1 as granted made apparent by the Board):

"(c) 0.25% to 5% of a phosphate builder salt, wherein the phosphate builder salt is sodium tripolyphosphate"

7. According to the Patent Proprietor, the presence of the comma after the term "salt", together with the inserted term "wherein", expressed said "double condition" (point 3, supra) imposed on the claimed composition in an even clearer way.

8. This argument does not, however, convince the Board.

8.1 At the oral proceedings, asked by the Board, the Patent Proprietor could not indicate without hesitation what the term "wherein" actually was supposed to refer to, i.e. to the phosphate builder salt or to the whole composition.

8.2 Accordingly, the amended feature (c) of claim 1 at issue can also be interpreted in the sense that the condition regarding the relative amount ("0.25% to 5%") only applies to the sodium tripolyphosphate present in the composition.

8.3 As in the case of claim 1 of the main request, this would imply that other phosphate builder salts may be comprised in the composition in amounts bringing the total relative amount of phosphate builder salts to a value beyond 5%, i.e. outside the range of 0.25% to 5% prescribed by claim 1 as granted for the totality of phosphate builder salts present (points 4.1 and 4.2, supra).

8.4 This conclusion is also in line with the Case law of the Boards of appeal, see e.g. the rationale of decision T 287/11 (01.04.2014), in which claim 1 as granted was directed to a composition comprising inter alia "from from 5% to 90% by weight of a water-soluble polyalkylene glycol" from a class defined in a relatively generic manner. Claim 1 as amended post-grant comprised the additional wording "wherein the water-soluble polyalkylene glycol conforms to the formula ...", the formula defining a more specific sub-group of compounds. The entrusted Board found that this amendment resulted in an extension of the protection conferred (Reasons, 2.4 to 2.6), but that a claim comprising an additional, express indication as to the total amount of compounds falling under the generic definition of the polyalkylene glycol component was allowable under Article 123(3) EPC.

8.5 The ambiguity in the wording of claim 1, feature (c) is thus not resolved by the slightly different wording proposed according to the first auxiliary request.

9. Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request is thus likewise objectionable for lack of clarity (Article 84 EPC). The first auxiliary request is therefore not allowable.

Auxiliary requests 2 to 7 - Lack of clarity

10. Claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 includes the same formulation of feature (c) as claim 1 of the main request. In the respective claims 1 of auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 7 feature (c) is worded as in claim 1 of the first auxiliary request.

10.1 As conceded by the Respondent at the oral proceedings, the conclusion reached by the Board as regards the lack of clarity (Article 84 EPC) of claim 1 of the main request and of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 applies likewise to claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 and to claim 1 of each of auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5-7, respectively (Article 84 EPC).

10.2 These requests are thus not allowable either.

Auxiliary request 1bis - Not admitted into the proceedings

11. Auxiliary request 1bis was submitted for the first time in the course of the oral proceedings before the Board.

11.1 According to the Respondent, the late filing of this request was justified considering that the Board's concerns regarding the clarity of feature (c) in claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 only materialised during the oral proceedings. The objections under Article 84 EPC raised by the Appellant in its letter dated 2 June 2017 were vague and unsubstantiated. The Patent Proprietor should thus be given a fair chance to react to the pending clarity objection.

Moreover, claim 1 of this new request was clearly allowable since it was formulated in accordance with the rationale of decision T 999/10 (19.06.2012), where a similarly amended wording had been considered allowable by the Board.

11.2 The Board does not accept this argumentation for the following reasons.

11.2.1 In point 5 of its communication the Board had indicated that the Patent Proprietor had to be prepared to comment on the compliance of the auxiliary requests with the requirements of inter alia Articles 84 and 123(3) EPC at the oral proceedings, giving consideration to the comments made in said communication. More particularly, under point 3.2 of the communication, the Board had drawn the attention of the parties to the publication "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO", 8th edition, 2016, section II.E.2.4.13, as to the way in which wording as used in claim 1 of the main request, feature (c), had previously been assessed by the Boards of Appeal. The quoted section explicitly refers to several decisions, including decision T 287/11 referred to above.

Hence, already in its communication, the Board had indicated to the Patent Proprietor that the compliance of auxiliary request 1 with the requirements of both Articles 84 and 123(3) EPC might come under scrutiny at the oral proceedings.

Moreover, as already noted above, an objection to the wording of feature (c) of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 was expressly raised by the Appellant in its letter of 2 June 2017 (point 4.2), i.e. well in advance of the oral proceedings, even if formulated in rather brief terms.

Since in inter partes appeal proceedings parties usually have divergent opinions regarding at least some of the issues decided by the Opposition Division, each party must envisage the possibility that the Board may overturn the decision of the Opposition Division and/or adopt the view of the adverse party.

In the written procedure, in reply to the objections raised by the Appellant and the communication of the Board, the Respondent had, however, chosen to defend its position without making any amendment to feature (c) of claim 1 according to auxiliary request 1. Only after the debate during oral proceedings did it decided to file a further auxiliary request supposed to address the clarity issue.

11.2.2 The Respondent also submitted that claim 1 of auxiliary request 1bis clearly overcame the pending clarity objection, since it was formulated in accordance with decision T 999/10.

In the case underlying this decision, granted claim 1 was directed to an adhesive, comprising inter alia "un mélange: de 15 à 55% en poids d'au moins une résine tackifiante compatible". The claim was then amended by appending to said claim the sentence (emphasis added by the Board) "et dans lequel (mélange) la résine tackifiante est une résine...".

The Board entrusted with the case considered (Reasons, 3.3-3.7) that this wording "en cascade" clearly imposed a double condition on the claimed "mélange", and that therefore the scope of protection conferred by this claim was more limited by virtue of the amendment made.

However, claim 1 of auxiliary request 1bis as filed by the Respondent is not worded in a comparable manner since it reads (amendments with respect to granted claim 1 made apparent by the Board, additions in bold) as follows:

"1. A bathroom cleaning composition which comprises by weight:
(a) 0.1 % to 10% of a chlorine bleach compound;
(b) 0.1 % to 3% of an alkali metal silicate;
(c) 0.25% to 5% of a phosphate builder salt; and
(d) the balance being water,
wherein the bathroom cleaning composition further includes
(e) an amine oxide surfactant,
and has a pH of at least 9 to 14,
and in which the composition comprises 0.25% to 5% of a phosphate builder salt which is sodium tripolyphosphate".

The Board holds that this formulation is also prima facie ambiguous and, hence, unclear (Article 84 EPC) because it is not apparent to what the expression "in which" and, hence, the entire following relative clause refers to, i.e. to the whole "cleaning composition", or to one or more of the listed components.

This formulation is still open to an interpretation according to which the composition comprises

- according to feature (c), at least one first phosphate builder salt in a relative amount within the stated range,

and, additionally,

- according to the last feature of the claim, sodium tripolyphosphate (as further, different phosphate builder salt) in a relative amount within the stated range.

Such different phosphate builder salts could thus be present in a combined (total) amount exceeding the upper limit of 5% prescribed by claim 1 as granted as regards the amount of (all) phosphate builder salt(s) present in the composition. According to this interpretation, claim 1 at issue thus confers a protection which is extended compared to the one conferred by claim 1 as granted.

The wording of claim 1 at issue is thus prima facie unsuitable for overcoming the pending objection under Article 84 EPC and, thus, not clearly allowable.

For the sake of completeness, the Board observes that also in decision T 1360/11 (11.11.2014), briefly referred to by the Respondent during the oral proceedings, a double condition (expressed differently than in the case underlying T 999/10 mentioned above) was held to be necessary to ascertain that an amendment narrowing down a generic class or list of chemical compounds did not lead to an extension of the protection conferred (Reasons, 3.1-3.9).

11.3 Taking into consideration all aspects addressed above, the Board concludes that the Respondent could have reacted to the raised objections under Article 84 and 123(3) EPC by filing a further auxiliary claim request well in advance of the oral proceedings. Auxiliary request 1bis was, however, only filed during the oral proceedings, i.e. in the latest stage of the proceedings. Due to the new wording added to claim 1, requiring further considerations as to its possible implications having regard to the requirements of Article 84 and/or Article 123(3) EPC, the complexity of the case would have been increased.

11.4 Therefore the Board decided, in the exercise of its discretion under Articles 12(4) and 13(1) and (3) RPBA, not to admit late-filed auxiliary request 1bis into the proceedings.

Conclusion

12. None of the Respondent's requests is both admissible into the proceedings and allowable.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The patent is revoked

This decision T 514/14 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T051414.20170721  . The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Bunker" by Alex Gilbert obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 2002/13 - Extension of subject matter

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In this opposition appeal, the proprietor intended to limit the claim 1 as granted as follows:


A method to detect the presence or absence of an MREJ type xi methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) strain characterised as having within the right extremity of SCCmec the sequence of SEQ ID NOs 17, 18 or 19 the SEQ ID NO 17 comprising:
generation of SCCmec right extremity junction sequence data by
contacting a sample to be analyzed for the presence or absence of said MRSA strain, said MRSA strain including a Staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec (SSCCmec) element containing a mecAgene inserted into chromosomal DNA, thereby generating a polymorphic right extremity junction (MREJ) type xi sequence that comprises sequences from both the SCCmec element right extremity and chromosomal DNA adjoining said right extremity, with a first primer and a second primer, wherein said first and second primers are at least 10 nucleotides in length, and wherein said first primer hybridizes with said SCCmecelement right extremity of an MREJ type xi sequence selected from the group consisting of SEQ ID NOs: 17, 18 and 19 and complements thereof, and wherein said second primer hybridizes with a chromosomal sequence of S. aureus and wherein each of said first and second primer hybridizes with said sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17 or complements thereof to specifically generate an amplicon if such MRSA strain is present in said sample; and
detecting the presence or absence of said amplicon.

At first glance these amendments limit the claim. In particular, the board acknowledges that the definition of the second primer is narrower than its definition as granted. Nevertheless, the combination of features amount to extension of the conferred protection.



Reasons for the Decision
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Auxiliary request 3
Article 123(3) EPC
The feature "wherein each of said first and second primer hybridizes with said sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17 of complements thereof"
23. In the decision under appeal (cf. page 6, first paragraph), the opposition division found that the feature "wherein each of said first and second primer hybridizes with said sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17 of complements thereof" did not extend the scope of protection as compared to the granted claims. The board does not agree with the opposition division on this issue.
24. Claim 1 as granted defines a first primer hybridizing "with said SSCmec element right extremity of an MREJ type xi sequence selected from the group consisting of SEQ ID NOs: 17 [...] and complements thereof" and a second primer that "hybridizes with a chromosomal sequence of S. aureus to specifically generate an amplicon if such MRSA strain is present in said sample" (cf. point I supra). The sequence of both the first and second primer may be located closely or immediately adjacent to the SCCmec insertion site defining the MREJ type xi of sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17 but, whilst the first primer must necessarily hybridize with a sequence within the SCCmec element right extremity of said MREJ type xi, the second primer may hybridize with any S. aureus chromosomal sequence, not necessarily within the MREJ type xi of sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17. All possible combinations of first and second primers fulfilling these conditions form the population of primer pairs that can be used in the method according to claim 1 as granted.
25. Amended claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 defines the first and second primers by the feature that "each of said first and second primer hybridizes with said sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17", and further requires that they "specifically generate an amplicon if such MRSA strain is present in said sample" (cf. point XII supra). Thus, even though the first primer is not explicitly required to hybridize with the SCCmec element right extremity of the MREJ type xi of sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17, a detection of the MRSA strain in the sample implicitly requires that at least one of the primers, if not both of them, must necessarily hybridize with sequences located within the polymorphic right extremity of the SCCmec because it is this specific polymorphic sequence which characterizes the MREJ type xi MRSA strain and allows its detection (cf. paragraphs [0007], [0012] and [0034], and claim 1 of the patent application).
26. The second primer in the method of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 does not hybridize with any chromosomal sequence of S. aureus - as in claim 1 as granted, but only with the MREJ type xi sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17. Although this definition of the second primer is narrower than the definition of the second primer found in claim 1 as granted, the second primer as defined in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 may now hybridize not only with the orfX sequence closely or immediately adjacent to the SCCmec insertion site defining the MREJ type xi sequence of SEQ ID NO: 17, but it may also hybridize with the insertion site itself, as well as with the SCCmec right extremity as far as this second primer, together with an appropriate first primer, specifically generate an amplicon if an MREJ type xi MRSA strain is present in the sample. A method using such combinations of first and second primers does not fall within the scope of granted claim 1. Since in the amended claim 1 the protection conferred by claim 1 as granted has been extended, the amendment is not allowable under Article 123(3) EPC.
27. Thus, the appellant's request to maintain the patent on the basis of claims 1 and 2 according to auxiliary request 3 fails.
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This decision T 2002/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T200213.20170517. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by Skeeze obtained via PixaBay under CC0 Creative Commons.

T 2406/16 - Reestablishment when appeal fee not paid

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It's another one of those nightmare scenario's. A notice of opposition is filed but the appeal fee is not paid. 
The attorney signed a notice of opposition and instructed his assistant to file the notice and pay the fee as soon as the deposit account contains enough funds. The latter requires checking with the CFO that there are enough funds in the deposit account, and can take a few days. Unfortunately, the assistent accidentally removed the due date from the system when the notice is filed. This  should not have been done until the payment was made. The board did not view this as an isolated mistake and refused the reinstate the case. 

Reasons for the Decision
(...)
Hence, the request for re-establishment of rights is admissible.
3. The appellant has, however, not shown that all due care required by the circumstances was taken to comply with the time limit for filing the appeal fee (Article 122(1) EPC).
3.1 In the case at hand, the appellant submits that the failure to comply with the missed time limit resulted from the decision to send the notice of appeal before payment of the appeal fee and the erroneous simultaneous removal of the time limit from the docketing system by an assistant, which went unnoticed by the representative.
3.2 In the case of non-observance of a time limit due to an error, the boards of appeal have established the criterion that due care is considered to have been taken if non-compliance with the time limit resulted either from exceptional circumstances or from an isolated mistake within a normally satisfactory monitoring system (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (hereinafter "CLBA"), 8th ed., III.E.5.2., penultimate paragraph). It is the appellant's contention that the present case amounts to such an isolated mistake.
3.3 The party requesting re-establishment of rights bears the burden of making the case and proving that the requirements are met (CLBA supra, III.E.5.2., last paragraph). Thus, in the present case the appellant bears the burden of proof to show the existence of a normally satisfactory monitoring system.
3.4 The Board observes that eOLF in combination with a docketing system for monitoring the relevant time limits, when used as intended by an experienced and well trained assistant such as Ms EN under the supervision of a carefully acting representative such as Mr FC, could under most circumstances provide a satisfactory monitoring system to deal with time limits such as the one for filing a notice of appeal. However, the system described is imperfect insofar as it does not guarantee sufficient supervision under all circumstances, in particular not in cases where the usual order of processing steps is intentionally or accidentally changed or interrupted, as will be described below.
3.5 In the present case, the monitoring system was overridden before the error occurred (see 3.5.1) and the way information was exchanged between the patent department and the accounts department (see 3.5.2) made the system error-prone to begin with.
3.5.1 The normal routine of having everything necessary to file an appeal prepared by the assistant and having the representative perform a cross-check when electronically signing the notice of appeal was not followed in the case at hand. Instead the representative signed a notice of appeal containing the (then) inaccurate statement "the decision is hereby appealed and the prescribed fee paid" (italics added by the board) and left it to the assistant to pay the fee later once the CFO had informed her that there were sufficient funds in the deposit account. Whereas the normal routine made sure that the representative, who is the only one allowed to sign submissions, would certainly perform the cross-check, the deviation therefrom meant that the assistant could single-handedly make the payment and remove the time limit from the docketing system (see appellant's letter of 8 September 2017, page 2, third paragraph), so a cross-check was missing. This, however, allowed the assistant's error to remain unnoticed by the representative, who did no longer need to be involved with the matter.
3.5.2 According to the appellant's submissions, it is the patent department's task to pay fees from the company's account with the EPO by giving an order in eOLF. Yet patent attorneys and their assistants apparently do not have access to the account balance. Thus, they cannot check themselves whether there are sufficient funds to make the payment, and need to get information from the accounts department before they can issue a payment order. However, according to the Appellant's submissions, it appears to be rather difficult to get this information. It is not sufficient to contact a colleague from the accounts department because the account balance is reviewed only once or twice a week (cf. letter of 10 February 2017, paragraph bridging pages 2 and 3). Thus, even when there are sufficient funds in the account, as was the case on 1 September 2016, it might well happen, as in the present case, that members of the accounts department are not in a position to give the green light for payments because the account balance has not been checked recently enough. Since they do not normally perform checks on demand (cf. letter of 8 September 2017, paragraph bridging pages 1 and 2), the only way to get the information needed is apparently to contact the accounts department repeatedly until the point in time where the account's balance has just been checked and the department is, thus, able to provide the required information. It is evident that such a system is unreliable and prone to error.
3.5.3 Thus, changing the normal routine of checking whether the appeal fee has been paid when the notice of appeal is being sent and leaving it, instead, to the assistant to pay the appeal fee as soon as she received information from the accounts department regarding the required funds, meant intentionally deviating from a potentially satisfactory system to a system that was subject to uncertainties. These became apparent after Ms EN had erroneously removed the due date in the docketing system. Ms JS forgot to get back to Ms EN and Ms EN forgot to make further attempts to get the required information from the accounts department. Moreover, the need to deviate from the common routine only arose as a consequence of the defective information system. In a system where patent assistants have immediate access to the account balance, be it electronically or by some other reliable way of getting the latest information from the accounts department, Mr FC would not have had to deviate from the normal routine and entrust Ms EN with paying the appeal fee later, or, if he had nevertheless done so, it would not have been a problem for Ms EN to perform this task any time after having been entrusted with it.
3.5.4 Therefore, the case at hand cannot be compared with the case underlying decision T 1355/09 where an order in writing to pay the appeal fee was not carried out. In that case it was the task of the accounting department of the Appellant's parent company to effect all payments ordered by the Appellant, a small patent exploitation agency that employed only four persons. The Board found that the Appellant had no influence over the further execution of its orders, which were sent by internal post to the relevant department of its parent company and had been reliably carried out over the last years. The Board found that the risk of errors in this context was relatively low and came to the conclusion that no additional control mechanism had to be in place as had been found previously in decision T 836/09 regarding the checking of outgoing mail.
In the case at hand, on the contrary, it was the task of the patent department, i.e. the representative and his assistant, to effect the payment. Thus, the patent department had not yet done everything within its competence to file the appeal in time. Taking into account the difficulties of getting prompt information regarding the sufficiency of funds in the account (cf. sections 3.5.2. and 3.5.3 above), one can also not describe the procedure for paying fees as being low risk. Thus, the reasoning in decision T 1355/09 (reasons 1.4 - 1.7) does not apply here.
3.6 Thus, looking at the way the case was handled, the Board does not deem the monitoring system used by the Appellant to have been normally satisfactory.
3.7 Furthermore, the ultimate responsibility in observing time limits lies with the representative (see CLBA, III. E.5.5.2 e)). In the present case, he signed the letter of 1 September that contained a wrong statement regarding the payment of the appeal fee. He should have made sure that such payment had really been made. When transferring complete responsibility for this payment to his assistant - contrary to the routine procedure - he should have ensured that he performed the final cross-check himself. By jeopardising the possibility of a final cross-check, the principle of "due care" was violated.
3.8 To conclude, the omission in paying the appeal fee and the deletion from the docketing system of the time limit for paying such a fee was due to an apparently unsatisfactory monitoring system and lack of due care from the representative.
3.9 For these reasons, the request for re-establishment of rights is to be refused.
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This decision T 2406/16 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T240616.20170921. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by Stefan Keller (kellepicsobtained via PixaBay under CC0 Creative Commons.

T 782/16 Can the content of a divisional be derived from an omnibus parent?

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In this opposition appeal the Board had to assess if the opposed claims could be derived from the filed divisional and parent. In the Board's view, the "gold" standard for the assessment of Articles 123(2) and 76(1) EPC requires that the subject-matter of an amended claim (or of a claim of a divisional application) be based only on what the skilled person would directly and unambiguously derive from the application as originally filed (or from the earlier application; see G 2/10). For a correct application of this standard, a distinction needs to be made between subject-matter which is disclosed either implicitly or explicitly in the original (or earlier) application and therefore can be directly derived from it, and subject-matter which is the result of an intellectual process, in particular a complex one, carried out on what is disclosed. The Board concluded that the latter was the case.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. European patent No. 2 292 219, based on European application 10179085.5 filed as a divisional of the earlier application 06816633.9, was granted on the basis of one claim reading as follows:

"1. Rivastigmine for use in a method of preventing, treating or delaying progression of dementia or Alzheimer's disease, wherein the rivastigmine is administered in a TTS and the starting dose is that of a bilayer TTS of 5 cm**(2) with a loaded dose of 9 mg rivastigmine, wherein one layer:

has a weight per unit area of 60 g/m2 and the following composition:

- rivastigmine free base 30.0 wt%

- Durotak® 387-2353 (polyacrylate adhesive) 49.9 wt%

- Plastoid® B (acrylate copolymer) 20.0 wt%

- Vitamin E 0.1 wt%

and wherein said layer is provided with a silicone adhesive layer having a weight per unit area of 30 g/m2 according to the following composition:

- Bio-PSA® Q7-4302 (silicone adhesive) 98.9 wt%

- Silicone oil 1.0 wt %

- Vitamin E 0.1 wt%".

II. The patent was opposed on multiple grounds, including that its subject-matter extended beyond the content of the application as filed and beyond the content of the earlier application.

III. By decision posted on 15 March 2016 the patent was revoked. The decision was based on a main request and three auxiliary requests. The main request, auxiliary request 1 and auxiliary request 3 were filed on 15 October 2015. Auxiliary request 2 was the patent as granted.

Each request consisted of a single claim relating to rivastigmine administered via a transdermal therapeutic system (TTS), wherein said TTS was characterised by a starting dose defined as in claim 1 of the patent as granted (see point I above).

The following document was referred to in the appealed decision:

B29: WO2007/064407 - parent application of the patent.

IV. In the appealed decision, the opposition division held that claim 1 of the main request related to any TTS providing the same starting dose as the specific TTS of 5 cm**(2)referred to in the claim. The subject-matter of the claim had no basis in document B29. In particular, this subject-matter could be derived neither from example IV nor from page 11, contrary to what the patent proprietors argued. Thus, the main request did not comply with Articles 123(2) and 76(1) EPC. These conclusions applied to the subject-matter of the auxiliary requests too.

V. The patent proprietors (hereinafter: the appellants) filed an appeal against that decision. With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal filed on 25 July 2016, the appellants submitted seven auxiliary requests.

Claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 differed from claim 1 of the patent as granted by the addition of expression "once a day" before the words "starting dose".

Claim 1 of auxiliary request 2 differed from claim 1 of the patent as granted in that the feature "dementia or Alzheimer's disease" had been replaced by "mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease".

Claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 differed from claim 1 of the patent as granted in that it included both amendments introduced in auxiliary requests 1 and 2.

Claim 1 of auxiliary requests 4 to 7 was based on claim 1 of the granted patent and of the first three auxiliary requests, respectively, but included the following feature, at the end of the claim:

"an AUC24h of 25 to 450 ng*h/mL after repeated once daily administration provided".

VI. Replies to the appeal of the patent proprietors were submitted by opponents 2, 3, 5 to 8, 10, 13 and 14 (hereinafter: respondents 2, 3, 5 to 8, 10, 13 and 14).

By letter of 4 November 2016, opponent 4 withdrew its opposition.

VII. Oral proceedings were held on 18 July 2017. For information on the course of the oral proceedings, reference is made to the minutes.

VIII. The appellants' arguments can be summarised as follows:

B29 contained embodiments which were directed to a "structural invention" relating to a TTS with a particular adhesive layer but not restricted to rivastigmine, and other embodiments directed to a "use invention" relating to TTSs that provided specific rivastigmine release profiles but which were not limited by any further structural features. The "structural invention" and the "use invention" were clearly presented in B29 as separable. The skilled team, with competence both in medicine and in the field of pharmaceutical formulations, would have concluded that use embodiments relating to rivastigmine TTSs need not be limited to TTSs having a particular structure. This applied in particular to the disclosure of example IV and to the first paragraph of page 11. Example IV disclosed a study in which a group of patients were treated either with capsules of rivastigmine or with a TTS containing rivastigmine. At the beginning of the study, the patients treated with the TTS inherently received a starting dose. This would have been clear to a skilled person despite the fact that it was not spelled out expressis verbis. In comparing tables 1 and 2 of example IV, the skilled team would have immediately noted that the AUC24h for the TTS starting dose was approximately four times higher than for the oral starting dose. Furthermore, as explained on page 9 of B29, the skilled team knew that the same starting dose could be obtained with other TTSs, different from the specific TTS used in the study of example IV. Accordingly, it was permissible to base a claim on the same starting dose as delivered by the TTS of example IV but with no restriction on the structure of the TTS. The first paragraph of page 11 containing an explicit reference to rivastigmine was a further embodiment of the "use invention". This paragraph was not restricted to any specific TTS. The skilled team would have linked the reference to a "higher starting dose" to the starting dose of the TTS used in example IV, since no other starting dose was mentioned in B29. The combination of the passage on page 11 and example IV provided a basis for the subject-matter of claim 1.

IX. The respondents argued inter alia that example IV of B29 described a study concerning the pharmacokinetic properties of a specific rivastigmine TTS named TTS#2. The results disclosed in this example were linked to the use of this specific TTS. There was no basis for a generalisation to cover any TTS providing the same starting dose as TTS#2. The passage on page 11 did not contain any link to example IV. Even assuming that the skilled person would have combined page 11 and example IV, he would have nonetheless concluded that it was possible to increase the starting dose of rivastigmine by the use of the specific TTS of example IV. Accordingly, the subject-matter of claim 1 could not be directly and unambiguously derived from B29.

X. The appellants requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the case be remitted to the opposition division for consideration of any grounds other than Article 100(c) EPC on the basis of the patent as granted or on the basis of one of the seven auxiliary requests filed with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal on 25 July 2016, and that the appeal fee be reimbursed.

XI. Respondents 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 requested that the appeal be dismissed.

Respondents 2 and 13 furthermore requested that auxiliary requests 4 to 7 not be admitted into the appeal proceedings.

Reasons for the Decision

MAIN REQUEST (GRANTED PATENT)

Articles 76(1) and 123(2) EPC

1. In line with the approach taken in the appealed decision and by the parties, the Board will assess compliance with the requirements of Articles 76(1) and 123(2) EPC by comparing the subject-matter of claim 1 with the disclosure of document B29, i.e. the publication of the parent application. This document is identical to the parent application as originally filed and is incorporated in the application underlying the patent in suit as originally filed.

2. The subject-matter of the patent

2.1 The patent contains a single claim drafted in the format of a purpose-limited product claim pursuant to Article 54(5) EPC (see point I above). In point 3 of its decision, the opposition division construed claim 1 as granted "as encompassing any TTS as long as it comprises rivastigmine and as long as in the use of claim 1 there is provided a certain "starting dose". The amount of the starting dose is corresponding to that provided by the TTS having the structural features as indicated in claim 1. These structural features, however, are intended to define the starting dose only, not the TTS employed in the medical use of claim 1 as such".

The Board agrees with this interpretation of claim 1. It is noted that none of the parties proposes a different reading of the claim.

3. The disclosure of B29

3.1 In their written submissions and during the oral proceedings, the appellants presented some general observations concerning the content of B29 as a preliminary remark for a correct interpretation of this document and in particular of the passages supposedly providing the basis for the subject-matter of claim 1, namely example IV and the first paragraph of page 11 (see below).

The Board therefore finds it appropriate to analyse the general disclosure of B29 before considering the specific passages of this document that supposedly provide a basis for the subject-matter of claim 1.

3.2 The appellants emphasise that B29 is a so-called omnibus application containing two separable embodiments. The first ("the structural invention") relates to a particular TTS which is defined in claim 1 and which is not restricted to rivastigmine, and the second ("the use invention") relates to TTSs that provide specific rivastigmine release profiles but which are not limited by any further structural features.

3.3 The Board observes that the description of B29 discloses, from paragraph 5 of page 1 to paragraph 2 of page 2, a number of objectives of the invention. The third paragraph of page 2 then states that these objectives are achieved by a TTS as defined in claim 1, which is characterised by the presence of an adhesive layer with a silicone polymer. This TTS represents, in the Board's view, the central aspect of the invention disclosed in B29. Indeed, the eighth paragraph of page 2 states that "[t]ests with active ingredients for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease have surprisingly shown that a line of silicone adhesive can be applied to a poorly adhesive reservoir matrix, thus significantly increasing the adhesive properties of the preparation without affecting the thermodynamic properties of the TTS". On the basis of this finding, the invention disclosed in B29 provides a TTS comprising (a) a backing layer, (b) a reservoir layer and (c) an adhesive layer with a silicone polymer (page 3, lines 5 to 7 and claim 1). TTS#2, the patch used in the clinical test disclosed in example IV is a TTS with these structural features.

Thus, what the appellant defines as the structural invention, represents in the Board's view the core of the disclosure of B29.

3.4 The appellants mentioned various passages of B29 as representative of the "use invention", for instance the third paragraph on page 3 ("The present invention is further related to a method for substantially improving the efficacy and tolerability of rivastigmine, comprising application of a TTS in the range of 2 to 50 cm**(2), said formulation providing a mean maximum plasma concentration of about 1 to 30 ng/mL...") or the fourth paragraph on page 9 ("The invention further provides a TTS comprising as active ingredient rivastigmine...having a mean maximum plasma concentration of about 1 to 30 ng/ml...and an AUC 24h of about 25 to 450 ng*h/mL ...").

In the Board's view, the skilled audience could well attribute all these passages to the "structural invention", i.e. it could consider the TTSs referred to in these paragraphs to be the same TTSs defined in claim 1 or on page 3 of B29. Indeed, B29 does not refer to any other type of TTS. Furthermore, the experimental data concerning the plasma concentration of rivastigmine disclosed in the patent (see example IV and figures 3 and 4) relate to tests carried out using TTS#2, i.e. a TTS according to claim 1 of B29. Hence, the specific rivastigmine release profiles, that characterise the "use invention" according to the appellants are in fact achieved by the use of the TTSs of claim 1. Moreover, as discussed above, on pages 1 and 2 B29 describes a number of objectives of the invention which include methods of treatment based on the administration of rivastigmine. The sole solution proposed in B29 to achieve these objectives is "by a TTS as defined in claim 1" (page 2, line 8).

Thus, the Board is not convinced that B29 relates to two groups of independent inventions, namely a "structural invention" and a "use invention".

3.5 In any case, the Board sees no need to establish whether one or more independent inventions are disclosed in B29. What matters in the assessment of compliance with Articles 76(1) and 123(2) EPC is to establish whether the subject-matter of the patent can be derived in a clear and unambiguous manner from the disclosure of B29.

The appellants do not disputed that B29 does not explicitly disclose the subject-matter of claim 1. In their opinion, however, this subject-matter can be derived from document B29 in two different ways: based on the disclosure of example IV (defined by the appellants as derivation#1) and on the first paragraph of page 11 (defined by the appellants as derivation#2). These are discussed below.
4. Possible derivations of the subject-matter of claim 1

4.1 Derivation#1

4.1.1 Example IV describes a study carried out on patients with mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease. The patients received either an oral formulation of rivastigmine (Exelon® capsules) or a transdermal one. The transdermal formulation is the patch TTS#2 which is described in example I of B29. The study comprised four periods with an increasing dosage of the active ingredient. In the first period the patients were treated either with 1.5 mg bid (twice a day) of Exelon® or with TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2). In the second to fourth periods the patients were treated with increasing doses of rivastigmine: the patients enrolled for the oral therapy received 3 mg, 4.5 mg and 6 mg bid Exelon®; those in the transdermal therapy were treated with TTS#2 patches of 10 cm**(2), 15 cm**(2) and 20 cm**(2). Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the pharmacokinetic parameters of rivastigmine following capsule administration (Table 1) or the TTS#2 application (Table 2). The pharmacokinetic parameters include the maximum serum concentration (Cmax), the time at which the Cmax is observed (tmax), the half-life (t1/2) and the 24-hour area under the concentration-time curve (AUC24h). The data relate to the four periods.

4.1.2 The Board notes that example IV does not contain any reference to a TTS other than the patch TTS#2 used on the patients. Nor is there anything in this example to indicate using a TTS other than TTS#2.

4.1.3 The appellants argue that a skilled team, composed of experts in medicine and in the field of pharmaceutical formulations, would have noted that the AUC24h provided by the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2)was approximately four times higher than the AUC24h obtained with 1.5 mg twice a day of Exelon®. They would have then considered using any TTS providing the same dose as the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2).

In the Board's view, the appellants' reasoning is not in line with the "gold" standard required for the assessment of Articles 123(2) and 76(1) EPC. This standard requires that the subject-matter of an amended claim (or of a claim of a divisional application) be based only on what the skilled person would directly and unambiguously derive from the application as originally filed (or from the earlier application; see G 2/10, point 4.3 of the Reasons). For a correct application of this standard, a distinction needs to be made between subject-matter which is disclosed either implicitly or explicitly in the original (or earlier) application and therefore can be directly derived from it, and subject-matter which is the result of an intellectual process, in particular a complex one, carried out on what is disclosed.
The intellectual process undertaken by the appellants to reach claim 1 from example IV comprises the steps of:

(a) singling out from all the data disclosed in tables 1 and 2 the AUC24h of the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2)and of the capsules of 1.5 mg;

(b) comparing these two pieces of data;

(c) formulating the idea of using any TTS that is capable of providing the same rivastigmine dose as the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2).


In this context the Board notes that the AUC24h values obtained with the TTS#2 patches of 10 cm**(2), 15 cm**(2) and 20 cm**(2)are also much higher than the AUC24h values obtained with the capsules of 3 mg, 4.5 mg and 6 mg bid Exelon®. Example IV is silent about the relevance of the AUC24h of the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2). There is also no indication to use a TTS different than TTS#2 but capable of providing the rivastigmine release of the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2). In other words, the clinical study described in example IV relates to the application of a specific patch, namely TTS#2.

The appellants' reasoning is therefore based on an intellectual processing of the subject-matter disclosed in the original (or earlier) application rather than a direct and unambiguous derivation as required by the "gold" standard. No matter whether or not such processing is based on obvious considerations, such a reasoning cannot be used to justify the compliance with Articles 76(1) and 123(2) EPC.

4.1.4 The arguments put forward by the appellants in relation to the information disclosed on page 9 of B29 do not invalidate the above conclusions.

Paragraph 4 of page 9 states that the invention provides a TTS comprising rivastigmine "having a mean maximum plasma concentration of about 1 to 30 ng/ml...and an AUC 24h of about 25 to 450 ng*h/mL". The following paragraph explains that a skilled person would be familiar with "how to produce a TTS having the above defined plasma profiles" and how a patch could be modified in order to obtain the desired plasma profile. In the appellants' view, the skilled audience would link these passages to example IV, finding an indication to provide patches other than the TTS#2 that are nonetheless capable of providing the same dose as the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2).

4.1.5 The Board is not persuaded by this argument. Page 9 does not contain any reference to example IV. Nor is there any indication that the instructions on how to produce a TTS providing a certain plasma profile should be applied to produce any TTS with the same rivastigmine release profile as the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2).

The skilled audience would read the passages on page 9 referred to by the appellants in relation to the main subject of the invention, namely the provision of the TTS described on page 3, lines 5 to 7 (see point 3.3 above). In this respect it is noted that the passage on page 9 refers to the possibility of modifying the adhesive layer. Whereas the TTS of claim 1 contains an adhesive layer, not every TTS does. The skilled team would therefore consider the general instructions of page 9 not to constitute an indication to produce any TTS, regardless of its structure. Rather, they are instructions on how to prepare or modify TTSs of the type described on page 3 in order to obtain such plasma profiles. Indeed, the sole pharmacokinetic data disclosed in B29 are those in example IV for TTS#2, i.e. a TTS comprising a backing layer a reservoir layer and an adhesive layer with a silicone polymer, just like the TTS defined on page 3.

4.1.6 It follows that example IV does not constitute a valid basis for a claim directed to any TTS providing the same rivastigmine release as the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2).

4.2 Derivation#2

4.2.1 The appellants' proposed alternative way to derive the subject-matter of claim 1 from the disclosure of B29 is based on the first paragraph of page 11. This passage of the description indicates that "the TTS of the invention...may allow a higher starting dose". In the appellants' view, the skilled team would link this passage to the starting dose of example IV since no other starting dose is disclosed in B29. It would also regard this sentence as defining an embodiment of "the use invention", which is not limited to any particular TTS. This would provide a direct basis for the subject-matter of claim 1.

4.2.2 In the Board's view, this position is not tenable. The most straightforward and logical way of interpreting the wording "the TTS of the invention" (page 11, line 1) is to consider it to refer to the TTS defined on page 3, lines 5 to 7, and in claim 1. Indeed, as explained in paragraph 3.3 above, this TTS represents the core of the invention disclosed in B29 and is the subject of claim 1 of B29.

Any other interpretation based on the assumption that "the TTS of the invention" is not the one in claim 1 seems much less logical, and in any case, such an interpretation could not invalidate the most logical one. Thus, in the best-case scenario for the appellants, there could be a second interpretation based on the assumption that "the TTS of the invention" is not the one in claim 1 but is "any TTS". That would imply that the sentence on page 11 is ambiguous in that it is open to various interpretations. However, using an ambiguous sentence as a basis for the subject-matter of an amended claim (or a claim of a divisional application) is against the principle that this subject-matter should be derived in a an unambiguous manner from the (earlier) application.

4.2.3 "Derivation#2" has a further deficiency, namely the absence of any link to example IV. Therefore, the appellants' argument that the "starting dose" referred to in the sentence on page 11 is the one of example IV is not based on an objective interpretation of this sentence. If, for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the skilled team would establish a link between page 11 and example IV, there would still be the problem that example IV relates to the use of a specific TTS which is a TTS according to claim 1 of B29. Thus, it could still not be concluded that the sentence of page 11 relates to a structurally undefined TTS providing the same release as the TTS#2 of 5 cm**(2).

4.2.4 In the light of the considerations set out above, the Board concludes that the first paragraph of page 11 of B29 does not provide a basis for the subject-matter of claim 1 either.

4.3 It follows that the patent does not meet the requirements of Articles 123(2) and 76(1) EPC.

AUXILIARY REQUESTS 1 to 7

5. Each of these requests relates to a rivastigmine-based TTS which is not structurally defined and is characterised by providing the same starting dose a the TTS of 5 cm**(2) used in the experiments of example IV.

The considerations set out in respect of the main request apply to the auxiliary requests too. Thus, auxiliary requests 1 to 7 are likewise considered to contravene Articles 123(2) and 76(1) EPC.

In view of the above, the Board does not need to decide on the admissibility of auxiliary requests 4 to 7.

REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF THE APPEAL FEE

6. As the appeal is not allowed, the appellants' request for reimbursement of the appeal fee has to be rejected, Rule 103(1)(a) EPC.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee is rejected.

This decision T 782/16 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier:ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T078216.20170718. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by Rodrigo Senna obtained via Flickr under Public Domain Mark 1.0.
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