DeltaPatents Case Law blog

Is it technical to centralize a function?

The appeal concerns a centralized merchant authentication processing system. The Examining division rejected the application as a "straight-forward implementation of an administrative (outsourced payment) scheme using a notorious distributed information". Initially, also the Board did much like the invention. In the summons, the Board considered the invention to be a "straightforward implementation, on a standard computer network, of non-technical measures (business measures and programming measures)".

Something must have happened after that because the appeal resulted in an order to grant. The reasons provide a detailed discussion of the 'business man' versus the 'skilled person'.

Reasons for the Decision

Background

1. The invention is concerned with online shopping. A consumer, having decided to buy something from an online shop, chooses how to pay. That could be a choice of credit card or of some other means of paying. To complete the transaction, the consumer has to be authenticated. The online store will pass information about the intended transaction to the credit-card company (for example), which handles the task of ensuring the consumer is entitled to use the chosen means of payment, and which informs the online shop of the outcome.

2. The technical implementation of this authentication involves the server of the online shop (the "merchant server") communicating with the computer of the credit-card company (as it may be). This communication is conventionally handled by a "plug-in" in the merchant server, a piece of software specific to the particular authenticating authority and to the needs of the authentication process. There will be a plug-in for each of the different means of payment: one for one type of credit-card; one for another; one for direct transfer from a particular bank, and so on.

3. The invention is about the plug-ins. It does not change their function, or how they perform it. All that is unchanged. Rather, the plug-ins are no longer installed in each online shop, but are installed on a separate server that can be accessed by several online shops and that handles access to several authenticating authorities. The idea is to alleviate the shop's server from the installation and upkeep of the plug-ins.

4. Thus, the invention replaces the three-machine prior art (consumer's computer, merchant's server, authenticating server) with a four-machine system (consumer's computer, merchant's server, authenticating server, and "merchant authentication processing system" - MAPS).

The starting point for inventive step

5. Document D1 foresees a single payment instrument (an "ATM card"). Authentication involves the merchant's server, an authenticating server, and a consumer's computer. There is no mention of plug-ins or of the organisation of software in layers.

6. Document D2 foresees a plurality of payment instruments and corresponding plug-ins (D2, page 6, lines 12-14 for example). The term "plug-in" is not used, but that is what the payment clients are. They take the form, preferably, of thin clients (D2, page 9, lines 13 - 15). There is no disclosure of whether software is arranged in layers.

D3 foresees a plurality of payment instruments and corresponding plug-ins for authentication (D3, page 16, lines 3-6, for example). There is, again, no disclosure of software being arranged in layers.

8. The appellant, on appeal, has filed document D4. D4 is not prior art. It was published after the priority date of the present application. The appellant argues that it nevertheless reflects the prevailing thinking in the field at the priority date. If that is so, then D4 is a secondary indicium; but it cannot be a starting point for an assessment of inventive step.

9. The application sets out along the lines described above. While D1 is somewhat further away, because it deals with a single payment instrument, D2 and D3 are broadly similar to the disclosure in the application itself. The invention, starting from either D2 or D3, or from the prior art set out in the application itself, differs by the centralised location of the plug-ins, in the means of communicating with the new location, and in the details of how the software is organised.

The approach to the assessment of inventive step

As the Examining Division found, and as the appellant agreed, claim 1 defines a method with both technical and non-technical elements. As is well established, non-technical elements do not contribute to inventive step, and, to that end, may appear in the formulation of the objective technical problem (T 0641/00, Two identities/COMVIK, OJ 2003, 352). If the essential idea of the invention lies in a non-technical field (usually one excluded by Article 52(2) EPC, such as business, programs, or presentations of information), the objective technical problem often amounts to a statement of requirements that any implementation must meet.

11. The basic principle of the Comvik approach is that only technical features can contribute to inventive step; but all technical features potentially do so.

12. The assessment of what is and what is not technical is, therefore, a critical step in the formulation of the objective technical problem. A non-obvious difference over the prior art leads to a positive outcome, if it is deemed technical; but a non-obvious difference that is deemed non-technical leads to a negative outcome. This often leads to opposing definitions of the problem and must therefore be analysed precisely.

13. The formulation of the objective technical problem in terms of non-technical requirements raises the question of what requirements the business person (for example) can actually give to the technically skilled person. Naturally, any requirement that is purely a business matter can be included. The business person can formulate requirements such as, "Move the money from the payer's account to the payee's account", but in the normal course of things, the business person will not include any technical matter.

14. In the real world, there might be circumstances under which a business person might require some particular technology be used. A real business person is not unaware of technology, and might, for example say, "We should do this on the internet", or "Let's do this by wireless", or "We have a lot of XXXX processors, please use them to implement my business idea."

However, in the assessment of inventive step, the business person is just as fictional as the skilled person of Article 56 EPC. The notion of the skilled person is an artificial one; that is the price paid for an objective assessment. So it is too with the business person, who represents an abstraction or shorthand for a separation of business considerations from technical. A real business person, a real technically-skilled person, or a real inventor does not hold such considerations separately from one another.

16. Thus, the notional business person might not do things a real business person would. He would not require the use of the internet, wireless, or XXXX processors. This approach ensures that, in line with the Comvik principle, all the technical matter, including known or even notorious matter, is considered for obviousness and can contribute to inventive step.

17. Similarly, the notional business person might do things that a real business person would not, such as include requirements that go against business thinking at the time - a sort of business prejudice, as is alleged in this case (see below). If this were not the case, business requirements would need to be evaluated and would contribute to inventive step, contrary to the Comvik principle.

Application to the present case

The examining division, in essence, considered that the problem solved by the invention amounted to how to outsource the authentication of a commercial transaction to a third-party, which was an administrative or business activity. It would thus be a requirement given to the skilled person. The appellant argued that the business person would never have formulated this problem because it went against thinking at the time. In the Board's view both of these approaches are too simplistic and need to be qualified by the considerations given above. In particular, neither approach distinguishes precisely enough between technical and non-technical aspects.

19. Firstly, the Board agrees that outsourcing a purely commercial transaction could be a requirement given to the skilled person. In such a case, it would follow from the above that a prejudice against this would not help the applicant. However, the Board judges that the transaction authentication in the present case cannot be abstracted to a purely business activity because it has aspects such as the use of plug-ins and servers.

20. It also follows from the above that the business person cannot require the technically-skilled person to use, for the plug-ins, a server other than the merchant server, and which is (perhaps) accessible to other vendors. The business person might well have noticed that expense and difficulties were involved in running the merchant server; but she has no technical appreciation of why that is or that using another server might help. Those are matters for the a programmer or network engineer.

Programs for computers are, in general, not considered technical. However, the choice of where a particular computation is carried out in a distributed system will normally have implications for availability, for latency and so on, and those are technical matters. The Board is persuaded, that the decision to centralise the plug-ins in a separate server that can be accessed by several merchant servers, in order to simplify installation and maintenance and reduce load, should be considered a technical one.

22. Thus, the question is whether the technically skilled person, from the starting point set out in the application, or from D2 or D3, would relocate the plug-ins in a centralised server. Having taken that decision, a series of other decisions would be needed such as how merchant servers access the plug-ins. If the relocation was not obvious, then an inventive step must be acknowledged. If it was obvious, then the further decisions must be looked at, to the extent they are reflected in the claims.

The obviousness of relocation

23. The issues of where particular software can best be located and whether it can be shared rather than copied, are familiar to network engineers. Thus, the technically-skilled person, seeking to simplify the merchant server or the installation or updating of plug-ins, might have considered placing them in a separate server that could be accessed by various merchants' servers. That speaks against inventive step. However, as pointed out by the appellant, there are a number of other possibilities, such as centrally managing the plug-ins, combining them into a single plug-in, and introducing a proxy server as in D4. None of the prior art suggests relocating the plug-ins in a centralised server and the appellant has argued that there was a technical prejudice against doing it, all of which speak in favour of inventive step.

A number of the appellant's submissions were, in fact, business prejudices, if they were prejudices at all.

Merchants considered it was essential that they keep control over consumer transactions, and the payment operators were worried the introduction of another party would affect profits. As mentioned above, these cannot affect the assessment of inventive step. Business is business.

25. The appellant supported its argument with four sworn statements. They are all intended to show that there really was a technical prejudice.

26. Mr Gallagher was Director of ECommerce and Products and Services at First Data Corporation(1996 - 2000), Senior Vice President of Corporate Alliances at Chase Paymentech (2000 - 2007). In 2002 - 2003, he evaluated the appellant's technology on behalf of Chase Paymentech. He says that he, and Chase Paymentech generally were dismissive of the invention for business reasons, but also because it "had the potential of creating latency of delay during a transaction", "increased the opportunities for a communications or other failure interrupting the transaction", and "created opportunity for a hacker to breach or compromise system security".

Mr Grace was employed at Bank One (now JP Morgan Chase) in retail banking and Management positions (1990 - 1994), by NYCE Corporation as Director of the Advanced Products Group (1999 - 2005). Mr Grace evaluated the appellants invention in 2002. He says the NYCE customers such as Amazon, Walmart, and Cybersource were all of the view that the merchant had to keep control of interactions with the consumer. There were doubts regarding additional latency and security, but also as to the merchant losing track of the transaction while the authentication process via the MAPS was taking place.

28. Mr Heatherington has worked for the National Westminster Bank, for MasterCard International (1992 - 1999) in senior management positions, for Bank One Canada (1999 - 2000) as Chief Executive Officer, for Cyota Inc (2000 - 2001) as Chief Executive Officer, and for First Data Loan Company Canada (2001 - 2013). He evaluated the appellant's invention for Cyota Inc. and for First Data Loan Company Canada. He explains that there were several approaches to authentication of credit-card transactions over the internet. The present invention was another, which changed the flow of information and was counter-intuitive, because, in order to cope with millions of transactions each day, banks and issuers of cards were loath to relinquish control. That might decrease the speed of transactions, increase the opportunities for failure, create new opportunities for hacking, and render the system less predictable by allowing the appellant to control part of the flow. Mr Heatherington states that the approach taken by the invention were ridiculed at a conference in 2001.

29. Mr Chandra Balasubramanian is one of the inventors in the present case. He worked as a software developer (1993 - 1999). He has been the appellant's Chief Technical Officer since 1999. His submission is that the system assessed by Mr Grace was an embodiment of the claimed invention.

The Board can ascribe little value to these statements, but neither can it simply ignore them. Messrs Gallagher, Grace, and Heatherington were evidently speaking more as businessmen than as engineers; the submissions are by reference to particular working embodiments rather than to the generality of the claimed subject matter;

Nevertheless, they tend to show that there were technical considerations that spoke against relocating the plug-ins. These were the potential for an increase in latency, possible reductions in the number of transactions that can be processed in a given time period, and the increase in the number of points at which communications could be subject to hacking. The argument about the merchant losing track of a transaction during authentication does not seem pertinent, since that happens in the prior art anyway. The argument concerning the appellant controlling part of the flow assumes that the MAPS server is under the control of the appellant, but the claim says nothing about that; and who owns the server is a non-technical matter anyway. On balance, these observations establish a prima facie case for technical prejudice against relocating the plug-ins to a centralised server.

Conclusion on inventive step

31. Thus, the situation at the priority date was that plug-ins were installed on the merchant's web server. The skilled person might have been aware that their installation and maintenance involved difficulties and their relocation on a central server was possible. However, there was no hint to do so and a prima facie prejudice against doing so which is not rebutted by any of the documents on file. In the Board's judgment, in such circumstances, their re-location cannot be considered to have been obvious.

32. Claim 1 defines, in a certain amount of detail, how the merchant's server is set up to communicate with the MAPS. Prima facie, they look like perfectly normal software structures, but since the provision of the MAPS at all is already a non-obvious step, there is no need to consider whether these details add to the inventive step, and the Board refrains from doing so.

33. The above applies to claim 11 as well as to claim 1.

Further issues

34. The Board has questioned compliance with Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC, but is now persuaded that the application is compliant.

35. In particular, the Board is satisfied that the software layers in the client need not match corresponding layers in the MAPS, though it would often be convenient if they did. In the Board's view, the particular layers and connections set out in the description are optional but convenient ways of organising the software that provide the communication between the merchant's server and the MAPS and between the MAPS and the authenticating servers.

36. The Board is also satisfied that the term "thin client" is a term of art. It is a relative term, but that is harmless in the present case, because the client is "thin" in relation to the MAPS, which bears the main burden of processing.

Conclusion

37. The Board sees nothing that stands in the way of the grant of a European patent. In particular, the claimed subject matters involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC), are clear (Article 84 EPC), and do not extend beyond the contents of the application as filed (Article 123(2) EPC).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The decision under appeal is set aside.

The case is remitted to the department of first instance with the order to grant a patent on the basis of the following documents:

Claims 1 to 14 of the main request filed during the oral proceedings before the Board.

Description pages 4 and 5 filed with the grounds of appeal dated 30 May 2011.

Description pages 1 to 3 and 6 to 17 as published.

Figures 1 to 3 as published.

This decision T 1463/11 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2016:T146311.20161129. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by pixelia obtained via Pixabay under CC0 (no changes made).

Where exactly are the boundaries of the forbidden area?

Can a lack of clarity in a claim lead to insufficiency of disclosure? The opponent tries to convert a clarity objection into a lack of sufficiency. The argument is that, the impossibility for the skilled person to know whether he is working within the forbidden area entails the impossibility of carrying out the invention.

To support the point a number of T decisions are cited which side with this argument. The board trumps it though with even more T decisions that do not agree. At the end, the board does concede though that in other situations this argument might work.

Reasons for the Decision

(...)

5. Sufficiency of disclosure

Apart from general references to first instance submissions - which are not part of the appeal proceedings within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) of the EPO (see OJ EPO 1/2016, Supplementary publication, page 41 et seq.)) - appellant II has raised two objections under Article 83 EPC 1973.

5.1 The first objection (paragraph bridging pages 7 and 8 of the statement of grounds of appeal of appellant II)

is based on the lack of clarity of a feature; appellant II argued that the impossibility for the skilled person to know whether he was working within the forbidden area entailed the impossibility of carrying out the invention.

This approach has its origin in decision T 256/87 of 26 July 1988. In this case, the board, having found the claim under consideration to be clear, declared:

"The further question then arises, however, of whether this information, although clear in itself, is sufficient to enable the skilled person to carry out the invention in the sense of his (a) being able to establish whether a composition containing an amount of EAC falling within the range claimed, and (b) being able reliably to prepare such a composition." (reasons, point 10)

This decision appears to have gone unnoticed until 2003. From that time on it has been cited in two ways.

First, there have been four decisions of board 3.2.06, issued between 2004 and 2007 (T 387/01, T 252/02, T 611/02, and T 464/05) in which the board found that the skilled person was not in a position to know whether he was working within the area covered by the claim, and, as a consequence, that the claimed invention was not disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. These decisions appear not to have been followed since then; to the best knowledge of the present board, the only decision following the same logic (without referring to previous decisions) is decision T 18/08 (see reasons 4.2.4). Decision T 909/12 cited by appellant II does not make an explicit statement in this respect but can be read accordingly, in particular when the last paragraph of point 4.7.3 and point 4.8 of the reasons are combined.

Secondly, there are many decisions of various other boards, in particular chemical boards, that have qualified the approach of decision T 256/87 and have pointed out that the definition of the scope of a claim was related to Article 84 EPC rather than Article 83 EPC. Since 2003, more than twenty decisions reaching this conclusion have been issued, the most recent so far (of which the board is aware) being T 1948/10, T 608/12, T 2331/11 and T 1507/10.

It may, therefore, be said that today there is agreement or at least a clearly predominant opinion among the boards that the definition of the "forbidden area" of a claim should not be considered as a matter related to Article 83 EPC. The present board shares this opinion.

It should be noted in this context that, as stated in decision T 608/07, reasons 2.5.2, "... care has to be taken that an insufficiency objection arising out of an ambiguity is not merely a hidden objection under Article 84 EPC ...").

This is not to say that a lack of clarity cannot result in an insufficient disclosure of the invention. However, in such a case it is not sufficient to establish that a claim lacks clarity, but it is necessary to establish that the application or patent, as the case may be, does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. In other words, it is not sufficient to establish a lack of clarity of the claims for establishing lack of compliance with Article 83 EPC 1973; it is necessary to show that the lack of clarity affects the patent as a whole (i.e. not only the claims) and that it is such that the skilled person - who can avail himself of the description and his common general knowledge - is hindered from carrying out the invention (cf. T 1886/06, reasons 1.4.2; T 593/09, reasons 4.1.4). Appellant II has not shown that this is the case here.

5.2 The second objection (statement of grounds of appeal, page 8, second paragraph) is based on a particular interpretation of feature e2). The board has not adopted this interpretation (see point 3.3. ) and cannot, therefore, endorse this objection.

5.3 As a consequence, the board has reached the conclusion that the request complies with the requirements of Article 83 EPC 1973.

This decision T 1811/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2016:T181113.20161108. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by Jorge Guillen (Fotocitizen) obtained via Pixabay under a CC0 license (no changes made).

The claimed invention makes use of available materialised views in order to improve database query performance. Due to the age of the application (filed in 2001), the Board examines inventive step in an appeal concerning added subject matter.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The applicant (appellant), which at the time was Microsoft Corporation, appealed against the decision of the Examining Division refusing European patent application No. 01123065.3.

II. In the course of the appeal proceedings, the application was transferred to Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC, which thereby obtained the status of appellant.

III. The Examining Division decided that the subject-matter of claims 1 and 9 of the main request contained added subject-matter. Moreover, it refused to admit the first and second auxiliary requests using its discretion under Rule 137(3) EPC, stating that the first and second auxiliary requests appeared to comprise the same violations of Article 123(2) EPC as the main request.

IV. In the written proceedings the Examining Division cited the following prior-art documents:

[...]

V. In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant requested that the decision be set aside. It also asked the Board to decide that the claims of one of the main and the two auxiliary requests, considered in the contested decision and resubmitted with the grounds of appeal, were allowable.

VI. In a communication under Article 15(1) RPBA accompanying a summons to oral proceedings, the Board expressed its provisional opinion that the reasons for the refusal were not convincing. However, the Board raised several objections under Articles 123(2) and 84 EPC.
The Board also drew the appellant's attention to the following document:
[...]

VII. With its reply to the Board's communication, the appellant submitted third and fourth auxiliary requests and new description pages 3, 3a, and 3b to replace description page 3 as on file.

VIII. In the course of the oral proceedings the appellant replaced its previous requests with a sole request corresponding to the fourth auxiliary request. At the end of the oral proceedings, the chairman pronounced the Board's decision.

IX. The appellant's final request is that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the following application documents:
- description pages 1, 2, and 4 to 13 as originally filed, and pages 3, 3a and 3b as filed with the letter dated 24 February 2017;
- drawings of Figures 1 to 8 as originally filed;
- claims 1 to 3 of the sole request maintained at the oral proceedings before the Board, corresponding to the fourth auxiliary request filed with letter dated 24 February 2017.

X. Claim 1 of the sole request reads as follows:
"A method for a computer-implemented query optimizer for selecting an execution plan for use in execution of a relational database query, the method comprising:
   generating, by a cost-based query optimizer, a table (300) of alternatives, the table (300) of alternatives comprising several groups, one group having a root entry representing the database query and additional entries representing alternative possibilities for executing the database query and the other groups having root entries representing sub-expressions of the database query and additional entries representing alternative possibilities for executing the respective sub-expression of the database query;
   selecting candidate views for the query from a number of materialized views by using information about what database tables are referenced in the query and whether or not the query contains aggregations;
   for each root entry,
      extracting an operator tree for the root entry,
      collapsing binary joins contained in the operator tree to obtain a query graph for the root entry, the query graph listing all underlying tables along with predicates that are applied on them,
matching the query graph for the root entry and the candidate views, and
   if a match is found, extending the table (300) of alternatives with the corresponding candidate view by extending the group of the root entry with the corresponding candidate view; and
using the cost based query optimizer to select an execution plan based on the extended table (300) of alternatives."

Claim 2 reads as follows:
"A computer readable medium having instructions for causing a computer to perform a method according to claim 1."

Claim 3 reads as follows:
"A computer-implemented query optimizer configured to perform a method according to claim 1."

XI. The appellant's arguments relevant to the decision are discussed in detail below.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal complies with the provisions referred to in Rule 101 EPC and is therefore admissible.

The invention

2. The application relates to the optimisation of relational database queries in the presence of materialised views. According to page 1, last paragraph, of the description, the basic idea of materialised views is to store the result of a query and to use this stored result to answer similar later queries. The invention addresses the known view utilisation problem: given a user query written over base tables, as well as a collection of materialised views, which materialised views can be used to answer the query (description, page 2, first paragraph)?

According to the technical background section on page 2 of the application, prior attempts to determine which views should be used treated the problem in isolation, handled limited scenarios, and often assumed a "global" structure that covered the whole query. There was a need to deal with arbitrary queries, and to integrate view utilisation within the actual architecture of query optimisers. There was a further need to decide whether a view that could be used to answer the query, should actually be used to execute that query. Constructing a "global" structure for the user query, for the purpose of view matching, was incompatible with common optimiser architecture and was sometimes infeasible.

According to page 7, lines 14 to 16, query optimisers are normally structured such that there is an initial simplification stage, followed by exploration of alternatives and cost-based selection of an execution plan as illustrated in Figure 2 of the application. Considering materialised views during query simplification is inadequate, because only a single solution can be generated, and there is no detailed cost information (page 7, lines 31 to 33). Hence, the invention proposes to extend the table of alternatives, which is generated by the query optimiser at the exploration stage and which compactly encodes for each sub-expression of a query the various possibilities for its execution (page 3, lines 9 to 13, and page 10, lines 1 to 21). In other words, materialised views are detected and substituted during exploration of the various query execution possibilities and added to the table of alternatives.

Admission of request

3. Since the current request was a legitimate response to the preliminary opinion of the Board, does not introduce additional complexity into the proceedings and could be dealt with without adjournment of the oral proceedings, the Board admitted it into the appeal proceedings.

Clarity and added subject-matter

The appealed decision found that the following features of the method of claim 1 of the then pending main request infringed the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC:
(a) "selecting candidate views for the query from a number of materialized views";
(b) "extracting, for each candidate view, an operator tree from a view definition of the candidate view".

4.1 The appellant argued that present claim 1 was based on claims 1 to 3, 8 and 17 as originally filed and page 1, lines 3 to 5 and 18 to 26, page 3, lines 9 to 14 and 21 to 24, page 4, line 32, to page 5, line 1, page 8, lines 12 to 19 and 21 to 31, page 9, lines 8 to 16, page 10, lines 14 to 19, and page 11, lines 2 and 3, of the original description and original Figures 3 and 5.

4.2 The method of present claim 1 no longer contains feature (b). Feature (a) is still present, but the method of present claim 1 adds at the end of that feature the text "by using information about what database tables are referenced in the query and whether or not the query contains aggregations".

4.3 The appellant argued in the statement of grounds of appeal that feature (a) was supported by page 9, lines 8 to 14. In particular, page 9, lines 8 to 10, stated that for a particular query there was in general a number of "candidate views", as not all of the materialised views stored in conjunction with previous database queries were relevant to a particular query submitted to the database.

4.4 The Board agrees with the appellant that a database usually has a limited set of materialised views (for example due to the high costs associated with maintaining views). A particular database query will normally refer only to a subset of all base tables and hence some materialised views will not be relevant for this query. Other views might not be relevant due to the use of aggregation. The appellant points correctly to page 9, lines 10 to 13, in support.

Hence, the Board does not share the view of the Examining Division that the cited passage on page 9 merely describes "the process of narrowing down a set of already present candidate views" and that the "origin of this initial set of candidate views ... remains undefined". The appellant suggested that the Examining Division had misinterpreted the following sentence (page 9, lines 13 to 14): "This provides the ability to narrow down the set of candidate views." The Board does not share the alleged interpretation by the Examining Division, namely that the first word ("this") of the cited sentence referred to the process of identifying views as not relevant for a particular query. The sentence simply means that the initial set of (all) materialised views is reduced to a subset of the candidate views by eliminating irrelevant views as described on page 9, lines 11 to 13.

4.5 Hence, the Board accepts the basis for the amendments to claim 1. Present claims 2 and 3 are directed to a computer-readable medium and to a computer-implemented query optimiser, both defined by reference to the method of claim 1.

4.6 Moreover, the amendments to the claims overcome the Board's objections under Article 84 EPC as detailed in its communication to the appellant.

4.7 Hence, the Board is satisfied that the claims comply with the requirements of Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC.

Novelty and inventive step

5. Inventive step was not examined in detail during the proceedings before the first instance. Nevertheless, in view of the age of the application, the Board considers it appropriate to deal with this issue itself under Article 111(1) EPC.

5.1 According to decision T 1569/05 of 26 June 2008, reasons 3.6, retrieving data in a computer database is normally considered to have technical character. While the method of claim 1 does not include the actual data retrieval, the Board considers that the cost-based optimisation of a query in a relational database system has normally technical character (see T 1003/09 of 29 April 2015, reasons 13.3 and 13.5). Such cost-based query optimisation searches for low-cost query execution plans using a cost estimate for the computer resources (such as CPU, main memory or hard disk) needed to execute a query plan (see D8, section 2, for technical background). Hence, this cost-based approach involves further technical considerations (see opinion G 3/08, "Programs for computers", OJ EPO 2011, 10, reasons 13.5) relating to the internal functioning of the computer system.

5.2 The Board summarises below the relevance of the prior art on file. Seven documents, D1 to D7, were cited in the European search report.

Document D1 describes that a query rewriter intercepts and attempts to rewrite user database queries using aggregate tables (materialised aggregate views; see for example page 12, line 18 to page 13, line 5; page 15, line 18 to page 16, line 12) in order to improve query performance. The query rewriter uses a cost-based algorithm to choose among potential rewrites and is detailed only in document D5 (D1 refers on page 24, lines 9 to 12, to U.S. Application Serial No. 09/049,784, the priority document of D5).

[...]

Document D8, introduced into the proceedings by the Board, provides an overview of known query optimisation techniques in relational database systems. Section 7.3 describes the optimisation problem for materialised views. It explains that the steps of enumerating and generating equivalent expressions in the presence of materialised views may overlap, but does not explain in detail how the exploration phase or the table of alternatives is implemented.

5.3 None of these prior-art documents addresses the problem of extending a table of alternatives generated by the query optimiser by adding further alternatives using materialised views. The invention makes it possible to find low-cost query execution plans that make use of the available materialised views in order to improve query performance (see page 2, third paragraph). Moreover, in order to explore the search space for such low-cost query execution plans, it proposes integrating the materialised views into the table of alternatives during the plan exploration stage. For this integration, it is necessary to match query plans with materialised views in order to identify useful plan alternatives for such views. The invention teaches using query graphs for the matching in order to substantially reduce the complexity of extracting operator trees which encode a specific join order. In the technical context of query optimisation in relational database systems, this teaching is based on further technical considerations and solves the problem of providing a technically feasible implementation, in particular one that achieves an acceptable time complexity for query optimisation in relational database systems. In the oral proceedings the appellant argued along these lines in favour of inventive step, and the Board agrees.

5.4 The Board therefore concludes that the subject-matter of independent claims 1 to 3 involves an inventive step (Articles 52(1) and 56 EPC) over the available prior art.

Conclusion

6. Since the appellant's request complies with the provisions of the EPC, the appeal is to be allowed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance with the order to grant a patent on the basis of the following application documents:
- description pages 1, 2, and 4 to 13 as originally filed, and pages 3, 3a and 3b as filed with the letter dated 24 February 2017;
- drawings of Figures 1 to 8 as originally filed;
- claims 1 to 3 of the sole request maintained at the oral proceedings before the Board, corresponding to the fourth auxiliary request filed with the letter dated 24 February 2017.

This decision T 1965/11 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T196511.20170324. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "View from LUC" by Fabian Beitsma (c) 2017.

The gold(en) standard?

This case concerns a divisional application in which a feature was removed from claim 1 with respect to claim 1 of the parent application, and whether such removal satisfies the requirements of Art. 76(1) EPC (and equivalently Art. 123(2) if it were to be performed as amendment).

This situation is dealt with by the 'essentiality test' of T 331/87.

This case discusses the essentiality test as it differs across its various versions (English original vs. German translation, original decision vs. guidelines), how it was applied in the recent past, criticism on the test including the criticism raised previously in T 910/03, and most importantly, how it fits into the 'gold standard' established by G 2/10.

After various deliberations, the Board considers the essentiality test to be dead: "Die Kammer ist zum Schluss gelangt, dass der Wesentlichkeitstest nicht mehr zum Einsatz kommen sollte", with one of the reasons being that the original phrasing of 'may not' in T 331/87 leaves open the possibility that all three conditions of the test are satisfied yet that Art. 123(2) is still violated.

As such, the Board considers that the essentiality test cannot replace the gold standard even in its specific application area (removal or replacement of a feature).

Is the essentiality test now finally dead? After T 910/03 it languished but occasionally reappeared.

The Board refrains from referring the matter to the EBoA as it considers such referral not to be decisive in the present case, since according to the Board a same conclusion would be reached using both the essentiality test and the gold standard (being that the removal violates Art. 76(1) EPC).

Entscheidungsgründe

(...)

2. Hauptantrag

Der einzige Unterschied zwischen Anspruch 1 der vorliegenden Teilanmeldung und Anspruch 1 der Stammanmeldung besteht darin, dass das Merkmal, dem zufolge "die Achse der mindestens einen zweiten Spritzeinheit mit der Maschinenachse einen spitzen Winkel einschließt" gestrichen wurde.

Strittig ist, ob diese Änderung den Erfordernissen von Artikel 76 (1) EPÜ genügt.

2.1 Auslegung des strittigen Merkmals

Mathematisch ist ein spitzer Winkel definiert als ein Winkel, der größer als 0° und kleiner als 90° ist.

Zwei Achsen, die einander schneiden, schließen grundsätzlich immer einen spitzen und einen (komplementären) stumpfen Winkel ein, es sei denn, die Achsen sind identisch (Winkel: 0°) oder stehen normal aufeinander (Winkel: 90°). So gesehen, bedeutet das Merkmal, dem zufolge "die Achse der mindestens einen zweiten Spritzeinheit mit der Maschinenachse einen spitzen Winkel einschließt" nur, dass die Achse der zweiten Spritzeinheit nicht mit der Maschinenachse identisch ist und mit ihr auch keinen rechten Winkel einschließt.

2.2 Grundsätzliches zu den Änderungen

Artikel 76 (1) Satz 2 EPÜ legt fest, dass eine Teilanmeldung nur für einen Gegenstand eingereicht werden kann, der nicht über den Inhalt der früheren Anmeldung in der ursprünglichen Fassung hinausgeht. Dieses Erfordernis entspricht im Wesentlichen demjenigen von Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ, dem zufolge ein europäisches Patent nicht in der Weise geändert werden darf, dass sein Gegenstand über den Inhalt der Anmeldung in der ursprünglich eingereichten Fassung hinausgeht.

2.2.1 Grundlage der Prüfung: der "Goldstandard"

In ihrer Entscheidung G 2/10 (ABl. EPA 2012, 376) hat die Große Beschwerdekammer die frühere Rechtsprechung bekräftigt, der zufolge das Grundprinzip des Artikels 123 (2) EPÜ darin besteht, dass jede Änderung an den die Offenbarung betreffenden Teilen einer europäischen Patentanmeldung oder eines europäischen Patents (der Beschreibung, der Patentansprüche und der Zeichnungen) nur im Rahmen dessen erfolgen darf, was der Fachmann der Gesamtheit dieser Unterlagen in ihrer ursprünglich eingereichten Fassung unter Heranziehung des allgemeinen Fachwissens - objektiv und bezogen auf den Anmeldetag - unmittelbar und eindeutig entnehmen kann (siehe Punkt 4.3 der Entscheidungsgründe). Zu prüfen ist also, ob der Fachmann unter Heranziehung des allgemeinen Fachwissens den beanspruchten Gegenstand als - explizit oder implizit - unmittelbar und eindeutig in der ursprünglichen Fassung der Anmeldung offenbart ansehen würde (Punkt 4.5.4 der Entscheidungsgründe). Dieser allgemein akzeptierte Maßstab für die Beurteilung der Frage, ob eine Änderung mit Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ in Einklang steht, wird von der Großen Beschwerdekammer selbst als 'Goldstandard' bezeichnet (letzter Absatz von Punkt 4.3 der Entscheidungsgründe: "... one could also say the "gold" standard ..."). Der Einfachheit halber wird im Folgenden ebenso dieser Begriff verwendet; in der Fachliteratur nennt man den Goldstandard manchmal auch den "Offenbarungstest" (disclosure test).

Der Goldstandard ist auch analog bei der Prüfung, ob das Erfordernis von Artikel 76 (1) Satz 2 EPÜ erfüllt ist, anzuwenden, wobei anstatt der ursprünglichen Fassung der Anmeldung die ursprüngliche Fassung der Stammanmeldung in Betracht zu ziehen ist (siehe dazu Entscheidung G 1/05 (ABl. EPA 2007, 362), Punkt 5.1 der Entscheidungsgründe).

2.2.2 Konkrete Tests

Die Schwierigkeit, den Goldstandard in konkreten Fällen zur Anwendung zu bringen, hat zu einigen Versuchen geführt, konkrete und einfach anzuwendende Prüfungskriterien einzuführen. Die Problematik dieser "Tests" besteht darin, dass sie auf Einzelfällen beruhen, die entscheidungsrelevante Betrachtungen aber zum verallgemeinerten Prüfstein machen. Die Gültigkeit solcher Verallgemeinerungen wird danach zumeist nicht mehr hinterfragt. Außerhalb des Überlappungsbereichs, in dem der Test zu den gleichen Ergebnissen führt wie die Anwendung des Goldstandards, kann es aber Bereiche geben, in denen der Test andere Ergebnisse liefert. Deshalb ist bei der Anwendung solcher Tests grundsätzlich große Vorsicht geboten.

Ein Beispiel für einen Test, der nur sehr beschränkt und mit Vorsicht angewandt wird und kaum mehr zum Einsatz kommt, ist der sogenannte "Neuheitstest" (siehe "Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des EPA", 8. Auflage, 2016, Punkt II.E.1.2.5). Der sogenannte "Wesentlichkeitstest", der im Folgenden besprochen wird, stellt ein anderes Beispiel dar.

2.2.3 Der "Wesentlichkeitstest" gemäß T 331/87

Im Zusammenhang mit der Streichung von Merkmalen eines ursprünglich offenbarten Anspruchs wurde in der Entscheidung T 331/87 (ABl. EPA 1991, 22), welche auf der Entscheidung T 260/85 (ABl. EPA 1989, 105) aufbaut, ein Drei-Punkte-Test, der oft auch als "Wesentlichkeitstest" bezeichnet wird, formuliert.

Diesem Test zufolge verstößt das Ersetzen oder Streichen eines Merkmals aus einem Anspruch nicht gegen Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ, sofern der Fachmann unmittelbar und eindeutig erkennen würde, dass

(1) das Merkmal in der Offenbarung nicht als wesentlich hingestellt worden ist,

(2) es als solches für die Funktion der Erfindung unter Berücksichtigung der technischen Aufgabe, die sie lösen soll, nicht unerlässlich ist, und

(3) das Ersetzen oder Streichen keine wesentliche Angleichung anderer Merkmale erfordert (siehe Punkt 6 der Entscheidungsgründe).

In diesem Zusammenhang muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass die Entscheidung T 331/87 diesen Test vorsichtiger formuliert hat, als es die amtliche deutsche Übersetzung erahnen lässt. Im englischen Originaltext liest man nämlich im Punkt 6 der Entscheidungsgründe: "... the replacement or removal of a feature from a claim may not violate Article 123(2) EPC provided the skilled person would directly and unambiguously recognise that (1) ..." (Unterstreichung durch die Kammer). Das bedeutet, dass das Erfüllen der drei Bedingungen nicht notwendigerweise bedeutet, dass die Erfordernisse von Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ auch erfüllt sind. Hätte die Kammer das zum Ausdruck bringen wollen, hätte sie "does not" statt "may not" geschrieben.

Der Wesentlichkeitstest wurde in der Folge oft angewandt und fand auch in jüngerer Zeit noch manchmal Verwendung. Die jüngsten der Kammer bekannten Entscheidungen stammen aus den Jahren 2011 und 2012: T 239/08, T 2135/08, T 1600/09, T 207/10, T 648/10 und T 747/10. Der Kammer ist keine klare und bedingungslose Anwendung des Wesentlichkeitstests durch die Beschwerdekammern nach dem Jahr 2012 bekannt. In der Entscheidung T 2282/10 vom 13. Februar 2014 (Punkt 2.5) wurde der Test nur mit Vorbehalt ("even if") benützt; in der Entscheidung T 1840/11 vom 13. November 2015 (Punkt 1.6) wurde er angesichts der Umstände des Falls als nicht anwendbar betrachtet.

Der Wesentlichkeitstest hat auch Eingang in die Richtlinien für die Prüfung im EPA gefunden (siehe Abschnitt H-V,3.1 in der derzeit geltenden Fassung vom November 2016: "Ersetzen oder Streichen eines Merkmals aus einem Anspruch"), allerdings wurde in der englischen Fassung das "may not" der Entscheidung T 331/87 hier durch ein "does not" ersetzt.

2.2.4 Wesentlichkeit und Priorität

In ihrer Stellungnahme G 2/98 (ABl. EPA 2001, 413) hat sich die Große Beschwerdekammer mit dem Erfordernis "derselben Erfindung" in Artikel 87 (1) EPÜ 1973 beschäftigt und festgestellt, dass die Priorität einer früheren Anmeldung für einen Anspruch nur dann anzuerkennen ist, wenn der Fachmann den Gegenstand des Anspruchs unter Heranziehung des allgemeinen Fachwissens unmittelbar und eindeutig der früheren Anmeldung als Ganzes entnehmen kann.

Dabei hat sich die Große Beschwerdekammer kritisch mit der Entscheidung T 73/88 (Entscheidung "Snackfood"; ABl. EPA 1992, 557) auseinandergesetzt. In dieser Entscheidung hatte die zuständige Kammer dargelegt, dass ein technisches Merkmal in einem Anspruch, das für die Bestimmung des Schutzbereichs wesentlich ist, nicht zwangsläufig auch für die Feststellung der Priorität wesentlich sei (siehe Punkt 2.3 der Entscheidungsgründe). Werde ein zusätzliches, einschränkendes Merkmal, das mit dem wesentlichen Charakter und der Art der Erfindung als solche nichts zu tun hat, in den Anspruch aufgenommen, so habe dies keinen Prioritätsverlust zur Folge.

Die Große Beschwerdekammer hat diesen Ansatz als "problematisch" bezeichnet, weil es keine geeigneten und eindeutigen objektiven Kriterien für eine Unterscheidung zwischen technischen Merkmalen, die mit der Funktion und der Wirkung der Erfindung in Zusammenhang stehen, und technischen Merkmalen, bei denen dies nicht der Fall ist, gebe und daher die Gefahr der Willkürlichkeit bestehe (siehe Punkt 8.3 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Die Große Beschwerdekammer hat in der Folge den auf Erfindungswesentlichkeit basierenden Ansatz der Entscheidung T 73/88 verworfen und einen dem Goldstandard analogen Maßstab befürwortet.

2.2.5 Kritik am Wesentlichkeitstest

Aufbauend auf die Stellungnahme G 2/98 hat die Kammer 3.2.05 (in anderer Besetzung) in ihrer Entscheidung T 910/03 vom 7. Juli 2005 Kritik am Wesentlichkeitstest geübt. Die Kammer war der Auffassung, dass die Stellungnahme G 2/98 im Zusammenhang mit der Offenbarung keine Unterscheidung zwischen wesentlichen und unwesentlichen Merkmalen zulasse. Mit Berufung auf Regel 29 (3) EPÜ 1973 stellte sie fest, dass alle Merkmale eines unabhängigen Anspruchs per definitionem wesentliche Merkmale seien. (Punkt 3.4 der Entscheidungsgründe). Die Kammer zog daraus den Schluss, dass der Wesentlichkeitstest gemäß T 331/87 nicht mehr angewendet werden sollte (Punkte 3.5 und 6 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Diese Kritik am Wesentlichkeitstest wurde seitdem mehrmals und von verschiedenen Kammern explizit bekräftigt; siehe zum Beispiel die Entscheidungen T 681/08 vom 25. Januar 2011 (Punkt 2 der Gründe), T 1180/08 vom 8. Oktober 2010 (Punkt 2), T 1003/09 vom 29. April 2015 (Punkt 4.1), T 2146/09 vom 22. September 2015 (Punkt 11), T 2311/10 vom 24. September 2012 (Punkt 2.9) und T 2561/11 vom 4. Juli 2016 (Punkt 8.1).

Unabhängig von der Entscheidung T 910/03 sind auch andere Kammern zum dem in der Entscheidung T 910/03 gezogenen Schluss gelangt, so zum Beispiel in den Entscheidungen T 1202/03 vom 14. Februar 2006 (Punkt 2.2 der Gründe), T 765/07 vom 31. März 2010 (Punkt 1.4), T 1643/10 vom 26. November 2014 (Punkt 2.22) und T 755/12 vom 23. Januar 2014 (Punkt 2.3).

2.2.6 Kritik an der Kritik

Die Entscheidung T 910/03 und die nachfolgenden Entscheidungen, die den Wesentlichkeitstest in Frage stellten, haben aber de facto nicht dazu geführt, dass der Test aufgegeben wurde: der Kammer sind mehr als zwanzig Entscheidungen bekannt, die zwischen 2006 und 2012 von Beschwerdekammern getroffen wurden und in denen der Test zur Anwendung kam. Allerdings gehen diese Entscheidungen in der Regel in keiner Weise auf die Kritik an T 331/87 ein. Die Entscheidung T 308/06 vom 21. Dezember 2006 erwähnt die beiden einander widersprechenden Standpunkte, sieht aber keine Notwendigkeit, sich für oder gegen den Wesentlichkeitstest zu entscheiden (siehe Punkt 1.8 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Der Kammer ist nur eine Entscheidung bekannt, die der Entscheidung T 910/03 Argumente entgegensetzt, nämlich die Entscheidung T 404/03 vom 12. Juli 2006, in der die zuständige Kammer in einem obiter dictum diesbezüglich Bedenken anmeldet und sie folgendermaßen begründet: Die Stellungnahme G 2/98 habe sich mit einem Fall der Hinzufügung (und nicht einer Streichung) eines Merkmals befasst. Darüber hinaus widerspreche die Streichung eines Merkmals, von dem der Fachmann weiß, dass es nichts mit der Erfindung zu tun hat, nicht der dem Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ zugrundeliegenden Idee - nämlich dass der Anmelder keinen ungerechtfertigten Vorteil aus der Änderung ziehen dürfe und die Rechtssicherheit Dritter gewahrt werden müsse. Es sei daher angebracht, Streichungen und Hinzufügungen von Merkmalen unterschiedlich zu behandeln. Die Streichung betreffe zwangsläufig Merkmale, die ursprünglich offenbart waren und daher dem Fachmann zur Bewertung der Wesentlichkeit vorlagen, während hinzugefügte Merkmale keinerlei Grundlage in der ursprünglichen Offenbarung hätten (siehe Punkt 11 der Entscheidungsgründe).

2.2.7 Auffassung der Kammer

Die Kammer ist zum Schluss gelangt, dass der Wesentlichkeitstest nicht mehr zum Einsatz kommen sollte. Diese Schlussfolgerung stützt sich wie folgt auf die Rechtsprechung der Großen Beschwerdekammer:

a) Goldstandard

Mit der Bekräftigung des Goldstandards (siehe Punkt 2.2.12.2.1 ) hat die Große Beschwerdekammer einen klaren Maßstab für die Prüfung von Änderungen vorgegeben. Demzufolge ist zu prüfen, ob der im geänderten Anspruch definierte Gegenstand in der ursprünglichen Fassung der Anmeldung unmittelbar und eindeutig offenbart ist.

Der Wesentlichkeitstest kann schon aus rein logischen Gründen nicht mit dem Goldstandard deckungsgleich sein. Dies geht auch schon aus dem Wortlaut der Entscheidung T 331/87 ("may not"; siehe Punkt 2.2.32.2.3 oben) hervor: die zuständige Kammer hat selbst die Möglichkeit gesehen, dass die Bedingungen ihres Drei-Punkte-Tests erfüllt, Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ aber dennoch verletzt sein könnte. Daraus folgt aber schon, dass der Wesentlichkeitstest als solcher nicht die Anwendung des Goldstandards ersetzen kann. Auch wenn der Wesentlichkeitstest in Einzelfällen nützliche Indizien liefern kann, ist der Goldstandard der einzig relevante Maßstab (vgl. T 755/12, Punkt 2.3 der Entscheidungsgründe).

b) G 2/98

Die Große Beschwerdekammer hat im Zusammenhang der Gültigkeit der Priorität den auf Erfindungswesentlichkeit fußenden Ansatz der Entscheidung T 73/88 verworfen und ein dem Goldstandard analoges Kriterium aufgestellt (siehe Punkt 2.2.42.2.4 oben). Die Bedenken der Großen Beschwerdekammer bezüglich der Willkürlichkeit der Abwägung der Wesentlichkeit lassen sich auch auf den Fall von Änderungen übertragen. Daher stimmt die Kammer der Entscheidung T 910/03 dahingehend zu, dass die ratio decidendi der Stellungnahme G 2/98 einer weiteren Anwendung des Wesentlichkeitstests im Wege steht.

2.2.8 Würdigung der Gegenargumente

a) Argumente der Entscheidung T 404/03

Es ist richtig, dass die Stellungnahme G 2/98 konkret durch den Fall "Snackfood" ausgelöst wurde, in dem das strittige Merkmal in der zweiten Anmeldung hinzugefügt wurde. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass die der Entscheidung zugrunde liegende Logik nicht auf den Fall einer Streichung anwendbar wäre. In Punkt 8.3 der Entscheidungsgründe geht die Große Beschwerdekammer vielmehr konkret auf die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten ein und erwähnt ausdrücklich auch die Streichung von Merkmalen ("... the answer to the question whether the claimed invention remains the same, if one of these features is modified or deleted, or if a further feature D is added, depends very much on the actual assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case ..."; Unterstreichung durch die Kammer).

Das Argument, dass der Wesentlichkeitstest der dem Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ zugrunde liegende Idee, nämlich dass der Anmelder keinen ungerechtfertigten Vorteil aus der Änderung ziehen dürfe und die Rechtssicherheit Dritter gewahrt werden müsse, nicht widerspricht, überzeugt die Kammer nicht. Der Goldstandard ist vermutlich nicht der einzige Maßstab, der dieser Idee gerecht wird, aber er ist der einzige von der Großen Beschwerdekammer für richtig befundene Maßstab. Darüber hinaus ist fragwürdig, ob der Wesentlichkeitstest tatsächlich die Rechtssicherheit Dritter wahrt; die Ausführungen in Punkt 8.3 der Stellungnahme G 2/98 suggerieren vielmehr, dass Kriterien, die auf der Wesentlichkeit fußen, der Rechtssicherheit abträglich sind.

Der Goldstandard ist dem Wesentlichkeitstest auch darin überlegen, dass er einen einheitlichen Maßstab für alle Änderungen darstellt und gleichermaßen auf Streichungen und auf Hinzufügungen anwendbar ist.

b) Argumente der Beschwerdeführerin

Die Kammer stimmt der Beschwerdeführerin zu, dass der Verweis auf Regel 29 (3) EPÜ 1973 in Punkt 8.3 der Entscheidung T 910/03 ("... All features of an independent claim are by definition essential features, cf. Rule 29(3) EPC.") nicht besonders hilfreich ist. Auch wenn die Aufzählung von Merkmalen in einem unabhängigen Anspruch die Vermutung rechtfertigt, dass die Merkmale nach Auffassung des Verfassers des Anspruchs zur Lösung der erfindungsgemäßen Aufgabe wesentlich sind, handelt es sich dabei um Überlegungen, die dem Fachmann im Sinne des Patentrechts fremd sind. Dieser liest ein Dokument nur in Hinblick auf seine technische Offenbarung und befasst sich in der Regel nicht mit redaktionellen Besonderheiten von Patenten und Patentanmeldungen, mit denen der Verfasser formalen Erfordernissen zu entsprechen sucht, sofern sie die technische Offenbarung als solche nicht beeinflussen.

Allerdings ist der Verweis auf Regel 29 (3) EPÜ 1973 in keiner Weise entscheidend für die Argumentation der Entscheidung T 910/03. Selbst wenn man dieses Argument der Entscheidung nicht weiterverfolgt, bleibt der Einwand eines Widerspruchs zwischen der Entscheidung T 331/87 und der Stellungnahme G 2/98 bestehen.

Die Kammer stimmt der Beschwerdeführerin auch dahingehend zu, dass die Gefahr einer fehlerhaften Anwendung des Wesentlichkeitstests (wie sie in Punkt 2.6 der Entscheidung T 2311/10 beschrieben wird) allein nicht ausreicht, um den Test zu disqualifizieren. Jeder Test, einschließlich des Goldstandards, kann falsch angewandt werden. Die Kammer hat aber, wie oben unter Punkt 2.2.72.2.7 dargelegt wurde, andere gute Gründe, den Wesentlichkeitstest als obsolet anzusehen.

Dass mehrere Kammern den Wesentlichkeitstest auch noch in jüngeren Jahren angewandt haben, ist kein Argument für die Richtigkeit des Tests. Allenfalls könnten widersprüchliche Entscheidungen der Kammern zu einer Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer führen (siehe dazu Punkt 3.3. ).

Die Tatsache, dass die "Richtlinien für die Prüfung im Europäischen Patentamt" den Wesentlichkeitstest vorschreiben, ist ebenso nicht entscheidend, da die Kammer nicht durch die Richtlinien gebunden ist. Die Beschwerdeführerin hat ausgeführt, "dass weder überzeugend, noch befriedigend ist, dass die Prüfungs- und Einspruchsabteilungen des EPA zur Anwendung eines Prüfungsschemas gehalten sind, das aus Sicht der vorliegend erkennenden Beschwerdekammer "obsolet", d.h. eben gerade nicht anwendbar ist" (siehe Erwiderung vom 15. April 2016, Seite 2, letzter Absatz). Die Kammer teilt diese Auffassung, hat aber nur die Möglichkeit, im Rahmen von Artikel 20 (2) VOBK darauf hinzuweisen, dass sie die Erfordernisse des EPÜ betreffend Streichungen von Anspruchsmerkmalen anders auslegt.

2.3 Die Änderungen im vorliegenden Fall

Die ursprüngliche Stammanmeldung beschreibt die Erfindung als eine Lösung der Aufgabe, bei besonders kurzen Zykluszeiten und günstigen statischen Verhältnissen die Beschränkungen hinsichtlich der Anordnung weiterer Aggregate zu verringern (Seite 3, Zeilen 4-14). Sie listet dann vier Merkmale auf, mit denen dies erreicht wird. Das Merkmal, dem zufolge die Achse der zweiten Spritzeinheit mit der Maschinenachse einen spitzen Winkel einschließt, ist Teil dieser Auflistung (Seite 3, Zeilen 18-20).

Die Kammer kann dem Argument der Beschwerdeführerin, dass der Fachmann diesem Teil der Beschreibung keine Beachtung schenken würde, da es sich nur um eine Wiederholung des Anspruchs in der Beschreibung handle, also um eine rein formale, "handwerkliche" Pflichtübung bei der Abfassung von Patentanmeldungen, nicht zustimmen. Wie unter Punkt 2.2.82.2.8 b)b) dargelegt wurde, liest der Fachmann ein Dokument nur im Hinblick auf seine technische Offenbarung. Sofern ein Absatz der Beschreibung technische Offenbarungen enthält, nimmt der Fachmann diese zur Kenntnis, ohne sich die Frage zu stellen, ob patentrechtliche oder andere Überlegungen den Verfasser zur Einfügung des Absatzes bewegt haben. Im gegenwärtigen Fall würde der Fachmann unzweifelhaft verstehen, dass ein Vorteil erreicht wird, und zwar durch die Kombination von vier verschiedenen Merkmalen.

In der Folge werden diese vier Merkmale jeweils näher im Hinblick auf ihre Vorteile untersucht. Die spitzwinklige Anordnung wird auf Seite 5, Zeilen 1-14, behandelt:

"Durch die schräge Anordnung der zweiten Spritzeinheit mit einer einen spitzen Winkel, der bevorzugt zwischen 20° und 60°, besonders bevorzugt zwischen 30° und 50° beträgt, mit der Maschinenachse einschließenden Orientierung hält sich im übrigen die Verlagerung des Massenschwerpunkts des bewegten Teilsystems (zweite, bewegbare Formaufspannplatte samt der zugeordneten, mitbewegten Spritzeinheit(en)) gegenüber der Maschinenachse in einem vertretbaren Rahmen, so daß die beim Öffnen und Schließen des Werkzeugs auftretenden asymmetrischen Kräfte und Momente auch im Falle von vergleichsweise hohen Schließgeschwindigkeiten in einem beherrschbaren Rahmen bleiben."

Der Fachmann, der diese Ausführungen zum spitzen Winkel liest, würde verstehen, dass nicht alle spitzen Winkel zu einer technisch bedeutsamen Verlagerung des Massenschwerpunkts führen würden. Ein Winkel von 89.9°, obwohl streng mathematisch als spitz anzusehen, würde den Massenschwerpunkt in der Tat kaum verlagern. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass der geltend gemachte Vorteil nur bei den bevorzugten Werten (zwischen 20° und 60° bzw. zwischen 30° und 50°) auftritt. Die Offenbarung macht dem Fachmann vielmehr klar, dass die Spitzwinkeligkeit mit dem Vorteil der Verlagerung des Massenschwerpunkts verbunden ist, wobei dieser Vorteil in Randbereichen verschwindend klein sein kann. Welche Verlagerungen des Massenschwerpunktes dem Fachmann signifikant oder wünschenswert erscheinen würden, das hängt vom konkreten Fall ab und lässt sich nicht allgemein beantworten.

Der Fachmann würde aber jedenfalls nicht verstehen, dass das Merkmal der Spitzwinkeligkeit bedeutungslos ist, nur weil es Bereiche gibt (insbesondere den Winkelbereich nahe 90°), in denen trotz mathematischer Spitzwinkeligkeit kein Effekt zutage tritt. Er würde vielmehr begreifen, dass es einen Winkelbereich gibt, in dem eine vorteilhafte Wirkung auftritt, auch wenn die genauen Grenzen dieses Bereichs nicht offenbart sind. Es geht aus der Beschreibung klar hervor, dass der Winkelbereich mindestens Winkel von 20° bis 60° umfasst und aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach beiderseits darüber hinausgeht.

Eine Streichung des Merkmals der Spitzwinkeligkeit wäre gemäß dem Goldstandard nur dann zulässig, wenn der Fachmann unter Heranziehung seines allgemeinen Fachwissens den beanspruchten Gegenstand (also eine Spritzgießmaschine in Drei-Platten-Bauweise mit zwei Spritzeinheiten, bei der die Achse der zweiten Spritzeinheit mit der Maschinenachse einen beliebigen Winkel einschließt) explizit oder implizit unmittelbar und eindeutig in der ursprünglichen Fassung der Stammanmeldung offenbart ansehen würde. Angesichts der Lehre der Stammanmeldung bezüglich des spitzen Winkels ist dies jedoch nicht der Fall.

Damit genügt die der Teilanmeldung zugrundeliegende Änderung den Erfordernissen des Goldstandards nicht.

2.4 Ergebnis

Der Gegenstand von Anspruch 1 erfüllt nicht die Erfordernisse von Artikel 76 (1) Satz 2 EPÜ.

3. Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer

Wie unter Punkt 2.22.2 dargelegt wurde, ist die Praxis der Beschwerdekammern im Hinblick auf den Wesentlichkeitstest nicht einheitlich. Trotz deutlicher Kritik am Test durch mehrere Kammern wurde der Test zumindest bis zum Jahr 2012 noch zum Einsatz gebracht. Insofern teilt die Kammer die Auffassung der Beschwerdeführerin, dass eine Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer Klarheit schaffen und zu einer einheitlicheren Rechtsprechung führen könnte.

Im vorliegenden Fall würde eine entsprechende Vorlage aber von der Großen Beschwerdekammer als unzulässig zurückgewiesen werden, da die Antwort auf die Frage, deren Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer beantragt wurde (siehe Punkt IV.IV. ) nicht entscheidungserheblich ist.

Die Kammer ist nämlich zum Schluss gelangt, dass die Anwendung des Wesentlichkeitstests nicht zu einem anderen Ergebnis führen würde als die Anwendung des Goldstandards.

Der Wesentlichkeitstest verlangt nämlich unter anderem, dass das Merkmal in der Offenbarung nicht als wesentlich hingestellt worden ist. Als "wesentlich" ist in diesem Zusammenhang zu verstehen, was zur Lösung der in der ursprünglichen Anmeldung formulierten Aufgabe beiträgt. Wie unter Punkt 2.32.3 dargelegt wurde, offenbart die Stammanmeldung, dass der geltend gemachte Vorteil durch die Kombination von vier Merkmalen, zu denen die Spitzwinkeligkeit gehört, gelöst wird. Damit stellt die Stammanmeldung aber die Spitzwinkeligkeit als wesentlich dar.

Das Argument, dass der Verfasser hier einen "Kunstfehler" begangen hat, ist in diesem Zusammenhang irrelevant. Entscheidend ist, was der Fachmann der Stammanmeldung unter Heranziehung seines allgemeinen Fachwissens entnehmen würde, und nicht, was die eigentliche Absicht des Verfassers war.

Da die Anwendung des Wesentlichkeitstests zu keinem anderen Ergebnis führen würde als die Anwendung des Goldstandards, ist die Antwort der Großen Beschwerdekammer auf die Vorlagefrage nicht entscheidungserheblich.

Somit kann dem Antrag auf eine Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer nicht stattgegeben werden.

4. Hilfsantrag

Wie von der Beschwerdeführerin selbst eingeräumt wurde, wurde dieser Antrag nur im Hinblick auf einen möglichen Einwand der Doppelpatentierung eingereicht. Er räumt den Einwand einer unzulässigen Erweiterung im Sinne von Artikel 76 (1) Satz 2 EPÜ nicht aus. Daher kann auch diesem Antrag nicht stattgegeben werden.

Entscheidungsformel

Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:

Die Beschwerde wird zurückgewiesen.

This decision T 1852/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T185213.20170131. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "The Gold Standard" by Caleb Roenigk obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

The opposition division had informed opponent O1 that "The notice of opposition contains no statement of grounds on which the opposition is based (Rule 76(2)(c) EPC)" and that "the notice of opposition will be rejected by the opposition division as inadmissible...". The opposition division issued a decision revoking the European patent as the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC prejudiced the maintenance of the patent as granted. In addition to revoking the patent, the title page of the decision states: "Additional decision: The opposition of the opponent(s) O1 is rejected as inadmissible". Appeals were filed by the patent proprietor and opponent O1. In its statement of grounds of appeal, appellant-opponent O1 requested that "the decision of the Opposition Division that rejected Opponent O1's opposition on grounds of inadmissibility pursuant to Rule 77 EPC be set aside and that Opponent O1's opposition be considered admissible". The Opponent argued that the facts and arguments in support of the grounds for opposition required by Rule 76 EPC were included in the DHL package that was timely filed within the opposition period, whereas the opposition division held that "Facts and arguments substantiating the indicated grounds for opposition have not been filed within the opposition period. Even the paper confirmation received on 4 October 2007 ... did not comprise facts and arguments, as has been confirmed by file inspection". How did the Board deal with these opposite positions of Opponent O1 and the opposiion division? And how did this effect the party status of the Opponent?

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. This case concerns appeals arising from the decision of the opposition division to revoke European patent No. 1 350 373.

II. Oppositions to the patent were filed by the company Intesa S.p.A (henceforth opponent O1) and, jointly, by the companies INFOCAMERE Soc. Cons., Actalis S.p.A., Cedacri S.p.A. and Postcom S.p.A. (henceforth jointly referred to as opponent O2) citing Articles 100(a) and (b) EPC.

III. In the course of the opposition procedure, an admissible intervention was filed by the assumed infringer Microsoft Deutschland GmbH (henceforth opponent O3), citing Articles 100(a), (b) and (c) EPC.

IV. Of the cited grounds for opposition, only that of Article 100(c) EPC is relevant to the board's decision.

V. The opposition division issued a decision revoking the European patent as the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC prejudiced the maintenance of the patent as granted. In addition, the opposition division either did not admit or did not allow any of the 21 auxiliary requests on file.

In addition to revoking the patent, the title page of the decision states:

"Additional decision: The opposition of the opponent(s) INTESA S.p.A is rejected as inadmissible".

As to the facts concerning the filing of the opposition of opponent O1, reference is made to point 2.1 below.

VI. Appeals were filed by the patent proprietor and opponent O1.

Opponents O2 and O3 are respondents.

VII. In its notice of appeal, the appellant-proprietor requested that the impugned decision be set aside and that the patent be maintained as granted, or, in the alternative, that the patent be maintained in amended form "according to any of the auxiliary requests filed by the patent owner during the Opposition proceedings".

VIII. In its statement of grounds of appeal, appellant-opponent O1 requested that "the decision of the Opposition Division that rejected Opponent O1's opposition on grounds of inadmissibility pursuant to Rule 77 EPC be set aside and that Opponent O1's opposition be considered admissible".

IX. In subsequent replies to the appeal of the appellant-proprietor, all opponents requested that the appeal of the appellant-proprietor be dismissed.

X. In a communication accompanying a summons to oral proceedings, the board gave a preliminary opinion that the opposition of opponent O1 was admissible. It however doubted that the appeal of opponent O1 was admissible as it could not see that opponent O1 was adversely affected by the decision to revoke the patent. It considered that opponent O1 had the status of respondent, at least until a negative decision on the admissibility of its opposition was taken.

The board further gave a preliminary opinion that claim 1 of the main request did not comply with Article 123(2) EPC, i.e. that the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC prejudiced the maintenance of the patent.

With respect to the auxiliary requests, the board stated that auxiliary requests 1 and 2 had been withdrawn during the opposition procedure and that auxiliary requests 3, 4, 11 and 12 had not been admitted. The board therefore saw no reason to admit these requests (Article 12(4) RPBA). As to auxiliary requests 5 to 10 and 13 to 23, the board noted that claim 1 of each request, although amended, did not comply with Article 123(2) EPC for essentially the same reasons as claim 1 of the main request.

XI. Oral proceedings took place on 29 March 2017 in the presence of all parties.

During the oral proceedings, the appellant-proprietor submitted an amended request as auxiliary request 24.

The appellant-proprietor requested by way of a main request that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the oppositions be rejected. Alternatively, it requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of one of auxiliary requests 3 to 23 as filed during the opposition proceedings and auxiliary request 24 as filed during the oral proceedings. Further, it requested that the appeal filed by opponent O1 be dismissed.

The appellant-opponent O1 requested that the decision under appeal be set aside to the extent that its opposition filed on 2 October 2007 be held admissible. Further, appellant-opponent O1 requested that the appeal filed by the appellant-proprietor be dismissed.

Respondents O2 and O3 both requested that the appeal of the appellant-proprietor be dismissed.

XII. Claim 1 as granted reads as follows:

"A method of certifying transmission, reception and authenticity of electronic documents between at least one sender user (2) and at least one addressee user (3) in a telecommunication network (4), wherein [...]"

XIII. For the sake of economy, the wording of claim 1 of each of auxiliary requests 3 to 24 is not reproduced in full. [...].

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of the appeal of appellant-opponent O1

1.1 The Opposition Division held that the opposition of opponent O1 was inadmissible. Opponent O1 appealed this part of the decision (see above point VIII).

1.2 As regards the admissibility of opponent O1's appeal, the board notes that only persons adversely affected by a decision are entitled to appeal (Article 107 EPC, first sentence). On the one hand, opponent O1 was not adversely affected by the decision to revoke the patent. On the other hand, the opposition division also held that O1's opposition was inadmissible and took a separate "additional decision" to this effect (see above point V). It is open to question whether this additional decision, which seemed to have a negative outcome for opponent O1 but did not change the fact that its main request that the patent be revoked had been granted, is open to a separate admissible appeal. However, for the reasons given below, this question does not need to be answered in the present case, where also the patent proprietor appealed the decision and did not withdraw its appeal.

1.3 As a matter of principle, the boards of appeal have to examine the question of party status ex officio before dealing with the substance of the case (cf. T 384/08, point 3 of the reasons).

1.4 It follows that in the present case, in order to determine whether opponent O1 has party status as of right (Article 107 EPC), here as a respondent with respect to the proprietor's appeal, the board has to decide on the admissibility of opponent O1's opposition, irrespective of whether or not the appeal of opponent O1 is admissible.

1.5 Following T 1178/04 (OJ EPO 2008, 80; cf. points 24 to 30 of the reasons) rather than T 898/91, which took another view (cf. point 1.2 of the reasons),the board is therefore of the view that when an opposition division decides that an opposition is inadmissible in a case where at least one other admissible opposition has been filed, it is not necessary for the opponent of the opposition held inadmissible to appeal this decision in order to preserve party status in appeal proceedings initiated by another party.

1.6 Since the board holds the opposition to be admissible (see below), meaning that, in any case, opponent O1 is a party as of right to these appeal proceedings as respondent, a formal decision as to the admissibility of the appeal of opponent O1 is not necessary.

1.7 Being a party as of right to the patent proprietor's appeal, opponent O1 has the right to request that a formal decision denying its party status be formally set aside. For this reason, the board has included this matter in the order.

2. Admissibility of the opposition of opponent O1

2.1 The essential facts and submissions concerned with the filing of the opposition of opponent O1 are the following:

(i) Opponent O1 filed a notice of opposition by fax on 2 October 2007 in which it was stated that the facts and arguments [in support of the grounds for opposition required by Rule 76 EPC] "will follow".

(ii) Opponent O1 sent a package by DHL, which was received at the EPO on 4 October 2007. The package contained EPO Form 2300.1, a confirmation of the notice of opposition sent by fax as well as the documents cited in the notice of opposition. However, contrary to what was stated in EPO Form 2300.1 ("VII. Facts and arguments (Rule 55(c) EPC) presented in support of the opposition are submitted herewith on a separate sheet (annex 1)"; "XI. List of documents Enclosure No. ... 1 Facts and arguments (see VII.) No. of copies: 2", apparently, there was no statement of facts and arguments. This was the last day for filing an opposition (9 months after grant on 3 January 2007, plus 1 extra day due to the public holiday in Germany on 3 October 2007).

(iii) In a communication dated 24 October 2007 from the formalities officer on behalf of the opposition division, opponent O1 was informed that there were no sheets of facts and arguments filed with the letter dated 2 October 2007.

(iv) A statement of facts and arguments was then sent by fax by opponent O1 on 30 October 2007 under cover of a letter dated 29 October 2007, saying "As requested in your communication dated 24 October 2007, we enclose herewith Facts and Arguments". The enclosed statement showed the Representative's letterhead and the date "29 October 2007". There was not the slightest indication that any "Facts and Arguments" had already been submitted earlier.

(v) In a communication dated 18 January 2008 from the formalities officer on behalf of the opposition division, opponent O1 was informed that "The notice of opposition contains no statement of grounds on which the opposition is based (Rule 76(2)(c) EPC)" and that "the notice of opposition will be rejected by the opposition division as inadmissible...".

(vi) In a letter dated 25 January 2008, opponent O1 expressed "amazement" at the substance of the communication. It argued that the facts and arguments had been submitted with the DHL package, and submitted declarations of persons involved in the sending of the package in support thereof. Opponent O1 requested that the office communication be withdrawn. Conditionally, oral proceedings were requested. That the "Facts and Arguments" as submitted later didn't show the date 2 October 2007 but 29 October 2007 was explained with an alleged reprinting under new letterhead whereas a first version had allegedly been printed on plain white paper. A copy thereof was enclosed. Opponent O1 did not give any explanation as to why the alleged presence of "Facts and Arguments" in the DHL package, sent on 02 October 2007 was not mentioned in the letter of 29 October 2007. Later, in the statement of grounds of appeal they explained that it was their belief that the formalities officer, when issuing the communication dated 24 October 2007, had not been able to find the original of the Facts and Arguments as handed in with DHL package of 2 October 2007 and was simply asking for a replacement. The fact that when posting the DHL package on 2 October 2007 with a letter dated the same day, this very letter still said that the "Facts and Arguments will follow", was explained with the observation that this letter was marked and only meant as a confirmation copy of the fax sent on the same day.

(vii) The opposition division subsequently first dealt with the matter in a communication accompanying a summons to attend oral proceedings dated 9 August 2012. It stated that "Facts and arguments substantiating the indicated grounds for opposition have not been filed within the opposition period. Even the paper confirmation received on 4 October 2007 ... did not comprise facts and arguments, as has been confirmed by file inspection". Consequently, the opposition division considered that "the opposition of O1 has to be rejected as inadmissible".

(viii) At the oral proceedings dated 4 December 2012, after hearing the parties, the opposition division decided that the opposition of opponent O1 was inadmissible. In the impugned decision, it is stated that the arguments of opponent O1 supported by the statements of the persons involved in sending the notice of opposition "cannot dispel the fact that "facts and arguments" were not filed within the opposition period".

2.2 In accordance with case law, in cases where there is a dispute as to whether documents have been filed with the EPO, it is necessary to determine the likely course of events. In the present case, this would be to determine which of the following two scenarios is more likely to have happened: (i) the DHL package did not include the statement of facts and arguments; or (ii) the statement was lost in the EPO.

2.3 Re (i): Opponent O1 tried to convince the Board that, although not having mentioned such content in the letters of 2 and 29 October 2007, it believed the DHL package to include the statement of facts and arguments. Of course, that does not rule out that an error occurred on the part of opponent O1. On the other hand, with letter of 28 January 2008, it provided evidence regarding the alleged submission of Facts and Arguments together with the DHL package.

2.4 Re (ii): It appears that neither the formalities officer nor the opposition division undertook any effort to investigate what may have happened when the DHL package was opened in order to determine the likelihood of the statement of facts and arguments having being mislaid within the EPO.

2.5 In a similar case, J 20/85 (OJ EPO 1987, 102), in which missing pages of claims were the issue, the board found that (cf. reasons 3):

"Article 114(1) EPC provides that "In proceedings before it, the European Patent Office shall examine the facts of its own motion". In the present case, faced with the contention and evidence identified above, it was necessary for the Receiving Section to investigate, in detail, what had happened to the set of documents inside the European Patent Office, from the moment when the envelope containing the documents was opened in the Post Room."

The decision goes on to state the following (cf. reasons 5):

"Having regard to the provisions of Article 114(1) EPC quoted in paragraph 3 above, the Board has considered whether the case should be remitted to the Receiving Section for further investigation, or whether it should itself investigate the facts of the case in relation to the handling of the documents which were filed in the Post Room on 27 September 1984. However, although it was filed in due time, the Statement of Grounds of Appeal was not filed until September 1985, so that any such investigation and taking of evidence would necessarily have to have taken place more than a year after the relevant events. It could not be expected in those circumstances that the personnel in the Post Room would have a clear recollection of what happened to the documents of this particular case, and therefore to conduct such an investigation now would not be fair either to the Appellant or to the European Patent Office. This consideration emphasises the importance of what is stated in paragraph 4 above, to the effect that in a case such as the present the department or section concerned should initiate the taking of evidence as soon as it is apparent that there is a dispute as to facts between the European Patent Office and a party to proceedings before it."

2.6 In the board's view, the opposition division should have made an attempt to investigate the circumstances of opening the DHL package and/or ascertaining whether the statement of facts and arguments could yet be found in the EPO, at the latest following receipt of the letter dated 25 January 2008, at which point it was clear that opponent O1 believed that the statement of facts and arguments had indeed been filed within the opposition period. Without such an investigation, it is unclear how the opposition division could, more than four years later, regard it as a "fact" that the statement of facts and arguments had not been received. Further, by waiting so long before considering the matter, any meaningful investigation was rendered impossible. The board is now in the position that nine years have passed since the filing of the opposition. It is more than doubtful, whether hearing witnesses, either those offered by opponent O1 or those within the EPO, after such a long time could now still serve any useful purpose.

2.7Under the circumstances that no investigation took place within the EPO it now seems impossible to establish whether it was more likely that the statement of facts and arguments was omitted by mistake on the part of opponent O1, or was lost within the EPO. In such a case, the opponent has to receive the benefit of any doubt.

2.8 Consequently, the board considers that the opposition of opponent O1 is admissible. Opponent O1 is therefore at least a party as of right, i.e. has the status of respondent with respect to the proprietor's appeal (cf. point 1.5 above).

3. Main request - claim 1 as granted - Articles 100(c) and 123(2) EPC

[...]

4. The board therefore concludes that the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC prejudices the maintenance of the patent as granted. The main request is therefore not allowable.

5. Auxiliary requests 3, 4, 11 and 12

5.1 In accordance with Article 12(4) RPBA, the admitting of requests which were not admitted by the department of first instance is at the discretion of the board.

Auxiliary requests 3, 4, 11 and 12 were not admitted by the opposition division because they were subject to the same objection as the main request. The appellant-proprietor has not challenged that assessment, which the board shares. The appellant did not provide any further reasons why the Board should exercise its own discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA in a different way than the opposition division had done.

5.2 Consequently, auxiliary requests 3, 4, 11 and 12 are held to be inadmissible (Article 12(4) RPBA).

6. Auxiliary requests 5 to 10 and 13 to 23 - claim 1 - Article 123(2) EPC

6.1 - 6.1 [...]

6.3 However, in the board's view, all aspects of these added features are implicitly comprised in claim 1 as granted. Consequently, these amendments make no difference to Article 123(2) EPC. In particular, each claim 1 still embraces both the "double checking" embodiment and the technical certification embodiment.

6.4 Consequently, claim 1 of each of these requests does not comply with Article 123(2) EPC for the same reasons as given above (cf. point 3) in respect of claim 1 of the main request.

7. Auxiliary request 24 - admissibility

7.1 In accordance with this request (cf. point XIV), the term "a certified sender user" is replaced by the expression "a certified namely identified sender user".

7.2 In accordance with Article 13(1) RPBA, "Any amendment to a party's case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply may be admitted and considered at the Board's discretion. The discretion shall be exercised in view of inter alia the complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy".

7.3 Auxiliary request 24 was filed at a late stage of the oral proceedings before the Board. A new request may be admitted at such a late stage if it overcomes, prima facie, all the objections previously discussed and does not introduce new objections or complications.

7.4 However, that is here not the case. Amended claim 1 is, in the board's view, even more unclear than claim 1 as granted, contrary to Article 84 EPC. Moreover, the amendment does not overcome the objection under Articles 100(c) and 123(2) EPC discussed in connection with claim 1 of the main request, and introduces considerable doubt as to compliance with Article 123(3) EPC.

7.5 In respect of Article 84 EPC, the expression "a certified namely identified sender" is manifestly unclear. In this respect[...]. If the claim is to mean "certified and identified sender", it would still apparently be subject to the same objection of non-compliance with Article 123(2) EPC discussed in connection with claim 1 of the main request. If it is to be understood as "not certified but identified", effectively the requirement of being certified has been deleted, which renders doubtful whether claim 1 complies with Article 123(3) EPC.

7.6 With respect to Article 123(3) EPC, the appellant-proprietor argued that in claim 1 as granted, "certified" has the possible sub-meaning "identified". Consequently, the amendment merely limited "certified" to one of its possible meanings.

However, the board notes that, although whether or not "certified" has a possible sub-meaning "identified" might have been relevant to a discussion on Article 123(3) EPC, the argument is moot, since a formulation of claim 1 has been chosen which, for the reasons given above, is prima facie not clear and not compliant with Article 123(2) EPC. Further, allowing an amendment at this stage which would require an in-depth discussion of Article 123(3) EPC would be contrary to procedural efficiency.

7.7 The appellant-proprietor further argued that the board was unfairly giving speculative meanings to the claim rather than considering the merits of the "invention" as described in the description. Such an approach was not in the spirit of the EPC. The board should take into account, when amendments are formulated by non-native speakers, that these might not be in position to find the clearest formulation. With regard to procedural efficiency, the appellant-proprietor found that the fault lay essentially with the EPO, who had taken nine years in processing the file through opposition and appeal proceedings.

7.8 The board finds these arguments unconvincing. In accordance with Article 84 EPC, the claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought and shall be clear. Consequently, it is incumbent on the board to ensure that this requirement is met. It is not possible to relax this requirement in view of a party not being a native speaker of the language of the proceedings, or because of alleged errors of drafting, all the more so in inter partes proceedings. As regards the length of the proceedings, the board does not see how that is relevant to admissibility of requests filed late in the oral proceedings to counter objections that had been on file for a very long time.

7.9 For above reasons, the board used its discretionary power under Article 13(1) RPBA to not admit auxiliary request 24.

8. Conclusions

8.1 As none of the proprietor's requests is allowable, it follows that the proprietor's appeal has to be dismissed.

8.2 The board holds the opposition of opponent O1 to be admissible. Opponent 1's request that the "additional decision" taken by the opposition division be set aside is therefore acceded to.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The appeal of the appellant-proprietor is dismissed.

2. The "additional decision" is set aside and the opposition filed by opponent O1 is held admissible.

This decision T 540/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T054013.20170329. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Sherlock Holmes the invisible detective" by Matt Brown obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

The opposition division did not allow the main request as it considered the priority application to be prior art pursuant Art. 54(3) EPC and the generically worded claim 1 of the main request to be anticipated by an examplary dental impression material disclosed in the priority application ('poisonous priority'). The proprietor appealed and argued that partial priority should have been recognized, following the principles of G 1/15. In the opponent's view, the claim was not entitled to partial priority and the working example of the priority document (also present in the granted patent) destroyed the novelty of the claim. In the decision , the Board carefully explains how G 1/15 is to be applied, and confirmed partial priority for the part of claim 1 concerning the working example. Consequently, the claim was novel.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. European patent No. 2 046 262 based on European patent application No. 07799773.2 was opposed on the grounds that its subject-matter lacked novelty and inventive step and was not sufficiently disclosed.

Claim 1 of the patent read as follows:

"A dental impression material comprising a base paste and a catalyst paste, wherein the base paste comprises at least one polymerizable polyether material with a linear backbone having no side chains which is selected from the group consisting of

a) polyethers with at least one aziridino group,

b) polyethers with at least one olefinically unsaturated group and a compound with at least one SiH group and

c) polyethers with at least one olefinically unsaturated group and at least one SiH group and

d) polyethers with at least one alkoxysilyl group;

e) polyethers with at least one olefinically unsaturated group

and 0.1 to 15% by weight of a fluidity improver, the fluidity improver being a random copolyether of ethyleneoxide and at least one more alkyleneoxide which is not ethylene oxide, the copolymer comprising at least about 50% of structural elements from ethylene oxide as a fluidity improver, the fluidity improver having a molecular weight Mw in a range of 100 to 1900, and wherein the catalyst paste comprises at least one initiator or catalyst or both for initiating or catalyzing the polymerization of the at least one polymerizable polyether material."

Independent claim 10 related to a cured dental impression material obtainable by curing the material of claim 1. Independent claims 11, 13 and 14 related to methods or uses concerning the dental impression material of claim 1. Independent claim 15 related to a kit for producing dental materials comprising a base component containing from 0.1 to 15% by weight of the fluidity improver of claim 1.

II. The following documents were among those cited during the first-instance proceedings:

D1 - D4: [...]

D5: EP 1 882 469 - Priority of the patent in suit

D7a: [...]

III. By an interlocutory decision posted on 10 December 2013, the opposition division maintained the patent in amended form on the basis of the patent proprietor's third auxiliary request, filed during oral proceedings held on 7 November 2013.

IV. In the decision under appeal the opposition division came to the conclusion that the patent was not entitled to the priority date claimed, and that priority document D5, published after the filing date of the opposed patent, was prior art pursuant to Article 54(3) EPC.

The dental impression material containing base paste 2, disclosed on page 15 of D5, anticipated the subject-matter of claim 1 of the opposed patent and of auxiliary requests 1 and 2.

The subject-matter of auxiliary request 3 was considered to meet the requirements of the EPC.

V. The patent proprietor (hereinafter: appellant-patent proprietor) and the opponent (hereinafter: appellant-opponent) both appealed against the decision of the opposition division.

With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal the appellant-patent proprietor requested the opposition to be rejected and submitted six auxiliary requests.

VI. In a communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA issued on 28 February 2017, the Board expressed the opinion that the patent was sufficiently disclosed and met the requirement of novelty. Concerning the requirement of inventive step, it observed that the technical problem was to be defined taking into account inter alia the experiments submitted during the examination phase by the appellant-patent proprietor, which both parties had discussed in their statements setting out the grounds of appeal.

VII. An additional experimental report (document D17) was submitted by the appellant-patent proprietor by letter of 28 March 2017.

VIII. Oral proceedings were held on 13 April 2017. They were not attended by the appellant-opponent, as announced in advance in its letter of 8 March 2017.

IX. In relation to the requirement of novelty of the patent, the appellant-patent proprietor essentially argued that in view of decision G 1/15 the priority document could not be regarded as novelty-destroying. As to inventive step, it argued that the evidence on file demonstrated the better performance of a dental impression material comprising a base paste as defined in claim 1, over the materials disclosed in the closest prior art D1. On the basis of this improvement the product of the patent in suit was inventive over the cited prior-art documents.

X. The appellant-opponent's arguments can be summarised as follows:

(a) The skilled person would not have been able to distinguish polymers useful as fluidity improvers from other substances, such as surfactants, which could be present in the dental impression material. In view of that, the patent did not meet the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure.

(b) Claim 1 of the patent was not entitled to priority. The working example disclosed in paragraphs [0154] to [0156] of priority document D5 was novelty destroying pursuant to Article 54(3) EPC. The principles affirmed in G 1/15 did not apply to the present case. Moreover, this decision did not cover the situation where partial priority was claimed with regard to an actual numerical range selection.

Document D1 was the closest prior art for the assessment of inventive step. The comparative experiments carried out by the patent proprietor did not establish any improvement for the dental impression material of the patent in suit over the materials of D1. The objective technical problem was the provision of an alternative dental impression material. The selection of materials containing a copolymer of polyethylene oxide having a molecular weight in the range 100 to 1900 was obvious since D1, in its broadest disclosure, suggested the use of mixing additives based on polyalkylene oxide polymers of a molecular weight over 300. The subject-matter of the patent was obvious also in view of the teaching of D1 in combination with documents D2 or D3.

XI. The appellant-patent proprietor requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the opposition be rejected or, alternatively, that the patent be maintained in accordance with one of the six auxiliary requests submitted with the grounds of appeal on 10 April 2014.

XII. The appellant-opponent requested in writing that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be revoked.

Reasons for the Decision

Main request (patent as granted)

1. Sufficiency of disclosure

[...]

Hence, the patent meets the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure.

2. Novelty

2.1 The opposition division decided that the patent was not entitled to the claimed priority date and that claim 1 of the patent in suit lacked novelty pursuant to Article 54(3) EPC in view of the priority document itself (document D5) which was published on 30 January 2008, i.e. after the filing date of the patent in suit (24 July 2007).

2.2 The appellant-opponent's novelty attack against claim 1 of the patent in suit is based on a working example disclosed in paragraphs [0154] to [0156] of D5 (hereinafter: "working example") relating to a dental impression material obtained by mixing the catalyst paste and base paste 2 disclosed in paragraph [0154]. The same working example is also disclosed in paragraphs [0159] to [0162] of the patent in suit.

In its statement setting out the grounds of appeal the appellant-patent proprietor argued that claim 1 of the patent enjoyed partial priority in respect of the part of the claim concerning the working example and that the working example disclosed in D5 could therefore not qualify as prior art under Article 54(3) EPC. The appellant-opponent argued that no priority could be acknowledged from D5 and that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit lacked novelty in view of the working example disclosed in D5.

For the reasons set out below, the Board decides that partial priority can be acknowledged for the part of claim 1 concerning the working example.

2.3 In G 1/15 the Enlarged Board of Appeal affirmed the concept of partial priority by answering the questions of law referred to it as follows:

"Under the EPC, entitlement to partial priority may not be refused for a claim encompassing alternative subject-matter by virtue of one or more generic expressions or otherwise (generic "OR"-claim) provided that said alternative subject-matter has been disclosed for the first time, directly, or at least implicitly, unambiguously and in an enabling manner in the priority document. No other substantive conditions or limitations apply in this respect." (see the order of the decision).

2.3.1 The first step in the assessment of whether certain subject-matter within a generic "OR"-claim may enjoy partial priority is to determine the subject-matter disclosed in the priority document that is relevant. G 1/15 gives guidance that this is to be done both in accordance with the disclosure test laid down in the conclusion of G 2/98, and on the basis of explanations put forward by the applicant or patent proprietor to support its claim to priority, in order to show what the skilled person would have been able to derive from the priority document (G 1/15, point 6.4 of the Reasons).

In this context the Board refers to G 2/98 where the Enlarged Board held that a claim to priority cannot be refused on the ground that certain elements of the invention for which priority is claimed do not appear among the claims formulated in the application whose priority is claimed, provided that the application as a whole specifically discloses such elements. In the case before the Board, the novelty-destroying disclosure forms part of priority document D5 and the relevant subject-matter disclosed in D5 is the working example.

2.3.2 The second step is to examine whether this subject-matter is encompassed by the claim of the patent claiming said priority (G 1/15, point 6.4 of the Reasons). The question is thus whether D5's working example is encompassed by claim 1 of the patent in suit. The Board notes that G 1/15 concerns a generic "OR"-claim and that the Enlarged Board referred in its answer explicitly to this type of claim. Thus, in the case before it the Board also has to consider whether the working example is alternative subject-matter by virtue of a generic "OR"-claim.

In G 1/15 the Enlarged Board concurred with the obiter dictum in T 1222/11 (point 11.8 of the Reasons), according to which a decision on whether partial priority can be acknowledged for subject-matter disclosed in a priority document and encompassed by an "OR"-claim cannot depend on whether this subject-matter was expressly identified as a separate alternative in the claim (G 1/15, points 2 and 6.6 of the Reasons). Instead, the Enlarged Board gave examples of cases where the finding that a claim was entitled to partial priority to the extent that the claim encompassed specific alternatives disclosed in the priority document was based on a mere comparison of the ambit of the claim with the content of the priority document (G 1/15, point 2.4 of the Reasons).

In the case now before the Board, claim 1 of the patent in suit is a dental impression material comprising a base paste and a catalyst paste. Both pastes are described using generic features such as "polyethers" and "copolyether of ethyleneoxide". The working example is one specific embodiment of the claim (see paragraphs [0159] to [0162] of the patent in suit). This was never disputed by the parties. Multiple alternative working examples would be possible, with different variants falling within the generic features of claim 1. The working example is thus alternative subject-matter by virtue of a generic "OR"-claim which falls within the ambit of claim 1 of the patent in suit. Thus, the part of claim 1 which concerns the working example is entitled to partial priority. Therefore, the disclosure in the priority document of the working example cannot be considered to take away the novelty of the subject-matter of claim 1 pursuant to Article 54(3) EPC.

2.4 The Board does not accept the appellant-opponent's argument that the questions referred to the Enlarged Board in G 1/15 were not relevant for the case at issue. The appellant-opponent argued that the referral in G 1/15 concerned the situation where the priority document disclosed only one or more embodiments, but not the subject-matter of the entire claim claiming that priority, whereas the patent in suit comprised a limitation of the more general disclosure in D5. It supported this by reference to the molecular weight of the fluidity improver. Claim 1 of the patent in suit identified a range of 100-1900, whereas D5 disclosed a range of 100-3800.

The Board notes that this comparison, as well as the reference to other distinguishing features between the patent in suit and D5, concerns the question of whether priority can be acknowledged for the entire scope of claim 1 of the patent in suit. This is, however, not the issue which the Board needs to decide.The only relevant issue is whether partial priority can be acknowledged for that part of claim 1 which concerns the working example, i.e. that part of claim 1 against which the novelty attack was directed.

2.5 The appellant-opponent posed the question of whether the patentee, in a situation where the generic "OR"-claim and an actual selection of a numerical range are combined (i.e. partial priority claimed with regard to an actual numerical range selection), might be in a better position than a third person who filed a selection invention within the priority interval, for example by claiming a sub-range of 600-1900 of molecular weight. For the latter the criteria for assessing novelty of a selection invention would apply, which included the criterion that the claimed range is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from the end-points of the known range. It was therefore not clear whether the principle of equal treatment of applicants and third parties, as referred to in G 2/98 (point 8.1 of the Reasons), would still apply in future. The appellant-opponent argued that the criteria for assessing novelty and priority should be the same.

The Board does not regard the appellant-opponent's question as being based on the facts of the case. The partial priority claimed by the appellant-opponent does not concern a range. The working example contains the fluidity improver Breox PAG 50 A 20 which has one specific molecular weight. Thus, even if one were to assess novelty, the criteria which the appellant-opponent cited with regard to the assessment of novelty of a selection invention would not apply. The appellant-opponent might have had the question in mind of what criteria would apply for the assessment of partial priority if the alternative subject-matter of a claim was a sub-range within the broader range of the claim in question. However, this is not at issue in the present case.

In its submissions dated 30 March 2016 the appellant-opponent asked the Board to decide, in view of its arguments concerning the referred questions in G 1/15, whether a further referral to the Enlarged Board was necessary. In view of the above, the Board does not regard such a referral to be necessary.

2.6 New submissions with regard to novelty

2.6.1 On 6 April 2017, and thus only one week prior to the oral proceedings on 13 April 2017, which the appellant-opponent did not attend, the appellant-opponent filed further submissions in reply to the Board's communication dated 28 February 2017. Whilst the submissions are said to concern inventive step, they can also be interpreted as a novelty attack based on D1. The appellant-proprietor objected to the introduction of this new novelty attack into the proceedings.

2.6.2 The admission of amendments to a party's case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply lies within the discretion of the Board (Article 13(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal). The appellant-opponent had referred to D1 already in the notice of opposition. However, throughout the opposition and opposition appeal proceedings and up to the submissions dated 6 April 2017, D1 had not formed the basis of a novelty attack. In view of the advanced stage of the appeal proceedings and the fact that throughout the proceedings the attacks on novelty were based only on D5, the Board decided not to admit the appellant-opponent's submissions to the extent that they can be understood as a novelty attack based on D1.

3. Inventive step

3.1 The invention underlying the patent in suit relates to curable preparations useful in the production of dental impression materials [0001]. In the "Summary of the invention" it is explained that these preparations are supplied to the dentist in the form of two separate pastes which are mixed before use. A problem commonly encountered with the materials known from the prior art is that the mixing of the two pastes requires complicated motorised mixing gears or the use of high force. The objective of the invention underlying the patent in suit is therefore to provide dental impression materials in the form of two components which can be easily mixed and easily dispensed by manually driven dispensers (paragraphs [0011] and [0012]).

3.2 Closest prior art

[...]

3.3 Technical problem

[...]

3.4 Obviousness

[...]

3.4.3 In the light of the considerations set out above, the Board concludes that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent meets the requirement of Article 56 EPC.

For the same reasons, the subject-matter of the other independent claims of the patent is likewise inventive.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The opposition is rejected.

This decision T 260/14 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T026014.20170413. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Ceda el paso / Give way" by Macnolete obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

This pencil cracked under the pressure

The main claim in this opposition appeal concerns an E. coli host cell sample subjected to non-lysing pressure. According to the opponent the examples in the patent are the only known cell systems that do not lyse under the conditions of the claim, or that give the effect of increased yield. As a result, the claim is neither workable nor inventive over the entire scope claimed.

The Board has problems with the evidentiary value of the documents cited by the opponent. Furthermore, that there exists an embodiment falling under the scope of the claim that does not show the effect is in itself not enough to deny inventive step.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

(...)

VI. Claim 1 of the set of claims found allowable in the decision under appeal (main request) reads as follows:

"1. A method for the manufacture of recombinant antibody molecules comprising culturing an E. coli host cell sample transformed with an expression vector encoding a recombinant antibody molecule that is expressed in the periplasm of the host cell and subjecting said host cell sample to a heat treatment step, characterised in that said sample is subjected to a non-lysing pressure treatment step between 1000 psi

(68.9 bar) and 4000 psi (275.8 bar) before being subjected to an increase in temperature within the range of 30°C to 70°C for a period of up to 24 hours".

(...)

Reasons for the Decision

1. The oral proceedings were held in the absence of the appellant, in accordance with Rule 115(2) EPC and Article 15(3) RPBA. Accordingly, the appellant is treated as relying on its written case.

Main Request - Claims 1 to 5

Disclosure of the invention - Article 100(b) and Article 83 EPC

2. The ground for opposition Article 100(b) EPC requires that the European patent discloses the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. According to the case law of the boards of appeal, the subject-matter of a patent is sufficiently disclosed if the skilled person is able to obtain substantially all embodiments falling within the ambit of the claims. Moreover, it must be possible to reproduce the invention on the basis of the patent without any inventive effort and undue burden (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition, II.C. 4.1, 4.4 and 5.6)

3. The appellant argued that finding E. coli strains suitable for use in the claimed method, other than the strain W3110, was an undue burden for the skilled person. Document D6, provided evidence of cell lysis under the pressure and temperature conditions of the claim. Similarly, Annexes 1 and A were submitted as additional evidence to show, inter alia, that due to cell lysis under conditions of the claim, the skilled person would not be able to carry out the invention other than by using the strain exemplified in the patent.

4. Document D6 concerns "the high-pressure homogenization of Escherichia coli, strain JM101, containing inclusion bodies of recombinant porcine somatotropin" (see abstract). None of the findings on the lysis of E. coli strains under homogeniser pressure (see page 368, right column, penultimate paragraph and Figure 7) relate to periplasmic expression of a protein. It was concluded that "the overexpression of a foreign protein leads to weakening of the cell wall" (Id, paragraph 1). However, in the case of periplasmic expression, the foreign protein would be expressed outside of the cell wall. In view of this, the board considers that there is no evidence in document D6 that the skilled person would encounter any difficultly in identifying strains of E. coli periplasmically expressing recombinant proteins that do not lyse under conditions of the claim.

4.1 Thus, document D6 does not provide evidence that the skilled person cannot carry out the invention as claimed without undue burden.

5. In relation to the evidence provided in Annexes 1 and A, the established case law of the boards is that there are no firm rules according to which types of evidence are, or are not, convincing. Each piece of evidence is given an appropriate weighting according to its probative value on a case-by-case basis (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition, III.G.4.2).

6. In the case at hand, the board has noted a number of issues that arise when considering the Annexes. These include the following:

6.1 Neither Annex 1 nor Annex A has an identifiable author. In the case law of the boards "an unsigned statement by an unknown and unnamed person should in principle be given minimal weight" (see Id., 4.2.1). Moreover, the level of skill of the person who carried out the experiments is unknown.

6.2 It is not clear if, in the experiments reported in the Annexes, the expression of the antibody was to the periplasm. The board notes that expression of a protein to the periplasm in E. coli is generally governed by the presence of an appropriate signal sequence. Neither Annex nor any of the appellant's written submissions provide any details about the expression vector used.

6.3 The information presented in Annex 1 is, in part, inconsistent with that presented in Annex A. For instance Annex 1 (Abb. 4) and Annex A (Fig. 1b) relate to the same experiment and both show the amount of product (antibody) recovered in mass per unit volume. The yield obtained for induced and auto-induced systems at 70 and 200 bar shown in Abb. 4 of Annex 1 and Fig. 1b of Annex A is shown below;

Annex 1 (Abb.4) Annex A (Fig. 1b)

70 bar

Auto-induced ca. 50 mg/l 0 mg/l

Induced ca. 250 mg/l 1050 mg/l

200 bar

Auto-induced ca. 230 mg/l 0 mg/l

Induced ca. 420 mg/l 1200 mg/l

6.4 The fact that there is no correspondence between the yield achieved for the induced and the auto-induced systems between the two sets of results, although these relate to the same experiment, leads to the conclusion the there must be an error, either in the reporting of the results or in the experiments themselves.

7. All of the above factors lead the board to the conclusion that the evidence in both Annex 1 and A is of a nature that it cannot convincingly demonstrate that the skilled person would face an undue burden in carrying out the invention as claimed without undue burden.

8. The board is therefore satisfied that the requirements of Article 83 EPC are met for the subject-matter of the claims.

Inventive step - Article 56 EPC

9. To assess whether or not a claimed invention meets the requirements of Article 56 EPC, the board applies the "problem and solution" approach, long established in the case law of the boards of appeal (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition, I.D.2).

The closest prior art

10. Document D3 discloses, inter alia, methods for the manufacture of recombinant antibodies from the periplasm of E. coli strain W3110 and retrieval of folded and soluble material by applying heat treatment (see column 13, line 64 to column 14, lines 1 to 19). This document was seen as representing the most relevant state of the art for assessing inventive step by the opposition division and both parties. The board has no reasons to depart from this assessment.

The technical problem and its solution

11. The method of claim 1 differs from that disclosed in document D3 in the inclusion of a step of subjecting the E. coli host cell sample to a non-lysing pressure treatment. According to the patent, the technical effect of this is "that non-lysing treatment in combination with heat treatment, brings an increase in the yield of functional antibody at the primary extraction stage of up to 50%; i.e. the yield of functional antibody is increased above that of heat treatment alone" (see paragraph [007]).

12. The appellant, on the basis of evidence in the patent itself, in Annexes 1 and A and in document D6, disputes that this effect is achievable over the entire scope of the claim.

13. It is established case law of the boards of appeal that "If the inventive step of a claimed invention is based on a given technical effect, [it] should, in principle, be achievable over the whole area claimed" (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition 2016, ID. 9.8.3).

14. The data provided in the patent in Figures 2, 3b, 4a and Table 1 shows that the yield of antibody obtainable by carrying out the method as claimed is improved in comparison to the yield obtainable without the non-lysing pressure conditions, i.e. in comparison with a method representing the closest prior art. Figure 3(a) of the patent (a histogram showing the effect of pressure treatment on the yield of functional antibody at 60°C) shows that the yield of functional antibody at 1000 psi (319 mg/l) was slightly less than the control (atmospheric pressure; 343 mg/l). However, in the same experiment, the yield at pressures of 2000 and 4000 psi was greater than the control (460 and 921 mg/l, respectively).

15. Thus, while the patent discloses that a single set of conditions, falling within the ambit of claim 1, did not result in an improved yield, it also discloses several other working embodiments of the claimed method which did result in an improved yield. For the board, the overall evidence in the patent convincingly demonstrates that using the claimed method leads to an improved yield of high purity antibodies, achievable over substantially the whole area claimed.

16. As far as document D6 and Annexes 1 and A are concerned, the board considers that none of them provides evidence that the technical effect of improved yield of high purity antibodies cannot be achieved over the whole area claimed for the reasons given in points 4.4. to 7.7. above.

17. Hence, the technical problem can be seen as to improve the yield of a method for the production of high purity recombinant antibodies.

Obviousness

18. The question to be answered in considering obviousness is whether the person skilled in the art, seeking a solution to the above formulated problem, and starting from the closest prior art as represented by document D3, would have considered that subjecting an E. coli sample, periplasmically expressing recombinant antibody, to a non-lysing pressure treatment step at between 1000 psi and 4000 psi, before subjecting it to an increase in temperature, was obvious.

19. The appellant has argued that the solution as presented in claim 1 was obvious because it combines heat with pressure treatment which combination was derivable from the disclosure of document D3 combined with that of document D5.

20. Document D5 is a review of process-scale techniques used to disrupt host cells for the large-scale manufacture of biological products. In relation to the release of proteins from the periplasmic proteins it states "[...] chemical attack of the outer membrane allows periplasmic proteins to be released. Enzymatic methods generally involve enzymatic attack of the peptidoglycan layer in gram-negative bacteria, and of the mannoprotein and glucan components of the yeast wall" (page 499, first paragraph). More specifically it states "EDTA is clearly effective at disrupting the outer membrane, and may therefore be employed to recover periplasmic proteins" (page 501, final paragraph).

21. On the other hand, pressure treatment is mentioned on page 498 as follows: "Complete destruction of the wall in a non-specific manner is usually achieved by mechanical means. Laboratory-scale methods [...] include the French press, shaking with glass beads and sonication. At process scale, mechanical methods are restricted primarily to bead milling, high-pressure homogenization, and microfluidization...".

22. In summary, document D5 suggests chemical means for the specific release of proteins from the periplasm and discloses pressure treatments as a means for the complete destruction of the cell wall and the release of the entire intracellular content.

23. From this, the board concludes that the skilled person starting from document D3 and seeking to improve the yield of high purity antibody would not have considered including an additional pressure step before the heat treatment step, since such steps were seen as a means of totally destroying the cell wall.

24. It follows that the board holds that the subject-matter of claim 1 was not obvious to the person skilled in the art at the effective date of the patent. Dependent claims 2 to 5 relate to embodiments of claim 1. The conclusions on inventive step reached for the subject-matter of claim 1 therefore apply equally to the subject-matter of claims 2 to 5.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 1818/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T181812.20170209. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by moritz320 via PixaBay under a Creative Commons CC0 license (no changes made).

T 2333/11: What exactly does "divided into smaller objects" mean?

Another case showing the dangers of Art. 123(2) EPC: an amendment going beyond the original disclosure seals the fate of this patent application. Dividing configuration information into smaller objects and dividing content metadata into smaller objects are not considered to be the same thing.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal is against the decision of the examining division refusing European patent application No. 04811384.9 published as international patent application WO 2005/050974 A2.

II. The decision under appeal was a decision according to the state of the file, as requested by the appellant, referring for its reasons to two previous communications dated 2 December 2010 and 3 December 2009. In these communications, the examining division had raised objections based on Articles 54, 56 and 84 EPC.

III. With the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant re-filed the claims of the sole request underlying the decision under appeal as a main request and filed the claims of first to third auxiliary requests.

IV. In a communication under Article 15(1) RPBA (Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal, OJ EPO 2007, 536), annexed to the summons to oral proceedings, the board informed the appellant of its provisional opinion that inter alia claim 1 according to each of the main and first to third auxiliary requests did not meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC because the functional feature identified by the expression "by dividing the configuration information into smaller objects (1004, 1005, 1006), each of which is provided with an object header (1008; 1009; 1010) of the format" was not directly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed.

V. In a letter of reply dated 28 April 2017, the appellant did not reply to the board's objections. Instead, it withdrew its request for oral proceedings.

VI. On 8 May 2017, the appellant informed the Registry of the board by telephone that it would not be attending the oral proceedings.

VII. The board held oral proceedings on 15 May 2017. As announced, the duly summoned appellant did not attend.

During the oral proceedings, the chairman noted that the appellant had requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a European patent be granted on the basis of the claims of the main request or, in the alternative, one of the first to third auxiliary requests, all requests filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

At the end of the oral proceedings, the chairman announced the board's decision.

VIII. Claim 1 according to the appellant's main request reads as follows:

"A content on demand system (102) comprising:
    logic to compose set top box configuration information (1002) into an audio and/or video stream format by dividing the configuration information into smaller objects (1004, 1005, 1006), each of which is provided with an object header (1008; 1009; 1010) of the format; and
logic to communicate the configuration information to a plurality of set top boxes (106, 108, 109), the configuration information affecting operational settings of the set top box."

IX. Claim 1 according to the appellant's first auxiliary request reads as follows:

"A content on demand system (102) comprising:
    a network structure (104) adapted to communicate audio and/or video formatted streams comprising on-demand content;
    logic to compose set top box configuration information (1002) into an audio and/or video stream format by dividing the configuration information into smaller objects (1004, 1005, 1006), each of which is provided with an object header (1008; 1009; 1010) of the format, wherein the streams also comprise the configuration information (1002); and
    logic to communicate the configuration information to a plurality of set top boxes (106, 108, 109), the configuration information affecting operational settings of the set top box."

X. Claim 1 according to the appellant's second auxiliary request reads as follows:

"A content on demand system (102) comprising:
    a server system (102) comprising logic to compose set top box configuration information (1002) into an audio and/or video stream format by dividing the configuration information into smaller objects (1004, 1005, 1006), each of which is provided with an object header (1008; 1009; 1010) of the format;
    a network structure (104) adapted to communicate audio and/or video formatted streams comprising on-demand content, wherein the streams also comprise the configuration information (1002), wherein the network structure (104) comprises a plurality of service nodes (119) including logic to insert, in the communication from the server system (102) to a plurality of set top boxes (106, 108, 109), a service group identifier for the set top boxes;
    logic to communicate the configuration information to the plurality of set top boxes (106, 108, 109) via the plurality of service nodes, each of the service nodes further including logic to communicate the configuration information and the service group identifier to the plurality of set top boxes, the configuration information affecting operational settings of the set top box; and
    logic to receive from a set top box a request for an audio and/or video stream, the request comprising the service group identifier for the set top box and an identifier of a title of the audio and/or video stream, and to communicate the audio and/or video stream to the service node corresponding to the service group identifier."

XI. Claim 1 according to the appellant's third auxiliary request reads as follows:

"A content on demand system (102) comprising:
    a server system (102) comprising logic to compose set top box configuration information (1002) into an audio and/or video stream format by dividing the configuration information into smaller objects (1004, 1005, 1006), each of which is provided with an object header (1008; 1009; 1010) of the format;
    a network structure (104) adapted to communicate audio and/or video formatted streams comprising on-demand content, wherein the streams also comprise the configuration information (1002), wherein the network structure (104) comprises a plurality of service nodes (119) including logic to insert, in the communication from the server system (102) to a plurality of set top boxes (106, 108, 109), a service group identifier for the set top boxes;
    logic to communicate the configuration information to the plurality of set top boxes (106, 108, 109) via the plurality of service nodes, each of the service nodes further including logic to communicate the configuration information and the service group identifier to the plurality of set top boxes, the configuration information affecting operational settings of the set top box;
    logic to receive from a set top box a request for an audio and/or video stream, the request comprising the service group identifier for the set top box and an identifier of a title of the audio and/or video stream, and to communicate the audio and/or video stream to the service node corresponding to the service group identifier; and
    logic to provide among the configuration information the service group identifier for a set top box and a channel and an alternate channel from which to retrieve a content index having the streamed audio and/or video format, and to communicate on the channel from which to retrieve the content index to allow a receiver to retrieve the content index, and to communicate on the alternate channel to allow a receiver to tune to the alternate channel when the channel from which to retrieve the content index comprises an indication of invalid data."

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

Non-attendance of the appellant at the oral proceedings

2. The duly summoned appellant did not attend the oral proceedings. According to Rule 71(2) EPC 1973, the proceedings could however continue without him. In accordance with Article 15(3) RPBA, the board relied for its decision only on the appellant's written submissions. The board was in a position to decide at the conclusion of the oral proceedings, since the case was ready for decision (Article 15(5) and (6) RPBA), and the voluntary absence of the appellant was not a reason for delaying the decision (Article 15(3) RPBA).

Main and first to third auxiliary requests - Article 123(2) EPC

3. It is established case law that Article 123(2) EPC requires that amendments to the parts of a European patent application relating to the disclosure (the description, claims and drawings) can only be made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from these parts of the application as filed (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition 2016, II.E.1).

4. Claim 1 according to each of the main and first to third auxiliary requests specifies the logic of the claimed system by means of a functional feature identified by the expression "by dividing the configuration information into smaller objects (1004, 1005, 1006), each of which is provided with an object header (1008; 1009; 1010) of the format".

5. The board considers that this feature cannot be derived directly and unambiguously from the application as filed for the following reasons:

The only portions of the application as filed which disclose a division into smaller objects are paragraphs [0068] and [0069] of the description and figure 10. However, in these portions it is "content metadata (1002)" which is divided, not "configuration information" as stated in claim 1.

The application as filed makes it clear that "configuration information" and "content metadata" are not the same. The former is defined in paragraph [0024] and the latter in paragraph [0025] as follows:

According to paragraph [0024] of the description, "configuration information" may include general configuration information (e.g. special-purpose channels, channel names, and IP address and port numbers for communicating with the server system 102), and configuration information that is specific to one or more groups of set top boxes (e.g. local program options).

In contrast, according to paragraph [0025] of the description, "content metadata" may include information about content categories (e.g. horror, documentary, comedy, etc.), and information about audio and/or video titles (e. g. movie titles, movie length, movie description, leading actors, etc. , as well as ads, logos, and other graphics.).

Moreover, another difference is that "configuration information" is transmitted in channel 333 of figure 3, whereas "content metadata" is transmitted in channels 323-325 and alternate channels 327-329 of figure 3.

As a result, it is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed that "configuration information" is divided into smaller objects, each of which provided with an object header.

Hence claim 1 according to each of the main and first to third auxiliary requests does not comply with the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC.

6. The appellant did not submit any argument in reply to the objections under Article 123(2) EPC raised by the board in the communication under Article 15(1) RPBA annexed to the summons to oral proceedings.

7. For the above reasons, the main and first to third auxiliary requests are not allowable.

Conclusion

8. Since none of the appellant's requests is allowable, the appeal must be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 2333/11 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T223311.20170515. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Divided into smaller objects" by Romano Beitsma (c) 2017.

One way street to obviousness?

This opposition appeal concerns an invention which provides an emulsion for coloring foodstuff, which is said to be more transparent and provide a more vibrant coloring ("stärkere Leuchtkraft").

This advantageous effect appears to be achieved by a reduced droplet size, which is also the sole distinguishing feature over D7 as closest prior art.

The opponent as appellant argues that the objective technical problem is to be formulated as how to obtain an emulsion which is more transparent and provides a more vibrant coloring.

According to the appellant, it is known from D5 and common general knowledge that a reduced droplet size improves the transparency of an emulsion, and that the more vibrant coloring would be obtained inherently, and thereby as a bonus-effect, when the skilled person reduces the droplet size of D7 to obtain the desired improvement in transparency.

The patent proprietor of course disagrees, and argues that the actual objective technical problem solved by the invention is how to obtain this more vibrant coloring and not the improved transparency. However, as a seemingly precautionary measure, the patent proprietor decides to 'eliminate' the technical effect of improved transparency by submitting an auxiliary request in which the emulsion is limited to application in Yogurt (which is non-transparent).

Does the latter strategy work? Yes. Although the Board concurs with the appellant with respect to the main request, the Board agrees that the 'transparency' effect is not achieved anymore by the auxiliary request. Accordingly, the improved vibrancy is now the sole technical effect of the distinguishing feature, by which the distinguishing feature is not rendered obvious anymore by the cited prior art.

Reasons for the Decision

Hauptantrag (erteilte Ansprüche)

1. Erfinderische Tätigkeit

1.1 Die dem Streitpatent zugrundeliegende Erfindung ist auf eine Farbstoffemulsion für Lebensmittel gerichtet, welche eine höhere Transparenz, eine stärkere Leuchtkraft, eine höhere Ergiebigkeit des Farbstoffs und eine hohe Säurestabilität aufweist (Absatz [0019]).

1.2 D7 ist ein deutsches Gebrauchsmuster, welches nach dem Prioritätsdatum, aber vor dem Anmeldetag des Streitpatents veröffentlich wurde. Wie vom Beschwerdegegner nicht bestritten wurde, ist die Priorität des erteilten Anspruchs 1 nicht gültig. D7 ist daher für den erteilten Anspruch 1 Stand der Technik gemäß Artikel 54(2) EPÜ.

1.3 In ähnlicher Weise wie das Streitpatent beschäftigt sich D7 mit Emulgatorzusammensetzungen, die eine hohe Säurestabilität aufweisen und somit die Emulgierung von Lebensmittelfarbstoffen ermöglichen (Absatz [0006]). Wie von allen Parteien während der mündlichen Verhandlung anerkannt, kann D7 daher als nächstliegender Stand der Technik angesehen werden.

1.3.1 D7 offenbart in den Absätzen [0021] bis [0026] ein Ausführungsbeispiel, das identisch auch in den Absätzen [0061] bis [0070] des Streitpatents unter der Überschrift "Beispielhafte Beschreibung der Emulgator-Zusammensetzung in einer säurestabilen Beta-Carotin 1% O/W" wiedergegeben ist. Dieses Ausführungsbeispiel der D7 offenbart die Herstellung einer Emulsion, bei der eine Ölphase, die u.a.

- 1% beta-Carotin E-160a, entsprechend dem anspruchsgemäßen Carotinoid,

- sowie 2% Lecithin E-322, entsprechend dem anspruchsgemäßen Lecithin (Absatz [0040] des Streitpatents), enthält,

einer Wasserphase die u. a.

- 2% Zuckerester E-473, entsprechend dem anspruchsgemäßen Saccharosefettsäureester (Absatz [0040] des Streitpatents), enthält

zugesetzt und über Dispergierungs- und Hochdruck-Homogenisierungssysteme bis 500 bar bis zu einer Partikelgröße "von 90% < 1 my" dispergiert wird.

Die auf die Gesamtzusammensetzung bezogene Menge von jeweils 2% an Lecithin und Zuckerester entsprechen einer auf die Emulgatorzusammensetzung bezogenen und in den anspruchsgemäßen Bereichen liegenden Menge von jeweils 50%.

1.3.2 Es war zwischen den Parteien strittig, ob das Beispiel der D7 auch das einzige, noch verbleibende Anspruchsmerkmal, nämlich die Größe der Öltröpfchen von 100 nm oder weniger offenbart.

Wie oben ausgeführt, sagt das Beispiel diesbezüglich aus, dass 90% der das Carotin enthaltenden Öltröpfchen eine Teilchengröße von kleiner "1 my" aufweisen.

Von den Beschwerdeführern wurde im schriftlichen Verfahren argumentiert, dass "1 my" für 1 Millimikrometer und damit 1 nm stehe, was im anspruchsgemäßen Bereich liege. Dem kann die Kammer nicht zustimmen, da dann die Größe der Öltröpfchen unterhalb derjenigen der in den Tröpfchen enthaltenen Moleküle läge, was physikalisch nicht möglich ist. Daher kann die Angabe "kleiner 1 my" in D7 nur kleiner 1 mym bedeuten. Somit geht die anspruchsgemäße durchschnittliche Tröpfchengröße von höchstens 100 nm (0.1 mym) nicht unmittelbar und eindeutig aus der in D7 genannten Tröpfchengröße "kleiner 1 my" hervor.

Darüber hinaus argumentierten die Beschwerdeführer, dass die Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase inhärent im anspruchsgemäßen Bereich liegen müsse, da das Beispiel ja identisch in den Absätzen [0061] bis [0070] des Streitpatents wiedergegeben sei. Man müsse davon ausgehen, dass ein Beispiel auch erfindungsgemäß sei.

Jedoch findet sich auch im Streitpatent identisch zu D7 die Offenbarung, dass 90% der das Carotin enthaltenden Öltröpfchen eine Teilchengröße von kleiner 1 my aufweisen, was, wie oben ausgeführt, für 1 mym steht und außerhalb des anspruchsgemäßen Bereiches liegt. Ferner hängt, wie vom Beschwerdegegner ausgeführt, die Tröpfchengröße von der Dauer der Homogenisierung ab, die im Beispiel der D7 (und auch entsprechend im Streitpatent) nicht genannt wird. Wenn überhaupt, kann aus der Formulierung in diesem Beispiel "bis zu einer Partikelgröße der Öltröpfchen von 90% < 1 my dispergiert" nur abgeleitet werden, dass die Homogenisierung bereits bei Erreichen einer Tröpfchengröße von 1 mym abgebrochen wurde, und damit die Homogenisierungsdauer in diesem Beispiel gerade nicht so lange war, um die anspruchsgemäße Tröpfchengröße von 100 nm oder weniger zu erreichen. Daher kann nicht davon ausgegangen werden, dass die Tröpfchengröße in D7 inhärent im anspruchsgemäßen Bereich liegt. Somit unterscheidet sich die Emulsion des Beispiels der D7 von derjenigen des Anspruchs 1 hinsichtlich der Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase.

1.4 Gemäß Streitpatent (Absätze [0019] und [0023]) löst die Erfindung insbesondere die Aufgabe, eine Farbstoffemulsion bereitzustellen, die eine höhere Transparenz und eine stärkere Leuchtkraft aufweist. Es ist zu prüfen, ob diese Aufgabe durch das oben identifizierte Unterscheidungsmerkmal glaubhaft gelöst wird.

1.4.1 Der Beispielteil des Streitpatentes (Absatz [0044] bis [0056]) enthält ein anspruchsgemäßes Beispiel 1 und ein Vergleichsbeispiel 1. Im Beispiel 1 liegt die Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase im anspruchsgemäßen Bereich, nämlich bei 80 bis 100 nm. Im Vergleichsbeispiel 1 wird eine Tröpfchengröße von 1 mym (Seite 5, Zeile 35), 1 mm (zweitletzte Zeile des Absatzes [0049]) sowie 1 mµ (vorletzte Zeile des Absatzes [0042]) genannt. Wie von den Beschwerdeführern nicht bestritten wurde, würde bei einer Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase von 1 mm keine stabile Emulsion vorliegen. Somit ist die Angabe "1 mm" technisch unsinnig. Gleiches gilt für die Angabe "1 mµ". Würde das "m" in dieser Angabe als Präfix "Milli" aufgefasst, stünde diese Angabe für 1 Millimikrometer und somit 1 nm, was technisch unsinnig ist, da dann die in den Tröpfchen enthaltenen Moleküle kleiner als die Tröpfchen selbst wären. Daher kann die Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase im Vergleichsbeispiel 1 bei technisch sinnvoller Würdigung nur bei 1 µm gelegen haben.

1.4.2 Aus den Emulsionen des Beispiels 1 und Vergleichsbeispiels 1 wurde ein gefärbtes Getränk hergestellt und gefunden, dass das mit der Emulsion des Beispiels 1 hergestellte Getränk einen niedrigeren Absorptionskoeffizienten (0.05) als das mit der Emulsion des Vergleichsbeispiels 1 hergestellte Getränk (0.3) aufwies. Darüber hinaus wies das die Emulsion des Beispiels 1 enthaltende Getränk eine um 15 % erhöhte Farbergiebigkeit (d. h. Leuchtkraft) auf (Absätze [0052] bis [0056] des Streitpatents).

Ferner wurden durch jeweiliges Ausmischen der Emulsion und Vergleichsemulsion mit einem Joghurt zwei gefärbte Joghurts hergestellt. Bei Verwendung der Emulsion des Beispiels 1 wurde hierdurch ein Joghurt mit einer Farbintensität b von 32 erhalten, während bei Verwendung der Vergleichsemulsion nur eine Intensität b von 29 erreicht wurde. Somit war die Leuchtkraft und Ergiebigkeit durch die Anwendung der Emulsion des Beispiels 1 im Vergleich zum Vergleichsbeispiel 1 im Joghurt um ca. 10% erhöht (Absätze [0057] bis [0059] des Streitpatents).

1.4.3 Wie von den Beschwerdeführern während der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht bestritten wurde, belegen diese Versuche, dass die im Streitpatent genannte Aufgabe der Bereitstellung einer Farbstoffemulsion mit höherer Transparenz und Leuchtkraft gegenüber D7 gelöst wurde. Damit stellt diese Aufgabe die objektive technische Aufgabe dar.

1.5 Es ist zu untersuchen, ob die anspruchsgemäße Lösung dieser Aufgabe im Hinblick auf den zitierten Stand der Technik oder das allgemeine Fachwissen nahelag.

1.5.1 Diesbezüglich zitierten die Beschwerdeführer die folgenden Textstellen der vorveröffentlichten Dokumente D5 und D6:

"Für spezielle Anwendungsgebiete von Carotinoiden, beispielsweise für die Färbung von Getränken (u.a. Softdrinks) ist gewünscht, daß die Carotenoid-Formulierung in flüssiger Form vorliegt, und daß die Redispergierung dieser Flüssigformulierung in wässrigen Systemen zu klar gefärbten Lösungen führt. Um diesen Effekt zu erzielen, sind entsprechend kleine Wirkstoffpartikel (<100nm) erforderlich." (Seite 2, Zeile 20 bis 23 der D5, Hervorhebung durch die Kammer).

"As used herein, 'microemulsion' refers to a clear-appearing system containing at least two immiscible (mutually insoluble) components (oil phase and water phase) and at least one emulsifier or surfactant component. [...] The size of droplets in a microemulsion is about 5 to 100 nm, smaller than the wavelength of visible light (about 100 nm). Therefore, a microemulsion is clear"

(Absatz [0018] der D6).

Aus den zitierten Textstellen der D5 und D6 geht hervor, dass es eine physikalische Gesetzmäßigkeit, und damit Teil des allgemeinen Fachwissens, darstellte, dass die Tröpfchengröße eines emulgierten Stoffes 100 nm oder weniger sein muss, um eine klare Emulsion und damit eine hohe Transparenz zu erhalten.

1.5.2 Der eine hohe Transparenz anstrebende Fachmann hätte daher aufgrund seines durch D5 und D6 belegten allgemeinen Fachwissens die Teilchengröße in D7 auf eine Größe von 100 nm oder weniger verringert und wäre so zum Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 gelangt.

1.5.3 Durch die Verringerung der Teilchengröße fällt dem Fachmann der zusätzliche Effekt einer erhöhten Leuchtkraft ohne zusätzliche technische Maßnahmen in den Schoß. So wird durch das Streitpatent (Absatz [0028]) anerkannt, dass eine auf 100 nm oder weniger verringerte Teilchengröße eine erhöhte Leuchtkraft bedingt. Daher liegt zum Erreichen der höheren Transparenz gewissermaßen eine Einbahnstraße vor, die zwangsläufig die Zusatzwirkung einer erhöhten Leuchtkraft bedingt. Eine derartige auftretende Zusatzwirkung einer naheliegenden Maßnahme stellt gemäß der Rechtspraxis des EPA einen Bonus dar, der - selbst als überraschender Effekt - keine erfinderische Tätigkeit zu begründen vermag (T 506/92; Punkt 2.6 und T 794/01; Punkt 3.8).

1.5.4 Diesbezüglich kann sich die Kammer dem Argument des Beschwerdegegners nicht anschließen, dass die Erhöhung der Leuchtkraft die eigentliche technische Aufgabe darstelle, deren Lösung ausgehend von D7 nicht nahegelegen habe. Insbesondere stellt das Streitpatent in seiner Gesamtoffenbarung immer auf beides, d. h. eine Erhöhung der Transparenz und Leuchtkraft ab und enthält keinerlei Hervorhebung der Leuchtkraft als eigentliche technische Aufgabe. So wird auf Seite 2, Zeile 15 und 57, Seite 3, Zeile 32 und 52 bis 53 und dem Beispielteil des Streitpatents (insbesondere Seite 6, Zeile 14 bis 37) immer sowohl auf die Transparenz, als auch die Leuchtkraft abgestellt, und auf Seite, 3, Zeile 41 bis 45 sogar nur auf die Transparenz eingegangen.

1.5.5 Auch das Argument des Beschwerdegegners, dass der Fachmann D5 und D6 nicht herangezogen hätte, da sich diese Dokumente nicht auf Emulsionen, sondern auf Lösungen bezögen, kann nicht durchgreifen. So stellt zumindest die oben zitierte, das allgemeine Fachwissen belegende Textstelle der D6 klar auf Emulsionen ab.

1.6 Daher ist der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 nicht erfinderisch gegenüber D7 in Kombination mit dem durch D5 und D6 dokumentierten allgemeinen Fachwissen.

2. Weitere Einwände

2.1 Von den Beschwerdeführern wurden zusätzlich zu dem obigen Einwand der mangelnden erfinderischen Tätigkeit noch weitere Einwände mangelnder erfinderischer Tätigkeit sowie mangelnder Offenbarung und fehlender Neuheit erhoben. Von der Kammer wurde in der mündlichen Verhandlung die Auffassung vertreten, dass der durch den Hauptantrag definierte Gegenstand ausreichend offenbart und neu sei. Aufgrund der Feststellung, dass es dem Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 gegenüber D7 als dem nächstliegenden Stand der Technik an erfinderischer Tätigkeit mangelt, erübrigt sich jedoch eine Abhandlung dieser Einwände in der vorliegenden Entscheidung. Gleiches gilt für den Antrag der Beschwerdeführer, die im Rahmen dieser zusätzlichen Einwände eingereichten Vergleichsversuche des Beschwerdegegners nicht zuzulassen.

Hilfsantrag 1

3. Zulässigkeit

3.1 Hilfsantrag 1 wurde in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer eingereicht. Von den Beschwerdeführern wurde beantragt, diesen Antrag nicht in das Verfahren zuzulassen.

Hilfsantrag 1 unterscheidet sich vom Hauptantrag dadurch, dass mit Ausnahme des erteilten Anspruchs 15 alle Ansprüche gestrichen wurden und der Rückbezug des erteilten Anspruchs 15 auf den erteilten Anspruch 11 und damit indirekt den erteilten Anspruch 1 ausgeschrieben wurde. Der verbleibende einzige Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrages 1 bezieht sich damit auf die Verwendung einer wie im erteilten Anspruch 1 definierten Emulsion in Joghurt, der 0.5 bis 3 g der Emulsion, vorzugsweise 2.0 g der Emulsion pro Kilogramm Joghurt enthält (siehe Punkt XI oben). Somit enthält der neue Hilfsantrag 1 keine neuen Ansprüche und wirft, wie vom Beschwerdegegner nicht bestritten wurde, auch keinen neuen, über die Diskussion des Hauptantrages hinausgehenden Problemkreis auf.

Von den Beschwerdeführern wurde während der mündlichen Verhandlung vorgebracht, dass der in der mündlichen Verhandlung vorgelegte Hilfsantrag 1 den zwanzigsten im Beschwerdeverfahren eingereichten Hilfsantrag darstelle, was gegen die Zulassung dieses Hilfsantrags spreche. Dieses Argument kann jedoch nicht durchgreifen. Die Beschwerdeführer haben eine Vielzahl von Angriffen im schriftlichen Beschwerdeverfahren vorgetragen, unter anderem vier Neuheitsangriffe und zahlreiche Angriffe auf die erfinderische Tätigkeit, die von drei unterschiedlichen Dokumenten als nächstliegendem Stand der Technik ausgingen. Daher ist es im vorliegenden Fall dem Beschwerdegegner nicht vorzuwerfen, dass er sich gegen diese Vielzahl von Angriffen mit einer relativ großen Zahl von Hilfsanträgen verteidigt hat.

Aus diesen Gründen hat die Kammer entschieden, Hilfsantrag 1 in das Verfahren zuzulassen.

4. Ausreichende Offenbarung

4.1 Von den bezüglich des Hauptantrages gemachten Einwänden wurde von den Beschwerdeführern der Einwand aufrechterhalten, dass die Homogenisierungsdauer, die entscheidend für den Erhalt der anspruchsgemäßen Tröpfchengröße ist, im Streitpatent nicht genannt sei. Wie vom Beschwerdegegner jedoch ausgeführt wurde, gehört es zum allgemeinen Fachwissen, dass bei der Homogenisierung einer Öl-in-Wasser-Emulsion die darin enthaltenen Öltröpfchen um so kleiner werden, je länger die Homogenisierung durchgeführt wird. Dies geht implizit auch aus Absatz [0049] des Streitpatents hervor, wo hinsichtlich des oben bereits diskutierten Vergleichsbeispiels offenbart wird, dass bis zu einer Teilchengröße von 1 mm (korrekt: 1 µm) homogenisiert wird, d. h. so lange, bis diese Teilchengröße erreicht wird.

4.2 Somit war der Fachmann ausgehend von der durch das Streitpatent bereitgestellten Information in Verbindung mit seinem allgemeinen Fachwissen in der Lage, die anspruchsgemäße Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase zu erreichen. Daher steht der Einspruchsgrund der mangelnden Offenbarung der Aufrechterhaltung des Streitpatents auf der Grundlage des Hilfsantrags 1 nicht entgegen.

5. Neuheit

5.1 Es wurden von den Beschwerdeführern keine Einwände erhoben und auch die Kammer sieht den Gegenstand des einzigen Anspruchs 1 als neu an.

6. Erfinderische Tätigkeit

6.1 Der einzige von den Beschwerdeführern vorgetragene Angriff beruhte in Analogie zum Hauptantrag auf D7 als dem nächstliegenden Stand der Technik.

Wie der Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrages fordert Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 eine Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase von 100 nm oder weniger. Daher unterscheidet sich auch der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 zumindest durch die anspruchsgemäße Größe der Öltröpfchen von D7.

6.2 Es war zwischen den Parteien strittig, welche Aufgabe durch dieses Unterscheidungsmerkmal gegenüber D7 gelöst wird.

Wie in Punkt 3.1 ausgeführt wurde, bezieht sich Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrages 1 im Gegensatz zum erteilten Anspruch 1 nicht mehr auf die Farbstoffemulsion als solche, sondern auf deren Verwendung in einem Joghurt. Ein Joghurt ist nicht transparent und somit kann der oben hinsichtlich des Hauptantrages diskutierte Effekt einer erhöhten Transparenz im Joghurt bei der Definition der objektiven technischen Aufgabe keine Rolle mehr spielen. Daher wurde die gegenüber D7 zu lösende Aufgabe vom Beschwerdegegner darin gesehen, eine Farbstoffemulsion für einen Joghurt bereitzustellen, die zu einem Joghurt mit erhöhter Leuchtkraft führt. Wie oben hinsichtlich des Hauptantrags ausgeführt wurde, liefert das Ausmischen einer anspruchsgemäßen Emulsion in einer Jogurtbasis tatsächlich einen Joghurt mit einer höheren Leuchtkraft als eine Vergleichsemulsion (Absätze [0057] bis [0059]). Somit ist glaubhaft, dass diese Aufgabe gegenüber D7 auch gelöst wurde. Daher stellt diese Aufgabe die objektive technische Aufgabe dar.

6.3 Es ist zu untersuchen, ob die anspruchsgemäße Lösung dieser Aufgabe im Hinblick auf den zitierten Stand der Technik nahelag. Von den Beschwerdeführern wurde diesbezüglich Seite 2, Zeile 15 bis 19 der D5 zitiert:

"Zur Verbesserung der Farbausbeuten sind verschiedene Verfahren beschrieben worden, die alle das Ziel haben, die Kristallitgröße der Wirkstoffe zu verkleinern und auf einen Teilchengrößenbereich von kleiner 10 µm zu bringen. Neben der Vermahlung von Carotinoiden, gemäß WO 91/06292 bzw. WO 94/19411, zählen dazu beispielsweise die bekannten Emulgier- und Mikronisierverfahren, u.a. beschrieben in DE-A-12 11 911, EP-A-0 410 236 sowie in EP-B-0 065 193."

Gemäß Beschwerdeführern lag es ausgehend von dieser Textstelle der D5 nahe, die Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase in D7 zur Verbesserung der Leuchtkraft zu verkleinern. Der Fachmann wäre daher ausgehend von D7 und dem durch diese Textstelle belegten allgemeinen Fachwissen in naheliegender Weise zum Anspruchsgegenstand gelangt.

Dem kann sich die Kammer nicht anschließen. Die in dieser Textstelle genannte Teilchengröße von kleiner 10 µm bezieht sich auf die Teilchengröße von festen, durch Vermahlen erhaltenen Carotinoidkristalliten, während eine Tröpfchengröße der Ölphase von Öl-in-Wasser-Emulsionen nicht genannt wird. Ferner würde der Fachmann, selbst wenn er die in dieser Textstelle für feste Carotinoidkristallite genannte Teilchengröße auch für die Öltröpfchen der Öl-in-Wasser-Emulsion der D7 anstreben würde, diese Tröpfchengröße lediglich auf 10 µm, d. h. dem Hundertfachen der in Anspruch 1 genannten Obergrenze, einstellen. Wie durch Vergleichsbeispiel 1 des Streitpatentes aber gezeigt, ergibt sich selbst bei einer deutlich geringeren, näher an der anspruchsgemäßen Obergrenze liegenden Tröpfchengröße von 1 µm eine Farbstoffemulsion, die zu einem Joghurt mit geringer Leuchtkraft führt und die somit die objektive technische Aufgabe nicht löst.

Somit wäre der einen Joghurt mit erhöhter Leuchtkraft anstrebende Fachmann ausgehend von D7 unter Berücksichtigung des durch D5 belegten allgemeinen Fachwissens nicht zum Anspruchsgegenstand gelangt.

6.4 Daher ist der Gegenstand des einzigen Anspruchs 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 erfinderisch.

7. Geänderte Beschreibungsseiten

7.1 Während der mündlichen Verhandlung reichte der Beschwerdegegner geänderte, an den Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 angepasste Beschreibungsseiten ein. Gegen die Endfassung wurden von den Beschwerdeführern keine Einwände erhoben und auch die Kammer ist der Ansicht, dass die geänderten Beschreibungsseiten die Erfordernisse des EPÜ erfüllen.

Entscheidungsformel

Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:

1. Die angefochtene Entscheidung wird aufgehoben.

2. Die Angelegenheit wird an die Einspruchsabteilung mit der Anordnung zurückverwiesen, das Patent in geändertem Umfang mit folgender Fassung aufrechtzuerhalten:

- Patentanspruch 1, eingereicht als Hilfsantrag 1 während der mündlichen Verhandlung vom 10. Februar 2017;

- Beschreibung: Seiten 2 bis 6, eingereicht während der mündlichen Verhandlung vom 10. Februar 2017;

- Figuren 1A und 1B wie erteilt.

This decision T 688/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T068813.20170210. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "One Way to..." by Jeffrey obtained via Flickr under CC BY-SA 2.0 license (no changes made).

Non-electronic exercise equipment

The application concerned a training device which receives an electronic training script that defines a workout sequence in which a user is instructed to perform a plurality of activities. The user is prompted for a next activity when a defined quantity of a previous activity is detected.

The application was rejected on the basis of document D1 which is an electronic system to monitor and train an individual on proper motion during physical movement. The Board agrees with the applicant that this is not relevant for the application. Unfortunately for the applicant, the Board knows from its own experience of other trainings systems, and send the case back for further investigation.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

(...)

VI. The wording of independent device claim 1 of the main request reads:

A training device, comprising:

a receiver (215) arranged to electronically receive data;

a sensor (221) arranged to detect at least one physical performance characteristic; and a display unit (219);

the training device being characterized in that it is for receiving and employing an electronic training script, and being further characterized in that:

the received data is an electronic training script defining a workout sequence in which a user is instructed to perform a plurality of activities, the script further defining quantities for the plurality of activities;

the at least one physical performance characteristic detected by the sensor (221) is a characteristic of at least one of the activities in the workout sequence; and

the display unit (219) is arranged to prompt the user to perform a next activity of the plurality of activities in the sequence designated by the electronic training script in response to a measurement of the at least one physical performance characteristic detected by the sensor indicating completion of the defined quantity of a previous activity in the sequence.

(...)

Reasons for the Decision

1. Inventive step starting from document D1 (Article 56 EPC 1973)

1.1 In the appealed decision, the examining division held that the claimed subject-matter did not involve an inventive step in view of the combined teaching of documents D1 and D2.

1.2 Document D1, which was considered as closest prior art in the appealed decision, is directed at solving the problem of preventing incorrect movements with the aim of reducing injuries (column 1, lines 58-63) and training an individual to make proper movements (column 1, line 55), or phrased otherwise, assisting in training an individual in proper posture while executing an identified physical activity (column 2, lines 49-51).

The main application is thus in an industrial setting where workers are required to perform repetitive manual tasks (column 8, lines 22-25). As the examining division correctly observed, document D1 also discloses a further application in sports (column 10, lines 62). Here, data collected by the device of D1 may be used as a tool to aid in the analysis and improvement of the individual's stroke technique in, for example, golf (column 10, lines 65 to column 11, line 6). Hence, the sports application is also directed at making proper movements / having proper posture while executing a specific physical activity.

1.3 The present application, on the other hand, is directed at enabling an athlete to perform a sequence of activities, wherein each activity is performed until an associated quantity is completed, without the athlete having to monitor continuously whether that quantity has been completed (see [56] of the application).

1.4 Document D1 does not mention any sequence of activities. Actually, the only sequence or series that is disclosed in D1 is the series of notice levels which can be uploaded to the device (column 5, lines 59-66).

These notice levels, however, do not correspond to a workout sequence in which a user is instructed to perform a plurality of activities, but rather to a plurality of degrees of (an angle of) a movement / posture associated to one single activity.

1.5 Thus, the claimed device and method are directed to a different purpose than the ones of document D1. The board is also satisfied that this difference is brought out in the technical features of the two independent claims.

In the absence of any specific suggestion in D1 to do so, the board does not see any reason why the skilled person would consider modifying the device and method of D1 such that they would serve the different purpose of guiding an athlete through a predefined sequence of workout activities.

The board thus concludes that the skilled person, starting from D1, would not be motivated to combine D1 with any other prior art document that is directed to that different purpose.

Document D2 is one of those documents. The board thus concurs with the appellant in that the skilled person, starting from D1, would not be motivated to combine D1 and D2.

2. New citation D6

From personal experience, however, the board is aware that Polar Electro Oy in the past marketed the portable training device S710. Document D6 contains archived screen shots from the manufacturer's website from February 2002 and earlier.

It appears from document D6 that the portable training device S710 was sold before the oldest priority date claimed for the present application (30 May 2002).

Furthermore, it appears from D6 that S710 could be programmed by a computer via an infrared or sonic link using "Polar Precision Performance Software".

Training programmes could be downloaded to S710 that were capable of guiding a user through an interval training involving heart rate target zones (with heart rate limit pairs and visible and audible alarms) as well as recovery intervals. Further, S710 could be used to determine distance and speed.

Hence it appears that the portable training device S710 of Polar was directed at the same purpose as the claimed invention, and in addition that most of the features of the independent claims of the present requests were present in that device.

S710 and document D6 relating to it thus seem to be highly relevant for the assessment of novelty and inventive step.

3. In view of this new citation, it appears to be appropriate to remit the case to the department of first instance (Article 111(1) EPC 1973, see also Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, IV.E.7.2.2).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.

This decision T 0648/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T064812.20170425. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by tookapic obtained via Pixabay under CC0 (no changes made).

Using common general knowledge as a secondary document in the problem-solution approach usually requires a bit less argumentation compared to using a normal publication, e.g. it needs hardly to be argued why such content would be consulted. In this decision, the Board seems to take a similar approach for a technical standard (in this case on credit cards).

Catchwords: It is expected from the skilled person that he would exercise his skills in the framework of technical Standards in force in his field of activity. No inventive activity can thus be derived from a feature that simply reflects the content of such a technical prescription (cf. point 3.5).

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The examining division refused European patent application No. 08 165 790.

In its decision, the examining division held that the subject-matter of independent claims 1 and 13 of the main request then pending was not inventive in the sense of Art. 56 EPC 1973 in view of document WO-A-2006/081385 (D1). The examining division further held that independent claims 1 and 13 of the first and second auxiliary requests then pending defined added subject-matter contrary to the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC.

II. The appellant (applicant) filed an appeal against the decision.

With the grounds of appeal, the appellant requested that the decision be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of an enclosed set of claims according to a main request or, alternatively, one of auxiliary requests I to VI.

III. At the appellant's request, a summons to attend oral proceedings was issued.

IV. In a communication pursuant to Art. 15(1) RPBA, the appellant was informed of the provisional opinion of the Board with regard to the appellant's requests.

The appellant was invited to indicate the basis in the original application documents for the amendments made to the independent claims of of all requests. In this regard, it was reminded that support in the description should not only exist for the claimed features as such, but also for the combination of features actually claimed.

With regard to inventive step, document D1 was considered to represent the closest prior art. Moreover, the appellant was asked to provide copies of standards concerning physical features of integrated circuit transaction cards.

V. In reply, the appellant did not make any submissions concerning the issues raised by the Board. The Board was only informed that the applicant's representative would not be attending the oral proceedings.

VI. The Board ordered, of its own motion, a copy of International Standard ISO/IEC 7816-2: 2007(e), second edition of 15 October 2007.

The appellant was informed by fax that the Board intended to refer to said standard insofar as aspects regarding the relative positioning of the microchip and embossing area were concerned. A copy of said document was annexed to the fax.

VII. Oral proceedings took place in the absence of the appellant.

VIII. Claim 1 of the main request reads:

"1. A method of making a transaction card comprising:

cutting a first sheet of metal to create a card body;

milling a first pocket on a second surface of the transaction card;

milling a second pocket on a first surface of the transaction card;

embossing the transaction card within the first pocket to provide embossed characters on the first surface of the transaction card;

disposing an adhesive within the second pocket;

disposing a microchip within the second pocket;

cutting a second sheet of metal to create a back panel; and

bonding the back panel to the first pocket with an adhesive to provide a smooth surface on the second surface of the transaction card".

Claims 2 to 12 of the main request depend on claim 1.

Independent claim 13 of the main request reads:

"A transaction card comprising:

a titanium card body having a first surface and a second surface;

a first pocket disposed in the second surface;

embossed characters punched into the transaction card within the first pocket and providing embossed characters on the first surface;

a back panel disposed in the first pocket and bonded to the second surface;

a second pocket disposed in the first surface;

a microchip disposed in the second pocket."

Claims 14 to 18 of the main request depend on independent claim 13.

IX. Claim 1 according to auxiliary request I differs from claim 1 of the main request in that it incorporates at the end of the claim the additional feature:

"wherein the first pocket to which the back panel is bonded is positioned below the location of a signature panel of the transaction card".

A similar amendment was introduced in independent claim 13 as to the transaction card.

X. Claim 1 according to auxiliary request II differs from claim 1 of the main request in that it recites at the end of claim 1 the additional feature:

"wherein the first pocket to which the back panel is bonded is positioned below the location of a signature panel of the transaction card and the second pocket in which the microchip is disposed is positioned above the location of the signature panel".

A similar amendment was introduced in independent claim 13 as to the transaction card.

XI. Claim 1 according to auxiliary request III differs from claim 1 of the main request in that the feature of "bonding the back panel to the first pocket with an adhesive to provide a smooth surface on the second surface of the transaction card" has been amended to read "bonding the back panel to the first pocket with an adhesive". Moreover, the following additional limitation has been added at the end of the claim: "wherein the method further comprises disposing indicia on the back panel and then pairing the back panel with the card and performing the bonding of the back panel to the first pocket".

Independent claim 13 differs from claim 13 of the main request in that the following wording "wherein indicia are disposed on the back panel" was added at the end of the claim.

XII. Claims 1 and 13 according to auxiliary request IV differ from the corresponding independent claims of the main request in that they combine the amendments made with regard to auxiliary requests II and III.

XIII. Auxiliary request V differs from auxiliary request III in that claims 13 to 18 as to the transaction card have been deleted.

XIV. Auxiliary request VI differs from auxiliary request IV in that claims 13 to 18 as to the transaction card have been deleted.

Reasons for the Decision

1. Applicable law [...]

2. The appeal is admissible.

3. Main request

3.1 D1 reproduces the content of the present application insofar as the embodiments of Figures 1 to 14 are concerned. Concretely, document D1 discloses a transaction card made of metal and a method of manufacturing such a card. In this respect, the Board shares the view of the examining division that D1 illustrates the closest prior art.

3.2 The question arises whether the examining division also rightly considered that the method of claim 1 according to the main request differed from the manufacturing method disclosed in D1 in that it comprised the steps of:

- milling a second pocket on a first surface of the

transaction card;

- disposing an adhesive within the second pocket; and

- disposing a microchip within the second pocket.

3.3 Paragraph [0100] in D1 explicitly refers to the presence of "any other pocket" that may be milled in one or more surfaces of a transaction card. Therefore, contrary to the view of the examining division, the feature of milling a second pocket on the first surface of the transaction card, that is on a surface different from the one receiving the first pocket, as mentioned above, is known from D1. Since, moreover, the part of the description relating to the embossing pocket also refers to a milling process, it follows that D1, as a whole, discloses milling both the embossing pocket and "other pocket" on said first surface.

Since said paragraph explicitly refers to a microchip transaction card, it is considered that the feature of disposing a microchip in an additional pocket is also disclosed in D1.

There is however no indication to be found in this paragraph or in the disclosure as a whole that the second pocket to be milled on the first surface is the one that would receive the microchip. For these reasons, a further selection is to be made between the two configurations identified above in paragraph [0100] which shall actually define the closest prior art.
3.4 The embodiment referring to the incorporation of a microchip as a card feature is considered to define the most promising starting point (closest prior art) when deciding on the inventive merits of the claimed invention since it reproduces the functionalities of the claimed transaction card.

It follows that the subject-matter of claim 13 differs from the card disclosed in D1 only in that the second pocket is disposed on the first surface of the card.

Similarly, the method of making the transaction card of claim 1 differs from the method disclosed in D1, in that the second pocket is milled on the first surface of the transaction card.

3.5 The presence of the second pocket for receiving the microchip on the first surface of the transaction card does not justify the presence of an inventive step since it results from requirements contained in said International Standard ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007(e). Specific reference is made to section 5 ("Location of contacts relative to other technologies") where it is specified that "Embossing (ISO/IEC 7811.1) when present, shall be located on the same side as the contacts". No inventive activity can be recognised with regard to this technical prescription. It is expected from the skilled person that he would exercise his skills in the framework of technical Standards in force in his field of activity. No inventive activity can thus be derived from a feature that simply reflects the content of such a technical prescription.

3.6 Consequently, the subject-matter of claims 1 and 13 of the main request does not involve an inventive step in the sense of Art. 56 EPC 1973.

The main request is thus not allowable.

4. Auxiliary request I

4.1 The appellant's view, according to which the amendment to claim 1 (cf. point IX above) permitted to avoid damage to a microchip during the milling process of the pocket (cf. point 45 in the statement of grounds), is not convincing.

In effect, there appears to be no need in the claimed method to dispose the microchip in the second pocket before milling the first pocket. It is stressed that claim 1 does not define any clear sequence with regard to the various operations being carried out. In this respect, the effect relied upon by the appellant appears not only artificial in that it would not reflect normal practice, but also at odd with the claim's wording which does not include the limitation relied upon by the appellant.

The problem addressed by the invention must thus be reformulated so as to apply to claim 1 in its generality and be technically sensible (cf. decision T 0939/92, OJ 1996, 309).

Applying the approach developed in T 0939/92 and having regard to the teaching of document D1, the technical problem solved by the claimed method would simply consist in selecting a location for said first pocket.

The claimed configuration does not then extend beyond an arbitrary selection of the position for said first pocket for which the presence of an inventive step is denied.

4.2 Consequently, the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request I does not involve an inventive step in the sense of Art. 56 EPC 1973. The same applies to claim 13.

Auxiliary request I is thus not allowable.

5. Auxiliary request II [...]

Order

For these reasons it is decided that: the appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 519/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T051912.20170317. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Credit Card Chip" by Kuhnmi obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

In two recent decisions in opposition appeal, the Board addressed how the skilled person interprets the claims. In interpreting the claims for assessing novelty and inventive step, the Board refers to established case law and emphasizes that "the patent must be construed by a mind willing to understand, not a mind desirous of misunderstanding" and that "the skilled person should try with synthetical propensity, to arrive at an interpretation which is technically sensible and takes into account the whole of the disclosure of a patent".

T 2456/12

Summary of Facts and Submissions

[...]

VIII. The appellant argued essentially as follows:

The invention as set out in independent claims 1 and 19 concerned a temperature-sensing field device comprising a wireless communication module and an energy conversion module. The energy conversion module converted thermal energy into electricity to power the field device. The field device provided a temperature indication based on the amount or quantity of electrical power converted, as set out in the description of the embodiment of figure 5B of the patent.

The opposition division considered the expression "the amount of electrical power" in the characterising part of claim 1 as not being unequivocally related to a measured value, and thus interpreted it as meaning the electricity itself, so that D4 (DE20107112) anticipated all of the features of claim 1.

This expression had however to be interpreted to mean a value, level, or quantity. This interpretation was evident from the claims, description and figures of the patent.

Furthermore, the pre-characterising part of claim 1 made use of the word "electricity" in the phrase "to convert thermal potential energy into electricity to power circuitry", while the characterising part of claim 1 used the words "electrical power" in the phrase "amount of electrical power converted is used to provide a temperature indication". The term "electricity" in the pre-characterizing part was indicative of a phenomenon whereas "electrical power" in the characterizing part indicated a measurable quantity. Both expressions "amount of" and "electrical power" in the characterising part of claim 1 related to a measure or quantification of the electricity, so that the claim had to be interpreted such that "amount of electrical power" referred to an amount or value, rather than the electricity itself.

The interpretation of claim 1 used by the opposition division was not in line with the invention as set out in the embodiment of the invention, as shown in figure 5B.

It was clear from figure 5A that separate energy converter and temperature sensor were present, because of the presence of the two items at the end of the thermowell 54 in figure 5A, each having separate reference numbers, and each having separate lines for connection to the electronics compartment of the field device.

It was however immediately apparent from figure 5B that only one device 72 was present at the end of the thermowell, and this device had only two lines providing signal and power (signal + power in the figure) to the electronics compartment 52 of the field device 70. From paragraphs [0013] and [0025] it was known that the device 70 was a temperature-sensing field device but with no separate temperature sensor. Given that the device 72 generated electricity related to the temperature to which it was exposed, the device 72 had to use some measure or assessment of the amount of electricity generated to provide the temperature indication. This was precisely the invention of claim 1.

The opposition division considered that claim 1 lacked novelty based on figure 1 of D4.

D4 disclosed a field device comprising a wireless communication module, an energy conversion module and a temperature sensor. The energy conversion module converted thermal energy into electrical energy to power a sensor and the wireless communication module.

D4 did not disclose or suggest that the "amount" (or numerical value, quantity) of electrical power converted by the energy conversion module was used to provide a temperature indication related to the thermal source. Using the correct interpretation of claim 1, wherein no sensor was required because the "temperature" related to the thermal source was derived from the value of the electrical power harvested, claim 1 was novel and inventive over D4.

Independent method claim 19 was correspondingly novel and inventive.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. Novelty (Article 54 EPC)

2.1 The opposition division considered the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request to be known from D4.

2.1.1 The first embodiment shown in figure 1 of document D4 is a field device reporting the temperature of a medium 3 flowing in a tube 2. It makes use of a temperature sensor 13 separate from the energy conversion module 14 (see D4, page 3, lines 17 to 19 and 29 to 32, and figure 1). Since the field device of the first embodiment of D4 does not carry out any operation other than reporting the temperature, the division concluded that the amount of energy converted by the conversion module, i.e. the thermo-elements 141, 142, could be seen as being totally provided to and used by the field device 1 to provide a temperature indication related to the thermal source.

2.1.2 Nevertheless, the board understands D4 as disclosing that the field device is provided with an energy storage element 15 constituted by either an accumulator or a high value, low loss capacitor (see D4, page 4, lines 22 to 26). The energy delivered by the thermo-elements 141-142 is first accumulated in the storage element 15 and then delivered to the field device.

The temperature reporting field device does not continuously report the temperature. The temperature is reported periodically. The energy used to power the field device at the instants during which the temperature needs be reported is provided by the storage element 15, which is able to deliver a higher amount of energy than the thermo-couple could deliver in the same given period of time (see D4, page 4, lines 28 to 31).

2.1.3 At point 12. v) of the grounds for decision, the opposition division, discussing the features of claim 1, referred to "the electrical connections in figure 1 (of D4), where the whole amount of converted thermopower from the thermoelements 141 and 142 is harvested" and considered therefore that the feature "the amount of electrical power converted by the energy conversion module is used to provide a temperature indication related to the thermal source" was known from D4.

Referring to D4, the opposition division also expressed the opinion that the amount of electrical power - either part of it or in its entirety - could be used to power the temperature sensor part of the field device and thus be used to provide the temperature indication (see last paragraph of item 12 of the grounds for decision).

2.1.4 The board understands on the other hand that in D4 the converted thermopower is not sufficient to power or supply the temperature sensor part of the field device, only the storage is able to deliver the necessary level of power. The expression of the opposition division "the whole amount of converted thermopower from the thermoelements 141 and 142 is harvested" should have therefore read: the whole amount of converted thermoenergy from the thermoelements 141 and 142 is harvested. Indeed the whole amount of energy delivered by the thermoelements of D4 is harvested to supply the field device of D4, which is the only device connected to the thermoelements 141, 142.

2.1.5 Thus, in order to reach its conclusion concerning lack of novelty, the opposition division interpreted the feature "an amount of electrical power" as meaning or being equivalent to "an amount of energy" or "an amount of electricity" to reuse the expression of the appellant.

2.1.6 However, in accordance with the established case law of the boards of appeal, when interpreting the claims, the person skilled in the art "should however try, with synthetical propensity, i.e. building up rather than tearing down, to arrive at an interpretation of the claim which is technically sensible and takes into account the whole disclosure of the patent. The patent must be construed by a mind willing to understand, not a mind desirous of misunderstanding" (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition 2016, Chapter II.A.6.1, page 287).

2.1.7 Thus, in the view of the board, and for the reasons mentioned by the appellant, a person skilled in the art would have immediately understood from the application as a whole that the expression "the amount of electricity"used in original claim 17 implied that the indicated temperature was a function of the amount of electrical power converted, and not that a part of the electrical power was used to supply a temperature sensor or indicator. The person skilled in the art would also not have interpreted the expression "amount of electricity" as an "amount of energy" since an energy is a power value measured and integrated over a certain time, while a temperature value is an instantaneous value like an electrical power value. The original expression "the amount of electricity" was consequently modified and introduced in granted claims 1 and 19 in the correct form: "the amount of electrical power".

2.1.8 Hence, the board concludes that the only possible interpretation of the contested features of the characterising portions of granted claims 1 and 19, is that a temperature indication is provided on the basis of the amount or quantity of electrical power converted by the energy conversion module 38.

2.1.9 This feature is not known from D4 and therefore the subject-matter of claims 1 and 19 of the main request is novel having regard to D4 (Article 54 EPC).

[...]

T 59/13

Summary of Facts and Submissions

[...]

VII. The respondent argues as follows:

The connection part defined in claim 1 should be interpreted as mainly having a structural function. Therefore the section depicted in figure 1 of E3 with a decreasing chord near the blade's root is not a connection part in the sense of claim 1, and thus the vortex generator is not provided in such a part. These vortex generators are furthermore attached on the suction side, and thus cannot hint to provide aerodynamic features on the pressure side as required in claim 1. None of the documents used to combine with E3, in particular E7, teaches to provide improvements to structural parts of a wind turbine blade. The gurney flaps disclosed therein are always located on aerodynamic profiles, and the skilled person does not learn that such a type of rib would increase the wind yield by providing it on a structural part.

In respect of the auxiliary request II the respondent argues that there was no occasion to file a further request, as the Board's communication did not raise any particular issues beyond those discussed in the previous proceedings. The discussion shed new light on the subject-matter and this was unexpected. The communication of the Board highlighted a different issue. The claim now makes it clearer that the rib is on the tube part of the connection part.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. Subject-matter of the invention, interpretation of claim 1

2.1 The patent seeks to increase the output of a wind turbine blade without prohibitively increasing costs and without decreasing the blade's strength. It does so by the provision of an angled rib on the pressure side of the blade in the connection part of that wind turbine blade, specification paragraphs [0005] and [0006].

In claim 1 as granted the connection part is defined as being provided at one end with connection means, for connection to the shaft/hub of a wind turbine and delimited at the other end by a wind-energy-absorbing profile which is optimized for the wind flow. Furthermore that connection part is provided with a member comprising a rib which is defined to project from the connection part and arranged at an angle from the pressure side as recited in the characterising portion.

2.2 According to established jurisprudence on claim interpretation, the skilled person should try with synthetical propensity, to arrive at an interpretation which is technically sensible and takes into account the whole of the disclosure of a patent (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, 2016, (CLBA) II.A.6.1). In this case the skilled person understands the "other end" of the connection part to be the one where the rotor blade starts to exhibit a substantially pure airfoil profile optimised for wind energy absorption. The particular shape and structure of the connection part is left undefined, and the skilled person knows that this may include various shapes ranging from a pure tubular part with a flange to a fully profiled shaped root. Therefore as interpreted from the claim's wording the connecting part merely represents the transition between the purely aerodynamic profile to an attachment ring or flange.

This otherwise clear interpretation on the basis of the wording of claim 1 or 9 itself is also supported by the description that specifies the term connection part in column 1, lines 50 to column 2, line 3, as meaning "that part of a blade that is optimized for the structure, and not so much optimized for the absorption of wind energy" and "compris[ing] the part beyond the maximum chord, in other words the part with decreasing or invariable chord". From the expression "not so much optimized" the skilled person infers that this connection part still can absorb wind energy to a certain degree. The connection part therefore comprises a transition area with mixed aerodynamic and structural properties.

Contrary to the respondent's opinion a limitation of the connection part to be one with a structural function only is neither inferred from the claim wording itself in the skilled person's understanding thereof, nor is it supported by what he gleans from the rest of the patent, in particular the above cited passage of the description.

2.3 In claims 1 and 9 the rib is defined with respect to that connection part as follows: " the connection part being provided with a member..., which member comprises a rib that projects from the connection part... said rib is arranged in a plane that forms an angle, which on the pressure side lies between 45° and 135° to the chordal plane of said wind-energy-absorbing profile."

Following established case law concerning the meaning of terms (CLBA, II.A.6.2) the fact that the connection part is "provided with" a member which "comprises" a rib does not exclude that this member or rib may also extend to another portion than the connection part of the same blade. This is indeed supported by the figures: Figure 1 shows a rib extending from a tubular portion on a trailing edge of an increasing chord portion; in Figure 3 shows the rib is provided on the tubular portion only, while in Figure 5, the rib extends on the whole length of the turbine blade, including the connection part.

3. Inventive step

3.1 The document E3 concerns a wind turbine blade with aerodynamic improving features in the form of vortex generators seeking to solve a similar technical problem and therefore represents a suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step. Figure 1 of E3 depicts a wind turbine blade with vortex generators 3 and a connection portion. With the above understanding this connection portion includes the portion from the root referenced 12 in figure 4 to the aerodynamic portion in the region of the maximum chord as depicted in figure 1. It therefore includes the two lower vortex generators shown in figure 1 located in the transition portion from maximum chord, which indisputably must have a purely aerodynamic profile, to the lower end, where there will be no or little aerodynamic profile and which is most likely substantially cylindrical.

[...]

3.6 The respondent submits that the vortex generator depicted near the root portion of the rotor blade of E3 with decreasing chord are not provided on a connection part in the sense of claim 1 (or 9). Moreover these vortex generators are not located on the pressure side as defined in claim 1 but instead on the suction side of the blade. E7 teaches only to provide aerodynamic devices such as gurney flaps e on aerodynamic sections of a blade.

In the Board's opinion the connection part defined in claims 1 and 9 is not limited to merely having a structural function, see above. The area of the wind turbine blade with decreasing chord shown in figure 1 of E3, which has mixed aerodynamic and structural properties, is seen to be a connection part in the sense of claim 1. This connection part starts from the free end at the root and extends up to a portion located at or near the largest chord, in other words beyond the section in which the lower vortex generator is provided.

3.7 From the above it follows that the blade of a wind turbine of claim 1 and the corresponding method for producing a blade of claim 9 lack an inventive step in view of E3 in combination with the teaching of E7. Since the main request must fail on this sole ground, the Board does not need to decide on the other arguments put forward in respect of novelty or inventive step raised in respect of claims 1 and 9 of the main request.

[,...]

Decision T 2456/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T245612.20170602 . The file wrapper can be found here.
Decision T 59/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T005913.20170428 . The file wrapper can be found here.
Photo "mystery object 7 - all the frames overlaid on each other" by David DeHetre obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

In this appeal in opposition, the Board considered it to be within the board's discretion not to admit auxiliary requests which define subject-matter "diverging" from subject-matter of higher ranking requests, including those requests which, in essence, were filed during first-instance proceedings and re-filed with the respondent's reply, but were not examined by the first-instance department.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The opponent appealed against the interlocutory decision of the opposition division maintaining European patent No. 1211500 in amended form.

Opposition had been filed against the patent as a whole and based on the grounds of Article 100(a) EPC, together with Articles 54(1) and 56 EPC, Article 100(b) EPC and Article 100(c), together with Article 123(2) EPC.

The opposition division had found that the patent as amended according to a second auxiliary request then on file and the invention to which it related met the requirements of the EPC.

II. Oral proceedings before the board were held on 27 April 2017.

The opponent-appellant requested that the decision of the opposition division be set aside and that the patent be revoked.

The patent proprietor-respondent requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of

- the claims of the Main Request, i.e. claims 1 to 11 according to then Auxiliary Request II as filed in the oral proceedings before the Opposition Division and found to meet the requirements of the EPC, with the description pages including new pages 5, 11, 12 and 14 as filed with a letter of 24 February 2017;

- claims 1 to 11 of Auxiliary Request I,

- claims 1 to 10 of Auxiliary Request II,

- claims 1 to 8 of Auxiliary Request III,

- claims 1 to 8 of Auxiliary Request IV,

all claims of the auxiliary requests as filed with a letter of 19 March 2014.

In response to the patentee filing Auxiliary Requests I to IV, the opponent further requested that none of Auxiliary Requests I to IV be admitted into the proceedings.

III. Independent claim 1 according to the main request reads as follows:

"A rolling bearing apparatus with sensor comprising:

a sensor unit (35) retaining a plurality of types of sensors in a single holder (33), said sensors detecting the status of a rolling bearing,

wherein the plurality of types of sensors are at least two types of sensors of a rotation speed sensor (27a), a temperature sensor (29a) and a vibration sensor (40),

characterized by

the rolling bearing apparatus further comprising one of a surge absorber protecting a sensor circuit of the sensor unit (35) from a surge voltage for eliminating a noise, or a Zener diode protecting a sensor circuit of the sensor unit (35) from a surge voltage for eliminating a noise,

and by the rolling bearing apparatus further comprising a reference voltage generation circuit (52) located within said sensor holder (33) for supplying a reference voltage to at least one of said temperature sensor and said vibration sensor."

Independent claim 1 according to the first auxiliary request differs from claim 1 of the main request in that it comprises the following additional feature:

"wherein a constant voltage regulator, a DC-DC converter, a reference voltage IC, or a constant voltage diode is used as the reference voltage generation circuit (52)".

Independent claim 1 according to the second auxiliary request differs from claim 1 of the main request in that it comprises the following additional feature:

"wherein outputs from at least one of said temperature sensor (29a), and said vibration sensor (40) are in the form of current".

Independent claim 1 according to the third auxiliary request differs from claim 1 of the second auxiliary request in that it comprises the following additional feature:

"the rolling bearing apparatus further comprising:

inner (5) and outer rings (4) rotating relative to each other such that one of said inner (5) and outer rings (4) is a rotating ring and the other is a stationary ring;

a plurality of rolling elements (6) rotatably disposed between a raceway (7) formed on an inner surface of said outer ring (4), and a raceway (8) formed on an outer surface of said inner ring (5); and

an encoder (19) supported on said rotating ring or a portion rotating together with said rotating ring, and rotating together with said rotating ring,

wherein said sensor unit (35) is disposed close to said encoder (19) in such a manner as to oppose said encoder (19), at said stationary ring or a portion supporting said stationary ring,

the rolling bearing apparatus further comprising:

a nut (14) disposed on an end of a shaft so as to position said inner ring in an axial direction of said shaft,

a housing being the portion supporting said stationary ring; and

a cover (22a) attached to said housing,

wherein said encoder (19) is disposed between said inner ring and said nut (14) in the axial direction or on an outer surface of said nut (14), and

wherein said sensor unit (35) is attached to one of said housing and said cover (22a)".

Independent claim 1 according to the fourth auxiliary request differs from claim 1 of the second auxiliary request in that it comprises the following additional feature:

"wherein further each of signal lines extending from said sensors (27a,29a,40) is twisted with a ground line, and said twisted signal lines are shielded individually".

IV. The following documents relied on in the first-instance opposition proceedings will be referred to in the present decision:

D2: WO 98/11356

D6: US 5,158,374

Reasons for the Decision

1. Main request

1.1 The opponent raised objections against claim 1 of the main request under Article 100(c) and (b) EPC. After a debate during oral proceedings, the board decided not to sustain the opponent's objections. The board sees no need to explain its stance on these objections in the present decision. This is because the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request lacks an inventive step, and the detailed reasons for this finding are stated at point 1.31.3 below.

1.2 Construction of the claim wording

1.2.1 During oral proceedings, contrary to its written statement in its letter of 20 March 2017, page 8, second paragraph, the opponent argued that the expression of claim 1 "reference voltage generation circuit" merely meant a "circuit providing any voltage which can be known" without comprising any other special technical properties. The board agrees with the opponent on this interpretation. Indeed, claim 1 does not comprise any technical feature characterizing the "reference voltage generation circuit" other than by the fact that it is located within the sensor holder and by the fact that it supplies a "reference voltage" to a sensor. However, a "reference voltage", in its broadest meaning, has no special technical meaning other than that its value can be known and that it can be used as a general reference. For instance, it is left open by the wording of the claim whether the "reference voltage" is a constant voltage or a non-constant voltage.

The patentee referred to paragraphs [0063] and [0064] of the patent for explaining that the "reference voltage generation circuit" of claim 1 provided a "voltage having an invariable, accurate value" and that "the circuit sends a constant reference voltage to the temperature sensor", "thereby enabling accurate measurement of a temperature" (see page 11 of the patent, lines 18, 32 and 27, respectively). While the board acknowledges that the description discloses concrete attributes of the "reference voltage generation circuit", these limiting features cannot be used to limit the scope of claim 1 with respect to the prior art disclosure because they are not mentioned in the claim (see Case Law of Boards of Appeal, eighth edition, sections II.A.6.3.2. and II.A.6.3.4.).

1.2.2 The term "sensor" in the expression of claim 1 "... for supplying a reference voltage to at least one of said temperature sensor and said vibration sensor" covers, in its broadest meaning, not only the basic sensor component but also any additional electrical components for operating the basic sensor component and for delivering a usable output signal. Indeed, except from its location in the sensor holder and its functionality to sense rotation speed, temperature or vibration, claim 1 does not comprise any other characterizing features of the "sensor".

1.3 Inventive step

The claimed subject-matter lacks an inventive step in view of the disclosure of D2 and D6 (Article 56 EPC 1973).

[...]

2. First auxiliary request

2.1 Admissibility

The opponent objected to the admissibility of the first auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings for the reason that it was filed for the first time during appeal proceedings and comprised features taken from the description which might require a new study of the prior art. For the opponent, the first auxiliary request should have been filed during first instance opposition proceedings.

The board cannot follow this reasoning. The first auxiliary request was filed by the patentee together with its reply to the opponent's appeal, i.e. at the earliest possible point in time of the appeal proceedings. The board sees no reason why the patentee should have filed this request earlier, since claim 1 of the present main request, which has a broader scope than claim 1 of the present first auxiliary request, was found compliant with the requirements of the EPC by the opposition division. In addition, claim 1 of the first auxiliary request represents an unsurprising and reasonable attempt to clarify and restrict the scope of the invention as defined in claim 1 of the main request.

Therefore, the board decides to admit the first auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings.

2.2 Inventive step

The claimed subject-matter, however, lacks an inventive step in view of the disclosure of D2 and D6 (Article 56 EPC 1973).

[...]

3. Second to fourth auxiliary requests

3.1 The second to fourth auxiliary requests were in essence already filed but not examined during first-instance opposition proceedings and re-filed during appeal proceedings by the patentee with the reply to the opponent's statement of grounds of appeal.

Except for the deletion of an alternative feature in claim 1, i.e. an electromagnetic interference filter, the second to fourth auxiliary requests are identical to the respective auxiliary requests already filed during first-instance opposition proceedings. However, the opposition division had to decide neither on the admissibility nor on the patentability of the subject-matter of these three auxiliary requests because it maintained the patent on the basis of a higher ranking request.

3.2 The opponent requested that the second to fourth auxiliary requests not be admitted into the proceedings because they were directed to subject-matter which did not converge with the subject-matter of the main request and first auxiliary request.

3.3 The board decides to sustain the opponent's request for the following reasons:

3.3.1 The main purpose of the opposition appeal proceedings is to give the parties an opportunity to have the decision of the opposition division reviewed. However, if the patentee, as in the present case, desires to have claim requests reviewed different from those underlying the decision of the opposition division, it is settled case law that the board has a discretion to admit or not these new requests into the appeal proceedings based on whether these new requests fulfil certain criteria (e.g. T 840/93, point 3.1; T 1685/07 point 6.4). Pursuant to Article 123(1) EPC, "The European patent may be amended in proceedings before the European Patent Office ...". From this wording it ensues that a board of appeal has discretion to admit or not new requests into opposition appeal proceedings. In other words, there is no absolute right for the patentee to file amendments. How the board should exercise its discretion to admit parties' submissions is defined inter alia in Article 12(4) RPBA.

3.3.2 Article 12(4) RPBA reads as follows: "Without prejudice to the power of the Board to hold inadmissible facts, evidence or requests which could have been presented or were not admitted in the first-instance proceedings, everything presented by the parties under (1) shall be taken into account by the Board if and to the extent it relates to the case under appeal and meets the requirements in (2)".

3.3.3 According to the first part of the sentence of Article 12(4) RPBA, everything filed with the statement of grounds of appeal or the reply is part of the proceedings, except for facts, evidence and requests which could have been presented or were not admitted in the first-instance proceedings. In the present case, despite the fact that the second to fourth auxiliary requests were in essence filed during first-instance proceedings and re-filed with the respondent's reply, the consequence seemingly implied by the first part of the sentence of Article 12(4) RPBA that any requests filed with the statement of grounds of appeal shall be taken into account by the boards, does not apply because these requests were not examined by the opposition division. Otherwise, Article 12(4) RPBA would make it compulsory for the boards of appeal to deal with requests that the opposition division would, in proper exercise of its discretion, not have admitted. Article 12(4) RPBA cannot be construed as restricting the exercise of the discretion under Article 123(1) EPC in such circumstances. No automatic admissibility of auxiliary requests filed during first-instance opposition proceedings and presented under Article 12(1) RPBA can therefore be deduced from Article 12(4) RPBA.

3.3.4 In the context of admittance or not of the present auxiliary requests, the board also notes the pertinent established case law of the boards of appeal. According to this case law the admissibility of amendments depends, among other things, on whether the amended claims converge with or diverge from the subject-matter previously claimed, i.e. whether they develop and increasingly limit the subject-matter of the claims in the same direction and/or in the direction of a single inventive idea, or whether they entail different lines of development because, for instance, they each incorporate different features (see "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal", 8th edition 2016, section IV.E.4.4.4). Indeed, in case T 1685/07, point 6.5, the board concluded that "convergence" or "divergence" was a relevant criterion for the restrictive handling of the admissibility of auxiliary requests.

The present board shares this view and considers that amendments in auxiliary requests should represent a convergent development.

3.3.5 Apart from that, the board notes that the second part of the sentence of Article 12(4) RPBA according to which everything shall be taken into account if and to the extent it relates to the case under appeal, has to be understood in the light of the forementioned "convergence principle" as established in the case law: subject-matter of lower ranking requests which does not converge with the subject-matter of higher ranking requests by comprising features which restrict its scope within the line of development defined by the amendments of the higher ranking requests, i.e. which does not follow the same inventive concept as that of the higher ranking requests, may be considered as not relating to the case under appeal within the meaning of Article 12(4) RPBA and, hence, need not be taken into account in the appeal proceedings.

3.3.6 Present claim 1 of the second to fourth auxiliary requests is considered by the board as diverging from claim 1 of the main request and the first auxiliary request.

Claim 1 of the main request and of the first auxiliary request has been amended with respect to claim 1 of the patent as granted by adding the features of a "reference voltage generation circuit" and of a "constant voltage regulator, a DC-DC converter, a reference voltage IC, or a constant voltage diode used as the reference voltage generation circuit", respectively. In other words, the amendments related to a voltage supply to the sensors.

Claim 1 of the second to fourth auxiliary requests has been amended with respect to claim 1 of the first auxiliary request by deleting the feature which has been added previously to claim 1 of the first auxiliary request and by replacing it by a sensor output in form of current. Claim 1 of the third and fourth auxiliary request have been further amended by adding features relating to mechanical aspects (third auxiliary request) or to twisted signal lines (fourth auxiliary request).

These amendments of claim 1 of the second to fourth auxiliary requests, instead of forming a consistent development of the claimed subject-matter in the direction defined by the consecutive amendments carried out in the higher ranking requests, represent new lines of development diverging from the inventive concept of the main request and the first auxiliary request, i.e. the electrical power supply of the sensors.

3.3.7 Therefore, the board, in exercising its discretion under Article 123(1) EPC, holds the second to fourth auxiliary requests inadmissible for not being convergent with the line of development defined by the main request and the first auxiliary request.

3.4 Counter-arguments by the patentee

The patentee argued that the second to fourth auxiliary requests had been filed in a slightly different form already during the first-instance proceedings, that the filing of the auxiliary requests did not constitute an abuse of procedure and that there was at least a partial convergence with the main request and the first auxiliary request in the sense that claim 1 of all requests defined features for eliminating noise. The patentee also argued that the admissibility of the auxiliary requests should have been decided at the beginning of the oral proceedings which would have allowed the patentee to modify the order of the auxiliary requests.

The board is not convinced by the patentee's counter-arguments for the following reasons:

- As explained above, the board has a discretion not to admit diverging auxiliary requests, including those requests which were filed during first-instance proceedings and re-filed with the respondent's reply but were not examined by the first-instance department.

- The question whether an abuse of procedure occurred in filing the second to fourth auxiliary requests was neither raised by the opponent nor by the board and had no influence on the decision taken by the board in the present case.

- The feature of a Zener diode for eliminating noise was already present in claim 1 as granted. The subsequent amendments of claim 1 of the main request and the first auxiliary request, however, do not contain features related to the elimination of noise (see also point 1.3 above). Therefore, even if it were assumed that the amended features of claim 1 of the second to fourth auxiliary requests, which do not explicitly refer to the elimination of noise, effectively define means for eliminating noise, the aspect of elimination of noise does not represent a consistent development of the amendments of the claims.

- It is the patentee's task and responsibility to present the requests in the order according to which the requests are to be examined by the opposition division and the board.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The patent is revoked.

This decision T 1903/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T190313.20170427. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Divergent" by Bart Everson obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

As we discussed in our blog of 19 December 2016, there has been a long debate about patentability of plants/animals under the EPC.
The final (?) chapter may now be closed: the Administrative Council took a decision to amend the relevant Regulations in order to exclude from patentability plants and animals exclusively obtained by an essentially biological breeding process. This ends the option allowed by the Enlarged Board in G2/12 and G 2/13. The new rule enters in force almost immediately on 1 July 2017.

The full text of the press release of the EPO can be found here and is reproduced below.

On a proposal of the European Patent Office its Administrative Council took a decision to amend the relevant Regulations in order to exclude from patentability plants and animals exclusively obtained by an essentially biological breeding process.

The proposal from the EPO took account of a Notice of the European Commission from November 2016 related to certain articles in the EU Directive on biotechnological inventions (98/44/EC).

This Directive was implemented in the EPO's legal framework in 1999. The Directive excludes essentially biological processes from patentability but does not provide for a clear exclusion for plants or animals obtained from such processes. However, in its Notice the Commission clarified that it was the European legislator's intention to exclude not only processes but also products obtained by such processes.

The EPO's proposal adopted by its Administrative Council today almost unanimously safeguards uniformity in harmonised European patent law. It contains an important precision to patenting practice at the EPO, providing more clarity and legal certainty for users of the European patent system.

The new provisions will apply with immediate effect starting on 1 July 2017. Proceedings in examination and opposition cases concerning plants or animals obtained by an essentially biological process have been stayed since last November following the Commission's Notice. These cases will now be gradually resumed and be examined according to the clarified practice.

Further information

News: "EPO stays proceedings in certain biotechnology cases"(12 December 2016)
Notice of the European Commission (3 November 2016)
EU Biopatent Directive (Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions)
Decisions G 2/12 and G 2/13 of the EPO's Enlarged Board of Appeal (25 March 2015)
Biotechnology patents at the EPO

Photo "Broccoli" by Mike Mozart obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 0578/12: Dispensing restricted products

Many features of the claimed invention were disclosed in an earlier patent application. However, the earlier patent application had no drawings, nor any description of a detailed embodiment of a dispensing machine. To what extent is the earlier application an enabling disclosure?

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal is against the decision of the Examining Division refusing European patent application No. 06 790 328.6 (published as WO 2007/041767) on the ground that claim 1 of the sole request lacked novelty within the meaning of Articles 54(1) and (2) EPC.

II. In its decision, the Examining Division made reference to the following documents:
D1: AU 2004101011 A4
D3: US 6735497 B

III. The applicant (appellant) appealed against this decision and with the statement of grounds of appeal submitted claims of a Main Request, as well of First, Second, Fourth Auxiliary requests and made reference to a Third Auxiliary request for which no claims were filed.

IV. In a communication pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA), which was annexed to the summons to oral proceedings, the Board communicated its preliminary non-binding opinion.

The Board introduced in the proceedings of its own motion the document
D6: US 6529801 B1
which was cited and commented in the description of the present application.

According to the Board's preliminary opinion, the subject matter of all independent claims of all three requests was obvious with respect to the combination of documents D1 and D6. In addition, objections under Articles 84 EPC 1973 and 123(2) EPC were raised.

V. In a letter dated 8 May 2017 the appellant argued against the objections raised by the Board and submitted claims of a Main request and of First to Eleventh Auxiliary requests. The claims of the Main request and those of the First, Second and Fourth Auxiliary requests corresponded to those filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

VI. Oral proceedings were held before the board on 8 June 2017.

The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the claims of the Main request filed with the letter dated 8 May 2017 or, as an auxiliary measure, of one of the First to Eleventh Auxiliary requests filed also with the same letter.

VII. Claim 1 of the Main request reads as follows:

A method of dispensing restricted products from an authorized vendor to an approved purchaser which includes the steps of:
a) providing a dispenser containing an inventory (20) of restricted goods;
b) providing an audio communication link (48, 54) from the dispenser to the authorized vendor;
c) providing means in the dispenser to enable the vendor to verify the purchaser's status as an approved purchaser;
d) providing an inventory system that includes product storage in rows and columns and a product identification system that identifies the location of each product by its row and column;
e) providing a product selection device that verifies that the product selected is correct and holds and carries the product from its storage location to one or more of a printing location, viewing location and issue tray (60) all located within the dispenser;
f) providing visual viewing means for the vendor to view the product (44A) before it is placed in the issue tray (60);
g) providing a payment transaction system (43) in the dispenser to verify payment for the product;
h) maintaining locked the issue tray until the vendor releases the product to the purchaser; and
i) the dispenser including a reject system (62, 63, 65 to 68 and 70) that securely removes the product (44A) to a reject hopper (70) at any time after the product is held by the product selection device but prior to the vendor releasing the product from the issue tray (60).

VIII. Claim 1 of the First Auxiliary request reads as follows:

A method of dispensing restricted products from an authorized vendor to an approved purchaser which includes the steps of:
a) providing a dispenser containing an inventory (20) of restricted goods;
b) providing an audio communication link (48, 54) from the dispenser to the authorized vendor;
c) providing means in the dispenser to enable the vendor to verify the purchaser's status as an approved purchaser;
d) providing an inventory system that includes product storage in rows and columns and providing a product identification system that identifies each product by its row and column location;
e) providing a viewing location and a lockable issue tray (60), and optionally a printing location, all within the dispenser;
f) providing a product selection device that picks a product from its row and column location and then verifies that the product selected is correct, the product selection device then holding and carrying the product optionally to the printing location, and then to the viewing location and to the issue tray (60);
g) providing visual viewing means for the vendor to view the product (44A) when at the viewing location and before it is placed in the issue tray (60);
h) providing a payment transaction system (43) in the dispenser to verify payment for the product;
i) maintaining locked the issue tray until the vendor releases the product to the purchaser; and
j) the dispenser including a reject system (62, 63, 65 to 68 and 70) that securely moves the product (44A) to a reject hopper (70) if the verification of a selected product by the product selection device fails or at any time after the product is held by the product selection device but prior to the vendor releasing the product from the issue tray (60).

IX. Claim 1 of the Second Auxiliary request reads as follows:

[...]

X. Claim 1 of the Third Auxiliary request reads as follows:

A dispenser for dispensing restricted goods by an authorized vendor to an approved purchaser which includes:
a) a cabinet containing an inventory storage system(20), a purchaser transaction module (40), a reject system (62, 63, 65 to 68 and 70) and a control system;
b) said inventory storage system (20) includes product storage (23) in rows and columns;
c) said purchaser transaction module (40) including an audio communication link (48, 54) from the dispenser to the authorized vendor, a payment transaction system (43) in the dispenser to verify payment for the product and an issue tray (60) in the dispenser that is locked until the vendor releases a product (44A) to the purchaser;
d) said reject system being arranged to securely remove product (44A) to a reject hopper at any time after the product is held by the product selection device but prior to the vendor releasing the product from the issue tray (60); and
e) said control system including:
(i) an identification device to enable the vendor to verify the purchaser's status as an approved purchaser;
(ii) a product identification system that stores the location of its product by its row and column;
(iii) a product selection device that enables verification that the product (44A) selected is correct and holds and carries the product from its storage location (23) to one or more of a printing location, viewing location and issue tray (60) all located within the dispenser;
(iv) a reject control to enable the vendor to actuate the reject system; and
(v) a release control to unlock the issue tray.

XI. Claim 1 of the Fourth Auxiliary request reads as follows:

[...]

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. Main Request

2.1 The Main request corresponds to the request that formed the basis of the appealed decision. The Examining Division found that claim 1 of the Main request was not new in view of prior art document D1, an Australian patent application by the appellant.

Regarding feature d) of claim 1, the examining division stated that this feature was implicitly disclosed in D1 because every pharmaceutical to be dispensed had to have a predetermined position so that the desired pharmaceutical could be remotely dispensed, otherwise D1 would not operate. Even if it were not implicitly disclosed in D1, this feature was considered to be known in the state of the art as exemplified by D3.

2.2 The appellant contested the findings of the examining division in the statement of the grounds of appeal. Its main argument was that document D1 had no drawings nor any description of a detailed embodiment of any dispensing machine. Therefore, it could not be regarded as an enabling disclosure but rather as the presentation of a concept of remote dispensing and, as such, it was not suitable as prior art at all.

2.3 The Board notes that claim 1 of the Main request defines a method of dispensing restricted products from an authorised vendor to an approved purchaser. The features of the claimed method are method steps and there is no detailed definition of any technical features of a dispenser in the claim. Any technical features of the dispenser used (provided) in the claimed method are defined by their function(s). D1 describes also a method of dispensing restricted products from an authorised vendor to an approved purchaser which comprises several steps. The use of a dispenser is also part of the method described in D1 and any features of the dispenser used in this method are also defined by their function(s). The fact that D1 does not contain any figures does not hinder the skilled person from understanding the described method or from carrying it out.

2.4 D1 discloses a method for dispensing pharmaceuticals upon production of a prescription by the purchaser (page 6, lines 6-8) providing a dispensing machine containing a stock of prescribed pharmaceuticals (page 6, lines 19-20) - i.e. restricted goods in the sense of claim 1 - with an audio communication link from the dispensing machine to a pharmacist (page 6, lines 30-32) and means for the pharmacist to verify whether the purchaser is to be approved or not (page 7, line 28 - page 8, line 2). The dispensing machine is also provided with means for the pharmacist to view the pharmaceutical package before it is dispensed to the client (page 8, lines 20-22) and a payment transaction system to verify payment for the package by the purchaser (page 8, lines 4-6). D1, hence, discloses features a), b), c), f) and g) of claim 1.

2.5 Regarding the product selection device (feature e) of claim 1), in D1 it is disclosed that in the dispensing machine a stock of pharmaceutical products is stored (page 6, lines 19-20). When the pharmacist/operator gives the instruction for a pharmaceutical to be dispensed, a label is printed and affixed on the product (or information is directly printed on the product - page 8, lines 4-10). The pharmacist then inspects an image of the product to ensure that the details on it are correctly printed (page 8, lines 20-22). This is done using a camera (page 6, line 30 - page 7, line 6). Information printed on the product before it is placed in the machine is read by a bar code reader and is used to verify that the selected product is the correct product and no stocking error has occurred (page 8, lines 24-30). If the verification by the pharmacist is positive and there has not been any stocking error, the product is ready to be dispensed to the user. Otherwise, it is retained in a reject area (page 9, lines 1-3). This series of steps implies that the product is taken out of storage, carried to a printer/label affixing device, through a camera and a bar code reader to a reject area or to a dispensing area. This series of actions must be carried out by a system/device that would select the product, take it out of storage, hold it and carry it to a printing/label affixing area (station), to an area where the pharmacist can view it and verify the correctness of the printed information (viewing station) and to a dispensing area (issue tray). D1 discloses, hence, that the dispensing machine used in the described method comprises a product selection device corresponding to the product selection device of feature e) of claim 1.

2.6 With respect to the collection/issue tray, the only information claim 1 provides is that it is maintained locked until the vendor releases the product to the purchaser (feature h). In D1, it is stated that the product is released to the purchaser only after the pharmacist (i. e. the vendor) operates the dispensing machine accordingly (page 9, lines 10-11). Although there is no specific mention of a collection/issue tray, the dispenser of D1 must comprise a part where the product is placed in order to be released to the purchaser after the vendor provides the corresponding instruction. Feature h) is therefore also disclosed in D1, even if implicitly.

2.7 The dispenser in D1 has an area for rejected packages in which packages are retained when the vendor determines that the label details printed are not correct or if there has been a stocking error (page 9, lines 1-3). In addition, the product(s) is (are) not released to the purchaser unless the vendor actively releases them, i. e. operates the dispensing machine to release them (page 9, lines 5-11). This indicates that the vendor has the choice not to release the package to the purchaser even when the other verification checks are positive. For the implementation of this function, there must be a reject system, i. e. a way for the package to be removed from the issue/collection tray to the area for rejected packages. It would not make sense to leave the package in the issue/collection tray if the vendor decides in the end not to release it to the purchaser.

2.7.1 During the oral proceedings, the appellant contested the Board's conclusion regarding the reject system. According to the appellant, the information provided in D1 indicated merely that the pharmacist had the choice not to dispense the package to the purchaser at the end of the dispensing sequence. This was distinct from the claimed feature where it was clearly defined that the product is removed from the issue tray to the reject bin. There was no information in D1 of what happened to the non-dispensed package. It might well be that it remained in the issue tray and had to be removed manually by the pharmacist (or another person) before the dispenser would be in a state to operate again. Since neither D3 nor D6 contained a similar feature, only with hindsight would it be possible to reach the conclusion that in the dispenser of D1 the non-dispensed product would be removed to the area for reject packages.

2.7.2 The Board is not convinced by this argument of the appellant. D1 describes a method of remote dispensing of packages which contain prescribed or pharmacy only pharmaceuticals (page 6, lines 19-20). This implies that access to such pharmaceuticals must be strictly controlled. Indeed, the verification of whether the purchaser is authorised to receive such packages is part of the described method (page 7, line 28 - page 8, line 2). Furthermore, the concept of remote dispensing implies that the pharmacist/vendor is not located near the dispensing machine. As it is described in lines 27-30 of page 5 and in lines 16-17 of page 6, the system comprises a distributed network of dispensing machines which are in data communication with a control centre that is staffed by qualified pharmacists. Following the appellant's argument, and accepting that the non-dispensed package of pharmaceuticals would remain in the issue tray of the dispenser at the end of an aborted dispensing sequence, this would result either in the dispenser being blocked and out of operation until the pharmacist (or another authorised person) removes manually the package from the issue tray, or in the following purchaser taking the non-dispensed package of the previous transaction with his/her own package(s). The former result goes against the concept of having a remote dispensing machine since every time the dispensing sequence is aborted after the product has arrived at the issue tray it would be out of service until someone goes to the dispensing machine and removes the product manually. The pharmacist (or the authorised person) would thus have to be located near the dispensing machine in order to ensure its normal operation and could not be located remotely. The latter result goes against the notorious legal regulations of allowing controlled pharmaceuticals to be given only by qualified pharmacists to approved purchasers. The inevitable conclusion is, thus, that the non-dispensed package of pharmaceuticals has to be removed from the issue tray by a reject device/system/mechanism to the product reject area, which is already included in the dispensing machine of D1 (page 8, lines 1-3). Feature i) of claim 1 is, therefore, implicitly disclosed in D1.

2.8 Regarding the storage of the products in rows and columns (feature d), there is no disclosure in D1 of any particular way the products are stored in the dispensing machine. Although the Board agrees with the Examining Division that in a dispensing machine which is operated remotely the products must be stored in identified and recorded positions, it is not necessary that such a storage system comprises columns and rows like the one in claim 1. This feature is not disclosed in D1 and, hence, it constitutes the only difference between the claim and D1.

2.9 Starting from D1, the skilled person is faced, thus, with the technical problem of providing a suitable storage system for the remote dispensing machine used in the method described therein.

2.10 Document D6 discloses a storage system for a remote dispensing machine in which the products are stored in columns and rows and the location of each product is identified by its row and column, see for example Fig. 13, column 12, lines 44-57 and column 13, line 44 - column 14, line 38 in D6, as well as lines 21-27 of page 1 of the present application (as published). The skilled person looking for a suitable implementation of the product storage system in the dispensing machine used in the method of D1 would readily integrate the storage system of the dispenser described in D6 to the dispensing machine of D1 in an obvious manner, without exercising any inventive skill.

2.11 The conclusion is that the subject matter of claim 1 of the Main request does not involve any inventive step within the meaning of Article 56 EPC 1973.

3. Auxiliary Requests

3.1 Compared to claim 1 of the Main request, claim 1 of the First Auxiliary request (see paragraph VIII above) has some slight differences in wording, but there is no substantive difference concerning the defined technical features. The conclusion is the same as for the Main request, i.e. that claim 1 of the First Auxiliary request is obvious with respect to the combination of D1 and D6. The appellant did not contest this conclusion during the oral proceedings.

3.2 Regarding claim 1 of the Second Auxiliary request (see paragraph IX above), the appellant pointed to features f) and g) and to the bar code reader in particular. It argued that the claim made clear that the bar code reader was used for reading a bar code on the selected product which was used in the verification that the selected product was the correct product. It was the bar code reader that allowed for the automatic rejection of a product that was identified as not being the correct product. It added that this feature was not present in claim 1 of the Main and First Auxiliary requests and therefore the conclusions of the Board regarding the obviousness of these requests were not valid for the Second Auxiliary request.

3.2.1 The Board notes that there is no mention of an automatic rejection of product(s) in claim 1 of the Second Auxiliary request. Moreover, the dispensing machine of the method in D1 comprises a bar code reader which reads a bar code printed on the package before it is placed into the machine. This is done in order to address potential errors in the time of stocking the machine, e. g. the wrong product being stacked into a dispensing stack within the machine (page 8, lines 24-30). If such a stocking error is identified, the selected product is retained within an area for rejected packages (i.e. reject bin) within the machine (page 9, lines 1-3). Hence, the subject matter of claim 1 of the Second Auxiliary request does not involve an inventive step with respect to the combination of D1 and D6 for the same reasons as for the Main request.

3.3 The appellant argued that claim 1 of the Third Auxiliary request (see paragraph X above) defined an apparatus in detail beyond a mere functional definition and that no such apparatus was disclosed in D1 which described a method for dispensing pharmaceutical packages, but no specific apparatus for carrying out that method. The skilled person would not be in a position to derive such a definition of a dispenser from D1 without hindsight. Claim 1 of the Third Auxiliary request involved therefore, an inventive step.

3.3.1 The Board does not share the appellant's opinion on this matter. The dispenser defined in claim 1 of the Third Auxiliary request comprises features which are defined by their functions. In the context of the method described in D1 there is also a dispensing machine (i. e. a dispenser) which is used to carry out this method. Since the method underlying the present invention is considered to be obvious in view of the combination of D1 with D6, it would also be obvious for the skilled person to build a corresponding dispensing machine with means to carry out the steps that consisted this method.

3.4 The appellant pointed to features a) and b) of claim 1 of the Fourth Auxiliary request (see paragraph XI above) and argued that there was no mention of any network or management server in D1. The management server of the claim, with all the databases it contained, managed the operation of the network of the dispensing terminals. The skilled person starting from D1 would not arrive at the solution of using such a management server without using any inventive skill since there was no relevant disclosure neither in D1 nor in D6.

3.4.1 The Board notes that in page 5, lines 27-30 as well in page 6, lines 16 and 17 of D1 it is stated that the disclosed invention provides a system including a distributed network of dispensing machines which are in data communications with a control centre that is staffed by qualified pharmacists. D1, hence, discloses the use (provision) of a network of dispensing machines (terminals). It is true that there are no details about the implementation of this network in D1. The standard way of implementing such a network, however, would be to use a server to manage the network's operation. For the network to operate, it would also be necessary to provide lists of the dispensing terminals and their locations and the authorised users who would have access to the network. The use of a management server according to feature b) would be a standard - if not necessary - way to implement the distributed network of dispensing machines disclosed in D1.

3.4.2 The appellant contested this conclusion by the Board stating that there were several differences between claim 1 of the Fourth Auxiliary request and the disclosure of D1 - the rejection of the product from the issue tray, the storage system in rows and columns, the management server - and it could not simply be accepted that these were all obvious for the skilled person.

3.4.3 The Board does not agree with the appellant. Even if there were several differences over D1, it is not apparent that there is synergy between the differentiating features and it cannot be said that they are all addressing the same technical problem. Rather, they are addressing different, partial technical problems. Regarding the rejection of the product from the issue tray and the storage system in rows and columns, the questions of whether they were obvious were addressed with regard to the Main request (see paragraphs 2.7-2.10 above). The present problem of how to implement a distributed network of dispensing machines is in no connection with the previously addressed technical problems. It is, therefore, legitimate to address it separately. The skilled person in this case would be a computer programmer, who would find it obvious to provide a management server with all the necessary standard software and databases for managing the distributed network of the dispensing machines. The conclusion is, hence, that the subject matter of claim 1 of the Fourth Auxiliary request does not involve any inventive step within the meaning of Article 56 EPC 1973.

3.5 Regarding claim 1 of the Fifth Auxiliary request (see paragraph XII above) the appellant pointed to feature j) and argued that it was made clearer that the product was removed by the reject system from the issue tray to the reject hopper. He repeated the argument that such a feature was not disclosed in D1.

3.5.1 Similar to the Main request (see paragraphs 2.7-2.7.2), this feature is considered to be implicitly disclosed in D1. The subject matter of claim 1 of the Fifth Auxiliary request is therefore obvious with respect to the combination of D1 with D6 for the same reasons as for the Main request.

3.6 As the appellant explained during the oral proceedings, claim 1 of each of the Sixth to Eleventh Auxiliary requests (see paragraphs XIII-XVIII above) was essentially identical to the respective claim 1 of the Main and each of the First to Fifth Auxiliary requests with minor amendments in the wording addressing the objections under Article 84 EPC 1973 and 123(2) EPC which the Board had raised in its preliminary opinion. The appellant did not present any further arguments regarding inventive step with respect to these requests.

3.6.1 In the absence of any further arguments, the Board concludes that the subject matter of claim 1 of the Sixth to Eleventh Auxiliary requests does not involve any inventive step within the meaning of Article 56 EPC 1973, for the same reasons as were explained in relation to the Main and the First to Fifth Auxiliary requests.

4. Since none of the appellant's requests is allowable, the appeal has to be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 0578/12(pdf) has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T057812.20170608. The file wrapper can be found here.
Photo "Dispensing restricted products" by Romano Beitsma (c) 2017.

In the statement of grounds of appeal against a decision from the Examining Division, the appellant also alleged a series of procedural violations in the first-instance proceedings and requested the reimbursement of the appeal fee. In particular, the appellant submitted that no intention to refuse the application was announced in the official communication preceding the refusal of the application. This argument was further developed by the appellant during the oral proceedings held before the board. The Board agreed with the applicant: "It is a general principle governing relations between the EPO and applicants that communications addressed to applicants must be clear and unambiguous so as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee, and that an applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication. Therefore the board considered that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the examining division's communication created a realistic and reasonable expectation that any subsequent negative finding of the examination division on the issue of novelty and/or inventive step would then be communicated to the appellant before any adverse decision on any of these issues would be taken by the examining division. The appellant could therefore not expect that by closely following the examining division's suggestion [in the preceding communication] in respect of the original claims 1 and 2 a decision refusing the application on the grounds of lack of inventive step of these claims could then be immediately issued."

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appellant (applicant) lodged an appeal against the decision of the examining division refusing European patent application No. 09000629.7 filed as a divisional application of European patent application No. 00100472.0.

II. In its decision the examining division referred inter alia to documents D1, D2, D5 and held with respect to the main and the auxiliary requests then on file that

i) claim 1 of the main request did not involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC) with regard to the disclosure of document D2, and

ii) the description of the auxiliary request did not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(1) EPC.

The examining division also expressed in an obiter dictum of the decision its view that

- claims 1 and 2 of the main request did not involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC) with regard to the disclosure of each of documents D1 and D5,

- the description of the main request did not satisfy the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC, and

- claims 1 and 2 of the auxiliary request did not involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC).

III. With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal the appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and a patent be granted on the basis of the set of claims of the main request or of the first auxiliary request underlying the decision under appeal, or on the basis of one of the sets of claims of two additional auxiliary requests filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

In the statement of grounds of appeal the appellant also alleged a series of procedural violations in the first-instance proceedings and requested the reimbursement of the appeal fee.

IV. In a communication annexed to a summons to oral proceedings the board presented a preliminary assessment of the case on appeal.

V. In reply to the summons to oral proceedings the appellant filed with its letter dated 20 April 2017 an amended description comprising pages 1 to 11, and the following sets of claims:

- claims 1 and 2 labelled "Main Request",
[...]
- claim 1 labelled "Auxiliary request 6".

VI. Oral proceedings were held on 22 June 2017.

The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the set of claims of the main request filed with the letter dated 20 April 2017 or, as an auxiliary measure, on the basis of one of the sets of claims of auxiliary requests 1 to 6 filed with the letter dated 20 April 2017, together with pages 1 to 11 of the description filed with the letter dated 20 April 2017 and drawing sheets 1/4 to 4/4 as originally filed.

The appellant further requested the reimbursement of the appeal fee by reason of procedural violations.

During the discussion on the procedural violations alleged by the appellant, the appellant requested that the case be remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution by reason of the alleged procedural violations.

At the end of the oral proceedings the board announced its decision.

VII. Claim 1 of the main request reads as follows:

"A method of [...]"

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. Article 11 RPBA

2.1 With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal the appellant submitted that the decision under appeal was tainted with a series of procedural violations. In particular, the appellant submitted that no intention to refuse the application was announced in the official communication preceding the refusal of the application, i.e. in the communication dated 7 December 2010. This argument was further developed by the appellant during the oral proceedings held before the board.

2.2 The facts of the first-instance proceedings relevant for the issues under consideration are the following:

a) The application as originally filed contained a set of claims 1 to 8. The subject-matter of claim 1 and dependent claim 2 was the same as the subject-matter of independent claim 23 and dependent claim 24 of the parent application as originally filed.

b) In the European Search Opinion based on the application as originally filed it was held that

- neither the subject-matter of independent claim 3 and dependent claims 6 to 8, nor the description of the application were in conformity with Article 76(1) EPC, and

- the subject-matter of independent claim 1 and dependent claim 2 was not new in view of document D1 and did not involve an inventive step over the disclosure of document D2.

c) With its letter dated 12 August 2009 the appellant submitted a new set of claims 1 to 8 and amended pages 2 and 2a of the description, independent claims 1 and 3 containing amendments with respect to independent claims 1 and 3 as originally filed. The letter included counter-arguments in response to the examining division's objections of lack of novelty and lack of inventive step.

d) In its communication dated 7 December 2010 the examining division reiterated its view that the application documents on file, and in particular the amended independent claim 3 and the amended pages of the description, did not comply with Article 76(1) EPC (point 1 of the communication, paragraphs (i) and (ii), and point 2), and indicated that a way of overcoming the objections under Article 76(1) EPC was seen "in using [...] claims 23 and 24 [of the parent application as originally filed] as the only basis for new claims" (point 1 of the communication, paragraph (iii)). This indication of the examining division was followed by the following statement in paragraph iv) of point 1 of the communication: "The examination of novelty and inventive step is deferred until the Article 76(1) problems are solved. It is further referred to the Novelty and Inventive Step objections raised in the European Search Opinion."

e) In reply to the communication, the appellant submitted with its letter dated 1 June 2011 a set of claims 1 and 2 and an amended description as a main request. Claims 1 and 2 of the main request corresponded, except for minor linguistic amendments, to claims 23 and 24 of the parent application as originally filed. In this letter of reply the appellant stated that the amended documents of the main request "correspond to the hints given by the Examiner under item 1(iii)" of the communication (point 1.1 of the letter) and submitted arguments in support of its view that the amended application documents complied with Articles 76(1) and 123(2) EPC.

f) Subsequently, the examining division issued the decision under appeal. According to the decision the main request was not considered allowable because the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request did not involve an inventive step over the disclosure of document D2 (cf. point II above).

g) Claims 1 and 2 of the present main request are identical to claims 1 and 2 of the main request underlying the decision under appeal.

2.3 It follows from these facts that in the official communication preceding the refusal of the application the examining division focused on the issue of the compliance of the application documents then on file with the requirements of Article 76(1) EPC and explicitly suggested to the appellant a way of overcoming the objections raised under Article 76(1) EPC by reinstating claims 23 and 24 of the parent application as originally filed (corresponding to claims 1 and 2 of the application as filed) as the sole claims, as the appellant subsequently did. The further statement by the examining division that the examination of novelty and inventive step was "deferred" until the objections raised under Article 76(1) EPC were appropriately overcome, while at the same time "referring" to the objections of lack of novelty and inventive step raised in the European search opinion, is ambiguous and, in its specific context, misleading. Indeed, such statement can, on the one hand, be interpreted in the sense that, in view of the objections raised under Article 76(1) EPC, no assessment of novelty and inventive step was carried out at that stage of the proceedings with respect to the claims then on file, and in particular with respect to the amended claims 1 and 2, but that, nonetheless, the objections of novelty and inventive step previously raised with respect to claims 1 and 2 as originally filed were expressly maintained in the event that these claims were reinstated. On the other hand, as submitted by the appellant during the oral proceedings before the board, the same statement can also be interpreted - as the appellant actually did - in the sense that the examining division considered premature to reassess the issues of novelty and inventive step of the claims, so that any consideration of these issues was postponed until a set of claims complying with Article 76(1) EPC was filed, and that the objections previously raised in the European search opinion were only formally "referred" to as the basis for a subsequent re-assessment of novelty and inventive step in view of the claims to be filed and of the arguments submitted by the appellant with its previous letter of reply.

In addition, the ambiguity of the examining division's statement mentioned above had also the effect that the statement "If the deficiencies indicated are not rectified the application may be refused pursuant to Article 97(2) EPC" in the text of form 2001 accompanying the mentioned communication was also ambiguous as to whether the "deficiencies" to be rectified only referred to the objections raised under Article 76(1) EPC, or also included - notwithstanding the examination on novelty and inventive step being "deferred", and in the event that the original claims 1 and 2 were subsequently reinstated in the proceedings - the objections of novelty and inventive step raised in the European Search Opinion.

2.4 It is a general principle governing relations between the EPO and applicants that communications addressed to applicants must be clear and unambiguous so as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee, and that an applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication (see for instance decisions G 2/97 (OJ EPO 1999, 123), points 1, 4.1 and 5.1 of the Reasons, and J 3/87 (OJ EPO 1989, 3), Headnote, points I and II). The mentioned communication of the examining division contained, on the one hand, an explicit and clear suggestion to reinstate claims 1 and 2 as originally filed as the sole claims in order to overcome the objections under Article 76(1) EPC. On the other hand, however, the aforementioned statement made by the examining division (see point 2.2 above, paragraph d)) was ambiguous as to the possible procedural consequences of the reinstatement of original claims 1 and 2.In the board's view this ambiguity objectively misled the appellant to expect that, after reinstatement of claims 1 and 2 as originally filed as the sole claims as expressly suggested by the examining division, the deferred examination of the issues of novelty and inventive step would then be resumed taking into account the arguments previously submitted by the appellant, and that the appellant would then be informed of any subsequent negative finding in this respect.

Therefore, the board considers that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the examining division's communication created a realistic and reasonable expectation that any subsequent negative finding of the examination division on the issue of novelty and/or inventive step would then be communicated to the appellant before any adverse decision on any of these issues would be taken by the examining division. The appellant could therefore not expect that by closely following the examining division's suggestion in respect of the original claims 1 and 2 a decision refusing the application on the grounds of lack of inventive step of these claims could then be immediately issued. For these same reasons, the fact that the appellant saw at this stage of the proceedings no need to request oral proceedings as a precautionary measure was justified in the circumstances of the case.

2.5 In the board's opinion the refusal of the main request then on file for lack of inventive step immediately after resuming the deferred examination of this issue constituted, in the specific circumstances mentioned above, a fundamental deficiency in the first-instance proceedings within the meaning of Article 11 RPBA as it adversely affected the procedural rights of the appellant. According to Article 11 RPBA the board shall remit the case to the department of first instance if such a fundamental deficiency occurred in the first-instance proceedings, unless special reasons present themselves for doing otherwise. The overall length of the proceedings to date (priority date of 12 January 1999) may constitute such a special reason. However, the application is a divisional application, and this explains, at least in part, the length of the proceedings. In addition, this sole circumstance does not constitute in the present case a sufficient special reason for not considering the remittal of the case, especially in view of the procedural deficiency noted above affecting the whole proceedings, and also in view of the new issues raised under Articles 83 and 84 EPC 1973 on a preliminary basis in the board's communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings which might require further consideration by the examining division.

The board concludes that, under these circumstances, the decision under appeal is to be set aside and the case remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution (Article 11 RPBA).

3. Rule 103(1)(a) EPC

The appeal is allowable within the meaning of Rule 103(1)(a) EPC insofar as the decision under appeal is set aside (cf. point 2 above). In addition, the fundamental procedural deficiency considered in point 2 above and justifying the remittal of the case constitutes a substantial procedural violation that justifies the reimbursement of the appeal fee as requested by the appellant.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.

3. The appeal fee is to be reimbursed.

This decision T 2092/13 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T209213.20170622. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "WRONG DIRECTION! TURN AROUND!" by Mats Lindh obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

In this appeal in opposition several issues came up. The patent proprietor filed a very creative (second) auxiliary request which basically amounted to "Opposition division, tell me which claims (of the first auxiliary request) are allowable".The patent proprietor was also unhappy about the short time it took the opposition division to reach a decision while allegedly not all members were present at the same time. (please note that the decision is 33 pages, so the following is a brief summary!).

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Gegen das Europäische Patent mit der Nummer 1 818 505 hat die Einsprechende, Alstom Technology Ltd, 5400 Baden, Schweiz, Einspruch eingelegt.

II. Mit der Zwischenentscheidung vom 20. März 2012 hat die Einspruchsabteilung entschieden, dass das Patent in geänderter Fassung den Erfordernissen des Übereinkommens genügt.

III. Gegen diese Entscheidung richtet sich die Beschwerde der Beschwerdeführerin (Patentinhaberin).

IV. Mit der Beschwerdebegründung verfolgte die Beschwerdeführerin die Aufrechterhaltung des Patents in der erteilten Fassung und reichte als Hilfsanträge mehrere Sätze geänderter Ansprüche ein. Sie beantragte weiter die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr wegen eines von der Einspruchsabteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung begangenen wesentlichen Verfahrensfehlers und legte zur Stützung ihres Vortrags eine Seite einer Mitschrift einer Begleitperson des Vertreters der Patentinhaberin über die mündliche Verhandlung vor. Sie bot die Einvernahme dieser Person und des Vertreters als Zeuge an.

V. In einer Mitteilung zur Vorbereitung einer mündlichen Verhandlung informierte die Beschwerdekammer die Parteien über ihre vorläufige Beurteilung der Sache.

VI. Eine Namens- und Rechtsformänderung der Einsprechenden und Beschwerdegegnerin in "General Electric Technology GmbH" wurde dem Europäischen Patentamt mit Schreiben vom 9. März 2017 mitgeteilt und die Umschreibung im Europäischen Patentregister beantragt. Als Anlage war dem Schreiben ein Handelsregisterauszug beigefügt.

VII. Mit Schreiben datiert auf den 7. April 2017 reichte die Beschwerdeführerin geänderte Anspruchssätze gemäß Hilfsanträgen I und III bis VII ein, wobei Hilfsantrag VII der Fassung des Patents entspricht, die in der Zwischenentscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung für gewährbar befunden wurde.

VIII. Am 9. Mai 2017 fand die mündliche Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer statt.

IX. Die Beschwerdeführerin (Patentinhaberin) beantragte, die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben und das Patent in der erteilten Fassung aufrecht zu erhalten (Hauptantrag), hilfsweise das Patent in geänderter Fassung auf der Grundlage eines der mit Schreiben vom 7. April 2017 eingereichten Hilfsanträge I, III bis VI aufrecht zu erhalten, oder"im Umfang derjenigen als Hilfsantrag I eingereichten Patentansprüche aufrechtzuerhalten, die als gewährbar angesehen werden" (Hilfsantrag II).

Zudem wurde die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr und eine Überprüfung der Berechtigung der Einsprechenden beantragt.

X. Die Beschwerdegegnerin (Einsprechende) beantragte, die Beschwerde zurückzuweisen.

XI. Folgender Stand der Technik ist für die vorliegende Entscheidung relevant:

D3: US-A-5 329 810

XII. Der erteilte Anspruch 1 des Streitpatents hat folgenden Wortlaut:

"Verfahren zum Herstellen einer Beschichtungsprobe zur Untersuchung von Beschichtungsparametern einer auf eine bestimmte Bauteilsorte aufzubringenden Beschichtung mit den Schritten:
- Aufbringen wenigstens eines Materialstreifens (11a bis 11d) auf wenigstens eine bestimmte Oberflächenstelle eines Bauteils (1) der zu beschichtenden Bauteilsorte, welches ein Trägerbauteil bildet, wobei das Material des Materialstreifens (11a bis 11d) derart gewählt ist [sic] dass der Beschichtungsvorgang auf dem Materialstreifen (11a bis 11d) dem des Materials, aus dem das Bauteil (1) hergestellt ist, zumindest im Hinblick auf die zu untersuchenden Beschichtungsparameter entspricht;
- Beschichten des Trägerbauteils (1) mit dem wenigstens einen darauf aufgebrachten Materialstreifen;
- Entfernen des Materialstreifens (11a bis 11d) zur Verwendung als Beschichtungsprobe."

XIII. Hilfsantrag I enthält fünf unabhängige Ansprüche 1, 2, 4, 6 und 7 und zwei abhängige Ansprüche 3 und 5. Die unabhängigen Ansprüche beruhen auf dem erteilten unabhängigen Anspruch, in dem jeweils am Ende eines der folgenden Merkmale einzugefügt wurde:

[...]

XVIII. Die Argumente der Beschwerdeführerin können wie folgt zusammengefasst werden.

Einsprechendenstellung

Die Übertragung der Einsprechendenstellung sei nach G 2/04 nur im Falle einer Gesamtrechtsnachfolge der Einsprechenden oder bei Übertragung eines einschlägigen Teils des Geschäftsbetriebs der Einsprechenden möglich. Aus dem vorgelegten Handelsregisterauszug sei eine solche Übertragung nicht mit der gebotenen Sicherheit nachvollziehbar. Offenbar seien nämlich Teile des Unternehmens abgespalten worden und es sei eine Fusion, eine Umwandlung sowie eine Vermögensübertragung im Zusammenhang mit weiteren Unternehmen erfolgt.

Hauptantrag

Der Gegenstand von Anspruch 1 sei neu gegenüber D3, da das Material der Teststreifen in D3 hinsichtlich der Parameter des Beschichtungsprozesses festgelegt sei und nicht, wie in Anspruch 1 als Verfahrensschritt definiert, im Hinblick auf den zu untersuchenden Parameter der Beschichtung in Abhängigkeit vom Material des Bauteils ausgewählt. Darüber hinaus impliziere der Ausdruck "Aufbringen ... auf" in Anspruch 1 einen direkten Kontakt zwischen Materialstreifen und Oberfläche, was in dem Verfahren nach D3 ebenfalls nicht ausgeführt werde.

[...]

Hilfsantrag II

Der Antrag sei als bedingter Antrag zulässig, da er nur an Bedingungen geknüpft sei, die im Verfahren bestimmbar seien. Die Zulässigkeit eines solchen Antrags entspreche allgemeinen Grundsätzen des Verfahrensrechts der Mitgliedstaaten. Der Antrag sei auch verfahrensökonomisch, da andernfalls die Ansprüche in einer Vielzahl von Permutationen in einzelnen Anträgen hätten formuliert werden müssen.

Hilfsantrag III

[...]

Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr

Die Einspruchsabteilung habe in der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht ordentlich über die Gewährbarkeit des Hauptantrags beraten. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt der Beratungspause im Anschluss an die Diskussion über den Gegenstand von Anspruch 1 seien alle drei Mitglieder der Abteilung zur Beratung gemeinsam anwesend gewesen. Eine diesbezüglich bereits in der mündlichen Verhandlung erhobene Rüge sei in der Niederschrift unvollständig erwähnt.

XIX. Die Beschwerdegegnerin trat dem Vorbringen der Beschwerdeführerin mit folgenden Argumenten entgegen:

[...]

Entscheidungsgründe

Einsprechendenstellung

1. Mit Schreiben vom 9. März 2017 hat die Beschwerdegegnerin dem Europäischen Patentamt eine Änderung des Namens und der Gesellschaftsform der Einsprechenden, vormals "Alstom Technology Ltd" in "General Electric Technology GmbH" angezeigt und die Umschreibung im Register beantragt.

Mit dem gleichzeitig vorgelegten Handelsregisterauszug wurde eine Rechtsformänderung nachgewiesen, die als solche keinen Wechsel des zugrundeliegenden Rechtssubjekts mit sich bringt. Da die Person der Einsprechenden somit gleich geblieben ist und kein anderes Rechtssubjekt die Stellung als Einsprechende beansprucht, bestehen für die Kammer keine Anhaltspunkte, die Berechtigung der Einsprechenden, die nunmehr lediglich in einer geänderten Rechtsform auftritt, in Frage zu stellen.

Dass daneben auch eine Abspaltung stattfand ist nicht relevant, da keine Anhaltspunkte bestehen, dass mit der Abspaltung auch eine Übertragung des konkreten Einspruchs vereinbart wurde. Zudem ist zu berücksichtigen, dass das abgespaltene Unternehmen nicht die Stellung als Einsprechende für sich beansprucht, sodass sich im Hinblick auf die von der Beschwerdeführerin genannte Entscheidung G 4/88 auch nicht die Frage stellt, ob jener Unternehmensbereich, auf den sich der Einspruch bezieht, auf das abgespaltene Unternehmen übertragen wurde.
Es bestehen im vorliegenden Verfahren daher keine Anhaltspunkte, die dem Parteiwillen, nämlich den Einspruch fortzusetzen, entgegenstehen.
Der Vollständigkeit halber ist im Hinblick auf die von der Beschwerdeführerin zudem erwähnte Unternehmensverschmelzung (Fusion) zu bemerken, dass hierzu weder ein substantiierter Vortrag besteht noch für die Kammer ein Grund ersichtlich ist, weshalb dieser Umstand zu einem Wechsel des Rechtssubjekts der Einsprechenden hätte führen können.
Es bestehen daher keine Gründe, die Einsprechendenstellung der "General Electric Technology GmbH" und damit ihre Stellung als Beteiligte im vorliegenden Beschwerdeverfahren in Zweifel zu ziehen (Artikel 107 EPÜ 1973).

Hauptantrag

2. Der Hauptantrag der Beschwerdeführerin ist unbegründet, da der Gegenstand des erteilten Anspruchs 1 nicht neu gegenüber D3 ist (Artikel 54 (1) und (2) EPÜ 1973).

[...]

2.3 Die Kammer findet also, dass alle Merkmale des erteilten Anspruchs 1 aus D3 bekannt sind, so dass sein Gegenstand nicht neu im Sinne von Artikel 54 (1) und (2) EPÜ 1973 ist. Das Patent kann folglich in dieser Fassung nicht aufrechterhalten werden.

Hilfsantrag 1

[...]

4. Die Kammer kommt folglich zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Gegenstand von Anspruch 2 nicht neu im Sinne von Artikel 54 (1) und (2) EPÜ 1973 ist. Zumindest für einen der fünf unabhängigen Ansprüche dieses Hilfsantrags sind die Erfordernisse des EPÜ nicht erfüllt, so dass das Patent mit diesem Anspruchssatz nicht aufrechterhalten werden kann.

Hilfsantrag II

5. Die Beschwerdeführerin beantragt mit diesem Hilfsantrag "das Patent im Umfang derjenigen als Hilfsantrag I eingereichten Patentansprüche aufrechtzuerhalten, die als gewährbar angesehen werden".

5.1 Die Kammer hatte in ihrer Mitteilung zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung dargelegt, dass dieser Antrag unbestimmt sei und damit als unzulässig zurückzuweisen wäre. Zu dieser vorläufigen Meinung kam die Kammer aus folgendem Grund.

5.1.1 Nach Artikel 113 (2) EPÜ 1973 ist die Beschwerdekammer nämlich bei der Prüfung des Patents und bei Entscheidungen darüber an die vom Patentinhaber vorgelegte Fassung (des Patents) gebunden. Nach Artikel 101 (3) EPÜ ist auf Grundlage der vom Patentinhaber vorgeschlagenen Änderungen zu prüfen und zu entscheiden, ob das Patent in geänderter Fassung die Erfordernisse des Übereinkommens erfüllt oder nicht.

5.1.2 Schlägt der Patentinhaber wie hier mit dem höherrangigen Hilfsantrag I eine Änderung vor, beantragt damit also die Aufrechterhaltung des Patents in dieser Fassung, und ist dabei irgendein Erfordernis des EPÜ für irgendeinen Anspruch des Anspruchssatzes nicht erfüllt, gibt es keine Grundlage im EPÜ, eine weitere Prüfung der Patentierbarkeit der anderen Ansprüche dieses Anspruchssatzes durchzuführen, da das Patent in der Fassung dieses Antrags sowieso nicht aufrechterhalten werden kann.

In Ermangelung einer rechtlichen Grundlage für eine weitergehende Prüfung kann die nach Hilfsantrag II formulierte Bedingung (d.h. dass die Kammer die gewährbaren Ansprüche des Hilfsantrags I nach einer entsprechenden Prüfung ermittelt hat) zur Bestimmung seines Gegenstands, d.h. eines konkreten Anspruchsatzes, auf dessen Grundlage das Patent aufrecht erhalten werden kann, nicht eintreten. Das Argument der Beschwerdeführerin, dass eine Bedingung, die von innerprozessualen Umständen abhängt, zulässig sei, greift somit jedenfalls im vorliegenden Fall nicht, da die Kammer im Rahmen ihrer Prüfung weder zu einem gewährbaren Anspruch gelangte noch eine rechtliche Verpflichtung besteht, die Prüfung einzelner Ansprüche des Anspruchssatzes des ersten Hilfsantrags so lange fortzusetzen, bis sich ein gewährbarer Anspruch findet, der dann als Grundlage für einen konkreten - jedoch noch auszuformulierenden - Anspruchssatz eines Hilfsantrags II von der Beschwerdeführerin verwendet werden könnte.

5.1.3 Die Behauptung der Beschwerdeführerin, dass ein in den Mitgliedstaaten allgemein anerkannter Rechtsgrundsatz bestehe, wonach eine Bedingung, die von innerprozessualen Umständen abhängt, zulässig sei, war mangels Entscheidungsrelevanz daher nicht weiter zu untersuchen.

5.2 Die Beschwerdeführerin hat zudem argumentiert, dass - sofern ein entsprechender Antrag nicht als zulässig erachtet würde - dies nachteilige Konsequenzen für eine ökonomische Verfahrensführung hätte, da dann eine große Anzahl von Hilfsanträgen mit permutierten Anspruchssätzen einzureichen wären. Dieses Argument ist allerdings für die Bestimmung des konkreten Gegenstands von Hilfsantrag II irrelevant und somit für die Frage der Zulässigkeit desselben nicht entscheidungswesentlich. Dennoch möchte die Kammer hierzu bemerken, dass die Frage der Zulässigkeit dieser "großen Anzahl von Hilfsanträgen" dann jedoch insbesondere unter den Gesichtspunkten der Verfahrensökonomie und der Konvergenz zu prüfen wäre.

5.3 Auch die in T 937/00 getroffene Aussage, wonach die Einspruchsabteilung zum Zwecke eines ökonomischen Verfahrens bei Vorliegen von mehreren unabhängigen Ansprüchen so viele wie vernünftig möglich behandeln sollte, kann hier zu keiner anderen Beurteilung führen. Im Gegensatz zum Einspruchsverfahren schließt sich an das Beschwerdeverfahren kein anderes Verfahren an, bei dem eine sachliche Überprüfung der durch die Beschwerdekammer jeweils getroffenen Entscheidung hinsichtlich der Erfüllung der Erfordernisse des EPÜ einzelner unabhängiger Ansprüche vorgesehen wäre. Demnach kann das von der Kammer in T 937/00 angenommene Szenario, wonach es bei einer großen Anzahl von unabhängigen Ansprüchen zu einem unendlichen Hin und Her der Sache zwischen Einspruchsabteilung und Beschwerdekammer kommen könnte, wenn die Abteilung ihre Entscheidung jeweils nur hinsichtlich eines einzigen unabhängigen Anspruchs begründet, hier gar nicht eintreten.

5.4 Die Kammer hatte daher keine Veranlassung, von ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung abzuweichen. Der Hilfsantrag II wurde daher nicht ins Verfahren zugelassen.

Hilfsantrag III

[...]

6.6 Die Kammer findet daher keinen Grund, ihre vorläufige Meinung zu ändern und bestätigt diese hiermit. Der Gegenstand des unabhängigen Anspruchs 5 beruht nicht auf erfinderischer Tätigkeit, Artikel 56 EPÜ 1973.

Hilfsantrag IV

7.Dieser Hilfsantrag wurde in Reaktion auf die Mitteilung der Kammer eingereicht und stellt nach Artikel 13 (1) der Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern (VOBK) eine Änderung des Vorbringens der Beschwerdeführerin dar.

Die Zulassung des Antrags in das Verfahren liegt demnach im Ermessen der Kammer. Bei der Ausübung ihres Ermessens berücksichtigt die Kammer neben dem Verfahrensstand und der Komplexität des neuen Vorbringens auch die gebotene Verfahrensökonomie.

7.1 Der Gegenstand der unabhängigen Ansprüche 1 und 4 entspricht dem der Ansprüche 3 und 4 aus Hilfsantrag I bzw. 2 und 3 aus Hilfsantrag III.

7.2 Allerdings enthält der jetzt vorliegende Anspruchsatz in den abhängigen Ansprüchen Gegenstände, d.h. Merkmalskombinationen, die mit den Hilfsanträgen I und III nicht weiter verfolgt wurden. Zum Beispiel ist der vorliegende abhängige Anspruch 2 auf eine Kombination des erteilten Verfahrensanspruchs mit den Merkmalen "lösbar", "Punktschweißen" und "Basismaterial" gerichtet, die in Hilfsantrag I nicht vorhanden war. Ebenso lag für den durch das Fixieren mittels "Punktschweißverfahrens" eingeschränkten unabhängigen Anspruch 2 aus Hilfsantrag III nur ein weiterer abhängiger Anspruch vor, der das "Reinigung"-Merkmal definierte, wohingegen jetzt Ansprüche 2 ("Basismaterial") und 3 ("Legierung") von dem entsprechenden Anspruch 1 abhängig sind.

7.3 Diese Änderungen stellen keine angemessene und notwendige Reaktion auf die in der Kammermitteilung mitgeteilte vorläufige Meinung dar.

Die Kammer hatte sich in ihrer Mitteilung kritisch zur Neuheit des erteilten Anspruchs 1 und des unabhängigen Anspruchs 2 des mit der Beschwerdebegründung eingereichten Hilfsantrags I, sowie kritisch zu den Erfordernissen der Artikel 123 (2) und 56 EPÜ hinsichtlich der unabhängigen Ansprüche der Hilfsanträge III und IV geäußert.

Die Einführung weiterer abhängiger Ansprüche kann die erwähnten Einwände nicht beheben. Auch die Tatsache, dass die abhängigen Ansprüche im erteilten Anspruchssatz vorhanden waren, stellt keinen Grund dar, die zwischenzeitlich mit Hilfsantrag I (der Beschwerdebegründung wie auch in der Form vom 7. April 2017) nicht weiter verfolgten abhängigen Ansprüche jetzt wieder einzuführen. Ein solches Verfahren steht einem ökonomisch geführten Verfahren entgegen, da prinzipiell der resultierende Gegenstand jedes abhängigen Anspruchs auch auf die Erfüllung der Erfordernisse des EPÜ, z. B. des Artikels 123 (2) EPÜ, zu prüfen wäre. Es kann nicht im Voraus ausgeschlossen werden, dass trotz des Bezugs auf die erteilten Ansprüche ein Gegenstand resultiert, der in den erteilten Ansprüchen (bzw. den ursprünglich eingereichten Anmeldungsunterlagen) nicht offenbart war.

7.4 Die Kammer hat daher ihr Ermessen nach Artikel 13 (1) VOBK dahingehend ausgeübt, den Hilfsantrag IV nicht in das Verfahren zuzulassen.

Hilfsantrag V

8. Dieser Hilfsantrag wurde ebenfalls nach Erlass der Mitteilung der Kammer vorgelegt und stellt daher ebenso eine Änderung dar, deren Zulassung in das Verfahren nach Artikel 13 (1) VOBK im Ermessen der Kammer liegt.

Im Hinblick auf die gemäß Artikel 13 (1) VOBK gebotene Verfahrensökonomie ist es für die Zulassung geänderter Ansprüche in das Verfahren erforderlich, dass diese wenigstens prima facie gewährbar sind, dass nämlich sofort erkennbar sein muss, dass die bestehenden Einwände eindeutig behoben werden ohne weitere hervorzurufen.

8.1 Mit Bezugnahme auf die Absätze 2, 23, 24, 33 bis 35, 39 und 42 bis 50 der dem Streitpatent zugrunde liegenden veröffentlichten Anmeldungsschrift hat die Beschwerdeführerin im erteilten Anspruch 1 das Bauteil weiter spezifiziert, nämlich dass es sich um ein thermisch hoch belastetes Gasturbinenbauteil handelt, und die Art der Beschichtung eingeschränkt.

8.2 Obwohl die eingefügten Merkmale in der Tat in Absatz 2 offenbart sind, beschäftigt sich dieser Absatz nur mit der Beschreibung der aus dem Stand der Technik bekannten beschichteten Bauteile und Folgen fehlerhafter Beschichtungen, wie auch die Beschwerdegegnerin vorgetragen hat, und nennt als Beispiel "Turbinenschaufeln". Die anderen von der Beschwerdeführerin zitierten Passagen, insbesondere die Absätze 23, 24, 33-35 und 42 bis 50 beziehen sich auf die spezifische Anwendung des Verfahrens bei Schaufeln; Absatz 39 erwähnt Hitzeschildelemente, die "ähnlich" wie Turbinenschaufeln beschichtet sein können, ohne sich aber auf das beanspruchte Verfahren, bzw. die jetzt in Anspruch 1 definierte Beschichtung zu beziehen.

8.3 Eine Offenbarung für ein Verfahren zur Herstellung einer Beschichtungsprobe an beliebigen thermisch hoch belasteten Gasturbinenbauteilen mit den Beschichtungen nach Anspruch 1, ist daher in den genannten Passagen, einzeln oder zusammen betrachtet, nicht eindeutig und unmittelbar gegeben. Damit scheint prima facie zumindest das Erfordernis des Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ nicht erfüllt zu sein.

8.4 Die Kammer hat daher ihr Ermessen nach Artikel 13 (1) VOBK dahingehend ausgeübt, den Hilfsantrag V nicht in das Verfahren zuzulassen.

Hilfsantrag VI

[...]

Folglich ist der Antrag, das Patent mit den Ansprüchen nach Hilfsantrag VI aufrechtzuerhalten, wegen fehlender erfinderischen Tätigkeit des Gegenstandes des Anspruchs 1 ebenfalls nicht gewährbar.

10. Da keiner der Anträge der Beschwerdeführerin Erfolg hat, ist die Beschwerde zurückzuweisen.

Antrag auf Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr

11. Nach Regel 103 (1) a) EPÜ wird die Beschwerdegebühr in voller Höhe zurückgezahlt, wenn der Beschwerde stattgegeben wird und die Rückzahlung wegen eines wesentlichen Verfahrensmangels der Billigkeit entspricht.

12. Da der Beschwerde aus oben dargelegten Gründen nicht stattgegeben wird, war der Antrag auf Rückzahlung allein aus diesem Grund zurückzuweisen.

13. Darüber hinaus kam eine Zurückverweisung der Angelegenheit nach Artikel 11 VOBK nicht zur Anwendung, da kein Verfahrensfehler vorliegt, wie im folgenden ausgeführt.

13.1 Nach dem Vortrag der Beschwerdeführerin besteht der schwerwiegende Verfahrensfehler offenbar darin, dass keine ordnungsgemäße Beratung der Einspruchsabteilung stattgefunden habe, bei der alle Mitglieder gleichzeitig anwesend gewesen wären.

13.2 In ihrer Mitteilung zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung hatte die Kammer bereits ausgeführt, dass sie in den behaupteten Umständen keinen wesentlichen Verfahrensfehler erkennt.
Es ist nämlich im EPÜ insbesondere nicht vorgeschrieben, wie lange eine Einspruchsabteilung beraten muss, um zu einer Entscheidung zu gelangen, was von der Beschwerdeführerin in ihrem Antwortschreiben und in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer auch nicht weiter bestritten wurde.

Demnach ist z.B. denkbar, dass sich die Mitglieder der Einspruchsabteilung nach einer der mündlichen Verhandlung vorausgegangenen Vorbesprechung durch den Vortrag der Parteien in der mündlichen Verhandlung in ihrer vorläufigen Auffassung bestätigt sahen. Eine Verständigung hierüber könnte zum Beispiel mittels Augenkontakt/Kopfnicken am Ende der Erörterung mit den Parteien erfolgen.

Sowohl die Dauer als auch die Form der Beratung zwischen den Mitgliedern einer Einspruchsabteilung hängt vom Umfang und von der Komplexität der im konkreten Fall zu beratenden Themen ab. Hierbei spielt auch der Grad der Vereinbarkeit möglicherweise divergierender Auffassungen der Mitglieder der Abteilung eine wesentliche Rolle.

13.3 Die Beschwerdeführerin begründet die Notwendigkeit oder Pflicht einer ausführlichen Beratung der Einspruchsabteilung auf Grundlage der Richtlinien für die Prüfung E-II, 8.11 und des Artikels 19 (1) VOBK.

13.3.1 Letzterer findet Anwendung in den Verfahren vor der Beschwerdekammer und hat daher keine Wirkung auf das Verwaltungsverfahren vor der Einspruchsabteilung. Darüber hinaus regelt er hinsichtlich der Beratungen auch nichts, was die Argumentation der Beschwerdeführerin stützen könnte. Im Gegenteil, nach Satz 1 dieser Bestimmung sind Beratungen dann erforderlich, wenn sich nicht alle Mitglieder einig sind. Damit besteht vor der Beschwerdekammer grundsätzlich die Möglichkeit eine Entscheidung zu treffen, nachdem sich die Mitglieder der Kammer lediglich kurz darüber vergewissert haben, einer Meinung zu sein.

13.3.2 Auch unter Berücksichtigung des zitierten Abschnitts der Richtlinien, E-II, 8.11, kann die Kammer nicht erkennen, dass die Form oder Länge der Beratung einer Einspruchsabteilung in einer mündlichen Verhandlung festgeschrieben wäre. Dieser Abschnitt betrifft die Schließung der mündlichen Verhandlung. Obwohl sich darin kein entsprechender Hinweis findet, kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass die zu diesem Zeitpunkt des Verfahrens - nämlich nach Abschluss der Erörterungen mit den Parteien - "gegebenenfalls" durchzuführende Beratung, die also offenbar auch zu diesem Zeitpunkt der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht zwingend vorgeschrieben ist (was der Ausdruck "gegebenenfalls" nahelegt), auch für Zwischenergebnisse im Laufe der Verhandlung Anwendung findet und in der Regel auch so praktiziert wird. Verpflichtend einzuhaltende Vorschriften für Beratungen der Abteilungen ergeben sich daraus nach Auffassung der Kammer aber nicht.

13.4 Aber auch die behaupteten Umstände selbst lassen keinen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensfehler erkennen.

13.4.1 Grundlage für die Beurteilung der Kammer, ob im Hinblick auf die von der Beschwerdeführerin behaupteten Umstände ein Verfahrensfehler vorliegt, bildet die von der Einspruchsabteilung angefertigte Niederschrift über die mündliche Verhandlung. Da die Beschwerdeführerin vor der Einspruchsabteilung keine Protokollberichtigung beantragt hat, geht die Kammer davon aus, dass die Niederschrift den tatsächlichen Ablauf der Verhandlung wiedergibt. Da die Mitglieder der Kammer an der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung selbst nicht teilgenommen haben, kann die Kammer sowieso weder über die Richtigkeit der Niederschrift entscheiden, noch kann sie feststellen, ob wesentliche Erklärungen der Parteien in der Niederschrift fehlen.

Auch über eine Ergänzung der Niederschrift durch Aufnahme angeblich fehlender Parteienerklärungen kann die Beschwerdekammer daher nicht entscheiden.

Die Behauptung der Beschwerdeführerin, dass die auf Seite 2 unter Punkt 3 des erstinstanzlichen Protokolls der mündlichen Verhandlung erwähnte Rüge der Einsprechenden unvollständig wiedergegeben worden sei, ist im Hinblick auf das Fehlen eines Antrags auf Protokollberichtigung vor der Einspruchsabteilung daher unbeachtlich. Es wurde zudem nicht vorgetragen, welche konkreten Elemente der Rüge im Protokoll nicht wiedergegeben wurden. Die Beschwerdekammer versteht den Vortrag der Einsprechenden im Beschwerdeverfahren in der Weise, dass der behauptete Umstand, dass die Mitglieder der Einspruchsabteilung während der Unterbrechung der Verhandlung zur Beratung nicht ständig alle gleichzeitig im Verhandlungssaal anwesend gewesen seien, als im Protokoll fehlend erachtet wird. Demnach wird die für eine angemessene Beratung zu geringe Dauer der gleichzeitigen Anwesenheit der Mitglieder der Einspruchsabteilung gerügt. Im Übrigen ist hierzu zu bemerken, dass eine Unterbrechung der Verhandlung für eine Beratung sowie die anschließende Fortsetzung der Verhandlung, im Sinne der für die Parteien erkennbaren Beendigung der Beratungspause, ohne eine Mindestdauer der Anwesenheit aller Mitglieder der Abteilung in der Praxis kaum vorstellbar ist und diesbezüglich jedenfalls ein detaillierter Tatsachenvortrag erforderlich gewesen wäre.

13.4.2 Gemäß Punkt 3 der Niederschrift wurde die Verhandlung von 10:05 bis 10:15 zur Beratung unterbrochen. Danach verkündete der Vorsitzende die Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung hinsichtlich der Neuheit von Anspruch 1. Im nächsten Absatz wird eine Rüge der Patentinhaberin wiedergegeben: "Der Patentinhaber unterstellte, daß man an der von der Einspruchsabteilung benötigten kurzen Pause erkennen könne, daß die Einspruchsabteilung bezüglich der mangelnden Neuheit des Hauptantrags eine vorgefaßte Meinung gehabt habe."

Daraus ergibt sich, dass offensichtlich eine Beratung der Einspruchsabteilung stattgefunden haben muss, da sich die Rüge auf die Dauer der Pause und nicht auf das komplette Fehlen einer Beratung bezieht.

Auch der weitere Vortrag der Beschwerdeführerin hinsichtlich der Abwesenheiten der Mitglieder während der Unterbrechung der mündlichen Verhandlung lässt keinen anderen Schluss zu, da selbst dadurch nicht ausgeschlossen wird, dass sich die Mitglieder anderweitig verständigt haben (siehe oben Punkt 13.2). Die Kammer erachtete aus diesem Grund die Einvernahme der angebotenen Zeugen als nicht erforderlich.

13.4.3 Darüber hinaus steht auch der Auszug der parteiseitigen Mitschrift im Einklang mit der amtsseitigen Niederschrift. In der Mitschrift der Beschwerdeführerin findet sich hierzu nämlich folgende Notiz:

[Handwritten minutes, see original file, page 30]

Auch hier ist vermerkt, dass die Patentinhaberin PI die "Beratung sehr kurz" beurteilte und deshalb die Vermutung über eine "vorgefasste Meinung"äußerte. Zudem kann den handschriftlichen Notizen auch nicht entnommen werden, dass die Mitglieder der Einspruchsabteilung zu keiner Zeit gleichzeitig im Verhandlungssaal anwesend gewesen sind. Aus dem behaupteten Umstand, dass die Mitglieder der Einspruchsabteilung - wie in der Mitschrift angedeutet - nacheinander den Raum verlassen haben, folgt auch nicht, dass diese zu keiner Zeit gemeinsam anwesend gewesen sind. Zudem, wie oben ausgeführt, kann auch eine relativ kurze Zeitspanne bereits genügen, um zu einer Entscheidungsfindung zu gelangen.

Beiden Zusammenfassungen der Ereignisse ist also in Übereinstimmung zu entnehmen, dass eine Beratung stattgefunden hat, diese aber in den Augen der beschwerdeführenden Patentinhaberin relativ kurz war.

13.4.4 Der Vollständigkeit halber sei angemerkt, dass aus einem Vergleich des schriftlichen Vortrags der beschwerdeführenden Patentinhaberin (Schreiben eingegangen am 25. Juli 2009 und datiert auf den 20. Mai 2009, sowie Schreiben eingegangen am 3. November 2011 und datiert auf den 26. Juli 2011) und dem Protokoll der mündlichen Verhandlung im Einspruchsverfahren auch nicht unmittelbar erkennbar ist, dass sich in der Verhandlung völlig neue Argumente/Sachverhalte ergeben hätten. Es kann daher nicht ausgeschlossen werden, dass keines der Mitglieder der Einspruchsabteilung eine weitere Beratung für notwendig gehalten hat und sie sich ihrer Übereinstimmung gegenseitig schnell versichert haben. Die Beschwerdeführerin hat diesbezüglich auch nicht vorgetragen, welche neuen Sachverhalte in der mündlichen Verhandlung behandelt worden wären, die von den Mitgliedern der Einspruchsabteilung vorher nicht hätten berücksichtigt werden können und eine längere Beratung erforderlich gemacht hätten. Die Beschwerdeführerin hat ebenfalls nicht behauptet, dass in der mündlichen Verhandlung vorgetragene Argumente in der Entscheidung nicht berücksichtigt worden seien.

13.5 Die Kammer hatte daher keine Veranlassung von ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung der behaupteten Umstände, wie im Anhang zur Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung ausgeführt, abzuweichen. Es konnte demnach kein erstinstanzlicher Verfahrensfehler festgestellt werden. Demnach würde eine Rückzahlung der Beschwerde nicht der Billigkeit entsprechen (vgl. Regel 103 (1) a) EPÜ), sodass der Antrag im Rahmen der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer auch aus diesem Grund zurückzuweisen war.

Entscheidungsformel

Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:

Die Beschwerde wird zurückgewiesen.

This decision T 1138/12(pdf) has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T113812.20170509. The file wrapper can be found here.
Photo "Pick your claims" by Romano Beitsma (c)2017.

Translating prohibited?

The present European patent application was filed in English as a divisional application from a parent application which was as an international application filed in German and also published in German. On entry of the parent application before the EPO, a translation into English was filed.

However, filing the divisional application in English turned out to be fatal mistake.

According to Rule 36(2), a divisional application shall be filed in the language of the proceedings for the earlier application, while providing for an exception in case the latter was not filed in an official language of the European Patent Office, in which case the divisional application may be filed in the (non-official) language of the earlier application while having to provide a translation.

Filing the English translation did not change the language of proceedings of the parent application (which remained German). German is an official language of the EPO, so the exception of Rule 36(2) does not appear to apply. However, one cannot fault the appellant for exploring all legal remedies.

Catchwords:

1. For the purposes of Article 76(1), first sentence, and Rule 36(2), first sentence, EPC, a European divisional application of an earlier European patent application which was filed in an EPO official language must also be filed in the EPO official language of the earlier application. Otherwise, it is filed in an inadmissible language. In this case a correction of the language deficiency by means of a translation into the language of the proceedings for the earlier application is neither required under Rule 36(2), second sentence, EPC nor is it even admissible in view of the wording of that provision and the Enlarged Board's decision G 4/08. Nor is it possible for the applicant to remedy the language deficiency in its divisional application by means of a correction under Rule 139, first sentence, EPC or by means of an amendment under Article 123(2) EPC.

2. In accordance with the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal, a European divisional application which was filed in an inadmissible language cannot be treated as a valid divisional application by analogous application of Article 90(2) EPC.

Reasons for the Decision

Admissibility of the appeal

1. The appeal is admissible.

Allowability of the appeal

2. The first question in this appeal case is whether the present application fulfils the EPC language requirements for divisional applications.

3. Applicable EPC provisions

3.1 It is established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal that a divisional application is a new application which is separate from and independent of the earlier application. Therefore, divisional applications are to be treated in the same manner as ordinary applications and are subject to the same requirements, unless specific provisions of the EPC require something different (see G 1/05, OJ EPO 2008, 271, points 3.1, 8.1, 9.1 of the Reasons).

3.2 The present application was filed on 1 October 2010, i.e. after entry into force of the revised European Patent Convention (EPC) on 13 December 2007. Thus, on the latter date, the present application was not pending. Therefore the transitional provisions do not apply in accordance with Article 7(1), second sentence, of the Revision Act of 29 November 2000 and the decisions of the Administrative Council of 28 June 2001 (Special edition No. 1, OJ EPO 2007, 197) and 7 December 2006 (Special edition No. 1, OJ EPO 2007, 89). However, said transitional provisions do apply to the parent application, which was pending at the time the revised EPC entered into force.

3.3 Since the present application was filed as a divisional application on 1 October 2010, the applicable provisions are those of Rule 36(2) EPC, as amended by the Decision of the Administrative Council CA/D 2/09 of 25 March 2009 (OJ EPO 2009, 296), which entered into force on 1 April 2010 (cf. Article 1, point 1, and Article 2, points 1 and 2, of said decision). The respective version of this provision is of relevance because Rule 36(2) EPC as in force before 1 April 2010 allowed the filing of a divisional application only in the language of the proceedings for the earlier application, irrespective of whether the language of filing of the earlier application was an EPO official language or not.

4. Language of the proceedings

4.1 Present application

The present application was filed in English, which is one of the EPO official languages pursuant to Article 14(1) EPC. Article 14(3) EPC stipulates that the EPO official language in which the European patent application is filed must be used as the language of the proceedings in all proceedings before the EPO. Accordingly, the language of the proceedings in the present case is English. This means that, in written proceedings on the present application, EPO departments cannot use an EPO official language other than English (see also G 4/08, OJ EPO 2010, 572, Headnote, Question 2, and section 4 of the Reasons).

4.2 Parent application

The parent application was filed and published as an international patent application under the PCT in German, which is one of the EPO official languages pursuant to Article 14(1) EPC 1973. Therefore, a translation of the international application was not to be filed under Article 22(1) PCT and Article 158(2) in conjunction with Rule 107(1)(a) EPC 1973. Accordingly, German is the language of the proceedings for the parent application.

5. Language regime with respect to the filing of a divisional application

5.1 Article 76(1), first sentence, EPC provides that a European divisional application must be filed directly with the EPO "in accordance with the Implementing Regulations".

The language regime for divisional applications is laid down in the first and second sentences of Rule 36(2) EPC, which read:

"A divisional application shall be filed in the language of the proceedings for the earlier application. If the latter was not in an official language of the European Patent Office, the divisional application may be filed in the language of the earlier application; a translation into the language of the proceedings for the earlier application shall then be filed within two months of the filing of the divisional application."

5.2 The first sentence of Rule 36(2) EPC lays down the principle that a divisional application must be filed in the language of the proceedings for the earlier application. However, there is an exception to this strict legal obligation if the earlier application was not filed in an EPO official language. In this case, the second sentence of Rule 36(2) EPC foresees the additional possibility of filing a divisional application in the non-EPO language of the earlier application, provided a translation into the language of the proceedings for the earlier application (which is one of the EPO official languages) is then filed within two months of the filing of the divisional application.

5.3 The first and second sentences of Rule 36(2) EPC clearly deal with two different factual situations and their wording is unequivocal on the language in which a divisional application must be filed in each respective situation. This wording also shows that only the first sentence of Rule 36(2) EPC applies in the present case, where the parent application was filed in German, thus in an EPO official language. It follows clearly from the foregoing that the present application should have been filed in no other language than German in order to meet the requirements of Article 76(1), first sentence, and Rule 36(2), first sentence, EPC. Therefore, the present application was filed in an inadmissible language.

6. Allowability of filing a translation of the present application into the correct EPO official language

6.1 The appellant essentially argued that, even in a case where the earlier application was filed in an EPO official language, it was still possible under Rule 36(2) EPC to use a language other than this EPO official language for the divisional application and to file the translation into the EPO official language of the earlier application at a later point in time.

6.2 The board notes that, first of all, it follows from the above that the unambiguous wording of the second sentence of Rule 36(2) EPC excludes the appellant's interpretation that this provision also applies where the earlier application was filed in an EPO official language. The second sentence of Rule 36(2) EPC requires a translation only if a divisional application is filed in the original non-EPO language of the earlier application. However, that is not the case here.

6.3 The appellant's interpretation is furthermore not supported by the explanatory remarks to the amendment of Rule 36(2) EPC which entered into force in 2010

(CA/145/08, page 8). The relevant part concerning the language of divisional applications reads:

"The text of Rule 36(2) in force since December 2007 says that a divisional application must be written in the language of the proceedings for the earlier application in order to simplify and streamline the procedure. In practice, divisional applications have virtually always been filed in the language of the proceedings for the parent application, even though EPC 1973 allowed them to be filed in the original language of the parent application, for instance Spanish or Dutch.

However, the option of using any language for filing European patent applications could have increased demand for divisional applications in the original language of the parent application, given that Article 14(2), second sentence, EPC allows the translation of an application to be adapted to the original text at any stage of the grant procedure. But Rule 36(2) EPC as currently worded has eliminated the possibility of adapting the divisional application, which has to be filed in the language of the proceedings for the parent application, to the latter's original text, which of course forms the basis for the wording of the divisional application. Moreover in the case of divisional applications filed under Rule 40(2) and (3) EPC with a reference to the earlier European application in a non-EPO language, it is fundamentally unsatisfactory to have to refer not to the original text of the earlier application but to its translation into the language of the proceedings.It is therefore proposed that Rule 36(2) EPC be amended to enable divisional applications to be filed in the language of the proceedings or the original language of the parent application."

The text does not explicitly say that the "original language of the parent application" must have been a non-EPO language. However, Spanish and Dutch, the two languages given as examples of the "original language of the parent application", are not EPO official languages. Moreover, the text refers to Article 14(2), second sentence, EPC, which "allows the translation of an application to be adapted to the original text at any stage of the grant procedure".

However, the second sentence of Article 14(2) EPC has to be read together with its first sentence. Article 14(2), first sentence, EPC, stipulates that "[a] European patent application shall be filed in one of the EPO official languages, or, if filed in any other language, translated into one of the EPO official languages in accordance with the Implementing Regulations." Thus a translation only has to be filed if the "original language" of an application is not one of the EPO official languages. Finally, the text of the explanatory remarks clearly distinguishes between the language of the proceedings for the earlier application and its original language; see for example the very last sentence of the explanatory remarks. If, however, the earlier application is filed in one of the EPO official languages, then, pursuant to Article 14(3) EPC, this language must be used as the language of the proceedings in all proceedings before the EPO. That means that, in such cases, there is no difference between the language in which the earlier application was filed and the language of the proceedings for it. The only case in which the (non-EPO) language in which the earlier application was filed differs from the language of the proceedings for it under Article 14(3) EPC is where the application has to be translated into one of the EPO official languages in accordance with Article 14(2) EPC.

6.4 In the light of the foregoing, the board cannot share the appellant's view that Rule 36(2) EPC provides for the alternative option to file a divisional application in an EPO official language other than the EPO official language in which the earlier application was filed (i.e. the language of the proceedings for the earlier application) and then to file a translation into the language of the proceedings for the earlier application at a later time.

6.5 The appellant's interpretation of Rule 36(2) EPC would also go against the ruling of the Enlarged Board of Appeal on the language of the proceedings.

In its decision G 4/08, the Enlarged Board ruled that if an international application has been filed and published under the PCT in an official language of the EPO, it is not possible, on entry into the European phase, to file a translation of the application into one of the other two EPO official languages, and it clarified that EPO departments cannot use, in written proceedings on a European patent application or an international application in the regional phase, an EPO official language other than the language of the proceedings used for the application under Article 14(3) EPC (G 4/08, Headnote, Questions 1 and 2, points 2 to 4 of the Reasons).

It is true that, in decision G 4/08, the primary question was whether, for an international application which was filed and published in an EPO official language, the applicant can, on entry into the European phase, choose another EPO official language by filing a translation of the international application in a different official language (see point 2, in particular, point 2.2 of the Reasons). However, the Enlarged Board noted that the basis for answering this question was Article 14(3) EPC 1973 and that this provision assumed "a language of filing that has already been defined and will be the language of the subsequent proceedings" (points 2.1 and 2.2 of the Reasons). In point 2.4 of the Reasons, the Enlarged Board referred to the principle of equivalence between European applications and international ones for which the EPO acts as designated or elected Office, which was expressly laid down in Article 150(3) EPC 1973 and implemented in particular by Article 158 EPC 1973, and held: "Under Article 150(3) EPC 1973, an international application for which the EPO acts as designated or elected Office is deemed to be a European application. Allowing a change of language when a Euro-PCT application published in an EPO official language enters the regional phase would mean supposedly identical applications being treated differently depending on whether they are international or direct European filings." The Enlarged Board also analysed the provisions of "EPC 2000" (G 4/08, point 3 of the Reasons) and concluded in point 3.11 of the Reasons that the EPC 2000 could not be interpreted "as allowing, on entry into the European phase, a Euro-PCT application published in an EPO official language to be replaced by its translation into another such language".

For the sake of completeness, it should also be mentioned that the Enlarged Board referred to some decisions by EPO boards of appeal which had allowed the language of the proceedings to be changed. However, the Enlarged Board held that the abolition of Rule 3(1) EPC 1973, which entered into force on 1 June 1991, removed all legal basis for the previous practice and that the texts in force left no room for a free interpretation which would be tantamount to restoring Rule 3 EPC 1973 (G 4/08, point 4 of the Reasons, in particular, points 4.5 and 4.10).

Finally, the board refers to G 4/08, point 2.4 of the Reasons, where it is held: "Language is not a mere procedural matter, after all; it goes to the heart of the patent's substance. Translations are - legitimately - suspect; that justifies precautions, exemplified by the way in which the original application remains the point of reference in case of translation (Article 14(2) EPC) and by Rule 46.3 PCT governing the language of amendments." In the board's view, these considerations apply equally to the translation of an application filed as a divisional application. This is clearly reflected in the provisions of Rule 36(2) EPC. In case of a translation under Rule 36(2), second sentence, EPC the original parent and the original divisional application also remain the point of reference (see Article 70(2) EPC).

6.6 The board accordingly concludes from the above interpretation and explanation by the Enlarged Board of the relevant EPC provisions that, if a direct European patent application has been filed in an EPO official language, which is then the language of the proceedings, it is not possible to change this language in the subsequent proceedings by translating the application into another EPO official language. In the board's view, the same applies to a direct European patent application filed as a divisional application and, therefore, the appellant's interpretation of Rule 36(2), second sentence, EPC must fail.

6.7 The board now turns to the appellant's argument on Rule 4 EPC 1973. This provision likewise concerns the language of a European divisional application, but under the EPC 1973, and reads:

"European divisional applications or, in the case referred to in Article 14, paragraph 2, the translations thereof, must be filed in the language of the proceedings for the earlier European patent application."

The board takes the view that there is no difference in substance between the term "must" in Rule 4 EPC 1973 and the term "shall" in Rule 36(2) EPC. This also follows clearly from the other two language versions of the latter provision, where the terms "ist ... einzureichen" and "doit être déposée" are used. Moreover, in the revised EPC the term "must" in the provisions of EPC 1973 has been replaced by the term "shall" without any change in substance according to the respective travaux préparatoires (see for example Articles 76(1) and 83 EPC). It is also clear from the reference to Article 14(2) EPC 1973 in Rule 4 EPC 1973 that the translation of European divisional applications which were filed in an admissible non-EPO language in accordance with Article 14(2) EPC 1973 had to be filed in the language of the proceedings for the earlier European patent application. Quite apart from that, Rule 4 EPC 1973 is not applicable to the present case (see point 3.2 above).

6.8 Regarding the appellant's submissions on the correctness of the Guidelines A-IV, 1.3.3 and A-VIII, 1.3, the board first notes that it is not bound by the Guidelines. Apart from that, the appellant cited a version of the Guidelines which reflects the provisions of Rule 36(2) EPC as in force before 1 April 2010, which allowed the filing of a divisional application only in the language of the proceedings for the earlier application, irrespective of whether the language of filing of the earlier application was a non-EPO language.

The respective parts of the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (status April 2010) obviously took into account Rule 36(2) EPC as in force on 1 April 2010. They read:

"Language requirements

As indicated in VIII, 1.3, a divisional application must be filed in the language of the proceedings of the parent application. Alternatively, if the earlier (parent) application was filed in a language other than an official language of the European Patent Office, the divisional application may be filed in that language. In this case a translation into the language of the proceedings for the earlier application shall then be filed within two months of the filing of the divisional application (see III, 14)." (A-IV, 1.3.3), and

"Any European divisional application must be filed in the language of the proceedings of the earlier application from which it is divided. Alternatively, if the earlier (parent) application was not in an official language of the European Patent Office, the divisional application may be filed in the language of the earlier application. In this case a translation into the language of the proceedings for the earlier application shall then be filed within two months of the filing of the divisional application (see A-III, 14)." (A-VIII, 1.3)

6.9 It follows from the above that it is not correct to say that a translation of the present application into the language of the proceedings for the parent application is required under Rule 36(2), second sentence, EPC. Nor is such translation admissible in view of the wording of Rule 36(2) EPC and the Enlarged Board's decision G 4/08.

7. Remedy of the language deficiency by means of a correction or an amendment under the EPC

Since the present application was filed in English and thus not in an admissible language as explained above, it contains a deficiency with regard to the language. The appellant argued that this deficiency could be remedied by means of a correction or an amendment, and based its view on different lines of argument (see point XII, (b), (i)-(iii) above). However, the board does not share the appellant's view for the reasons set out below.

7.1 Correction in reply to an invitation from the EPO under Rule 58 EPC in conjunction with Rule 57(a) EPC

Article 90(4) EPC stipulates that, where the EPO in carrying out the examination under Article 90(1) or Article 90(3) EPC notes that there are deficiencies which may be corrected, it must give the applicant the opportunity to correct them. Hence, Article 90(4) EPC concerns correctable deficiencies which were noted during the examination under Article 90(1) or (3) EPC.

If the European patent application has been accorded a date of filing, the EPO must examine, in accordance with Article 90(3) EPC, whether a translation of the application required under Rule 36(2), second sentence, EPC has been filed in time (Rule 57(a) EPC). Where the EPO notes that this requirement of Rule 57(a) EPC has not been complied with, it informs the applicant accordingly and invites him to correct this deficiency within two months (Rule 58, first sentence, EPC).

In the board's view, a correction of the language deficiency in the present application under Rule 58 in conjunction with Rule 57(a) EPC is not possible since these provisions do not apply. The reason for this is that a correction of the language deficiency in the present application by a translation into the language of the proceedings for the parent application is neither required under Rule 36(2), second sentence, EPC nor admissible for the reasons explained under point 6 above. Thus the language deficiency in the present application cannot be corrected. Consequently, there is no legal basis in the EPC upon which the EPO could have invited the applicant to correct this deficiency.

7.2 Nor is a correction under Rule 139 EPC or an amendment under Article 123(2) EPC possible. In the board's view, the Enlarged Board's interpretation and explanation of the relevant EPC provisions in its decision G 4/08 apply mutatis mutandis where an applicant wishes to change the language of the proceedings by means of a correction under Rule 139, first sentence, EPC or by means of an amendment under Article 123(2) EPC. Therefore, the "Right to Amend" in decision G 1/05 does not exist with regard to the language of the proceedings.

Moreover, in the present case, the conditions would not be met for a correction of a "linguistic error" under Rule 139 EPC or for an amendment according to Article 123(2) EPC.

As to Rule 139 EPC, choosing the "wrong" language for a document to be filed with the EPO cannot be equated with a "linguistic error" for the purposes of Rule 139, first sentence, EPC (see also T 642/12, point 28 of the Reasons). The same must apply if the intended correction concerns the description, claims or drawings (Rule 139, second sentence, EPC).

According to Article 123(2) EPC, the European patent application may be amended. It may still be amended during examination proceedings so as to comply with the requirements of Article 76(1) EPC, provided, however, that the amendment complies with the other requirements of the EPC (see G 1/05, point 7 of the Reasons). Such a requirement is laid down in Rule 3(2) EPC, which stipulates that amendments to a European patent application have to be filed in the language of the proceedings. The board concludes from this that the language of the proceedings cannot be changed by means of an amendment under Article 123(2) EPC.

8. Legitimate expectations

The issue of legitimate expectations was addressed in the decision under appeal (see points 11 to 12 of the Reasons). The appellant has provided no arguments as to why this finding was wrong and even confirmed during the oral proceedings before the board that it was not relying on this procedural principle. Thus there is no reason for the board to deal with this issue in its decision.

9. Legal consequences of non-compliance with the language requirements

9.1 The board understands from the appellant's submissions that it objects to the finding in the decision under appeal that "[s]evere formal deficiencies in a divisional application may entail as consequence that the application is invalid, i.e. has no legal effect and accordingly it is not treated as valid divisional application by analogous application of Article 90(2) EPC (cf. G 1/05, op. cit., at 2.4; J 18/04, OJ EPO 2006, 560, at 39)." The appellant argued that no legal consequence was specified in Rule 36(2) EPC in the event that the divisional application was, for example, filed in an EPO official language other than the EPO official language in which the earlier application was filed. It also submitted that decision J 2/01 did not refer to language requirements. Rather, a correction of the deficiency in respect of the language requirements was possible according to decision G 1/05 (in particular, points 3.2 to 3.4 of the Reasons).

9.2 Under Article 90(1) EPC, the EPO is responsible for examining whether, on filing, a European patent application satisfies the requirements for the accordance of a date of filing. These requirements for a filing date are laid down in Article 80 EPC and the related provisions of the Implementing Regulations. However, since the present application was filed as a divisional application, it must first and foremost comply with the specific requirements of Article 76(1), first sentence, EPC and the related provisions of the Implementing Regulations, which contain conditions within the meaning of Article 4G(2), second sentence, Paris Convention. It is established EPO jurisprudence that if these specific requirements are not fulfilled, this situation is comparable to the case dealt with in Article 90(2) EPC, so that an analogous application of that provision is justified, with the legal consequence that the application at issue is not to be dealt with as a divisional application (see J 2/01 and J 18/04, point 39 of the Reasons, referring to J 11/91, point 4.2 of the Reasons; this last decision has been followed in later decisions such as J 26/10 and J 4/11).

9.3 As far as decision G 1/05 is concerned, it has to be noted that one of the questions the Enlarged Board ruled upon was whether it would indeed follow from accepting the "invalidity" of a divisional application containing added matter that such an application could not be made valid by a later amendment removing the added matter with retroactive effect (emphasis added). The passages cited by the appellant concern this issue and, indeed, it was decided that a divisional application which at its date of receipt contains subject-matter extending beyond the content of any earlier application as filed can be amended later in order that its subject-matter no longer so extends, even at a time when the earlier application is no longer pending.

However, the Enlarged Board acknowledged that severe formal deficiencies in an application as filed may thus, even if only in the extreme case and if so provided in the EPC, entail as a consequence that the application has no legal effect (G 1/05, points 2.3 and 2.4 of the Reasons). Moreover, as explained above, under the EPC provisions and in the light of decision G 4/08, amending the language of the proceedings for the present application is not possible.

9.4 The appellant further argued that EPO Form 1044, which was used for the EPO communication dated 28 January 2011 (see point IV above), contained a pre-printed exhaustive list of reasons for not processing an application as a divisional application and that, therefore, a further reason for such non-processing could not be added. The board notes that it is the EPC that provides the law governing the processing of European patent applications, and not any form that the EPO may have created, including EPO Form 1044. The contents of any such form must be properly based on the EPC. Apart from that, the board does not share the appellant's view that EPO Form 1044 entitled "Noting of loss of rights pursuant to Rule 112(1) EPC" contains an exhaustive list of reasons which justify not processing an application as a divisional. There is no indication of an exhaustive list in that form. Although one could argue that the sentence added to it does not refer to the relevant EPC provision, i.e. Rule 36(2) EPC, the information as such must have been clear and unambiguous for the applicant, as can be seen from its reply dated 7 April 2011. Moreover, there is nothing in the form issued to the applicant which might have justified a different interpretation of the text of the EPO form in accordance with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Therefore, the present case differs from that underlying decision J 17/04, in which the pre-printed text in the EPO form at issue (EPO Form 1001) was ambiguous and could be misinterpreted.

9.5 For the above reasons and in accordance with the above-cited established jurisprudence, the present application cannot be treated as a valid divisional application by analogous application of Article 90(2) EPC because it does not fulfil the requirements of Article 76(1), first sentence, and Rule 36(2), first sentence, EPC.

10. Request for referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal

10.1 The appellant requested that certain questions be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (see point X above). The appellant based its request for a referral on the argument that an important point of law was concerned since the legal consequence of non-compliance of a divisional application with Rule 36(2) EPC was not regulated in the EPC, and that the matter touched on the possibility for the applicant to correct the language deficiency in its application, which was filed as a divisional application.

10.2 According to Article 112(1)(a) EPC, a board may, either of its own motion or following a request from a party, refer any question of law to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if it considers that a decision is required in order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if an important point of law arises.

10.3 An "important point of law" within the meaning of Article 112(1)(a) EPC 1973 arises if that point is of fundamental importance in that it is relevant to a substantial number of similar cases and is therefore of great interest not only to the parties to the appeal in hand but also to the public at large (see e.g. T 271/85, OJ EPO 1988, 341; G 1/12, OJ EPO 2014, A114, Reasons, point 11). However, even in such a situation, the board should make a referral only if it considers that a decision by the Enlarged Board is required. A question regarded as an important point of law does not need to be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if the question can be answered beyond all doubt by the board itself (see for example J 5/81, OJ EPO 1982, 155; T 198/88, OJ EPO 1991, 254; J 22/95, OJ EPO 1998, 569).

10.4 The present board considers that cases in which the issue is a correction of an inadmissible language in which a divisional application has been filed will occur only extremely infrequently, so that the number of cases which might be negatively affected provides no reason for a referral. Moreover, the board dealt with the issues of whether Article 90(4) EPC or Rule 58 EPC in conjunction with Rule 57(a) EPC apply in the present case and whether a correction under Rule 139 EPC was possible (see section 7 above). The board was able to reach its conclusions on the basis of the wording of the provisions of the EPC and the existing EPO jurisprudence and to decide on these issues free from any doubt. Hence, no important point of law arises or needs to be clarified by the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

10.5 For the above reasons, the appellant's request for a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal must be refused.

11. Conclusion on the allowability of the appeal

In view of the above, the appellant's request that the case be remitted to the Receiving Section for treatment of the application as a divisional application is unallowable and, consequently, its appeal must be dismissed.

Request for reimbursement of the appeal fee

12. Pursuant to Rule 103(1)(a) EPC, a prerequisite for reimbursement of the appeal fee is that the appeal is deemed to be allowable. Since the appeal must be dismissed (see previous point 11), the appellant's request for reimbursement of the appeal fee is to be refused.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The request for referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the questions filed during the oral proceedings before the Legal Board is refused.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee is refused.

This decision J 13/14 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2016:J001314.20161213. Photo "Translation Prohibited" by Jacob Bøtter obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

Claim 1 of this Examination appeal describes on a high level the mathematical processing of an audio signal. The claim comprises, for example, the generation of output channels using a basic matrix or a post matrix. Said matrices are functionally defined and by their configuration elements which 'are acquired by using' a number of parameters.

The Board does not consider this definition sufficient. The description does not help in further understanding what processing is actually performed. Technicality is never an issue in this decision, even though all processing seems to be of a mathematical nature. Nevertheless, also in mathematics the invention needs to be explained fully.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

(...)

VII. Claim 1 of the appellant's request reads:

"1. A method for processing an audio signal comprising:

receiving an audio signal including a downmix signal generated by downmixing a multi-channel audio signal;

generating a fixed output channel, having multiple channels, using the downmix signal and configuration elements of a basic matrix; and

generating an arbitrary output channel using the fixed output channel and configuration elements of a post matrix,

wherein the configuration elements of the basic matrix are acquired by using basic data including channel level difference and inter-channel correlation, and fixed channel configuration information,

the configuration elements of the post matrix are acquired by using extension data including channel level difference and arbitrary channel configuration information,

a number of the multiple channels of the fixed output channel is greater than a number of channels of the downmix signal,

the post matrix is useable to extend the number of the multiple channels of the fixed output channel, and

the arbitrary channel configuration information indicates a presence or absence of a channel division using a division identifier and a non-division identifier."

(...)

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility

The appeal is admissible.

2. Sufficiency of disclosure (Art. 83 EPC 1973)

2.1 In parallel case T 1155/12, objections similar to those raised in the present case, regarding sufficiency of disclosure under Art. 83 EPC 1973, were raised. In a letter of reply filed in said case, the appellant provided a copy of working draft standard ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 29/WG 11 N7136 (text of Working Draft for Spatial Audio Coding (SAC)), as evidence of common general knowledge.

During the oral proceedings held for the present case, the Board decided not to introduce, ex officio, said document into the appeal proceedings for the following reasons.

Firstly, the appellant had not requested the introduction of said document into the present proceedings and had not even mentioned it in its submissions. Secondly, the public availability of said document at the priority date of the application appeared questionable in view of the nature of said document representing a "Working Draft". Thirdly, although possibly relevant, there were doubts as to whether the content of said document would have been conclusive for the issue to be decided.

2.2 Contrary to the appellant's view, the claims alone do not contain sufficient information to carry out the invention.

While it is acknowledged that the independent claims establish that the configuration elements may be obtained from parameters such as the Channel Level difference (CLD) and inter-channel correlation (ICC), the skilled person would still be at a loss to determine how said information contributes to the definition of each configuration element of both the basic matric and the post matrix.

If the notion of correlation suggests that a certain relationship would exist between two signals originating from different sources and might indeed be used to re-create a signal, it is not straightforward how a parameter reflecting the difference between signals of different channels could define the configuration elements of both matrices. The appellant submitted that "for each channel to be generated a configuration element may indicate which difference the levels of two of these channels have" (cf. statement of grounds, page 4, last two lines). In the Board's communication under Art. 15 RPBA, the appellant was invited to elaborate on this submission and to provide some more specific and concrete information in this respect. The appellant, however, did not react to the invitation of the Board.

The mere identification of the parameters which are taken into account for the definition of the configuration elements does not suffice to define said elements. Indeed, the output and arbitrary channels to be generated have a specific relationship to the input channels on the encoding side. Said relationship is described by the matrices and their configuration elements, the configuration elements permitting to retrieve for each of the various output and arbitrary channels the original input signals before the down-mixing operations. A prerequisite consists, in this respect, in defining the dimensions of the two matrices involved in the complete process. The application is, however, silent as to this aspect of the invention.

2.3 According to an alternative line of argumentation developed by the appellant, the information required to carry out the invention would derive from the description. It was stressed, in this respect, that the embodiment described with regard to Figures 2 and 3, as well as the embodiment of Figure 4, would constitute valuable sources of information allowing the skilled person to reproduce the claimed subject-matter.

2.3.1 This argumentation is rejected for the following reasons. It is doubtful whether the embodiment of Figures 2 and 3 would indeed fall under the definition of independent claims 1 and 8. In this respect, a discrepancy between this embodiment and the claimed subject-matter appears in the terminology used. Namely, no feature could be identified which could be equated with a "basic matrix" or a "post matrix".

2.3.2 Concerning the embodiment of Figure 4, the skilled person would, firstly, wonder about the necessity of a basic matrix followed by a post matrix since, from a purely mathematical point of view, one single matrix corresponding to the product of the two matrices m1*m2 would have been sufficient. Moreover, the presence of two matrices increases the number of configurations elements required as compared with one single matrix and, thus, the difficulty faced by the skilled person in order to define the various configuration elements.

2.4 In the Board's communication, the appellant was invited to expound on the whole process, starting from the encoding of multi-channel data to the final steps of generating fixed and arbitrary output channels, for the embodiment of Figure 4 or, alternatively, the embodiments of Figures 2 and 3. The appellant did not, however, make any submissions in this respect.

The submissions filed by the appellant with the statement of grounds do not extend beyond mere statements regarding the parameters intervening in the process of generating the output channels. As a matter of fact, neither the application nor the statement of grounds explain how said parameters effectively contribute to the elaboration of the output and arbitrary channels.

Moreover, the appellant did not comment on the fact that the examining division did not consider document A2 as evidence of common general knowledge. As the assessment of A2 made by the examining division appears to be correct, there is no reason to reverse said findings.

Hence, in the absence of evidence regarding the existence of common knowledge which might have compensated for the missing information in the application, the skilled person would not be in a position to carry out the claimed invention.

2.5 In conclusion, the application does not meet the requirements of Art. 83 EPC 1973.

3. Reimbursement of the appeal fee (R. 103(2)(a) EPC)

Partial refund of the appeal fee was requested under R. 103(2)(a) EPC.

R. 103(2)(a) EPC specifies that "The appeal fee shall be reimbursed at 50% if the appeal is withdrawn after expiry of the period under paragraph 1(b), provided withdrawal occurs:

(a) if a date for oral proceedings has been set, at least four weeks before that date".

By submissions of 20 April 2017, the Board was informed of the appellant's intention not to attend oral proceedings scheduled for 5 May 2017.

The appeal, however, was not withdrawn.

For this reason, the appellant's request for partial refund of the appeal fee is devoid of any legal basis.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 1153/12 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T115312.20170512. Photo via PixaBay by Taken under a CC0 license (no changes were made).

Amendments introducing disclaimers have probably led to more pain than joy. Disclaiming subject-matter in the application-as-filed usually is acceptable, but often has a high risk of lacking inventive step. Disclaiming subject-matter not in the application-as-filed led to G 1/03 already quite some years ago and is well-documented in many later decisions as well as in the Guidelines - strict conditions, which can basically only work out well if there is only one Art.54(3) EPC prior right document with a single, clear disclosure. Disclaiming embodiments in the application as filed led to G 2/10, which has a quite cryptically phrased headnote, but when read as a whole also gives very clear conditions -it usually is possible, as long as it is clear that something remains and that you do not sneakily change to a different inventive concept- and it is also well documented in the Guidelines. G 1/03 and G 2/10 relate to different cases, so cannot prima facie be considered as somehow conflicting, but Board 3.3.09 made the currently pending referral G 1/16 while handling appeal T 0437/14 asking a.o. whether the G 2/10 decision effects how some aspects of G 1/03 shall be interpreted. The current decision shows again that even of a disclaimer is made in good faith, it can easily be done wrongly and, as here, of the disclaimer is introduced before grant, one may all too easily end up in an inescapable Art.123(2)-123(3) trap... And the trouble was in this case actually not even in how the disclaimers needs to be drafted, but how novelty has to be assessed... which the opponent did correctly, but the examining division and the applicant/proprietor had not/did not... As to the aux requests, Art. 13(1) and 13(3) RPBA prevented further chances to remedy the trouble.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal lies from the decision of the opposition division posted on 11 December 2013 revoking European patent No. 1 477 525.

II. European Patent No. 1 477 525 was granted on the basis of 7 claims, claim 1 reading as follows:

"1. Polyolefin composition with low coefficient of linear thermal expansion (CLTE); determined according to DIN 53752 and good impact strength and low density, having an MFR (measured according to ISO 1133 with a load of 2.16 kg at 230°C) of from 5.0-60 g/10 min, which polyolefin composition comprises

(A) 90-99 wt% of a heterophasic propylene copolymer containing

a) 60-80 wt% of a matrix phase comprising a propylene homopolymer or a propylene copolymer with up to 5 mol% of ethylene and/or at least one C4-C8 alpha-olefin and

b) 20-40 wt% of a disperse phase comprising an ethylene rubber copolymer with from 20-80 mol% ethylene and from 80-20 mol% of at least one C3-C8 alpha-olefin,

where the intrinsic viscosity (measured according to DIN ISO 1628-1 (October 1999) in decalin at 135°C) of the XCS-fraction of the heterophasic copolymer is <= 2.0 dl/g and

(B) 1-10 wt% of an inorganic filler,

wherein the composition does not contain a beta-nucleating agent."

III. A notice of opposition was filed in which revocation of the patent in its entirety was requested.

IV. The decision of the opposition division to revoke the patent was announced at the oral proceedings on 21 November 2013. The opposition division found that several selections in the disclosure of D1 (EP 1 344 793) were necessary in order to arrive at the object of claim 1 as granted without the disclaimer. Therefore claim 1 was already novel over D1 even without the disclaimer and there was "no legal basis for the introduction of the disclaimer (Art. 100(c) & Art. 123(2) & G1/03)". Since the opposition division found that the claims as granted did not meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC, it revoked the patent.

V. The proprietor (appellant) lodged an appeal against that decision. With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal dated 16 April 2014 the appellant requested that the decision of the opposition division be set aside and that the opposition be rejected.

VI. In its reply to the statement of grounds of appeal dated 21 October 2014, the opponent (respondent) requested that the appeal be dismissed.

VII. On 24 July 2015, the appellant filed the first to third auxiliary requests.

VIII. In a communication sent in preparation to the oral proceedings, the Board summarised the points to be dealt with and provided a preliminary view on the disputed issues.

IX. With letter of 20 April 2017, the appellant filed a modified version of the first to third auxiliary requests.

First auxiliary request

Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request differed from claim 1 as granted in that "which polyolefin composition comprises" was replaced by "which polyolefin composition consists of" and the disclaimer "wherein the composition does not contain beta-nucleating agent" was removed.

Second auxiliary request

Claim 1 of the second auxiliary request read:

"1. Process for preparing a polyolefin composition with low coefficient of linear thermal expansion (CLTE); determined according to DIN 53752 and good impact strength and low density, having an MFR (measured according to ISO 1133 with a load of 2.16 kg at 230°C) of from 5.0-60 g/10 min, consisting of meltmixing 90-99 wt% of a heterophasic propylene copolymer base resin with 1 to 10 wt% of inorganic filler, based on the propylene copolymer at temperatures from 175°C to 250°C, optionally adding stabilizers, and cooling and crystallizing the melt,

wherein the heterophasic propylene copolymer contains

a) 60-80 wt% of a matrix phase comprising a propylene homopolymer or a propylene copolymer with up to 5 mol% of ethylene and/or at least one C4-C8 alpha-olefin and

b) 20-40 wt% of a disperse phase comprising an ethylene rubber copolymer with from 20-80 mol% ethylene and from 80-20 mol% of at least one C3-C8 alpha-olefin,

where the intrinsic viscosity (measured according to DIN ISO 1628-1 (October 1999) in decalin at 135°C of the XCS-fraction of the heterophasic copolymer is <= 2.0 dl/g."

Third auxiliary request

Claim 1 of the third auxiliary request differed from claim 1 of the second auxiliary request in that the wording "optionally adding stabilizers" was removed.

X. With letter of 18 May 2017, the respondent contested the admission of the auxiliary requests and provided new document D10 (EP 2 055 739).

XI. On 30 May 2017, the appellant submitted the fourth and fifth auxiliary requests.

Fourth and fifth auxiliary requests

Claim 1 of these requests corresponded to claim 1 of the second and third auxiliary requests respectively in which the heterophasic propylene copolymer was defined as follows:

"...wherein the heterophasic propylene copolymer consists of

a) 60-80 wt% of a matrix phase consisting of a propylene homopolymer with up to 5 mol% of ethylene and/or at least one C4-C8 alpha-olefin and

b) 20-40 wt% of a disperse phase consisting of an ethylene rubber copolymer with from 20-80 mol% ethylene and from 80-20 mol% of at least one C3-C8 alpha-olefin,..."

XII. Oral proceedings were held on 2 June 2017.

XIII. The arguments provided by the appellant, as far as relevant to the present decision, can be summarised as follows:

Main request

Article 123(2) EPC

The disclaimer was allowable in claim 1 because it restored novelty over D1. D1 disclosed a polyolefin composition containing a heterophasic propylene copolymer (A) and a beta-nucleating agent (B). The amount in (A) in the polyolefin composition was directly and unambiguously derivable from the subject matter of claims 8, 6, 4, 3 and 1. That claim combination disclosed that the composition contained only the components (A), (B) and a preferred amount of 1-5 wt% of fillers for enhancing stiffness. Since D1 disclosed that the amount in (B) in the composition was up to 2 wt%, it could be deduced that the amount in (A) had to be between 93 and 99 wt%. That amount in (A) did not result from a selection within D1 and was completely contained in the range of 90-99 wt% of the patent in suit. As to the nature of the fillers for enhancing stiffness, the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art at the priority date of the patent in suit was that these fillers were mostly inorganic. That was confirmed by D1 as it only disclosed talc as a filler for enhancing stiffness. Also, only inorganic fillers could be compounded at temperatures of up to 250°C as disclosed in D1.

There were then only three further numerical ranges relating to the melt flow rate, the amount in matrix phase (a) and in disperse phase (b) from which a selection had to be made in order to arrive at the subject matter of granted claim 1. The large overlap of the ranges of melt flow rate according to D1 and the patent in suit as well as the values of melt flow rate disclosed in examples 3, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of D1 established that the person skilled in the art would have seriously contemplated a melt flow rate of around 5 g/10min, i.e. within the lower part of the claimed range of the patent in suit. Regarding the amount in disperse phase (b), the upper limits of the ranges defined in claim 1 (5-50 wt%) and claim 3 (9-20 wt%) of D1 could be combined to generate a preferred range of 20-50 wt% that completely contained the range of 20-40 wt% according to claim 1 of the patent in suit. Although the amounts in disperse phase (b) (11 wt%, 7.5 wt% and 16 wt%) in polymers 1, 3 and 4 in Table 1a of D1 were not according to the patent in suit, they nevertheless fell within the preferred range of claim 3 of D1. This showed that the skilled person would have worked in the area overlapping the range of the patent in suit. Since the heterophasic propylene copolymer (A) was made up of the matrix phase (a) and the disperse phase (b) only, preferred ranges in matrix phase (a) were deducible from the preferred ranges in disperse phase (b) (7-25 wt% or 9-20 wt%) disclosed in claim 3 of D1. The calculated ranges in matrix phase (a) in D1 (75-93 wt% or 80-91 wt%) overlapped significantly with the range disclosed in claim 1 of the patent in suit.

In conclusion, the disclosure of D1 showed an extensive overlap with the subject matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit and it could be deduced from D1 that the skilled person would have seriously contemplated working in the area of overlap. The subject matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit without the disclaimer was not novel in view of the disclosure of D1. The disclaimer in claim 1 of the main request was therefore allowable because D1 was otherwise novelty destroying for the claimed subject matter.

In any case, the disclaimer was still allowable in view of G 1/93 because it merely limited the protection conferred by the patent as granted and it did not provide a technical contribution to the claimed subject matter, as could be seen from a comparison of the notched impact strength and of the flexural modulus of the compositions of examples 7 and 8 of D1.

First to third auxiliary requests

Admittance

In claim 1 of the first to third auxiliary requests the disclaimer was removed and the subject matter was limited such that the polyolefin composition consisted of (A) and (B), excluding other additives in the composition. These requests were clearly allowable under Article 123(2) and (3) EPC and should therefore be admitted into the proceedings.

Fourth and fifth auxiliary requests

Admittance

The fourth and fifth request were filed in response to the submission of the opponent of 18 May 2017 relating to the open formulation used in claim 1 of the second and third auxiliary requests. The open language was avoided in claim 1 and the matrix phase was limited to a homopolymer on the basis of the last paragraph of page 4 of the application as originally filed. These requests were allowable. They should be admitted into the proceedings.

XIV. The arguments of the respondent, as far as relevant to the present decision, can be summarised as follows:

Main request

Article 123(2) EPC

Claim 1 of the main request contravened the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC as the disclaimer present therein was not allowable since D1 did not anticipate the subject matter of claim 1 without the disclaimer. The amount in component (A) in the composition could not be derived from D1. The presence of a filler in the composition was not mentioned in claim 8 of D1; moreover, there was no mention of the class of inorganic fillers in that document either. Since the examples of D1 only disclosed the use of 0.1 wt% of beta-nucleating agent, the skilled person would not have considered an amount of up to 2 wt%. As to the amounts in matrix phase (a) and disperse phase (b), the person skilled in the art would not have considered working in the area of overlap with the claimed range. Multiple selections in the ranges defining the amounts of the components and the range in melt flow rate were necessary to arrive at the claimed subject matter. There was no pointer to the multiple selections to be made within D1. The disclaimer was therefore not necessary to restore the novelty of the claimed subject matter. Since the disclaimer was not allowable, claim 1 contravened the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC.

The beta-nucleating agent made a technical contribution to the claimed compositions since it had an effect on the impact resistance of samples produced thereof, as could be deduced from the examples of D1. The disclaimer could not be maintained in the claim even in view of G 1/93.

First to third auxiliary requests

Admittance

Claim 1 of these requests were defined by an open formulation that allowed the beta-nucleating agent to be present in the matrix phase. As a result, claim 1 of these requests contravened the requirements of Article 123(3) EPC. As there was also no justification for their late filing, these requests should not be admitted into the proceedings.

Fourth and fifth auxiliary requests

Admittance

These requests were filed a few days before the oral proceedings only. They contained substantial modifications that raised issues that had not been discussed before the oral proceedings. Also, these requests could and should have been filed earlier. These requests should therefore not be admitted into the proceedings.

XV. The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the case be remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution on the basis of the patent as granted (main request), or on the basis of one of the first to third auxiliary requests filed with the letter of 20 April 2017, or on the basis of the fourth or fifth auxiliary request filed with the letter of 30 May 2017.

XVI. The respondent requested that the appeal be dismissed and that the auxiliary requests not be admitted into the proceedings. If the main request were found to meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC it requested that the case be remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution. If one or more auxiliary requests were admitted, it requested an apportionment of costs in the event the case were remitted for further prosecution on the basis of an auxiliary request.

Reasons for the Decision

Main request

1. Article 123(2) EPC

1.1 The subject matter of claim 1 as granted concerns a polyolefin composition and is defined by a disclaimer "wherein the composition does not contain a beta-nucleating agent"added in the course of the examination proceedings in response to an objection of lack of novelty in view of D1. It was undisputed that that disclaimer was not disclosed as such in the application as originally filed. The opposition division found in its decision that the disclaimer was not allowable because it did not fulfil the requirements set out in the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 1/03 (OJ EPO 2004, 413).

1.2 In its decision G 1/03 the Enlarged Board decided that a disclaimer that had not been disclosed in the originally filed application may be allowable in order to:

(i) - restore novelty by delimiting a claim against state of the art under Article 54(3) and (4) EPC;

(ii) - restore novelty by delimiting a claim against an accidental anticipation under Article 54(2) EPC; an anticipation is accidental if it is so unrelated to and remote from the claimed invention that the person skilled in the art would never have taken it into consideration when making the invention; and

(iii) - disclaim subject-matter which, under Articles 52 to 57 EPC, is excluded from patentability for non-technical reasons.

Also, a disclaimer should not remove more than is necessary either to restore novelty or to disclaim subject-matter excluded from patentability for non-technical reasons. A disclaimer which is or becomes relevant for the assessment of inventive step or sufficiency of disclosure adds subject-matter contrary to Article 123(2) EPC. Finally, a claim containing a disclaimer must meet the requirements of clarity and conciseness of Article 84 EPC.

1.3 Since D1 is a document according to Article 54(3) EPC for the patent in suit, which has not been disputed by the parties, the question that has to be answered first in view of the admissibility of the disclaimer in claim 1 is whether it restored novelty by delimiting claim 1 against D1 (condition (i) of G 1/03). Thus, in order for the disclaimer to be allowable in this case, it is a precondition that D1 is novelty destroying for the object of granted claim 1 without the disclaimer.

1.4 Claim 1 of D1 discloses polyolefin compositions with high impact strength and high gloss, comprising

A) a heterophasic propylene copolymer containing

a) 50-95 wt% of a matrix phase comprising a propylene homopolymer or a propylene copolymer with up to 5 mol% of ethylene and/or at least one C4-C8 alpha-olefin and

b) 5-50 wt% of a disperse phase comprising an ethylene rubber copolymer with from 20-80 mol% ethylene and from 80-20 mol% of at least one C3-C8 alpha-olefin and where the intrinsic viscosity of the XCS-fraction of the heterophasic copolymer is <= 2 dl/g and

B) a beta-nucleating agent.

1.5 It was submitted by the appellant that the composition of D1 which was the closest to that of claim 1 of the patent in suit corresponded to the subject matter formed by the claims 8, 6, 4 and 3 in combination with claim 1. That specific subject matter formed by the aforementioned combination of dependent claims constitutes a first selection within the disclosure of D1.

1.6 Claim 8 of D1 concerns a process for producing a polyolefin composition according to one of claims 1 to 7, characterized by mixing a heterophasic propylene copolymer containing (a) a matrix phase and (b) a disperse phase, with an effective amount of beta-nucleating agent, melting and homogenising the mixture and cooling and crystallising the mixture.

1.7 It was argued by the appellant that a polyolefin composition resulting from that process contained exclusively an heterophasic propylene copolymer containing the matrix phase (a), the disperse phase (b), a beta-nucleating agent and fillers for enhancing stiffness which leads to an amount in weight percent of the heterophasic propylene copolymer fully within the range 90-99 wt% given in claim 1. As to the only remaining numerical ranges of granted claim 1, namely 60-80 wt% for the matrix phase, 20-40 wt% for the disperse phase and 5.0-60 g/10 min for the MFR, they were overlapping with the ranges in claims 1, 3 and 4 of D1 and the examples of D1 pointed to the overlapping parts of the ranges.

1.8 Even accepting the argument of the appellant that the specific combination of claims directly and unambiguously discloses a composition with all the features of claim 1 apart from the listed ranges,the Board does not agree with the conclusion of the appellant for the following reasons.

1.9 D1 discloses numerical ranges relating to the amount of ethylene rubber copolymer as disperse phase (b) and MFR as follows:

1.9.1 The amount in ethylene rubber copolymer of the disperse phase (b) is generically defined by three ranges in D1, 5-50 wt% (claim 1 and paragraph 9), 7-25 wt% and 9-20 wt% (claim 3 and paragraph 15), overlapping the range of 20-40 wt% of claim 1 of the main request. The polyolefin compositions of examples 3, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of D1 that were found the most relevant by the appellant in that respect are based on polymers 1, 3 and 4 of Table 1a that contain an ethylene rubber copolymer in amounts of respectively 11 wt%, 7.5 wt% and 16 wt%. These amounts are all within the preferred range of 9-20 wt% of D1 but are not within the range of claim 1 of the patent in suit (20-40 wt%). It can only be concluded that D1 generically teaches that the amount in ethylene rubber copolymer of the disperse phase (b) may be chosen within a range (7-25 wt% or 5-20 wt%) overlapping with that of claim 1 of the main request (20-40 wt%), but in order to arrive at the claimed subject matter, a second selection within the general disclosure of D1 is necessary.

1.9.2 The melt flow rate (MFR) of the polyolefin compositions according to D1 is defined in claim 4 and in paragraph 16 of D1 as being comprised between 1 and 30 g/10min, preferably between 2.5 and 10 g/10 min, showing some overlap with the range of 5-60 g/10 min of claim 1 of the main request. The specific MFR values of the compositions according to the examples 3, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of D1 cited by the appellant are 2.9, 4.7, 4.9, 4.2 and 4.7 g/10min (Table 2). While these values of MFR are within the preferred range of D1, they are all outside the claimed range of the patent in suit. Even if some of these values of the examples of D1 come close to the lower end of the area of overlap, non of them was shown to fall within the range of 5-60 dl/g. It can only be concluded that D1 generically teaches that the polyolefin compositions may have an MFR within a range overlapping with that of claim 1 of the main request, but in order to arrive at the claimed subject matter, a third selection within the general disclosure of D1 is necessary.

1.10 A total of three selections within D1 is therefore needed to arrive at polyolefin compositions falling under claim 1 of the main request. D1 does not point at this very specific set of three selections. It has also not been established that the selected features of the polyolefin compositions (presence of an inorganic filler, amount in ethylene rubber and MFR) were in any way convergent so that the specific compositions selected clearly arose from D1. The Board can only conclude that D1 does not take away the novelty of claim 1 of the main request.

1.11 Under these circumstances there was no necessity to disclaim beta-nucleating agents from the scope of claim 1 in order to restore novelty over D1 as no lack of novelty was present. Therefore, the disclaimer of claim 1 of the main request does not fulfil the first condition set out in the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 1/03. As there was evidently no basis for that disclaimer in the description as originally filed, its introduction in claim 1 infringes Article 123(2) EPC.

1.12 The appellant also submitted that the disputed disclaimer did not to contribute to the technical teaching of the claimed subject-matter; its addition to claim 1 thus could not be considered to contravene the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC for the reasons given in G 1/93 (OJ EPO 1994, 541).

1.12.1 As regards decision G 1/93, a feature which has not been disclosed in the application as filed but which has been added to the application during examination and which, without providing a technical contribution to the subject-matter of the claimed invention, merely limits the protection conferred by the patent as granted by excluding protection for part of the subject-matter of the claimed invention as covered by the application as filed, is not to be considered as subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed within the meaning of Article 123(2) EPC (see headnote 2). However, also according to this decision, the idea underlying the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC is that an applicant shall not be allowed to improve his position by adding subject-matter not disclosed in the application as filed, which would give him an unwarranted advantage and could be damaging to the legal security of third parties relying on the content of the original application (G 1/93, point 9 of the reasons). Therefore, if such a feature added to a claim is found to provide a technical contribution to the subject-matter of the claimed invention, it would give the applicant an unwarranted advantage and the amendment is to be considered contrary to the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC (see G 1/93, point 16 of the reasons).

1.12.2 In the present case, the disputed disclaimer is a feature providing necessarily a technical contribution to the claimed subject-matter since it excludes beta-nucleating agents generally known in the art to induce crystallization of polypropylene homo- and copolymers in polyolefin compositions, as already indicated by the name of the class of compounds and as also shown for instance in D1 itself (paragraph 11) and in D10 (paragraphs 69-74), whereby the presence of crystals has an undisputable effect on the chemical and mechanical properties of the composition. Therefore, the disclaimer, by modifying the technical characteristics of the matrix phase of the polyolefin composition of claim 1, necessarily gives the appellant an unwarranted advantage by restricting the claimed subject-matter to a group of polyolefin compositions having specific technical characteristics and properties. Therefore, even taking into account the exception in decision G 1/93, the disclaimer in question constitutes an amendment that contravenes the requirements of Articles 123(2) EPC.

First to third auxiliary requests

2. Admittance

2.1 The first to third auxiliary requests were filed by the appellant on 20 April 2017, after the reply to the statement of grounds of appeal by the respondent on 21 October 2014. Any amendment to a party's case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply may be admitted and considered at the Board's discretion. The discretion is exercised in view of inter alia the complexity of the new subject matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy (Article 13(1) RPBA).

2.2 Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request differs from claim 1 as granted in that the wording "which polyolefin composition comprises" has been replaced by "which polyolefin composition consists of" and in that the disclaimer "wherein the composition does not contain beta-nucleating agent" has been removed.

2.3 Such amendments were introduced in order to look for a solution to the disclaimer issue which was the central point on which revocation was based. Therefore there was no justification not to file appropriate requests at the outset of the appeal proceedings. Moreover, the amendments do not provide a clear solution to the issue, since, in spite of the introduction of the expression "consists of", the presence of the "comprising" language in the definition of the matrix phase and of the disperse phase,leaves strong doubts as to whether the presence of beta-nucleating agents is excluded. Under these circumstances and in particular in view of the need for procedural economy, the Board finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion by not admitting the first auxiliary request into the proceedings.

2.4 The subject matter of claim 1 of the second and third auxiliary requests was reformulated as a process for preparing a polyolefin composition consisting of meltmixing 90 to 99 wt% of a heterophasic propylene copolymer base resin with 1 to 10 wt% of inorganic filler, based on the propylene copolymer at temperatures from 175°C to 250°C, and cooling and crystallizing the melt. The heterophasic propylene copolymer of that composition mentioned in claim 1 contains a matrix phase (a) and a disperse phase (b) defined by the same open formulation as that used in claim 1 of the first auxiliary request.

2.5 The situation is therefore the same as the one detailed for the first auxiliary request in point 2.3 above.

2.6 In addition, the process of claim 1 of the second and third auxiliary requests sets out that the amount of 1 to 10 wt% in inorganic filler meltmixed with 90-99 wt% of the heterophasic propylene copolymer is based on the propylene copolymer. Claim 1 as granted did not specify that the amount in inorganic filler was based on the propylene copolymer. On the contrary, claim 1 as granted implied that the amount in inorganic filler and that of the heterophasic propylene copolymer were both based on the polyolefin composition as a whole. As a result, the extent of the modifications performed in the second and third auxiliary requests appears to raise further issues of Article 123 EPC (paragraphs 2 and 3) and/or Article 84 EPC that were not part of the discussion before the opposition division and that have been raised for the first time in appeal proceedings.

2.7 Under such circumstances the Board finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion by not admitting the second and third auxiliary requests into the proceedings.

Fourth and fifth auxiliary requests

3. Admittance

3.1 The fourth and fifth auxiliary requests were filed by the appellant on 30 May 2017, just three days before the oral proceedings. Such late filed amendments are not admitted if they raise issues which the Board or the other party or parties cannot reasonably be expected to deal with without adjournment of the oral proceedings (Article 13(3) RPBA).

3.2 Claim 1 of the fourth and fifth auxiliary requests corresponds to the process for preparing a polyolefin composition of claim 1 of the second and third auxiliary requests respectively, further amended in that the heterophasic propylene copolymer, the matrix phase (a) and the disperse phase (b) are defined by a closed formulation and in that the matrix phase (a) consists of "a propylene homopolymer with up to 5 mol% of ethylene and/or at least one C4-C8 alpha-olefin". As to the definition of the matrix phase (a) now part of claim 1 of both requests, the limitation to a propylene homopolymer seems is not in line with the fact that the polymer can still contain substantial amounts of ethylene or C4-C8 alpha-olefin comonomers, thereby raising serious doubts as to whether claim 1 refers to a homopolymer or a copolymer, amounting to an issue of lack of clarity (Article 84 EPC). This issue, together with the issue relating to the basis for the calculation of the amount in inorganic filler relating to the second and third auxiliary requests mentioned above in point 2.6, implies that the fourth and fifth auxiliary requests contain amendments that add further complexity to the case at the latest possible stage of the proceedings.

3.3 Apart from the fact that the amendments present in claim 1 of the fourth and fifth auxiliary request constitute a very late attempt to address an issue, the allowability of the disclaimer, that was already known to the appellant since the decision of the opposition division in 2013, the large number of amendments raises numerous issues relating to Article 123(2) and (3) EPC as well as Article 84 EPC which the Board and the other party could not reasonably be expected to deal with without adjournment of the oral proceedings. The fourth and fifth auxiliary requests are therefore not admitted into the proceedings according to Article 13(3) RPBA.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision T 287/14 (pdf) has European Case Law Identifier:ECLI:EP:BA:2017:T028714.20170602. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Selection" by VinceHuang obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 1463/11 - Business man versus Skilled person

T 1811/13 - Can lack clarity imply lack of sufficiency?

T 1965/11 Materialised Views

T 1852/13 - Essentiality test vs. gold standard

T 540/13 - Impossible to establish whether facts or arguments were filed or not

T 260/14 - Partial priority for a working example of a generic claim feature

T 1818/12 - On evidence, sufficiency, and effect

Article 0

T 2333/11: What exactly does "divided into smaller objects" mean?

T 688/13 - Bonus effect or main effect to be achieved?

T 648/12 - New document introduced by Board

T 519/12 Technical standard similar to common general knowledge?

T 2456/12 & T 0059/13 - Interpretation by the skilled persion

T 1903/13 - Diverging auxiliary requests

No longer a European patent for plants or animals exclusively obtained by an essentially biological process

Further information

Article 0

T 0578/12: Dispensing restricted products

T 2092/13 - Misleading communication

T 1138/12 - Creative opposition issues

J 13/14 - On divisionals and translations...

T 1153/12 - Lack of sufficiency in a mathematical claim

T 287/14 - Disclaimers: donot try this at home!